Showing papers on "Rationality published in 2000"

Choices, Values, and Frames

Abstract: We discuss the cognitive and the psy- chophysical determinants of choice in risky and risk- less contexts. The psychophysics of value induce risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. The psychophysics of chance induce overweighting of sure things and of improbable events, relative to events of moderate probability. De- cision problems can be described or framed in multiple ways that give rise to different preferences, contrary to the invariance criterion of rational choice. The pro- cess of mental accounting, in which people organize the outcomes of transactions, explains some anomalies of consumer behavior. In particular, the acceptability of an option can depend on whether a negative outcome is evaluated as a cost or as an uncompensated loss. The relation between decision values and experience values is discussed. Making decisions is like speaking prose—people do it all the time, knowingly or unknowingly. It is hardly surprising, then, that the topic of decision making is shared by many disciplines, from mathematics and statistics, through economics and political science, to sociology and psychology. The study of decisions ad- dresses both normative and descriptive questions. The normative analysis is concerned with the nature of rationality and the logic of decision making. The de- scriptive analysis, in contrast, is concerned with peo- ple's beliefs and preferences as they are, not as they should be. The tension between normative and de- scriptive considerations characterizes much of the study of judgment and choice. Analyses of decision making commonly distin- guish risky and riskless choices. The paradigmatic example of decision under risk is the acceptability of a gamble that yields monetary outcomes with specified probabilities. A typical riskless decision concerns the acceptability of a transaction in which a good or a service is exchanged for money or labor. In the first part of this article we present an analysis of the cog- nitive and psychophysical factors that determine the value of risky prospects. In the second part we extend this analysis to transactions and trades. Risky Choice Risky choices, such as whether or not to take an umbrella and whether or not to go to war, are made without advance knowledge of their consequences. Because the consequences of such actions depend on uncertain events such as the weather or the opponent's resolve, the choice of an act may be construed as the acceptance of a gamble that can yield various out- comes with different probabilities. It is therefore nat- ural that the study of decision making under risk has focused on choices between simple gambles with monetary outcomes and specified probabilities, in the hope that these simple problems will reveal basic at- titudes toward risk and value. We shall sketch an approach to risky choice that

“Let's Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics

Abstract: This article introduces a mode of social action and interaction that has so far been largely overlooked in the U.S.-dominated international relations debate between rational choice and social constructivism that focuses mainly on the differences between instrumental rationality and norm-guided behavior. Drawing on insights from a theoretical debate within the Germanspeaking international relations community, I suggest that actors have a third mode of social action at their disposal: arguing and deliberating about the validity claims inherent in any communicative statement about identities, interests, and the state of the world. Arguing and truth-seeking behavior presuppose that actors no longer hold fixed interests during their communicative interaction but are open to persuasion, challenges, and counterchallenges geared toward reaching a reasoned consensus. The preconditions for argumentative rationality, particularly a “common lifeworld” and the mutual recognition of speakers as equals in a nonhierarchical relationship, are more common in international relations than is usually assumed. Arguing processes are more likely to occur the more actors are uncertain about their interests and even identities, the less they know about the situation in which they find themselves and the underlying “rules of the game,” and the more apparently irreconcilable differences prevent them from reaching an optimal rather than a merely satisfactory solution for a widely perceived problem (“problem solving”). Moreover, arguing is likely to increase the influence of the materially less powerful, be it small states or nonstate actors such as INGOs. I illustrate these claims empirically with two plausibility probes. The first concerns the East–West talks leading to a negotiated settlement of the Cold War in Europe and German unification within NATO. The second case focuses on the implementation of international human rights norms into domestic practices of Third World states.

Adaptive Thinking: Rationality in the Real World

Abstract: PART ONE: WHERE DO NEW IDEAS COME FROM? Introduction 1. From tools to theories: A heuristic of discovery 2. Mind as computer: The social origin of a metaphor 3. Ideas in exile: The struggles of an upright man PART TWO: ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY Introduction 4. Ecological Intelligence 5. AIDS counselling for low-risk clients 6. How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction PART FOUR: BOUNDED RATIONALITY 7. Probabilistic mental models 8. Reasoning the fast and frugal way PART FOUR: SOCIAL RATIONALITY 9. Rationality: Why social context matters 10. Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts and cheater detection 11. The modularity of social intelligence PART FIVE: ILLUSIONS AND RITUALS 12. How to make cognitive illusions disappear 13. The Superego, the Ego, and the Id in statistical reasoning 14. Surrogates for theories Index

Constructing Organizations: The Example of Public Sector Reform

Abstract: Organizations are socially constructed phenomena. A crucial task for organizational research is to analyze how and why people construct organizations rather than other social forms. In this paper, it is argued that recent public-sector reforms can be interpreted as attempts at constructing organizations. Public-sector entities that could formerly be described as agents or arenas have been transformed into `more complete' organizations by installing or reinforcing local identity, hierarchy and rationality. This interpretation helps to explain important aspects of the reform process.

Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism

Abstract: Introduction 1. Semantic Inferentialism and Logical Expressivism 2. Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning 3. Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism 4. What Are Singular Terms, and Why Are There Any? 5. A Social Route from Reasoning to Representing 6. Objectivity and the Normative Fine Structure of Rationality Notes Index

Public Policy and Program Evaluation

Abstract: Evaluation is a controversial and little-understood strategy of public governance, control, and decision making. As early as classical antiquity, scholars were summoned to court to counsel kings. Public policy and program evaluation is a recent addition to the great chain of attempts to use the brainpower of scholars and scientists to further the interests of the state. Evaluation scholars are asked to provide retrospective assessments of the implementation, output, and outcome of government measures in order to effect deeper understanding and well-grounded decisions on the part of those in charge of government operations. Evaluation is the process of distinguishing the worthwhile from the worthless, the precious from the useless; evaluation implies looking backward in order to be able to steer forward better. Written from a political science perspective, Public Policy and Program Evaluation provides an overview of the possibilities and limits of public sector evaluation. Evert Vedung examines evaluation as a mechanism for monitoring, systematizing, and grading government activities and their results so that public officials, in their future-oriented work, will be able to act as responsibly, creatively, and efficiently as possible. Topics discussed include: "Evaluation, Rationality, and Theories of Public Management"; "Models of Evaluation"; "Internal or External Evaluation"; "Impact Assessment as Tryout and Social Experimentation"; "Process Evaluation and Implementation Theory"; "The Eight-Problems Approach to Evaluation"; and "Uses and Users of Evaluation." All evaluation rests upon the idea that perceptions, opinions, intentions, judgments--in short, everything concerned with the world of human consciousness--play such interesting roles in political and administrative action that their functions are worth investigating. Through experience, humans may learn from past actions. The interventions of the modern state are so extensive, their execution so complicated, and their potential consequences so far-reaching that science and social research are needed to monitor operations and establish impacts. As an excellent Introduction to the field of policy evaluation, Public Policy and Program Evaluation will be a valuable resource for students of public administration, public policy, political science, education, and sociology.

Bounded Rationality in Social Science: Today and Tomorrow

Abstract: With the discovery of voluminous discordant empirical evidence, maximizing expected utility is rapidly disappearing as the core of the theory of human rationality, and a theory of bounded rationality, embracing both the processes and products of choice, is replacing it. There remains a large task of organizing our picture of economic and social processes and adding the new facts needed to shape the theory in an empirically sound way. It is also urgent that new tools now available for conducting empirical inquiry and constructing models be incorporated in social science graduate education.

Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument

Abstract: Contents: Preface. Introduction. Part I: The Historical Context. Context: Argumentation as a Cultural Practice. Context: The Study of Argumentation. Paradigm Abandoned: Critique of Deductivism. Lessons From the Past. Part II: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument. Informal Logic: An Alternative Theory of Argument. Argument as Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Conception. What Makes a Good Argument? Toward a Theory of Evaluation. Principles of Criticism. Part III: Matters Dialectical. Criticisms, Objections, and Replies. Alternative Theories of Argument. Outstanding Issues and the Research Agenda. Retrospect and Prospect.

Producing vertical territory: geology and governmentality in late Victorian Canada:

Abstract: This paper relates developments in the science of geology to forms of governmental rationality in Canada during the late nineteenth century. By so doing it opens for discussion a topic rarely broached by political theorists: the role that the earth sciences played in the historical evolution of forms of political rationality. The paper contests theoretical approaches that understand the relation between scientific knowledge and state rationality as only instrumental. Instead, the paper demonstrates how attending to the temporality of science (as evident in the emergence of specifically geological ways of seeing nature during the period) helps us understand the ways in which science is constitutive of political rationality, rather than merely its instrument. This argument is developed through a critique of Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’, a concept that historicizes political rationality, yet remains silent on how the physical sciences contributed to its varied forms. The paper concludes wit...

Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints

Abstract: Common sense suggests that it is always preferable to have more options than fewer, and better to have more knowledge than less. This provocative book argues that, very often, common sense fails. Sometimes it is simply the case that less is more; people may benefit from being constrained in their options or from being ignorant. The three long essays that constitute this book revise and expand the ideas developed in Jon Elster's classic study Ulysses and the Sirens. It is not simply a new edition of the earlier book, though; many of the issues merely touched on before are explored here in much more detail. Elster shows how seemingly disparate examples which limit freedom of action reveal similar patterns, so much so that he proposes a new field of study: constraint theory. The book is written in Elster's characteristically vivid style and will interest professionals and students in philosophy, political science, psychology, and economics.

Rationality in decision- and policy-making: implications for strategic environmental assessment

Abstract: A proper integration of strategic environmental assessment (SEA) into policy-making processes is considered critical to the success of SEA. Most of the work in SEA seems to be based on the assumption that the provision of rational information will help improve decision-making, but the literature points to other characteristics of real decision-making processes, including cognitive limitations, behavioural biases, ambiguity and variability of preferences and norms, distribution of decision-making over actors and in time, and the notion of decision-making as a process of learning and negotiation between multiple actors. All these are very relevant at the planning and policy level. In the policy sciences literature, some approaches may also hold promise for SEA, such as supporting an open learning process, variety in ways to support and roles to play in these processes, and paying more attention to the actor configuration and distribution of interests, as a basis for finding implementable and effective solut...

Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics

Abstract: As law and economics turns forty years old, its continued vitality is threatened by its unrealistic core behavioral assumption: that people subject to the law act rationally. Professors Korobkin and Ulen argue that law and economics can reinvigorate itself by replacing the rationality assumption with a more nuanced understanding of human behavior that draws on cognitive psychology, sociology, and other behavioral sciences, thus creating a new scholarly paradigm called "law and behavioral science." This article provides an early blueprint for research in this paradigm. The authors first explain the various ways the rationality assumption is used in legal scholarship and why it leads to unsatisfying policy prescriptions. They then systematically examine the empirical evidence inconsistent with the rationality assumption and, drawing on a wide range of substantive areas of law, explain how normative policy conclusions of law and economics will change and improve under the law-and-behavioral-science approach.

Negotiating the World Economy

Abstract: It is often said economics has become as important as security in international relations, yet we work with much less than full understanding of what goes on when government negotiators bargain over trade, finance, and the rules of international economic organizations. The process of economic negotiation shapes the world political economy, John S. Odell says, and this essential process can be understood and practiced better than it is now. His absorbing book compares ten major economic negotiations since 1944 that have involved the United States. Odell gives the inside stories, targeting the strategies used by the negotiators, and explaining strategy choice as well as why the same strategy gains more in some situations and less in others. He identifies three broad factors-changing market conditions, negotiator beliefs, and domestic politics-as key influences on strategies and outcomes. The author develops an insightful mid-range theory premised on bounded rationality, setting it apart from the most common form of rational choice as well as from views that reject rationality. Negotiating the World Economy reveals a rich set of future research paths, and closes with guidelines for improving negotiation performance today. The main ideas are relevant for any country and for all who may be affected by economic bargaining.

The roles of embodiment, emotion and lifeworld for rationality and agency in nursing practice

Abstract: Nursing practice invites nurses to embody caring practices that meet, comfort and empower vulnerable others. Such a practice requires a commitment to meeting and helping the other in ways that liberate and strengthen and avoid imposing the will of the caregiver on the patient. Being good and acting well (phronesis) occur in particular situations. A socially constituted and embodied view of agency, as developed by Merleau-Ponty, provides an alternative to Cartesian and Kantian views of agency. A socially constituted, embodied view of agency is less mechanistic and less deterministic than Descartes' and Kant's radical separation of mind and body, and more responsive and generative than Kant's vision of moral agency as constituted by autonomous choice makers who are uninfluenced by emotion. The role of emotion in perception and judgement is explored in this paper. Distinctions between techne and phronesis are drawn. The role of emotion in market relationships and procedural ethics drawn for the abstract, general other are strategies for exchange of goods and services, but these same market relationships are dependent on well-functioning nonmarket relations of noncalculated giving and receiving.

