Showing papers on "Rationality published in 1984"

Agendas, alternatives, and public policies

Abstract: 1. How Does an Idea's Time Come? 2. Participants on the Inside of Government 3. Outside of Government, But Not Just Looking In 4. Processes: Origins, Rationality, Incrementalism, and Garbage Cans 5. Problems 6. The Policy Primeval Soup 7. The Political Stream 8. The Policy Window, and Joining the Streams 9. Wrapping Things Up 10. Some Further Reflections: New Case Studies Thoughts About the Modeling Appendix on Methods: The Interviews Coding Case Studies Noninterview Measures of Agenda Status.

Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education

Abstract: Ethics has been discussed largely in the language of the father, Nel Noddings believes: in principles and propositions, in terms such as justification, fairness, and equity. The mother's voice has been silent. The view of ethics Noddings offers in this book is a feminine view. "This does not imply," she writes, "that all women will accept it or that most men will reject it; indeed there is no reason why men should not embrace it. It is feminine in the deep classical sense - rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness. It does not imply either that logic is to be discarded or that logic is alien to women. It represents an alternative to present views, one that begins with the moral attitude or longing for goodness and not with moral reasoning."What is at the basis of moral action? An altruism acquired by the application of rule and principle? Or, as Noddings asserts, caring and the memory of being cared for? With numerous examples to supplement her rich theoretical discussion, Noddings builds a compelling philosophical argument for an ethics based on natural caring, as in the care of a mother for her child. The ethical behaviour that grows out of natural caring has at its core as care-filled receptivity to those involved in any moral situation, and leaves behind the rigidity of rule and principle to focus on what is particular and unique in human relations."The hand that steadied us as we learned to ride our first bicycle did not provide propositional knowledge, but it guided and supported us all the same, and we finished up 'knowing how.'" Noddings' discussion is far-ranging, as she considers whether organizations, which operate at a remove from the caring relationship, can truly be called ethical. She discusses the extent to which we may truly care for plants, animals, or ideas. Finally, she proposes a realignment of education to encourage and reward not just rationality and trained intelligence, but also enhanced sensitivity in moral matters.

Reasons and Persons

Abstract: This book challenges, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity. The author claims that we have a false view of our own nature; that it is often rational to act against our own best interests; that most of us have moral views that are directly self-defeating; and that, when we consider future generations the conclusions will often be disturbing. He concludes that non-religious moral philosophy is a young subject, with a promising but unpredictable future.

Narration as a human communication paradigm: The case of public moral argument

Abstract: This essay proposes a theory of human communication based on a conception of persons as homo narrans. It compares and contrasts this view with the traditional rational perspective on symbolic interaction. The viability of the narrative paradigm and its attendant notions of reason and rationality are demonstrated through an extended analysis of key aspects of the current nuclear war controversy and a brief application to The Epic of Gilgamesh. The narrative paradigm synthesizes two strands in rhetorical theory: the argumentative, persuasive theme and the literary, aesthetic theme.

Reason and the rationalization of society

Abstract: Translator's Introduction. Author's Preface. I. Introduction: Approaches to the Problem of Rationality. 1. "Rationality" - A Preliminary Specification. 2. Some Characteristics of the Mythical and the Modern Ways of Understanding the World. 3. Relations to the World and Aspects of Rationality in Four Sociological Concepts of Action. 4. The Problem of Understanding Meaning in the Social Sciences. II. Max Weber's Theory of Rationalization. 1. Occidental Rationalism. 2. The Disenchantment of Religious-Metaphysical Worldviews and the Emergence of Modern Structures of Consciousness. 3. Modernization as Societal Rationalization: The Role of the Protestant Ethic. 4. The Rationalization of Law: Weber's Diagnosis of the Times. III. Intermediate Reflections: Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication. IV. From Lukacs to Adorno: Rationalization as Reification. 1. Max Weber in the Tradition of Western Marxism. 2. The Critique of Instrumental Reason.

Strategic Decision Processes: Comprehensiveness and Performance in an Industry with an Unstable Environment

Abstract: Comprehensiveness is a measure of rationality and is defined as the extent to which organizations attempt to be exhaustive or inclusive in making and integrating strategic decisions. Results from a...

