Showing papers on "Rationality published in 1977"

Essays in Social Theory

Abstract: These essays draw together the author's thoughts on a diverse range of sociological issues. Dominant themes are: the distinction between normative and empirical theorizing and the relationship between them; the bearing of theory on evidence; and the alleged relativity of standards of rationality.

Urban Planning in Theory and Practice: A Reappraisal

Abstract: In this paper an attempt is made to discover the sociohistorical meaning, rationality, and limits of urban planning. The paper falls into five major sections. First, some rudimentary criteria are suggested as a basis for identifying the principal tasks of a theory of planning. Second, an attempt is made to situate contemporary urbanization processes within the capitalist mode of production. Third, planning itself is then situated within and derived out of the historical dynamic of capitalist urbanization. Fourth, conventional urban planning theory is criticized. Fifth, some questions of urban policy and political practice are discussed.

The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument *

Abstract: The probability that an individual's voting in a presidential election will determine the outcome being negligible, it is argued that participation is irrational if predicated on principles that are either egocentric or act-prospective. Voter participation, if rational, must rely on some over-arching principle that is (a) Sociotropic, (b) Axionomic, (c) Collective-distributive, and (d) Neutrofactual. A distinctively ethical component must be involved, such that all purely “economic,” “cost-benefit” models postulating selfish voter rationality are incoherent. The notion of “helping” to elect one's candidate is criticized and rejected unless formulated in a special way. An important pragmatic consequence of the analysis is that the idea (relied on by the two major parties) of “wasting one's vote” on a third party candidate is shown to be invalid or of more limited application than generally assumed. If a sizeable minority (e.g., college students) were educated to reject that argument, politics might be profoundly affected.

The “New Home Economics:” Retrospects and Prospects

Abstract: Problems with models used to investigate the economics of the household are described. Special emphasis is given to the issue of rationality in the allocation of time, the appropriateness of the family as the relevant unit, and the importance of life-cycle changes. Contributions economists can make using the “new home economics” to provide a basis for rational decision making are discussed.

Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior

Abstract: It will be argued that economic theory, decision theory and some recent work in game theory, make important contributions to a deeper understanding of the concept of rational behavior. The paper starts with a discussion of the common-sense notion of rational behavior. Then, the rationality concepts of classical economics and of Bayesian decision theory are described. Finally, some (mostly fairly recent) advances in game theory are briefly discussed, such as probabilistic models for games with incomplete information; the role of equilibrium points in non-cooperative games, and the standard game-theoretical approach to the prisoner’s dilemma problem; the concept of perfect equilibrium points; the use of non-cooperative bargaining models in analyzing cooperative games; and the Harsanyi-Selten solution concept for non-cooperative games.

Sidgwick's ethics and Victorian moral philosophy

Abstract: Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics challenges comparison, as no other work in moral philosophy, with Aristotle's Ethics in the depth of its understanding of practical rationality, and in its architectural coherence it rivals the work of Kant. In this historical, rather than critical study, Professor Schneewind shows how Sidgwick's arguments and conclusions represent rational developments of the work of Sidgwick's predecessors, and brings out the nature and structure of the reasoning underlying his position.

Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem

Abstract: The axiom of Pareto optimally in Nash's definition of a solution to the bargaining problem may be replaced by an axiom of individual rationality, without altering the result.

Agenda Influence and its Implications

Abstract: When choosing from many competing alternatives, groups often narrow the range of choice and then select from the remaining alternatives using a predetermined procedure or agenda. In some groups, this process may involve the use of committee reports and parliamentary procedure. In others, choices may be narrowed by common consent, by the chairman, or by some other means and "voting" may proceed in a predetermined, non-parliamentary fashion. Recent developments in the theory of group choice (embodied in a literature that has come to be known as the "social choice" literature) suggest that there probably is no single nondictatorial method of aggregating the preferences of an electorate that will reliably produce a choice which satisfies minimal consistency and rationality standards.

On the Role of Complete, Transitive Preferences in Equilibrium Theory

Abstract: Most of modern economic equilibrium analysis has as one of its components the “rational consumer”. The rational consumer is assumed to have an ordering on all possible states of the world so that given two such states he will either be able to select the one he prefers or else express indifference between them. Further his preferences are supposed to display consistency by being transitive. Judged by these standards it seems that few real people would pass the rationality test, for it is easy to think of situations in which people deliberately avoid making decisions, say, on a future course of action because they have no clearly felt preference (e.g. to go on a picnic next Sunday, or stay home and watch a televised football game).

