Showing papers on "Rationality published in 1982"

Models of bounded rationality

Abstract: Part 1 The structure of complex systems: Causal ordering - causality in economic models causal ordering, comparative statics, and near decomposability, ( with Y Iwasaki) causality and model abstraction, (with Y Iwasaki) simulating large systems - simulation of large-scale systems by aggregation prediction and prescription in systems modelling Part 2 The advance of information technology: the rural-urban population balance again the impact of electronic communications on organizations the steam engine and the computer - what makes technology revolutionary managing in an information-rich world on the alienation of workers and management Part 3 Motivation and the theory of the firm: a mechanism for social selection and successful altruism organizations and markets altruism and economics - a summary statement altruism and economics - social implications Part 4 Behaviourial economics and bounded rationality: behaviourial economics - preface to "Handbook of behaviourial economics" behaviourial economics bounded rationality satisfying empirical methods in economics - behaviourial research - theory and public policy methodological foundations of economics preface to "La theorie moderne de l'enterprise - l'approche institutionelle initial and boundary conditions in economic theory - on the behaviourial and rational foundations of economic dynamics rationality in psychology and economics the state of economic science - the failure of armchair economics why economists disagree the state of economic science economic reasoning in words and pictures - effect of mode of data presentation on reasoning about economic markets (with HJM Tabachneck)

Choice, Welfare and Measurement

Abstract: In the course of his distinguished career, Amartya K. Sen has scrutinized the foundations of economic theory and analysis. He has brought into sharper focus such concepts as choice, preference, rationality, aggregation, evaluation, and measurement, and applied these concepts to the economic issues underlying universal social concerns, among them inequality, unemployment, poverty, human welfare, liberty, rights, justice. The twenty essays in this book encompass both these aspects of Sen's economic endeavors.Kenneth Arrow has written that "Sen's mastery in the fields of social choice, the foundations of welfare economics, and, more broadly, distributive ethics and the measurement problems associated with these fields is unquestioned. The selection of articles fully reflects his work in this area ... a number of the papers are already classics."The author has provided a substantial introduction to the book that interrelates his diverse concerns and analyzes the wide-ranging discussions that were generated by the original papers, while stressing the central concepts and underlying issues.His writings are distributed among five topical sections: Choice and Preference, Preference Aggregation, Welfare Comparisons and Social Choice, Non-utility Information, and Social Measurement. The contributions have been collected from many journals in the fields of economics and public affairs and from books that were published between 1966 and 1980.Amartya K. Sen is Drummond Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, and Fellow of All Souls College.

Rationality and Relativism

Abstract: Are there absolute truths that can be gradually approached over time through rational processes? Or are all modes and systems of thought equally valid if viewed from within their own internally consistent frames of reference? Are there universal forms of reasoning and understanding that enable us to distinguish between rational beliefs and those that are demonstrably false, or is everything relative? These central questions are addressed and debated by the distinguished contributors to this lively book. Some of them -- Hollis, Lukes, Robin Horton, and Ernest Gellner -- discuss new directions in their thinking since their earlier articles appeared in 1970 in the seminal volume Rationality (edited by Bryan Wilson). They are now joined in the debate by Ian Hacking, W. Newton-Smith, Charles Taylor, Jon Elster, Dan Sperber, and, in the jointly authored lead article, by Barry Barnes and David Bloor. Emerging from the debate are a variety of supportable interpretations and conclusions rather than a single, distinct "truth." The contributors represent the complete spectrum of positions between a relativism that challenges the very concept of a single world and the idea that there are ascertainable, objective universals.

The irrationality of action and action rationality: decisions, ideologies and organizational actions

Abstract: The Irrationality of Action and Action Rationality : Decisions, Ideologies and Organizational Actions

Risk perception in psychology and economics

Abstract: : The concept of rationality has been basic to most economic analysis. Its content has been successively refined over the generations. As applied to the static world of certainty, it has turned out to be a weak hypothesis, not easily refuted and therefore not very useful as an explanation, though not literally a tautology. But recent decades have seen the development of stronger versions applied to a world in which time and uncertainty are real. Among its most important manifestations have been criteria for consistency in allocation over time, the expected-utility hypothesis of behavior under uncertainty, and what may be termed the Bayesian hypothesis for learning, that is the consistent use of conditional probabilities for changing beliefs on the basis of new information. These hypotheses have been used widely in offering explanations of empirically-observed behavior, though as not infrequently in economics, the theoretical development has gone much further than the empirical implementation. These hypotheses have also been used increasingly in normative analysis, as a component of benefit-cost studies (therefore frequently referred to as benefit-risk studies). The value of reducing mortality rates from diseases, for example, has been studied by assuming that choice of occupations is made inter alia by comparing wage differences with mortality differences.

