Showing papers on "Rationality published in 1973"

Congressmen's voting decisions

Abstract: This classic study of voting decisions in the U.S. House of Representatives, based on extensive interviewing and observation, combines theory and substance, generalization and detailed description. With a new introduction, this influential and innovative book remains the best statement of the ways in which legislators reach decisions. The work contributes in critical ways to scholars' and students' understanding of such larger features of legislative process as representation of constituencies, the place of specialization in the making of public policy, the extent and types of legislative rationality, the importance of principles in decisions, and the place of legislatures in larger political systems.

Path independence, rationality, and social choice

Abstract: The paper provides several axiomatizations of the concept of "path independence" as applied to choice functions defined over finite sets. The axioms are discussed in terms of their relationship to "rationality" postulates and their meaning with respect to social choice models. IN ANSWER to critics of the first edition of Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow advanced in the second edition ajustification for imposing his "consistency" or "rationality" conditions which had not previously appeared, explicitly, in the social choice literature [2, p. 120]. He argued that the rationality conditions were necessary in order for social choices to be independent of the path of choice. He provided no real elaboration on the point. Perhaps he felt no explanation was necessary, since much of the social choice literature, especially those papers which deal with cycles, implicitly place a premium on some type of path-independence property. The purpose of this paper is to report some results which bear on the meaning and usefulness of this type of property. Specifically, it is shown that path independence is implied by, but does not imply rational choice. The importance of the observation is threefold. First, if path independence, rather than rationality, is desired as a property of social choice, the stronger rationality conditions need not be imposed. One result of this relaxation is that the immediate impossibility result discovered by Arrow is avoided. Welfare economists then are free to explore the possible applications of the tools he provided. Secondly, the observations made raise issues pertaining to the reasons for investigating mathematical properties like path independence in the first place. Thirdly, it is shown that the lines which separate rationality properties, which induce immediate impossibility results, from path-independence properties are very thinly drawn. We will proceed as follows. Immediately below, in Section 2, a survey of the interpretations of the symbols is given. A glossary is also added at the end. Section 3 provides a brief summary of the arguments which have been advanced in support of "rationality conditions" in the case of social choice. These are presented in order that they can be separated from those arguments which are

Reason and teaching

Abstract: 'Exhibits to the highest degree that commitment to rationality that Scheffler is so at pains to argue on behalf of. No viewpoint is misrepresented: there is meticulous concern to state the issues' - "Philosophical Books".

Fiduciary Rationality and Public Policy: The Theory of Agency and Some Consequences

Abstract: This paper introduces the theory of agency, identifies key concepts, relationships, and logics of agency. Norms of agency are identified and discussed, including the fiduciary norm. Problems of agency are identified and discussed. Applications of agency theory are made to regulation, the legislative representative, and diplomacy.This 1973 paper was the first to identify many of the central concepts and logics associated with the theory of agency and was the first to make applications to social institutions. This paper and Stephen Ross's 1973 paper were the first to explicitly propose agency theory, and this paper was also the first to develop the approach in an extended way. This paper is posted in order to make it generally available to scholars interested in the theory of agency.

Reason and commitment

Abstract: 1. Conceptual relativism 2. Wittgenstein and religious concepts 3. Commitment 4. Forms of life 5. The rationality of commitments 6. Relativism and disagreement 7. Rationality Bibliography Index.

The Concept of Rationality in the Work of Max Weber

Abstract: This paper attempts to clarify the concept of rationality in Max Weber's sociology of religion. Three new terms: rationalism, rationalization, and rationality, are used to distinguish the different meanings Weber gives to rationality. Efficient orientation of means to ends (rationalism) is distinguished from the systematization of ideas (rationalization). Rationality, finally, is the control of action by ideas. Rational social action is produced only by powerful irrational motives, and it holds a distinct place in Weber's sociology of ideas.

Rationality and Irrationality in Economics

Abstract: Despite Maurice Godelier's desire for philosophical significance, this collection of his essays stays for all practical purposes on the terrain of the social sciences, as conventionally defined, in particular of economics. The question which forms the theme connecting all these pieces—“What is the rationality of the economic systems that appear and disappear throughout history…, their hidden logic and the underlying necessity for them to exist, or to have existed?” (vii)—brings with it a second basic question, what Godelier calls that of the “rationality of economics,” i.e., the scientific status of economic theory. A theory capable of assessing relative rationalities must both encompass several economic systems and differentiate between them.

Magic and rationality again

Abstract: The previous paper has created some controversy, and has been labelled both absurd and obvious. We would not deny the charge of obviousness. For if the basic question here is how to understand beliefs that are prima facie irrational, then our suggestion — that first there had to be prior agreement on criteria of rationality of belief — was hardly startling. We by-passed detailed discussion of such criteria because this would take us into one of the most extensive debates in contemporary philosophy (for example, the entire vast literature on induction consists of attempts to state criteria for rational belief or rational choice between beliefs). Our heart would not have been in a summary of this literature because we thought it pointless. Unless beliefs are a sub-class of actions (which, we hinted in a footnote, they are), then it is not at all clear whether a belief can be rational or irrational, any more than whether it can be red or not red, lazy or energetic. To be more precise, it is quite generally agreed that the act of believing in a belief, or of holding on to a belief, may or may not be rational; not really the object of the act — the belief itself, the doctrine, the theory in question. While it makes sense to claim that Catholics, alchemists, phlogistonists, and Newtonians are rational or irrational, then, it is loose to claim Catholicism, alchemy, phologistonism and Newtonianism to be so.