Class conflict and the industrial relations crisis

Abstract: The central purpose of the thesis is to interpret in the context of theories of class structure certain developments in the industrial relations policies of British governments between 1956 and 1971. Although British sociology has long been pre-occupied with class, and although the relevance of industrial relations to the historical development of class relations is generally recognised, it is only in very recent years that a few authors have attempted class analyses of recent policy changes. The present study is probably the first to attempt a detailed analysis of the policies in this context, though the period has been one of institutional innovation rivalling the immediate postwar years. In tackling this task the thesis brings together three usually separate literatures: that on class and stratification, that on industrial relations and that on political processes. The first two of these are dealt with at length, the last less so (and perhaps, on reflection, inadequately). Nearly all the themes discussed will be found elsewhere in the literature, but originality is claimed for (i) the particular combination of themes achieved, and the relations made between them and (ii) the detailed relation of these themes to the particular body of empirical material studied. For example, the central contention examined - that recent policy developments constitute the rise of the corporate state - has very recently found its way into general discussion, but the present thesis tries to define corporatism systematically, demonstrate its place within a theory of class relations, and assess precisely the corporatist content of policies. Methodologically the thesis is unadventurous and conventional and makes no use of sophisticated techniques. Further, the great bulk of empirical material studied consists of published documents. However, it is considered that it goes beyond many conventional treatments in the extent to which its analysis of empirical material relates closely to the theoretical framework which is established. Further, although the data used are not original in the sense of having never before been exposed to public gaze, their use is original in the sense that they are studied in terms and for purposes very different from those intended by their authors. In summary, the contributions claimed for the thesis are as follows: (1) starting from a Marxian/Weberian perspective it directs attention to a central aspect of class which has been neglected in sociology's pre-occupation with problems of the identification of and subjective attitudes of classes, viz the particular combination of economic, political and ideological constraints that provide the structure of different forme of class relations; (2) it relates issues of class to recent industrial relations strategies more systematically than is usually the case in recent debates; (3) in particular, it establishes the outlines of two contrasting strategies called the Compromise and corporatism; (4) it makes use of these and other concepts to provide a sociological analysis of incomes policies and industrial relations law reform measures; (5) in less precise detail, it provides an histoire raisonee of political developments in the period concerned, interpreting them in the terms established earlier; (6) it makes an empirical study of, and relates together, certain other themes of recent literature, such as managerialism, administrative rationality as ideology, the changing role of the state and the problems this creates for existing political, ideologies.

The Rationality of the Emotions

Abstract: IRA BREVIS furor, said the Latins: anger is a brief bout of madness. There is a long tradition that views all emotions as threats to rationality. The crime passionnel belongs to that tradition: in law it is a kind of \"brief-insanity defence.\" We still say that \"passion blinds us;\" and in common parlance to be philosophical about life's trials is to be decently unemotional about them. Indeed many philosophers have espoused this view, demanding that Reason conquer Passion. Others from Hume to the Emotivists have appeared to reverse this hierarchy (\"reason is and ought to be nothing but the slave of the passions).\" But those philosophers who refuse to join in the general denigration of emotion as irrational usually share the presupposition that the role of rationality is limited to the calculation of means. In so far as emotions (often confused with desires) are concerned with the determination of ends, they remain, on this view, beyond the pale of rationality. Modern decision theorists have worked out schemes to assess the rationality of desires, as well as actions, against the background of beliefs and other desires. But these schemes leave no room at all for emotions, except, by implication, as disrupters of the rational process.

Power and Policy Making

Abstract: POLICY MAKING IN BRITISH GOVERNMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF POWER AND RATIONALITY BY Brian Smith. COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHOICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA by Arnold Heidenheimer

Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: A Rejoinder to Professor Sen

Abstract: I shall comment only on Section 2 of Amartya Sen’s contribution, where he discusses a recent paper of mine (Harsanyi, 1975). In this paper, I argued for the utilitarianview that our social welfare function ought to be defined as a linearcombination-and, indeed, as the arithmetic mean—of the different individuals’ von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions. One basis of my arguments was the following mathematical theorem (proved in Harsanyi, 1955). If (a) the individual members of society follow the Bayesian rationality axioms in their behavior; and if (b) our moral choices between alternative social policies likewise follow these rationality axioms; and if (c) we are always morally indifferent between two social policies when we know that all individuals in our society would be indifferent between the effects of these two policies; thenour social welfare function will be, as a matter of mathematical necessity, a linearcombination of all individuals’ vNM utility functions. In the same paper, I also criticized Sen’s views favoring nonlinearsocial welfare functions.

Postmodernity and Hermeneutics

Abstract: "These are apocalyptic times, Doctor," says Strelnikov in Doctor Zhivago, and the same might be said today. Andrew Hacker has said that we stand at "the end of the American era,"1 but the more sobering thought is that we stand at the end of the modern era, an era stretching back not just two hundred but five hundred years. The "storming of the mind" to which Robert Hunter refers2 is the storming of the modern mind: not the mind of modernism, the modern mind. Something like a general effort to break out of the limits of "modern" thinking is becoming evident today on many fronts. There is the practical gesture of deserting urban life to join an alternative community. In fact "alternatives" are springing up around us: alternative education, alternative agriculture, alternative medicine, alternative nutrition. In the academy, the revolt against positivism is gaining ground in psychology, sociology, political science, philosophy, and other disciplines. In literature there is the rejection of tradition, of coherence and rationality, of nameability. (Beckett: "In the silence, you don't know, you must go on, I can't go on, you must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on" The

