Showing papers on "Rationality published in 2001"

Where the Action Is: The Foundations of Embodied Interaction

Abstract: Computer science as an engineering discipline has been spectacularly successful. Yet it is also a philosophical enterprise in the way it represents the world and creates and manipulates models of reality, people, and action. In this book, Paul Dourish addresses the philosophical bases of human-computer interaction. He looks at how what he calls "embodied interaction" -- an approach to interacting with software systems that emphasizes skilled, engaged practice rather than disembodied rationality -- reflects the phenomenological approaches of Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and other twentieth-century philosophers. The phenomenological tradition emphasizes the primacy of natural practice over abstract cognition in everyday activity. Dourish shows how this perspective can shed light on the foundational underpinnings of current research on embodied interaction. He looks in particular at how tangible and social approaches to interaction are related, how they can be used to analyze and understand embodied interaction, and how they could affect the design of future interactive systems.

Collective identity and social movements

Abstract: ■ Abstract Sociologists have turned to collective identity to fill gaps in resource mobilization and political process accounts of the emergence, trajectories, and impacts of social movements. Collective identity has been treated as an alternative to structurally given interests in accounting for the claims on behalf of which people mobilize, an alternative to selective incentives in understanding why people participate, an alternative to instrumental rationality in explaining what tactical choices activists make, and an alternative to institutional reforms in assessing movements’ impacts. Collective identity has been treated both too broadly and too narrowly, sometimes applied to too many dynamics, at other times made into a residual category within structuralist, state-centered, and rationalist accounts.

Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox

Abstract: In a complex and uncertain world, humans and animals make decisions under the constraints of limited knowledge, resources, and time. Yet models of rational decision making in economics, cognitive science, biology, and other fields largely ignore these real constraints and instead assume agents with perfect information and unlimited time. About forty years ago, Herbert Simon challenged this view with his notion of "bounded rationality." Today, bounded rationality has become a fashionable term used for disparate views of reasoning. This book promotes bounded rationality as the key to understanding how real people make decisions. Using the concept of an "adaptive toolbox," a repertoire of fast and frugal rules for decision making under uncertainty, it attempts to impose more order and coherence on the idea of bounded rationality. The contributors view bounded rationality neither as optimization under constraints nor as the study of people's reasoning fallacies. The strategies in the adaptive toolbox dispense with optimization and, for the most part, with calculations of probabilities and utilities. The book extends the concept of bounded rationality from cognitive tools to emotions; it analyzes social norms, imitation, and other cultural tools as rational strategies; and it shows how smart heuristics can exploit the structure of environments.

Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: An Introduction

Abstract: Scholarship in the social studies of science has argued convincingly that what demarcates science from nonscience is not some set of essential or transcendent characteristics or methods but rather an array of contingent circumstances and strategic behavior known as "boundary work" (Gieryn 1995, 1999). Although initially formulated to explain how scientists maintain the boundaries of their community against threats to its cognitive authority from within (e.g., fraud and pseudo-science), boundary work has found useful, policy-relevant applications-for example, in studying the strategic demarcation between political and scientific tasks in the advisory relationship between scientists and regulatory agencies (Jasanoff 1990). This work finds that the blurring of boundaries between science and politics, rather than the intentional separation often advocated and practiced, can lead to more productive policy making. If it is the case, however, that the robustness of scientific concepts such as causation and representation are important components of liberal-democratic thought and practice (Ezrahi 1990), one can imagine how the flexibility of boundary work might lead to confusion or even dangerous instabilities between science and nonscience. These risks could be conceived, perhaps, as the politicization of science or the reciprocal scientification of politics. Neither risk should here be understood to mean the importation to one enterprise from the other elements that are entirely foreign; that is, science is not devoid of values prior to some politicization, nor politics of rationality, prior to any scientification. Rather, both should be understood to mean the rendering of norms and practices in one enterprise in a way that unreflexively mimics norms and practices in the other. These concerns have been central to the socalled science wars, and to the extent that they are implicated in public discussions of such policy issues as health and safety regulation, climate change, or genetically modified organisms, they are real problems for policy makers and publics alike.'