Selfishness, altruism, and rationality

Abstract: Why do we volunteer time? Why do we contribute money? Why, even, do we vote, if the effect of a single vote is negligible? Rationality-based microeconomic models are hard-pressed to explain such social behavior, but Howard Margolis proposes a solution. He suggests that within each person there are two selves, one selfish and the other group-oriented, and that the individual follows a Darwinian rule for allocating resources between those two selves. "Howard Margolis's intriguing ideas . . . provide an alternative to the crude models of rational choice that have dominated economics and political science for too long."—Times Literary Supplement

Economic Self-Interest and Political Behavior

Abstract: The nature of the relationship between personal economic well-being and political behavior has been an object of much theory and research in the social sciences. A growing number of studies of survey data have concluded, however, that there is little or no relationship in the U.S. between financial well-being and political attitudes and behavior. This paper offers an explanation for these findings based on the way people perceive the nature of their financial well-being. The analysis shows that belief in economic individualism leads people to accept personal responsibility for their economic conditions, which in turn eliminates any connection between personal well-being and political evaluation. I discuss the role of political culture and belief in the assessment of "self-interest" and "rationality" in political behavior in light of these findings.

Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games

Abstract: This paper explores some of the consequences of adopting a modern subjective view of probability for game theory. The consequences are substantial. The subjective view of probability clarifies the important distinction between normative and positive theorizing about behavior in games, a distinction that is often lost in the search for "solution concepts" which largely characterizes game theory since the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Many of the distinctions that appear important in conventional game theory two-person versus n-person, zero-sum versus variable sum appear unimportant in the subjective formulation. Other distinctions, such as single play versus repetitive-play games, appear to be more important in the subjective formulation than in the conventional formulation.

Rationality and Relativism: Habermas’s ‘Overcoming’ of Hermeneutics

Abstract: The debate between Habermas and Gadamer which took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s came to a provisional close on Habermas’s side with a series of promissory notes.1 While he agreed with Gadamer on the necessity for a sinnverstehenden access to social reality, he insisted nevertheless that the interpretation of meaningful phenomena need not, indeed could not, be restricted to the type of dialogic understanding characteristic of the hermeneutic approach. He held out instead the possibility of a theoretically grounded analysis of symbolically structured objects and events which, by drawing on systematically generalised empirical knowledge, would reduce the context-dependency of understanding and leave room for both quasi-causal explanation and critique. The types of theoretical-empirical knowledge in question, he suggested, included (i) a general theory of communication which would reconstruct the ‘universal-pragmatic infrastructure’ of speech and action; (ii) a general theory of socialisation in the form of a theory of the acquisition of communicative competence; (iii) a theory of social systems which would make it possible to grasp objective meaning connections going beyond what is subjectively intended or expressly articulated in cultural traditions; and (iv) a theory of social evolution which would make possible a theoretical reconstruction of the historical situations of the interpreter (or critic) and his or her object.

Classwide Rationality in the Politics of Managers and Directors of Large Corporations in the United States and Great Britain

Abstract: The support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged (SOC77-06658). The assistance of numerous individuals was invaluable to the completion of this study, especially that of Philip Antweiler, Gladys Delp, Russell Epker, Arthur Francis, Carmenza Gallo, John Hoops, Jerome Karabel, Carol Keller, Arlene McCormack, Francine Miller, S. M. Miller, Susan Sorensen, David Swartz, Linda Tren holm, and Dorothy Wedderburn. The institutional assistance of Imperial College of Science and Technology, London, and University of California, Santa Cruz, is greatly appreciated. Opposed theories of relations between business and government in advanced capitalist democracies are predicated on contrary assumptions concerning the capacity of the managers and directors of large corporations to act upon their political interests. An assumption of corporate rationality presumes that the corporate elite is largely incapable of identifying and promoting its common political objectives; an assumption of classwide rationality presu mes that such a capacity is present. This article examines these and related assumptions about the internal social organization of the corporate elite in the United States and Great Britain. Inclusive and diffusely structured networks of economic and social relations among the largest corporations are found in both countriesto provide a foundation fora special segment of the elite whose political interests transcend individual firms and whose internal cohesion facilitates expression of those interests in the political process. This politically dominant segment enters into contact with government in ways that favor promotion of classwide policies and disfavor more parochial outlooks. Challenge to the position of large business, whether from the labor movement in Great Britain orthe national government in the United States, is shown to have further consolidated the political capacities of this segment. Though corporate rationality still characterizes much of the internal organization of the corporate community, classwide rationality now characterizes its highest circles.