The Comprehensiveness of Strategic Decision Processes: Extension, Observations, Future Directions

Abstract: A recent study in an industry with an unstable environment (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984) reported a negative relationship between comprehensiveness (a measure of rationality) and organization perf...

Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning

Abstract: A general two-stage theory of human inference is proposed. A distinction is drawn between heuristic processes which select items of task information as ‘relevant’, and analytic processes which operate on the selected items to generate inferences or judgements. These two stages are illustrated in a selective review of work on both deductive and statistical reasoning. Factors identified as contributing to heuristic selection include perceptual salience, linguistic suppositions and semantic associations. Analytic processes are considered to be context dependent: people reason from experience, not from inference rules. The paper includes discussion of the theory in comparison with other contemporary theories of human inference, and in relation to the current debate about human rationality.

The Rationality of Caring

Abstract: In order to find better models for caregiving work, an analysis of the concept of caring is developed in this article. The focus is on caring for dependents and it is argued that this kind of caring, typically a responsibility for women, is based on a specific kind of rationality. 'Rationality of caring' is different from scientific rationality which is aimed at controlling the environment. It also transcends the categories of rationality and instrumentality as opposed to emotions and expressiveness. It is suggested that the search for new models of organizing the public care system must pay attention to the specific qualities inherent in caregiving work.

The limits of rationality: An essay on the social and moral thought of Max Weber

Abstract: Introduction 1. The Specific and Peculiar Rationalism of Modern Western Civilization 2. The Nature and Limits of Rational Action 3. The Ethical Irrationality of the World 4. Weber's moral Vision

White Queen psychology and other essays for Alice

Abstract: Ruth Millikan's extended argument for a biological view of the study of cognition in Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories caught the attention of the philosophical community. Universally regarded as an important, even brilliant, work, its complexity and dense presentation made it difficult to plumb. This collection of essays serves both as an introduction to that much discussed volume and as an extension and application of Millikan's central and controversial themes, especially in the philosophy of psychology. The title essay, referring to the White Queen's practice of exercising her mind by believing impossible things, discusses meaning rationalism and argues that rationality is not in the head, indeed, that there is no legitimate interpretation under which logical possibility and necessity are known a priori. Nor are there any laws of rational psychology. Rationality is not a lawful occurrence but a biological norm that is effected in an integrated head-world system under biologically ideal conditions. In other essays, Millikan clarifies her views on the nature of mental representation, explores whether human thought is a product of natural selection, examines the nature of behavior as studied by the behavioral sciences, and discusses the issues of individualism in psychology, psychological explanation, indexicality in thought, what knowledge is, and the realism/antirealism debate.

From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution in the Aims and Methods of Science

Abstract: This book argues for the need to put into practice a profound and comprehensive intellectual revolution, affecting to a greater or lesser extent all branches of scientific and technological research, scholarship and education. This intellectual revolution differs, however, from the now familiar kind of scientific revolution described by Kuhn. It does not primarily involve a radical change in what we take to be knowledge about some aspect of the world, a change of paradigm. Rather it involves a radical change in the fundamental, overall intellectual aims and methods of inquiry. At present inquiry is devoted to the enhancement of knowledge. This needs to be transformed into a kind of rational inquiry having as its basic aim to enhance personal and social wisdom. This new kind of inquiry gives intellectual priority to the personal and social problems we encounter in our lives as we strive to realize what is desirable and of value – problems of knowledge and technology being intellectually subordinate and secondary. For this new kind of inquiry, it is what we do and what we are that ultimately matters: our knowledge is but an aspect of our life and being.

After Rationality, What? A Review of Responses to Paradigm Breakdown

Abstract: Rationality is identified as the paradigm that dominated planning and related disciplines until the mid-1950s. Subsequent attacks on the rational model revealed anomalies that have led to loss of professional identity and ambiguous roles for planners. Responses to paradigm breakdown include “the ritual response,” “avoidance,” “abandonment,” and search for a new paradigm. Each response is described and examined for its potential to yield a usable replacement for the rational model. No such replacement appears imminent, but a contingent approach within the framework of a new meta-theory of decision making may offer the best prospects.