Rationality in Action

Abstract: The study of rationality and practical reason, or rationality in action, has been central to Western intellectual culture. In this invigorating book, John Searle lays out six claims of what he calls the Classical Model of rationality and shows why they are false. He then presents an alternative theory of the role of rationality in thought and action. A central point of Searle's theory is that only irrational actions are directly caused by beliefs and desires -- for example, the actions of a person in the grip of an obsession or addiction. In most cases of rational action, there is a gap between the motivating desire and the actual decision making. The traditional name for this gap is "freedom of the will." According to Searle, all rational activity presupposes free will. For rationality is possible only where one has a choice among various rational as well as irrational options. Unlike many philosophical tracts, Rationality in Action invites the reader to apply the author's ideas to everyday life. Searle shows, for example, that contrary to the traditional philosophical view, weakness of will is very common. He also points out the absurdity of the claim that rational decision making always starts from a consistent set of desires. Rational decision making, he argues, is often about choosing between conflicting reasons for action. In fact, humans are distinguished by their ability to be rationally motivated by desire-independent reasons for action. Extending his theory of rationality to the self, Searle shows how rational deliberation presupposes an irreducible notion of the self. He also reveals the idea of free will to be essentially a thesis of how the brain works.

Some considerations on the validity of evidence-based practice in social work

Abstract: Summary This paper considers the validity of evidence-based practice in social work. It critically examines various underlying presuppositions and assumptions entailed in evidence based practice and draws out their implications for social work. The paper is divided into three main parts. Following a consideration of the background to the develop ment of evidence-based practice and a discussion of its key organizing concepts, the paper goes on to examine its underlying scientific assumptions. It shows that evidence based practice proposes a particular deterministic version of rationality which is unsatis factory. Evidence-based practice is derived from ideas based on optimal behaviour in a planned and systematically organized environment. By concentrating on 'epistemic processes' involved in planning and psychological inference it is claimed that cognitive heuristic devices are the determinants of decision making and not evidence. The heur istic model suggests that decision making is indeterminate, reflexive, locally optimal at best and based on a limited rationality. It is argued that social workers engage in a reflexive understanding and not a determinate or certainty based decision-making pro cess based on objective evidence. Complex phenomena such as decision making are not rationally determined or subject to 'control'. The paper goes on to suggest that the tendency to separate processes into 'facts' and 'values' implicit in evidence-based procedures undermines professional judgement and discretion in social work. The third part of the paper focuses on the connection between method and ideology in evid ence-based practice. It examines how the evidence-based preoccupation with positiv istic methods and determinate judgement entraps social workers within a mechanistic form of technical rationality. This framework restricts social work to a narrow ends means rationality such that only certain forms of action are considered legitimate. This feeds into the rhetoric of new managerialist strategies aimed at developing a perform

Return to Reason

Abstract: Preface 1 Introduction: Rationality and Certainty 2 How Reason Lost Its Balance 3 The Invention of Disciplines 4 Economics, or the Physics That Never Was 5 The Dreams of Rationalism 6 Rethinking Method 7 Practical Reason and the Clinical Arts 8 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 The Trouble with Disciplines 10 Redressing the Balance 11 The Varieties of Experience 12 The World of Where and When 13 Postscript: Living with Uncertainty Notes Index

Politics and the Architecture of Choice: Bounded Rationality and Governance

Abstract: This text draws on work in political science, economics, cognitive science and psychology to offer an innovative theory of how people and organizations adapt to change and why these adaptations do not always work. The author argues that our decision-making capabilities are rational and adaptive, but because our rationality is bounded and our adaptability limited, our actions are not based simply on objective information from our environments. Instead, we overemphasize some factors and neglect others, and our inherited limitations - such as short-term memory capacity - all act to affect our judgement.