Heidegger on being a person

Abstract: This paper presents a non-standard and rather free-wheeling interpretation of Being and Time, with emphasis on the first division.' I make Heidegger out to be less like Husserl and/or Sartre than is usual, and more like Dewey and (to a lesser extent) Sellars and the later Wittgenstein. My central point will be Heidegger's radical divergence from the Cartesian-Kantian tradition regarding the fundamental question: What is a person? According to Aristotle, man is a logical or "word-using" animal, a political or "community-participating" animal, and a featherless biped. In a sense easier to appreciate than to explain, the last is only incidental, while the first two are important; but those two are not our only important differentia. People (and probably only people) make and use tools, play games, judge themselves and others critically, and develop cultural traditions. It may seem that apes and social insects share some of these characteristics, at least primitively; yet people are clearly quite distinctive. A satisfactory account of what it is to be a person would expose the roots of this distinction, thereby showing why certain differentia are important, and others only incidental. For instance, Christian and modern philosophers interpreted Aristotle's "logical" as "rational," and proposed this rationality as our fundamental distinction. Thus Descartes held that people can talk because they can ratiocinate; and he could well have said the same for making and using tools. Similarly, Hobbes tried both to explain and to justify our living in a commonwealth by showing that it is rational. I see Heidegger, on the other hand, as starting from Aristotle's second definition-trying, in effect, to ground all other important differentia on our basic communal nature. But how can we conceive animals that are "political" in the relevant sense, without presupposing that they are rational or word-using? My reconstruction of Heidegger's answer to this question is the foundation of my interpretation. Imagine a community of versatile and interactive creatures, not otherwise specified except that they are conformists.

Risk and rationality

Abstract: Acceptable Risk. By Baruch Fischhoff et al. Pp.185. ISBN 0-521-24164-2. (Cambridge University Press: 1982.) £15, $19.95. Risk/Benefit Analysis. By Richard Wilson and Edmund Crouch. Pp.218. ISBN US 0-88410-667-5; ISBN UK 0-66-60514-8. (Ballinger/Harper & Row: 1982.) $23.75, £16.95.

The Construal of Reality: Criticism in Modern and Postmodern Science

Abstract: I shall attempt to demonstrate here that the general categories of hermeneutics can be applied just as well to the natural sciences as to the humanities, and I shall explore the implications of this demonstration for both types of disciplines. In doing so, it will be necessary for me to raise some unfashionable issues about the objectivity and rationality of critical interpretations, and, as a result, I may appear to be cast in the role of advocatus diaboli. The value of lowering the critical barriers that have been set up between the human and natural sciences, however, will outweigh any incidental paradoxes that may crop up en route.

Comment-Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Comments on Kadane and Larkey's Paper

Abstract: The normative solution concepts of game theory try to provide a clear mathematical characterization of what it means to act rationally in a game where all players expect each other to act rationally. Kadane and Larkey reject the use of these normative solution concepts. Yet, this amounts to throwing away an important piece of information to the effect that the players are rational and expect each other to be rational. Even in situations where the players do not expect each other to act with complete rationality, normative game theory can help them heuristically to formulate reasonable expectations about the other players' behavior.

State and Class Under Peripheral Capitalism

Abstract: Given the central role that is accorded to the state and public policy in “modernization” theory, it is rather striking to see how little thought is given to an examination of the nature of the state itself, its location within the matrix of a class-divided society, and its relationship with contending social forces. The state is, rather, thought of as an entity that stands outside and above society, an autonomous agency that is invested (potentially) with an independent source of rationality (enriched by “technical assistance” from metropolitan countries), and the capability to initiate and pursue programs of development for the benefit of the whole of society. There is an implicit disjunction between the state and society, slurring over questions about the social foundations of political power and the making of public policy. The problematic of the state is then narrowed down to that of the efficacy of its public institutions and organs to achieve objectives and programs of “modernization,” focusing especially on the respective roles of “ruling elites,” political parties, the bureaucracy, and the military.