Rationality and relativism

Abstract: Relativism is easily confused with tolerance and hence with rational scepticism. Absolutism is easily confused with sure conviction and hence with irrational fanaticism. But cognitive relativism, by denying absolute truth even as a regulative idea, evacuates the possibility of criticism, and hence the project of co-operative, progressive, learning from experience. All this is permitted by weak absolutism which is also able crisply to define the notions of relative truth and of toleration. Hence it is a better framework for the cognitive work of the anthropologist since it assimilates every community of knowers to the model of the community of science, be they primitive peoples or sophisticated anthropologists. Evans-Pritchard on the Azande, Turnbull on the Ik, and Gellner on Legitimation of Belief are discussed.

Organization, Rationality, and Spontaneity in the Civil Rights Movement.

Abstract: So-called "classical collective-behavior theorists" have been charged with placing too much emphasis on spontaneity and the emergence of new norms and structures in social movements. Empirical support for this charge and materialfor constructing an alternate model have been offered in recent revisionist studies of the Civil Rights Movement. This alternate model emphasizes the importance of deliberate planning and pre-existing social structures in the development and growth of bus boycotts and sit-ins between 1955 and 1965. Reexamination of the Civil Rights Movement in Tallahassee, Florida, shows it to be a case which does not fit the alternate model in important respects. It is concluded that while organization and planning are key variables, social movement theory must take into account spontaneity and emergence, and the transformation of pre-existing structures.

Microeconomics, Norms, and Rationality

Abstract: A divergence of views among microeconomists in general and game theorists in particular regarding the explanatory objectives of microeconomic theory has become apparent in recent years. This divergence concerns, most fundamentally, the question whether institutions, legal or customary rules, or social norms are to be classified among the endogenous as opposed to the exogenous variables in the framework of microeconomic analysis.' The majority of economists are probably agnostic or ambivalent on this question, not having confronted, or not having had to confront, the issue in their own work. Many have sidestepped it by treating institutions as immutable or by restricting their analyses to a given rule regime. But rules do vary and change, and among those who are concerned with studying variation in institutions, two diverging views are increasingly identifiable, sometimes coexisting even within the writings of the same author. The first sees game theory (and microeconomic theory in general) as an analytical device useful for considering the comparative incentive features of (and corresponding outcomes associated with) different institutional regimes, regimes that might be changed in one's capacity as a policymaker or that have varied in fact as the result of differential historical development in different regions. The second position accepts this statement of the objectives of microeconomic theory vis-avis institutions for the short run but takes it as the ultimate task of

Bachelard, science and objectivity

Abstract: This is the first critically evaluative study of Gaston Bachelard's philosophy of science to be written in English. Bachelard's professional reputation was based on his philosophy of science, though that aspect of his thought has tended to be neglected by his English-speaking readers. Dr Tiles concentrates here on Bachelard's critique of scientific knowledge. Bachelard emphasised discontinuities in the history of science; in particular he stressed the ways of thinking about and investigating the world to be found in modern science. This, as the author shows, is paralleled by those debates among English-speaking philosophers about the rationality of science and the 'incommensurability' of different theories. To these problems Bachelard might be taken as offering an original solution: rather than see discontinuities as a threat to the objectivity of science, see them as products of the rational advancement of scientific knowledge. Dr Tiles sets out Bachelard's views and critically assesses them, reflecting also on the wider question of how one might assess potentially incommensurable positions in the philosophy of science as well as in science itself.

Social Choice Observed: Five Presidential Elections of the American Psychological Association

Abstract: There have been few opportunities to assess the implications of social choice theory using data from large, naturally occurring elections. We examine here five presidential elections of the American Psychological Association. These elections involve ten to fifteen thousand voters who express rank-ordered preferences over five candidates. We investigate the occurrence of the "paradox of voting," the ability of various voting systems to select majority winners, violations of subset rationality conditions, and the possibility of manipulating election outcomes through the misrepresentation of preferences. The frequent occurrence of these anomalies (with the exception of the paradox of voting) emphasizes the essential relevance of social choice theory to a theory of democratic electoral processes. T he claim by social choice theorists that developments in their field over the past thirty years require a fundamental rethinking of the role of voting in democratic societies has met with a wide range of responses from political scientists. Some, such as William Riker in his recent book Liberalism Against Populism (1982), have had their views radically altered by the "confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice" that constitutes the subtitle of Riker's book. For Riker, social choice theory has been decisive in evaluating two contending