The Biological Basis of Economic Behavior

Abstract: This paper first considers the implications of biological evolution for economic preferences. It analyzes why utility functions evolved, considers evidence that utility is both hedonic and adaptive, and suggests why such adaptation might have evolved. Time preference and attitudes to risk are treated--in particular, whether the former is exponential and the latter are selfish. Arguments for another form of interdependence--a concern with status--are treated. The paper then considers the evolution of rationality. One hypothesis examined is that human intelligence and longevity were forged by hunter-gatherer economies; another is that intelligence was spurred by competitive social interactions.

Building competitive advantage from ubuntu: Management lessons from South Africa

Abstract: Executive Overview Much of management theory is based on the writings of early 20th-century Western scholars whose disciplinary orientations were heavily grounded in economics and classical sociology. These writings depict homo sapiens as an individualistic, utility-maximizing, transaction-oriented species. In contrast, recent scholarship has revealed the gender and racio-ethnic biases of these theories, and shown them to be invalid models of human nature. Humans are social and communal beings. Along with rationality, we are guided by emotions such as anxiety, hope, disappointment, fear, anger, excitement, pity, and remorse. By acknowledging the importance of emotions, world management discourse can evolve more holistic, inclusive, and emancipatory theories. South Africa offers a unique opportunity for understanding the African concept of ubuntu or humaneness. Ubuntu is rich with consideration for compassion and communality. This article discusses the characteristics of ubuntu, explores situations in whic...

Towards Design Theory and Expandable Rationality: The Unfinished Program of Herbert Simon

Abstract: It is said that Herbert Simon would have described himself as follows : «I am a monomaniac. What I am a monomaniac about is decision making ». In spite of its shares of legend and humour, this self-portrait deeply reflects the main logic of Herbert Simon’s works. From his early papers on administrative behaviour to his last investigations on thought and learning, Simon kept a same goal : to explain complex and mysterious human behaviour by simple and constrained, yet informed, decision rules. « Bounded rationality » was the name he gave to a research orientation wich rejected the maximizing behaviour assumed by classic economics. But beyond this critical aim, Simon attempted to build an empirically grounded theory of human problem solving. A theory that was intended to settle the foundation stone of « behavioural economics ».

Against Essentialism: A Theory of Culture and Society

Abstract: Introduction 1 Theory after Essentialism Accounting for the Observer Observing Observers Levels of Observing Ideological Conflicts in Observation Inside and Outside Observers Value-Freedom and Disinterestedness The Myth of "Going Native" A Few Pretty Old Rules of Method The Classics Revisited, Briefly Networks and Systems Some Elements of a Working Epistemology 2 How to Sociologize with a Hammer The Crisis of Representation Underdetermination and Theory-Ladenness The Indeterminacy of Translation Empiricizing Contexts and Demarcations Incommensurability The Double Hermeneutic Things and Persons 3 Cultural Rationality After Reason Causes and Reasons The Unity of Persons What Do Persons Want and Believe? Decisions, Decisions How to Locate Rationality Some Covariates of Rationality 4 Foundations of Culture Never Minds Who Knows? No Idea! The Meanings of Meaning Observing Culture and Cultural Observers What Is in a Culture? Cultural Stratification Art Reputation From Creativity to Genius 5 Modes of Social Association I: Encounters, Groups, and Organizations The Bodies and Brains of Persons Emotional Selves Levels of Society Encounters Groups Organizations Variations in Organizational Cultures 6 Modes of Social Association II: Networks Drift Fields of Forces Power to the Networks Metabolism Renormalization Autopoiesis Self-Similarity Unity Boundaries Network Expansions Networks of Culture 7 Realism Explained A Continuum of Realism Core Expansions and Time Machines Instruction Density Monopoly and Hegemony Competition and Decentralization Literacy and Printing Orality, Perception, and Copresence Consensus Distance and Frontstages Conclusion Appendix: Theses References Index

Communicative Action and Rational Choice

Abstract: In this book Joseph Heath brings Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action into dialogue with the most sophisticated articulation of the instrumental conception of practical rationality-modern rational choice theory. Heath begins with an overview of Habermas's action theory and his critique of decision and game theory. He then offers an alternative to Habermas's use of speech act theory to explain social order and outlines a multidimensional theory of rational action that includes norm-governed action as a specific type.In the second part of the book Heath discusses the more philosophical dimension of Habermas's conception of practical rationality. He criticizes Habermas's attempt to introduce a universalization principle governing moral discourse, as well as his criteria for distinguishing between moral and ethical problems. Heath offers an alternative account of the level of convergence exhibited by moral argumentation, drawing on game-theoretic models to specify the burden of proof that the theory of communicative action and discourse must assume.