Rationality and morality: A reply

Abstract: In his contribution, 'Rationality and Morality', (this issue, pp. 197-223), Professor Kurt Baier has provided a detailed and interesting critique of the treatment of the Prisoners' Dilemma and related games in my paper for the 1972 Bristol Conference on Practical Reason.1 The purpose of this note is to respond to Professor Baier's criticisms and to take this opportunity to make a few general remarks on the issues involved.2

Frank h. knight on uncertainty and rational action

Abstract: The writings of Frank H. Knight (1885-1972) present peculiar difficulties to critics and interpreters. He was not only one of America's leading economists, he wrote extensively about social and political philosophy, ethics and social science methodology. Yet in spite of the broad range of his interests there is an underlying unity to his thought. It is not easy to understand and appreciate one aspect of his teaching, such as his economic analysis, without relating it to other aspects. In this essay, we shall look at Knight's conception of economic rationality and his treatment of uncertainty and error against the background of his views about the nature of economic science and its appropriate method. Knight is a great teacher because of his ability to provoke hard thinking about the most basic principles of economic analysis.

Moral Autonomy and the Rationality of Science

Abstract: The few extant arguments concerning the autonomy of science in the rational acceptance of hypotheses are examined. It is concluded that science is not morally autonomous, and that the attendant notion of rationality in science decisionmaking is inadequate. A more comprehensive notion of scientific rationality, which encompasses the old one, is proposed as a replacement. The general idea is that scientists qua scientist ought, in their acceptance decisions, to take into account the ethical consequences of acceptance as well as the consequences with regard to the attainment of "purely scientific" or "epistemic" objectives. The result constitutes an argument for a (presumably cooperative) game theoretic treatment of inductive logic.

Validity and Rationality: The Rhetorical Constituents of Argumentative Form.

Abstract: This essay reconsiders validity as the “soundness” of a rhetorical argument. Characteristics of rhetorical argument which contribute to this reconsideration are examined: the complicity of an audie...

Rationality and Bureaucracy: Maoist Contributions to a Marxist Theory of Bureaucracy*

Abstract: The assessments of the role of bureaucracy in socialism offered by Weber and Lenin are seriously weakened by their reliance on an inadequately developed category of rationality. A genuinely Marxist...

Towards a Unified Decision Theory: A Non-Bayesian Approach

Abstract: In his ‘Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior’ John Harsanyi (1977) raises, and answers, some very interesting problems. The one with which I will be mainly concerned is the problem of unifyingdecision theory. (He prefers the term ‘utility theory’ for a general theory that covers rational decision making under conditions of certainty, risk, and uncertainty.) Before turning to that I will make one quick suggestion concerning another problem that he raises: how can the normativeidea of rationality play a central role in a positivescience such as economics?

Rationality and Problem-Solving

Abstract: The problem which this paper attempts to solve is this: if rationality is given a rational defence, it is question-begging, and if it is not defended rationally, it is arbitrary. So that holding a belief or performing an action on rational grounds seems to be in the same epistemological position as are beliefs and actions ‘justified’ on the basis of faith, intuition, authority, taste or revelation.

Incommensurability and the rationality of the development of science

Abstract: The Thesis of Incommensurability (henceforth referred to as 77) says that two theories separated by a revolution may be altogether incommensurable. Acceptance of 77 seems to undermine the possibility of representing revolutionary advances in science in a rational way. According to 77, such \"advances\" proceed in a disconnected way, so that it is not possible to find logical connections between the old theory and the new theory that replaced it. The aim of this note is to present two criticisms of 77. My first criticism will be that if 77 were true it would apply not only to revolutionary periods but to all phases of theoretical change in science. Most defenders of 77 would allow that, during periods of non-revolutionary or \"normal\" science, an improved theory 7\" is comparable with the earlier theory T from which it was developed; so that rational appraisal is possible in these cases. I agree. But I claim that 7\" and T will be \"incommensurable\" in these cases no less than in cases of revolutionary change: thus \"incommensurability\" either excludes rational comparison and appraisal in non-revolutionary cases, or allows rational comparison and appraisal in revolutionary cases. This criticism is based on a historical claim: both in revolutionary and nonrevolutionary cases, at least in physics and chemistry, a typical pattern occurs again and again, namely, the theory 7\" that is subsequently accepted is in the relation of correspondence with its predecessor T. My second criticism also arises from this historical fact. It is this. The relation of correspondence does indeed involve meaning variance without involving incommensurability, at least in the sense of 77: for T and 7\" will be rationally comparable if they are in the relation of correspondence. Allowing that 77 is correct concerning meaning variance, I will propose a \"desemanticised\" explication of the relation of correspondence. This will enable us to say that the theories T and 7\", considered as formal sentences, are in a relation of correspondence even though they become \"incommensurable\" when semantical interpretations are put upon their extra-logical vocabularies (one in the language of T and the other in the language of 7\").