Philosophy in History: The concept of “trust” in the politics of John Locke

Abstract: Because in politics the most fundamental question is always that of what particular human beings have good reason to do , and because what they do have good reason to do depends directly and profoundly on how far they can and should trust and rely upon one another, I take the central issue in political philosophy (properly so called) to be that of how to conceive the rationality of trust in relation to the causal field of politics. In this essay I shall be talking about the thinking of Locke, firstly because I consider that he made a more systematic and determined effort to think about this question than any other and more recent political philosopher, and secondly (and, of course, connectedly) because the attempt to think comprehensively about this conception has essentially disappeared from modern political philosophy, both in its Marxist and in its liberal or conservative variants. (There are, to be sure, important analytical idioms in modern thought – such as game theory – and key moments in the construction of particular political theories – such as Rawls' original position – in which the issue is treated with great assurance.) The explanation of this disappearance is a complicated and somewhat obscure matter, and not one suitable for treatment in this context. But that it is so would be difficult to deny. I discuss Locke, therefore, not because I wish to argue that we should espouse all – or any – of Locke's own detailed conceptions, but because we do, in my view, have good reason to treat his conception of political philosophy as exemplary – as a model which there is still every ground for our trying to emulate.

Psychology and the Limitations of Individual Rationality: Implications for the Study of Reasoning and Civility

Abstract: This paper discusses the learning and teaching of reasoning and civility from the historical perspective of psychology as a discipline. Reasoning and civility are hardly a familiar couple. Indeed, they have been more frequently seen as competing educational goals rather than complementary purposes. It is our intention, however, to define reasoning and civility as two interacting dimensions of human action. We will argue that man must be both rational and civil, both a creature of reason and a cooperative social being. Moreover, not only are these two compatible human traits that are fully capable of pacific coexistence, human rationality is contingent upon human civility in certain fundamental ways. We do not use the term civility to connote some Western sense of "civilized" or even the traits of propriety, proper etiquette, or good classroom behavior, though the latter is an important concern in a society that defines classroom discipline as its most important problem of educational policy. Indeed, civility is the capacity to function as a citizen, as an active member of a group, in a way that benefits both the individual and the aggregate. This is not a paper summarizing the recent research on the teaching of reasoning skills, critical thinking, or problem solving, important though such a review would certainly be. Our goal is the discussion of the processes of reason or rationality within contemporary psychology writ large, rather than a detailed review of a body of empirical work involving any particular category of research on human reasoning. We have been invited to address the question of education for reasoning and for civility from the perspective of psychology. Psychology as a field has exhibited four faces, each countenance embodying a distinctive perspective on human capacity for reasoning and reasoned choice. We have called these four perspectives man as rational, man as irrational, man as boundedly rational, and man as collectively rational. The first is captured in the view of the human as a "rational animal," an organism endowed with the capacity to reason logically, to act consistently in its own interests (or in response to the contingencies of its environments), to sense, perceive, and subsequently represent mentally the objects and events of the real world, and to develop through education and learning increasing capacities for reason as it matures. This view of man as a rational machine is located in the writings of Aristotle and Francis Bacon, and in the British Associationists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) who laid the philosophical foundations for American functionalism and behaviorism (Thomdike, Watson, Skinner), and probably defines the implicit prevailing view of human functioning among most contemporary educators.

Disequilibrium economic dynamics: A post-Schumpeterian contribution

Abstract: Adaptive economizing in a decentralized economy with alternative technologies and scarce resources leads to various kinds of locally unstable behavior. Economic disequilibrium is the rule in such a world and requires the presence of market mechanisms that make possible continued viability. If in addition to local instability economies are also globally unstable, as considerable evidence suggests, then the discovery and application of new structure is essential. A complete dynamic theory of economic change must therefore be based not only on conventional rationality and routinely adapting behavior but on a superior faculty which may perhaps best be called creative intelligence.