Reasons, robots and the extended mind

Abstract: A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and Decentralized Cognition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life. 1 Such approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality too wide a berth. They focus their attention on such superficially poor cousins as 'adaptive behaviour', 'ecologically sound perception-action routines', fast and frugal heuristics' and 'fast, fluent real-time real-world action control'. 2 Is this robbery or revelation? Has 'embodied, embedded' cognitive science simply lost sight of the very phenomena it was meant to explain? Or are we finally seeing rationality aright, as fully continuous with various forms of simpler, ecologically situated, adaptive response? I distinguish two ways of developing the embodied, embedded' approach. The first, which does indeed threaten to lose sight of the key targets, is fully committed to a doctrine of biological cognitive incrementalism according to which full-scale human rationality is reached, rather directly, by some series of tweaks to basic biological modes of adaptive response. The second depicts human capacities for advanced reason as at best the indirect products of such a process. Such capacities, it is argued, depend heavily upon the effects of a special kind of hybridization in which human brains enter into an increasingly potent cascade of genuinely symbiotic relationships with knowledge-rich artifacts and technologies. This latter approach, I finally suggest, does better justice to our peculiar profile, which combines deep biological continuity with an equally deep cognitive discontinuity.

Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures

Abstract: Democratic regimes depend for their survival and effective functioning on the public's willing acquiescence and support; however, the measurement of support is problematic. The failure to appreciate the difference between established democracies and new regimes that may (or may not) be in the process of democratizing has prompted scholars to mismeasure support by relying on idealist measures. We propose a realist conception of political support and realist measures. We test these measures with data from the 1995-97 World Values Surveys, comparing their ability to describe and explain variations in support for both old and new regimes. Realist measures perform substantially better in all contexts and in ways that suggest the rationality of realist support.

Rational Markets: Yes or No? The Affirmative Case

Abstract: With the recent flurry of articles declaiming the death of the rational market hypothesis, it is well to pause and recall the very sound reasons this hypothesis was once so widely accepted, at least in academic circles. Although academic models often assume that all investors are rational, this assumption is clearly an expository device, not to be taken seriously. What is in contention is whether markets are “rational” in the sense that prices are set as if all investors are rational. Even if markets are not rational in this sense, abnormal profit opportunities still may not exist. In that case, markets may be said to be “minimally rational.” I maintain that not only are developed financial markets minimally rational, they are, with two qualifications, rational. I contend that, realistically, market rationality needs to be defined so as to allow investors to be uncertain about the characteristics of other investors in the market. I also argue that investor irrationality, to the extent that it affects prices, is particularly likely to be manifest through overconfidence, which in turn, is likely to make the market hyper-rational. To illustrate, the article reexamines some of the most serious historical evidence against market rationality.

The Liberal Government of Unfreedom

Abstract: Perhaps the most influential aspect of Michel Foucault's work on government has been his treatment of liberalism as a distinctive form of political reason. Liberalism is commonly regarded as a normative political doctrine or theory that treats the maintenance of individual liberty as an end in itself and therefore views liberty as setting limits of principle both to the legitimate objectives of government and to the manner in which those objectives may be pursued. Foucault's account of liberalism as a rationality of government also accords central place to individual liberty, which is seen as giving rise to a prudential concern that one might be governing too much. The suggestion is that, rather than pursue its objectives through the detailed regulation of conduct in the manner of police, it might be more effective for the government of a state to work through the maintenance and promotion of certain forms of individual liberty. According to this account, underlying the liberal fear of governing too much are two distinct but related perceptions of the population to be governed. It is seen first as containing a number of self-regulating domains of social interaction, and secondly as consisting of individuals endowed with a capacity for autonomous, self-directing activity. In liberal political thought, Foucault observes, the market epitomizes both perceptions, serving, in effect, as "a locus of privileged experience where one can identify the effects of excessive governmentality."1 Liberal political reason, then, sees individual liberty as a limit, not simply to the legitimate reach of government, but also to its effectiveness. More recent scholars have adapted this account of liberalism to the analysis of neoliberal attempts to govern through the decisions of autonomous individuals.

