Showing papers on "Rationality published in 1987"

The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and reason.

Abstract: "There are books-few and far between-which carefully, delightfully, and genuinely turn your head inside out. This is one of them. It ranges over some central issues in Western philosophy and begins the long overdue job of giving us a radically new account of meaning, rationality, and objectivity."-Yaakov Garb, "San Francisco Chronicle"

The Intentional Stance

Abstract: How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand and predict.These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. "The Intentional Stance" brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters - its first and the final three - appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection - an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind.Daniel C. Dennett is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor at Tufts University and the author of "Brainstorms" and "Elbow Room." "The Intentional Stance," along with these works, is a Bradford Book.

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason

Abstract: 1. Introduction 2. On the way to the planning theory 3. Plans and practical reasoning 4. Agent rationality: toward a general theory 5. Reconsideration and rationality 6. Agent rationality: the historical theory 7. Commitment revisited 8. Two faces of intention 9. Acting with an intention 10. Intention and expected side effects 11. Conclusion Bibliography Notes Index.

On ethics and economics

Abstract: Foreword: John M. Letiche. Preface. 1. Economic Behaviour and Moral Sentiments. Two Origins. Achievements and Weakness. Economic Behaviour and Rationality. Rationality as Consistency. Self-interest and Rational Behaviour. Adam Smith and Self-interest. 2. Economic Judgements and Moral Philosophy. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility. Pareto Optimality and Economic Efficiency. Utility, Pareto Optimality and Welfarism. Well-being and Agency. Valuing and Value. Agency and Well-being: Distinction and Interdependence. Utility and Well-being. Achievements, Freedom and Rights. Self-interest and Welfare Economics. Rights and Freedom. 3. Freedom and Consequences. Well-being, Agency and Freedom. Plurality and Evaluation. Incompletenes and Overcompleteness. Conflicts and Impasse. Rights and Consequence. Consequential Assessment and Deontology. Ethics and Economics. Welfare, Goals and Choices. Conduct, Ethics and Economics. References. Author Index. Subject Index.

Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action

Abstract: This book addresses questions that have concerned rhetoricians, literary theorists, and philosophers since the time of the pre-Socratics and the Sophists: How do people come to believe and to act on the basis of communicative experiences? What is the nature of reason and rationality in these experiences? What is the role of values in human decision making and action? How can reason and values be assessed? In answering these questions, Professor Fisher proposes a conceptualisation of humankind as homo narrans, that all forms of human communication need to be seen as stories-symbolic interpretations of aspects of the world occurring in time and shaped by history, culture, and character; that individuated forms of discourse should be considered "good reasons"-values or value-laden warrants for believing or acting in certain ways; and that a narrative logic that all humans have natural capacities to employ ought to be conceived of as the logic by which human communication is assessed.

The rationality of emotion

Abstract: In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists. He argues that emotions are a kind of perception, that their roots in the paradigm scenarios in which they are learned give them an essentially dramatic structure, and that they have a crucial role to-play in rational beliefs, desires, and decisions by breaking the deadlocks of pure reason.The book's twelve chapters take up the following topics: alternative models of mind and emotion; the relation between evolutionary, physiological, and social factors in emotions; a taxonomy of objects of emotions; assessments of emotions for correctness and rationality; the regulation by emotions of logical and practical reasoning; emotion and time; the mechanism of emotional self-deception; the ethics of laughter; and the roles of emotions in the conduct of life. There is also an illustrative interlude, in the form of a lively dialogue about the ideology of love, jealousy, and sexual exclusiveness.Ronald de Sousa teaches philosophy at the University of Toronto. A Bradford Book.

Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy

Abstract: The book describes the variety of institutional arrangements through which collective decisions can be achieved and makes special reference to decision-making on ecology. According to the author, the means employed by societies to make collective choices have far-reaching ramifications for the kind of world which exists or develops. He assesses those means in connection with various forms of rationality used to make decisions and to act: markets, bureaucracies, and polyarchies are among the institutional arrangements evaluated. He examines their capacity for intelligent decision-making, based on notions of justice, individual liberty or economic efficiency, and measures these against the yardstick of environmental concerns, a pressing set of problems which transcend particular political and institutional arrangements. The analysis extends beyond the realm of environmental choice to elucidate more fully the characteristics of the world's social choice mechanisms and proposes innovations for improving these forms.