Household Technology and the Social Construction of Housework

Abstract: Historians and social scientists generally agree that the forces of industrialization and the growth of the market economy have progressively absorbed much of the household's economic function. Furthermore, popular belief assumes that the vestiges of old forms of production in the home will surely be eliminated by the application of technological rationality. Put another way, it is thought by the public and many academics that "technology," broadly defined, has "freed" women for other, nonhousework tasks-in particular, employment in the paid labor market. These assumptions are reflected in popular terminology such as "fast foods" (to save time), "convenience foods" (to increase ease of preparation), and "laborsaving devices" (conducive to easing the work load generally). This imagery has such power that much traditional research takes these effects for granted instead of demonstrating or disproving them empirically. Yet even with the unprecedented growth of the market sector and the almost universal availability of certain items of household equipment and goods, recent studies show that labor in the home still accounts for approximately half of this country's total work time.1 In this article our goal is to investigate the evidence concerning the effects of technological developments on household work. We believe that popular beliefs about the positive effects are inadequately sub-

Structuring Administrative Discretion: The Pursuit of Rationality and Responsiveness

Abstract: This article describes and analyzes three important developments in the process of regulatory administration over the past fifteen years. Efforts to structure agency discretion have been intended to mitigate the dilemma caused by the continuing growth of delegated policymaking authority. Considered together, they have been designed to promote the traditional, though inconsistent, goals of rational and responsive agency decision making.

The Importance of What Might Have Been

Abstract: Expected utility theory is often presented as a normative theory, resting on a few simple axioms that no reasonable person would wish to violate. Arrow (1972, p.21), for example, describes one version of these axioms as ‘a set of assumptions designed to characterise reasonable behaviour under conditions of uncertainty’ he describes particular axioms in such terms as ‘a hallmark of rationality’ (p. 22) and ‘highly acceptable’ (p.24). The claim that these axioms have a special normative status is sometimes used as a second line of defence for expected utility theory in cases where that theory does not predict observed behaviour well. It can be suggested that when people act contrary to the theory, they do so in error. As Morgenstern (1979, p. 180) puts it, ‘if people deviate from the theory, an explanation of the theory and of their deviation will cause them to readjust their behaviour’. Even some of the proponents of alternative positive theories seem to have been prepared to accept some of the normative claims made on behalf of expected utility theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 277), for example, regard the behaviour that their theory predicts as #x2018;normatively unacceptable’, and Machina (1982, p. 277) notes the ‘normative appeal’ of expected utility theory before presenting his own theory.

One-Dimensional Management Science: The Making of a Technocratic Consciousness

Abstract: Management science has lost much of the vitality and vision it had a decade ago. It languishes in a morass of technical specialization; it lacks overall coherence, and direction. The departmental structure of Management Science and the college structure of TIMS reflect a one-dimensional view: the literature elevates a “technocratic rationality” and neglects “social rationality.” A revitalized two-dimensional management science is proposed.

Deterrence, maximization, and rationality

Abstract: Is deterrence a fully rational policy? In our world deterrence works sometimes. But in a more perfect world, in which actors rationally related their choices to their beliefs and preferences, and in which those beliefs and preferences were matters of common knowledge, could deterrence work? Some say no.' Others hold a conception of rationality that would commit them to saying no, were they to consider the issue.' I say yes. Deterrence can be part of a fully rational policy. I propose to demonstrate this. At the heart of a deterrent policy is the expression of a conditional intention. An actor A expresses the intention to perform an action x should another actor B perform an action y. If B would do y did A not express her intention, then we may say that A's expression of intention deters B from doingy. In expressing her intention as part of a deterrent policy, A seeks to decrease the probability of B's doing y by increasing his estimate of her conditional probability of doing x should he do y. We need better labels than x and y if our talk about deterrence is to be perspicuous. In at least some situations, A's deterrent intention is retaliatory; A expresses the intention to retaliate should B do y. So let us call x retal. And what A seeks to deter is an action that would advantage B in relation to A; let us then call y advant. We shall then say that an actor A expresses the intention to retal should another actor B advant. A seeks to affect B's estimate of her conditional probability of retal should he advant. Why does she expect her expression of conditional intention to have this effect? Let us suppose that A and B are rational; on the received view of rationality, an actor seeks to maximize expected