Masons, Tricksters and Cartographers: Comparative Studies in the Sociology of Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge

Abstract: 1. Introduction: From Rationality to Messiness: Rethinking Technoscientific Knowledge 2. "On With the Motley": The Contingent Assemblage of Knowledge Spaces 3. Talk, Templates and Tradition: How the Masons Built Chartres Cathedral Without Plans 4. Tricksters and Cartographers: Maps, Science and the State in the Making of a Modern Scientific Knowledge Space 5. Pacific Navigation: An Alternative Scientific Tradition 6. Making Malaria Curable: Extending a Knowledge Space to Create a Vaccine 7. Messiness and Order in Turbulence Research 8. Conclusion: Rationality, Relativism and the Politics of Knowledge

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?-Open Peer Commentary-Differences, games, and pluralism

Abstract: Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experimenter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the model response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance errors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations underlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Unexpected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

Advancing the rationality debate

Abstract: In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily integrated into our generic dual-process account. We further explicate how we view the relation between System 1 and System 2 and evolutionary and normative rationality. We clarify our attempt to fuse the contributions of the cognitive ecologists with the insights of the original heuristics and biases researchers.

Guide to the Study of Religion

Abstract: Part I Descriptions: definition classification comparison interpretation. Part II Explanations: structure exchange social formations rationality cognition origin myth ritual gender sacred manifestation world building body projection depravation stratification intellect ethnicity experience. Part III Locations: modernism romanticism nationalism colonialism postmodernism culture discourse ideology.

A psychological point of view: violations of rational rules as a diagnostic of mental processes

Abstract: The target article focuses exclusively on System 2 and on reasoning rationality: the ability to reach valid conclusions from available information, as in the Wason task. The decision-theoretic concept of coherence rationality requires beliefs to be consistent, even when they are assessed one at a time. Judgment heuristics belong to System 1, and help explain the incoherence of intuitive beliefs.

Motivated Scientific Reasoning Biases, Epistemological Beliefs, and Theory Polarization: A Two-Process Approach to Adolescent Cognition

Abstract: Theory-motivated reasoning biases arise when different reasoning skills are invoked to evaluate evidence that is congruent or incongruent with individuals' belief systems. To explore this phenomenon, 66 early and 73 middle adolescents evaluated evidence relevant to their theories of social class or religion. In both conditions, reasoning biases were found, but in-group biases were evident only in the religion condition. In both conditions, higher order scientific reasoning was used to reject theory-incongruent evidence and judgmental heuristics (i.e., cognitive rules of thumb) were used to evaluate theory-congruent evidence. In both conditions, subsequent to the evidence presentation, adolescents' theories became more extreme (i.e., polarized) than at the outset of the experiment. Beliefs regarding the origin, acquisition, and certainty of knowledge, however, appeared to moderate reasoning biases and theory polarization. Age differences emerged on only one index of bias: In the religion condition, middle adolescents were more likely to treat theory-incongruent evidence as implausible. These findings are pertinent to theories of cognitive development, decision making, rationality, and in-group favoritism.

Eight Eurocentric historians

Abstract: Eurocentric History. Max Weber: Western Rationality. Lynn White, Jr.: Inventive Europeans. Robert Brenner: The Tunnel of Time. Eric L. Jones: The European Miracle. Michael Mann: The March of History. John A. Hall: Democratic Europeans. Jared Diamond: Euro-Environmentalism. David Landes: The Empire Strikes Back. Thirty Reasons Why Europeans Are Better Than Everyone Else (A Checklist). The Model.

Rationality Revisited: Planning Paradigms in a Post-Postmodernist Perspective

Abstract: The historical association between planning and rationality is unquestioned, but postmodernist critiques have raised doubts about the future of rational planning. This review defines and arrays different types of rationality to reveal that rationality is broader and more diverse than the instrumental rationality which has been associated with planning. An integrative framework associates complementary (contingent) planning paradigms with various forms of rationality, to suggest that the association between planning and rationality continues unabated. Discussion should shift from questioning the link between rationality and planning to asking what kinds of planning and rationality particular cases, situations, or contexts demand.