Rhetoric in Claims-Making: Constructing the Missing Children Problem

Abstract: Claims-making about social problems is a persuasive activity, subject to rhetorical analysis. I use Toulmin's categories, which classify statements as grounds, warrants, and conclusions, to examine the rhetoric of claims made about the missing children problem. In particular, the grounds for missing children claims included a broad definition of the problem, horrific examples, and large estimates of the problem's scope, while references to the priceless, blameless nature of children and the evils threatening missing children provided key warrants. Rhetorical devices analogous to those identified in this case study appear in claims-making about other social problems. I also identify some patterns in rhetorical work, conditions favoring rhetorics of rectitude or rationality. The relationship between rhetoric and the cultural context within claims emerge deserves further study .

Reality and representation

Abstract: Realism and anti-realism an argument for anti-realism of belief belief and representation the teleological theory of representation the possibility of error universal rationality naturalized epistemology naturalized realism inferential processes relativism, history and scepticism.

Reasoning about beliefs and actions under computational resource constraints

Abstract: Although many investigators affirm a desire to build reasoning systems that behave consistently with the axiomatic basis defined by probability theory and utility theory, limited resources for engineering and computation can make a complete normative analysis impossible. We attempt to move discussion beyond the debate over the scope of the problems that can be handled effectively to cases where it is clear that there is insufficient computational or engineering resource to perform an analysis deemed to be complete. Under these conditions, we stress the importance of considering the expected costs and benefits of applying alternative approximation procedures and heuristics for computation and knowledge-acquisition. We discuss bow knowledge about the structure of user utility can be used to control value tradeoffs for tailoring inference to alternative contexts. We finally address the notion of real-time rationality, focusing on the application of knowledge about the expected timewise-refinement abilities of reasoning strategies to balance the benefits of additional computation with the costs of acting with a partial result.

Measuring delusional experiences: a method and its application.

Abstract: This study describes the development and use of some measures that can be used to make systematic evaluations of delusional experiences. In a series of nine single-case studies using these measures, delusions were found to be multidimensional in character, with a marked desynchrony and lack of covariance between different aspects of delusional beliefs. The rationality of delusional thought processes is also considered with suggestions as to methods that can be used to clarify the role of objective experiences in dispersing delusional beliefs.

Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory

Abstract: Preface Introduction to the Second Edition Introduction Chapter 1 Subjects and Agents 1.1. There concepts of agency 1.2. The orthodox conception of agents 1.3. Human nature: the need for a philosophical anthropology 1.4. Human nature: morality, justice and virtue. 1.5. Practical reason and social structures Chapter 2 Structure and Action 2.1. The concept of social structure 2.2. The basic concepts of historical materialism 2.3. Orthodox historical materialism 2.4. Rational-choice Marxism 2.5. Structural capacities and human action 2.6. What's left of historical materialism? Chapter 3 Reasons and Interests 3.1. Expressivism and the hermeneutic tradition 3.2. Interpretation and social theory 3.3. Charity, truth and community 3.4. The Utilitarian theory of action 3.5. Interests and powers Chapter 4 Ideology and Power 4.1. Collective agents 4.2. Falsehood and ideology, I 4.3. Falsehood and ideology, II 4.4. Nation, state and military power 4.5. A note on base and superstructure Chapter 5 Tradition and Revolution 5.1. Revolution as redemption: Benjamin and Sartre 5.2. Marxism and the proletariat 5.3. The rationality of revolution 5.4. Revolution and repetition 5.5. The tradition of the oppressed Conclusion Index

Evolutionary epistemology, rationality, and the sociology of knowledge

Abstract: This collection of essays in support of the theory of evolutionary epistemology includes articles by Karl Popper, Peter Munz and Gerhard Vollmer. This volume attempts to show how an evolutionary and non-justificational approach affects the sociology of knowledge.