On the Status of the Nash Type of Noncooperative Equilibrium in Economic Theory

Abstract: In economic theory the Nash type of noncooperative equilibrium is a widely used equilibrium concept Nevertheless, the concept is frequently misunderstood, and misleading explanations and interpretations are often given This paper presents a sample of such frequently appearing misleading explanations, and goes on to explain why they are misleading The case for using the Nash noncooperative equilibrium concept is stronger than what is implied by the many misleading statements found in the literature A basic issue is whether it can be argued that decisions in accordance with the noncooperative equilibrium theory are individually rational decisions This issue is not covered by the classical rationality postulate in economic theory This problem is tackled by stating certain postulates which may be taken as defining individual rationality in situations of noncooperative interaction; it is shown that Nash behavior satisfies these postulates

Rational Man and Irrational Society?: An Introduction and Sourcebook

Abstract: The Prisoner's Dilemma and Kenneth Arrow's General Possibility Theorem, are two of the most simple, yet far-reaching concepts in social science. The first captures in an easily understood paradox how individually rational acts that benefit individual people can combine to produce a result that is of less benefit to everyone. The Arrow Theorem shows that there is no formula for ranking the preferences of many people into a rational aggregate. This book is a collection of the best work done on these two ideas. It is an ideal introduction for students or sourcebook for professionals. '...it presents the traditional works addressing the problems of rationality in social and political theory...the anthology represents a much needed collection of essays on the important theme of rationality in society.' -- Queen's Quarterly, Vol 91 No 2, 1985

Aided and unaided decision making: Improving intuitive judgement

Abstract: Intuitive judgement forms the basis of decision making both by experts, in professional settings, and by people in everyday life. Psychologists have studied the rationality of intuitive judgements. In this paper three approaches to decision making will be discussed: unqualified rationalism, qualified rationalism and irrationalism. The first approach holds that man is essentially rational, the second that serious cognitive biases exist, and the third that thinking is strongly influenced by non-cognitive sources of distortion, i.e. emotions and motives. Evidence on judgement is reviewed and found to support the last two approaches. Various ways of improving judgements, as suggested by the three basic viewpoints, are then presented.

Defendant attributes in plea bargaining: notes on the modeling of sentencing decisions*

Abstract: Previous research on how defendant attributes affect sentencing decisions has relied mainly on “variable analysis.” This paper argues that such research improperly models the decision process. In plea bargaining, defendant descriptions are selected from an array of possible attributes. They are related to other descriptions and “facts” of a case, in a contextual manner, to justify a defense or prosecution position regarding sentence. To properly model the relation of defendant attributes to case dispositions, a gestalt framework is required. This would allow the investigation of commonsense reasoning practices and typifications involved in decisionmaking. The question of whether all defendants receive “equal treatment before the law” is related to what kinds of typifications are employed by lawyers and judges. Where “variable analysis” uses a standard of formal rationality to measure how well the courts administer justice, the standard displayed in plea bargaining is substantive rationality.

Relationships between Rational beliefs and anxiety

Abstract: The relationships between rationality, as measured by the recently developed Rational Behavior Inventory (RBI), and several commonly used measures of anxiety are examined in both a general student sample (N =144) and a clinically tested anxious sample (N =34). Although differing aspects of rationality were related to anxiety for the two groups, consistent negative correlations were found between specific irrational beliefs and measures of test, state, and trait anxiety. The observed relationships of decreased rationality associated with increased levels of anxiety lend support to the theoretical basis of cognitive restructuring forms of therapy, and to the concurrent validity of the RBI.

Personal identity and rationality

Abstract: There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. I shall briefly describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This conception I shall call \"Classical Prudence.\" I shall argue that, on what I believe to be the true view about personal identity, Classical Prudence is indefensible.

Risk and Consent: Philosophical Issues for Centralized Decisions

Abstract: Centralized decisions that impose risks demand a justification. The most promising way to justify these decisions is in terms of consent of those people who will be affected by them. Attempts to determine how safe is safe enough in terms of justice, rights, or efficiency are unlikely to get us very far. The problem with consent, however, is that actual consent is impossible to obtain for decisions that affect large numbers of persons. For this reason, we need to explore other kinds of consent and the idea of what a reasonable person would agree to. Three models of consent are described, each one more powerful (but more controversial) in terms of its potential for justifying centralized decisions.

Testing the Rationality of Inflation Expectations Derived from Survey Data: A Structure-Based Approach

Abstract: Following the inspiration of Muth [21], expectations are said to be "rational" if the (subjective) probability distribution of expected outcomes coincides with the (objective) probability distribution of actual outcomes.' In practical applications, however, it is common to employ the so-called "weak-form" version of this hypothesis, which defines rationality as equality between the expected outcome and the objective mathematical expectation conditional on all data available at the time the expectation is formed. Thus, expectations of inflation are said to be (weakly) rational in Muth's sense if

Rationality and Disconfirmation: Further Evidence

Abstract: Recent laboratory research on the psychology of problem solving has important implications for an understanding of the psychology of science. Such work is reviewed, and supports the claim made by H...