Rationality and rhetoric in philosophy

Abstract: If philosophy is a rational enterprise, it is natural to see that rationality as a function of the arguments used by philosophers. Yet there have been few philosophical arguments, if any, the validity of which have not been challenged. This essay claims that the rationality of the philosophical enterprise resides precisely in the activity of exposing arguments as invalid. Such exposure is rhetorical since the attitude of the critic, the style of his message, and the nature of his audience are all involved.

Rationality and the Tu Quoque Argument

Abstract: The tu quoque argument is the argument that since in the end rationalism rests on an irrational choice of and commitment to rationality, rationalism is as irrational as any other commitment. Popper's and Polanyi's philosophies of science both accept the argument, and have on that account many similarities; yet Popper manages to remain a rationalist whereas Polanyi decided for an irrationalist version of rationalism. This is more marked in works of their respective followers, W. W. Bartley III and Thomas S. Kuhn. Bartley declares the rationalist's very openness to criticism open to criticism, in the hope of rendering Popper's critical rationalism quite comprehensive. Kuhn makes rationality depend on the existence of an accepted model for scientific research (paradigm), thus rendering Polanyi's view of the authority of scientific leadership a sine qua non for scientific progress. The question raised here is, in what sense is a rationalist committed to his rationality, or an irrationalist to his specific axi...

Rationality and Uncertainty at National Nominating Conventions

Abstract: Coalition theory has moved to increasingly more sophisticated models in order to account better for the alliances and deals contracted between political actors competing for scarce political prizes. Virtually all formal theories posit the idea of "rationa' actors who make decisions-either consciously or unconsciously -after shrewd and often complicated calculations about maximizing their rewards and satisfactions. Thus, William Riker has developed a theory about the "minimum winning coalition" which applies the mathematics of game theory to zero-sum conditions of

The Concept of Political Rationality

Abstract: The authors seek to develop the concept of (instrumental) rationality into a useful analytic tool in political science. Analogous to the economists' hypothetical rational man, the political man seeks to maximize his power. They note the idiosyncratic limitations of assuming that all purposive behavior is rational by definition, and turn to the action with the larger payoff as the more rational strategy, but this situational definition of rationality offers its own problems. They conclude that in most political situations it may be impossible to discover with certainty the best strategy, so settle for a less demanding definition of rational political choices, which includes recognition of the cost of choosing. The starkness of game theory analysis is relieved en route by perceptive comments on political institutions and choices.

Rationality between the maximizers and the satisficers

Abstract: It is argued that by explicating rationality in terms of benefits balancing or outweighing costs instead of in terms of maximizing or satisficing something, a more adequate view of rationality is obtained.

Ideological complexity and middle-american rationality

Abstract: This article investigates certain elements of causal belief systems and the reasons for respondent irrationality. Connections between a respondent's ideology and social action or sense of powerlessness are suggested and avenues of future investigationi revealed. Eugene Litwak is Professor of Sociology at Columbia University; Nancy Hooyman is Assistant Professor of Social Work at the University of Minnesota at Deluth; and Donald Warren is Senior Research Associate at the Center for Policy Research, New York City.

Exorcising the Beast: Attempts at Rationality in French Classicism

Abstract: IT WOULD BE no mere bad pun to call reason the bete noire of the "age of reason." In the clash between reason and bestial unreason which took place in the seventeenth century, the former did not necessarily emerge victorious. The development of the Cartesian beastmachine doctrine in this period marked an increasing inability to conquer through rationality and to keep the irrational beast in his place. The union of the mechanical or corporeal with the spiritual posed no insuperable problem for Descartes: his man was a machine with a soul,' readily distinguishable from other machines by the faculty of language.2 But it was precisely the union of the rational and the irrational in man, so clear and distinct to Descartes, that other writers of the time found difficult to comprehend.3 When comprehension was strained to the utmost, the beast-machine figuring man degenerated into a "monster," supreme symbol of unreason. And, in the gamut from "beast" to "monster," French classical literature presents us with certain recurring responses to the problem of rationality in man. The progressive solidification of absolute monarchy in seventeenth-century France was accompanied by the proliferation of all types of machines, real or imagined.4 It is thus not surprising that Descartes, Pascal, and their colleagues should have been fascinated by the many possibilities of mechanical devices. The rigid, mechanistic formalism of Descartes's animal automata, moreover, aside from its disputed theological advantage,5 possessed the immense philosophical advantage of imposing a coherent, rational organization upon a hitherto tenebrous realm: corporeal man, for whom the beast-machine served as a verifiable paradigm. There was an element of mystery in the sinuous relationship between man and beast woven by Montaigne in the "Apologie de Raimond Sebond":

God and Rationality: A Critique of the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance

Abstract: American theologians and philosophers of religion do not customarily identify Barthianism with theological rationality; hence the title of Professor Thomas F. Torrance's latest volume, God and Rationality,1 seems curiously provocative. This book is the third in a trilogy which includes Space, Time, and Incarnation2 and the better-known Theological Science,3 winner of the first Collins Award in Britain for the best work in theology, ethics, and sociology relevant to Christianity for 1967-69. Together these works present a fairly coherent, if occasionally repetitious, picture of a gifted and very creative theologian at work trying to develop the Barthian position in new and sometimes intriguing directions. It would of course be but noting: the obvious to say that Torrance is firmly convinced of the essential correctness of the Barthian analysis, but in his recent writings he does concede that Karl Barth did not go far enough in showing the conceptual connections between theological science and natural science, and that he also has not paid sufficient attention to Aquinas's recognition that if knowledge of God is to be actualized in us it requires a rational counterpart in our understanding firm enough to merit philosophical analysis and consideration on its own.4 The three works mentioned above deal in large measure with these two issues, and in this essay I shall attempt to evaluate Torrance's achievement. Whatever the outcome, I am convinced that he has raised some very fruitful questions for any contemporary theological method, and I am also encouraged by his willingness to engage in this kind of dialogue. Torrance possesses immense historical erudition and his recent works indicate that he is now developing a constructive position,5 making use of the latest developments in logic and philosophy of science, as well as offering thoughtful critiques of Kant, Schleiermacher, Bultmann, and Tillich which are well worth pondering regardless of one's attitude toward Barthianism.6

Professionalism and the erosion of rationality in the health care field

Abstract: This paper poses some fundamental, and therefore naive, questions about the purposes health care delivery systems should serve, and it analyzes the discrepant purposes our current systems do serve. After considering some general propositions from the sociology of organizations, and then some derived propositions bearing specifically on the roles of professionals today, it argues that professional dominance tends to produce results that are dysfunctional in terms of the purposes health care delivery systems should serve, and explores implications of these general dilemmas in the mental health field.

Agricultural policy: Banktruptcy of a ‘monodisciplinary’ economic approach

Abstract: A confrontation of the findings of agricultural economics with the actual accomplishments of agricultural policy and behaviour of farmers reveals the existence of a wide gap between economic theory and reality. One of the reasons for this is that a politician is not a homo oeconomicus but a homo politicus who reacts on the premises of various groups from whom he needs or seeks political support. This may divert him from the path of economic rationality shown by agricultural economists. Agriculture economics, on the other hand, has not succeeded in providing adequate explanations for the economic conduct of farmers, particularly with regard to the termination of farms and has tende to neglect the influence of collective actions directed to the protection of their economic position in the short run, preferably by means of the price policy. The author proposes an interdisciplinary approach, based on systems theory, directed to the analysis of the system of agricultural policy and its various sub-systems such as individual farms, farm organizations, etc.

Hegel On Consent and Social-Contract Theory: Does He "Cancel and Preserve" the Will?:

Abstract: N MANY ways it is difficult to think of two philosophers more different than Hegel and Rousseau: who can imagine Rousseau lecturing regularly and punctually perhaps on the destructive effects of the arts and sciences in a university? Who can imagine the still more inconceivable existence of Hegel's Confessions? And yet it is instructive to compare them, for in respect to one restricted but significant problem that of relating individuals to a social whole by means of their wills, in a way such that "will" means only rational and social will, and not arbitrariness or caprice or "natural" will they have a difficulty in common. Their dilemma, that is, is much the same insofar as both writers at once value the will, and fear it, as the source of freedom on the one hand, and of mere wilfulness on the other. (What Rousseau says about the barrenness and destructiveness of the egoistic will in the 1conomie Politiquel surely finds a complex echo in Hegel's Phenomenology.) Comparison of the two from other points of view would, of course, yield only negative relationships: Hegel was the chief defender of the rationality of the large modern states which Rousseau hated, and his "universal" civil-service comes close to the "government by clerks" that Rousseau detested equally.2 Still, it is worth noting that, however critical of Rousseau Hegel often was, he rarely failed to point out that Rousseau had been right in basing his theory of the state on the idea of will, that he had, however, not succeeded in finding a proper content for the will, or a proper means of arriving at such a content.3 The problem of the content of the will is always critical in Hegel, and there is throughout his political writings an unrelenting attack on the merely "abstract" or "one-sided" view of the will in its numerous forms: as mere independence or differentiation of the ego from the outside world," as Stoic indifference to everything but

Health planning rationality

Abstract: Health planning theory has failed to operationalize the concept of rationality into terms useful for theory building. The concept of rationality has also generally not been translated into a useful tool for the health planning practitioner. In order to decrease the mystique associated with rationality and to aid in refinement of the concept, four attributes of health planning rationality are proposed: (1) Health planning rationality is “bounded” due to the magnitude of problems and man's limited problem-solving abilities; (2) Health planning rationality has multiple dimensions (technical, social, legal, political and economic); (3) The multiple dimensions of health planning rationality interact as complements and substitutes; and (4) Health planning rationality may be conceived of as the exposure of problems to cognitive processes.