The cunning of reason

Abstract: Preface 1. The sovereign artificer 2. Rational choice 3. Norms and institutions 4. The Cunning of Reason I: unintended consequences 5. Motivation 6. External and internal reasons 7. Rational expectations 8. Maximising and satisficing 9. The Cunning of Reason II: functions and rules 10. Reasons and roles 11. Rationality and understanding 12. The Cunning of Reason III: self and society Bibliography Index.

Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity

Abstract: This book brings together leading figures in history, sociology, political science, feminism and critical theory to interpret, evaluate, criticize and update Weber's legacy. In a collection of specially commissioned pieces and translated articles the Weberian scholarship recognizes Max Weber as the figure central to contemporary debates on the need for societal rationality, the limits of reason and the place of culture and conduct in the supposedly post-religious age. In Part 1, Wolfgang Mommsen, Wilhelm Hennis, Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter provide a full and varied account of the theme of rationalization in the world civilizations. In Part 2 Pierre Bourdieu and Barry Hindess critically examine Weber's social action model, and Johannes Weiss and Martin Albrow address the putative 'crisis' of Western rationality. In Part 3 Jeffrey Alexander, Ralph Schroeder, Bryan Turner, Roslyn Bologh and Sam Whimster scrutinize Weber's understanding of modernity with its characteristic plurality of 'gods and demons'; they focus on its implications for individuality and personality, the body and sexuality, feminism and aesthetic modernism. Part 4 turns to politics, law and the state in the contemporary world: Colin Gordon on liberalism, Luciano Cavalli on charismatic politics, Stephen Turner and Regis Factor on decisionism and power and Scott Lash on modernism, substantice rationality and law. First published in 1987

Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism

Abstract: Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence.- The Incoherence Argument and the Notion of Relative Truth.- Frameworks, Conceptual Schemes, and "Framework Relativism".- Relativism and the Philosophy of Science.- Kuhn and Relativism: Is He or Isn't He?.- The Kuhnians.- The Kuhn-Inspired New Philosophy of Science.- The Un-Kuhnians: Relativism via the Problem-Solving Theory of Rationality.- Further Epistemological Considerations.- Goodmanian Relativism.- Relativism and Rationality: Towards an "Absolutist" Epistemology.

The narrative paradigm: Another story

Abstract: The narrative paradigm, recently proposed as a model for rhetorical criticism, is problematic because of internal contradictions and inconsistencies. In the paradigm, the status of traditional rationality and the extent to which it is to be applied are unclear. The conditions in which the universal audience, the particular audience, and the critic are to serve as the source for critical judgment are also unclear. When we have only the immanent facts of the text (its narrative) and the personal judgment of the critic to rely on, we lack independent sources for judging the adequacy of a critic's claims about the text.

Decision-Making at the Top of Organizations

Abstract: Strategic decision-making processes at the top of organizations are examined. Research is reviewed on types of process movement, on the matters under decision, the problems raised, the interests implicated, the rules of the game, and its outcomes and implementation. Methodology is found to have gone through a conventional sequence of development from the small-scale intensive study to the large-scale extensive study, the latter very recently. Methodology has been catching up with theory, which has long been well developed. There are three main theories, overlapping and complementary—the incrementalism theory, the garbage-can theory, and the dual rationality theory. Five areas for further research are indicated.

Complexity and Rationality in Public Life

Abstract: Increasing complexity in the contemporary world calls into question prevailing notions of rationality in public policy and political life Even in their most refined forms, instrumental-analytic st

Rationality: A Third Dimension

Abstract: I want in this paper to do two things. First, I want to respond to some studies that argue that people are often not rational: that people regularly and systematically depart from rationality. The conclusion itself does not worry me. I pressed for the same in a recent book (Schick, 1984). But the arguments seem to me wrong, and wrong in an interesting way. There may be something to be learned from seeing how and why they fail.