Economics as Moral Science

Abstract: Introduction.- Theory-Construction in Economic Science.- Rationality, Values, and Economic Theory.- The Intrasigence of Evaluative Concepts.- The Ethical Content of 'Formal' Structures.- Teleology and Utilitarian Economics.- Functionalism and the 'Systems Approach'.- Reasons, Causes, and Economic Methodology.- Justification, Obligation and Consumer Motivation.- The Problems Related.- Essential Statements and Holistic Theory.- Economic Uncertainty and Logical Structure.- Economic Uncertainty and Consumer Autonomy.- From Normative Theory to Empirical Science.- Neo-classical Economics and Scientific Utopias.- Neo-classical Economics and the Rational Justifiability of Moral Principles.- Conclusion.

Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead

Abstract: As papers presented at recent disciplinary conferences and articles published in major political science journals reveal, the field of judicial politics is undergoing a sea change. Variants of the social-psychological paradigm, which have long dominated thinking about law and courts, are giving way to approaches grounded in assumptions in rationality. More to the point, ever-growing numbers of scholars are now invoking the strategic account to understand judicial politics. In what follows, we investigate this "strategic revolution." We begin by providing an intellectual history of the field, with special emphasis on why judicial specialists resisted strategic analysis for so long and why they are now (re)turning to it in ever-increasing numbers. Next, we consider the ways that analysts have begun to put the strategic account to work. This is an important task, for debates are already emerging over the "best" way to invoke the account to study judicial politics. We take the position that there is no one "right" way but rather four different approaches--all of which have the potential to provide us with important insights into law and courts.

Rational Poverty or Poor Rationality? The Take-up of Social Assistance Benefits

Abstract: In several countries social assistance dependence has been increasing since the 1980s. After surveying the theoretical and empirical take-up literature, this study presents estimates of recent rates of non take-up of social assistance benefits. Once methodological shortcomings of prior estimations are corrected, the results show that take-up has fallen recently and thus cannot explain the rising welfare receipt. Following theoretical predictions, the probability that a rational individual takes up social assistance increases with the expected benefit amount and duration, and falls with application cost and stigma. More than half of all households eligible for transfers under the German social assistance program did not claim their benefits.

Dialectical argumentation to solve conflicts in advice giving

Abstract: Conflict situations do not only arise from misunderstandings, erroneous perceptions, partial knowledge, false beliefs, etc, but also from differences in “opinions” and in the different agents' value systems It is not always possible, and maybe not even desirable, to “solve” this kind of conflict, as the sources are subjective The communicating agents can, however, use knowledge of the opponent's preferences, to try and convince the partner of a point of view which they wish to promote To deal with these situations requires an argumentative capacity, able to handle not only “demonstrative” arguments but also “dialectic” ones, which may not necessarily be based on rationality and valid premises This paper presents a formalization of a theory of informal argumentation, focused on techniques to change attitudes of the interlocutor, in the domain of health promotion

Rationality of Migration

Abstract: The paradigm of a rational individual acting on the earnings-enhancing benefits of migration is subjected to statistical scrutiny, using data from Turkey. Results with robust selectivity correction support the rationality hypothesis: Both migrants and nonmigrants chose the option in which they had comparative advantage. However, the estimated gain from moving is negative for a substantial portion of migrants, whereas a minority realize very high returns. This suggests that migration is a lottery: Individuals are willing to invest in a proposition that has a high probability of yielding negative returns because of the potential for a very large payoff.

Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics

Abstract: Normative pragmatics can bridge the differences between dialectical and rhetorical theories in a way that saves the central insights of both. Normative pragmatics calls attention to how the manifest strategic design of a message produces interpretive effects and interactional consequences. Argumentative analysis of messages should begin with the manifest persuasive rationale they communicate. But not all persuasive inducements should be treated as arguments. Arguments express with a special pragmatic force propositions where those propositions stand in particular inferential relations to one another. Normative pragmatics provides a framework within which varieties of propositional inference and pragmatic force may be kept straight. Normative pragmatics conceptualizes argumentative effectiveness in a way that integrates notions of rhetorical strategy and rhetorical situation with dialectical norms and procedures for reasonable deliberation. Strategic effectiveness should be seen in terms of maximizing the chances that claims and arguments will be reasonably evaluated, whether or not they are accepted. Procedural rationality should be seen in terms of adjustment to the demands of concrete circumstances. Two types of adjustment are illustrated: rhetorical strategies for framing the conditions for dialectical deliberation and rhetorical strategies for making do with limitations to dialectical deliberation.