Stability and collective rationality

Abstract: THE PRINCIPLE of pairwise comparisons is a well established one in social choice theory. The idea of collective rationality-that social decisions be made consistently with the maximization of some ordering of the alternatives-is the most familiar application of this principle, and indeed, is a defining property of the social welfare functions of Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947), and of Arrow (1951). As is well known, the idea of collective rationality involves comparing every social state to every other social state in terms of the welfare assigned by those states to a given group of individuals, and declaring a social state to be fair or good if it is good when considering all such pairwise comparisons with other social states. Alternatively, one could imagine a social decision process based on comparing every individual to every other individual in terms of the welfare assigned to those individuals by a given social state, and declaring a social state to be good or fair if it is fair when considering all such pairwise comparisons of individuals. A social decision process in this spirit has been suggested by Harsanyi (1959),

One Culture: Essays in Science and Literature

Abstract: In this volume, the first in the series Science and Literature, editor George Levin has brought together the contributions of historians, critics, and philosophers of science to explore these relationships. From the preface: "The interaction between science and literature has been a subject of growing concern in criticism; the languages of science have increasingly found their way into literature and into discussions of it. And the traditional assumptions that literary people care nothing about science, scientists care nothing about literature have been belied throughout the twentieth century but particularly in recent years. There remain, however, large gaps of knowledge and of misunderstanding that make fruitful interchange and informed discussion difficult to achieve. And while this series will be aimed primarily at a literary audience, we are hoping to be of use as well to historians and philosophers of science at a level high enough to ensure the respect if not the agreement of the scientific community. While the series will not take a 'position' in relation to controverted questions and will leave the directions of the arguments to the highly qualified and independent scholars and critics it seeks, it does grow from three assumptions, first, that science and literature are two alternative but related expressions of a culture's values, assumptions, and intellectual frameworks; second, that understanding science in its relation to culture and literature requires some understanding not only of its own internal processes, but of the pressures upon it exercised by social, political aesthetic, psychological, and biographical forces; third, that the idea of 'influence' of one upon the other must work both ways it is not only science that influences literature, but literature that influences science. These assumptions, of course, are not uncontroversial, and they impinge on such large issues as the question of 'representation' in literature and entail corollaries about such matters as the 'rationality' of science, or the degree to which it actually describes reality that are at the center of contemporary battles within the philosophy of science. We hope that this series will throw light on these matters. The subject is enormous, its importance inescapable. Vague as the enterprise may occasionally seem when viewed in the abstract, its significances are clear when we get down to cases, as the authors of the several essays in this volume do. The range of questions they address intimates the ambitions of the series.""

Narrative: Mode of discourse or paradigm?

Abstract: This essay critically analyzes the recent work of Walter. Fisher on the “narrative paradigm.”; While Fisher's work has undeniable value, the implications of it have not been completely considered. This essay proposes three limitations on the narrative paradigm. First, Fisher's definition of narrative is too broad, encompassing nearly all discourse. Using Fisher's example of The Fate of the Earth, a case is built for the claim that a more limited definition of narrative is needed. Second, the view that there is an independent standard of narrative rationality that can be distinguished from the “rational world paradigm”; is considered and rejected. Finally, the claim that the proper role of the expert in the public sphere is that of story teller is also considered and rejected.

Structural consistency, consistency, and sequential rationality

Abstract: In an extensive form game, a strategy profile is a sequential equilibrium if there are consistent beliefs at all information sets which, with the strategy profile, are sequentially rational at every information set. Along the equilibrium path, consistent beliefs are computed using the strategy profile and Bayes' rule. Consistent out-of-equilibrium beliefs, on the other hand, are derived by taking the closure of belief-strategy profile pairs, for totally mixed strategies. Kreps and Wilson (1982) claim that consistent beliefs are structurally consistent; that is, out-of-equilibrium beliefs can be rationalized by some single alternative conjecture as to the strategy opponents have used. We show by example that this is incorrect. Moreover, while equilibrium beliefs are structurally consistent in some cases, the alternative conjectures that justify them are inconsistent with the hypothesis (implicit in sequential rationality) that there will be no further defectionis from the initially hypothesized equilibrium strategies. These difficulties disappear if one relaxes the requirement of structural consistency, so that out-of-equilibrium conjectures may be formed as convex combinations of conjectured strategies of opponents. But such convex combinations result in out-ofequilibrium conjectures in which opponents' strategies are correlated. Correlation arises ",naturally" if one adopts the perspective that no action can really have zero probability. But if one admits this sort of correlation, then other forms of correlation might also seem reasonable, including correlation that is not permitted under consistency and sequential rationality.