The Laws of Fear

Abstract: Cognitive and social psychologists have uncovered a number of features of ordinary thinking about risk. Giving particular attention to the work of Paul Slovic, this review-essay explores how an understanding of human cognition bears on law and public policy. The basic conclusion is that people make many mistakes in thinking about risk and that sensible policies, and sensible law, will follow statistical evidence, not ordinary people. The discussion explores the use of heuristics, the effects of cascades, the role of emotions, demographic differences, the role of trust, and the possibility that ordinary people have a special "rationality" distinct from that of experts. Because people are prone to error, what matters, most of the time, is actual risk, not perceived risk.

Transformative learning theory: a neurobiological perspective of the role of emotions and unconscious ways of knowing

Abstract: Transformative learning as explained by Mezirow in the field of adult education has been criticized as a process that is overly dependent on critical reflection, such that it minimizes the role of feelings and overlooks transformation through the unconscious development of thoughts and actions. This paper further substantiates these concerns by exploring the emotional nature of rationality and unconscious ways of knowing (implicit memory) from the field of neurobiology and psychology and offers a physiological explanation of the interdependent relationship of emotion and reason and the role of implicit memory in transformative learning theory. Recent research not only provides support that emotions can affect the processes of reason, but more importantly, emotions have been found to be indispensable for rationality to occur. Furthermore, brain research brings to light new insights about a form of long-term memory that has long been overlooked, that of implicit memory, which receives, stores, and recovers outside the conscious awareness of the individual. From implicit memory emerges habits, attitudes and preferences inaccessible to conscious recollection but these are nonetheless shapes by former events, influence our present behaviour, and are an essential part of who we are. Finally, based on these new insights for fostering transformative learning is discussed, revealing the need to include practices inclusive of ’other ways of knowing,’ and more specifically, from the study of emotional literacy and multiple intelligences.

Analytic and heuristic processing influences on adolescent reasoning and decision-making

Abstract: The normative/descriptive gap is the discrepancy between actual reasoning and traditional standards for reasoning. The relationship between age and the normative/descriptive gap was examined by presenting adolescents with a battery of reasoning and decision-making tasks. Middle adolescents (N = 76) performed closer to normative ideals than early adolescents (N = 66), although the normative/descriptive gap was large for both groups. Correlational analyses revealed that (1) normative responses correlated positively with each other, (2) nonnormative responses were positively interrelated, and (3) normative and nonnormative responses were largely independent. Factor analyses suggested that performance was based on two processing systems. The "analytic" system operates on "decontextualized" task representations and underlies conscious, computational reasoning. The "heuristic" system operates on "contextualized," content-laden representations and produces "cognitively cheap" responses that sometimes conflict with traditional norms. Analytic processing was more clearly linked to age and to intelligence than heuristic processing. Implications for cognitive development, the competence/performance issue, and rationality are discussed.

Agency, Rationality and Social Policy

Abstract: The recent concern to develop a radical but critical account of agency in social policy is to be welcomed. However this article questions whether the work of A. Giddens can provide an adequate foundation for such a project. Giddens's account of the welfare subject contains several weaknesses. It is voluntaristic and yet paradoxically it cannot offer an adequate understanding of radical change. It is also rationalistic and assumes the existences of a unitary and knowledgeable subject. As a consequence there is a danger that social policy develops a lop-sided model of agency which is insufficiently sensitive to the passionate, tragic and contradictory dimensions of human experience. A robust account of the active welfare subject must be prepared to confront the real experiences of powerlessness and psychic injury which result from injustice and oppression and acknowledge human capacities for destructiveness towards self and others. Only by exploring these different subject positions – victim, ‘own worst enemy’ and creative, reflexive agent – can we develop an understanding of the welfare subject which is optimistic without being naive.

Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning

Abstract: 0. Overview 1. Doxastic States and Their Representation 2. Epistemology and Belief Change 3. Changing Doxastic States: Two Complementary Perspectives 4. Concepts of Theoretical Rationality: Postulates for Belief Change and Nonmonotonic Reasoning 5. Foundational Belief Change Using Nonmonotonic Inference 6. A General Concept of Practical Rationality: Constraints for Coherent Choice 7. Coherentist Belief Change as a Problem of Rational Choice 8. Revealed Preferences: Understanding the Theory of Epistemic Entrenchment Appendices A B C D E References/Bibliography Index of Symbols Index of Names Subject Index

Bounded Rationality, Institutions, and Uncertainty

Abstract: The notion of bounded rationality, originally developed by Herbert Simon, has occupied an important place in many discussions about an alternative to neoclassical economics. Some of these discussions take place within the so-called “old” (or “original”) and “new” institutionalisms. In other cases, a connection between bounded rationality and an alternative theory is established via fundamental uncertainty by some authors such as Tony Lawson (1985), J. Gay Meeks (1991), and Roberto Marchionatti (1999), who suggested that John Maynard Keynes’ notion of rationality was similar to Simon’s bounded rationality or that he would be sympathetic to Simon’s views (see also Garner 1982, Arestis 1992 and Lavoie 1992). Discussing bounded rationality has become even more important with its growing incorporation into the mainstream of our profession (see the surveys by Barton Lipman (1995), John Conlisk (1996) and, with special reference to game theory, Robert Aumann (1997)), often with the aim of strengthening neoclassical economics rather than replacing it, as pointed out by Esther-Mirjam Sent (1998). This paper is about some theoretical relationships between bounded rationality, institutions, and uncertainty. Its purpose is to assess the usefulness and limitations of the notion of bounded rationality for a theory of economic behavior under fundamental uncertainty, in particular if such a theory emphasizes the role of institutions. The paper is organized as follows. The definition of bounded rationality is briefly discussed in the first section. The second section distinguishes the lack of knowledge caused by complexity, which underlies Simon’s theory of bounded rationality, from fundamental uncertainty, as well as from less strong notions of uncertainty. The possibility of creativity and unpredictable structural change in social reality separates fun-

Social Rationality versus Rational Egoism

Abstract: Rationality means many different things to many different people. Some use the term to indicate individuals' ability to exercise reason. Others use it to indicate that something is the result of reasoning or even of conscious calculation. Some use the term to indicate that purposes are being served, so that "rational action" is the same as purposeful action. Still others already presuppose purposeful action and use the term in the much more restrictive sense that individuals "act rationally" by choosing the best means available for achieving a given end. Again, others see rationality as a form of consistency between what is wanted and what is chosen: individuals rank the options open to them according to their ordered preferences and choose according to this ranking. Each of these meanings of rationality has been criticized as being too vague (for example, "exercise reason") or too narrow (for example, "consistency") to cover the wider intuitive reach of the term. I believe that these criticisms have a point. The very wish to come up with a simple definition of rationality is to stress what one considers to be the most essential feature of rationality among a number of other features of rationality that are not stated. There is no need to begin with such a restrictive strategy because even in its restrictive form, a definition of rationality is not enough to be used as a theory of action. As a heuristic device, it would serve its function better if it included a greater number of important elements associated with an intuitive understanding of rationality. For this reason, I would like to take a different approach. I use the term "rationality" to indicate a particular heuristic device for asking questions and searching for and evaluating answers concerning human behavior. At a later stage, more specifications can be added to come to a theory of action. The heuristic device I would like to propose consists of six assumptions about human beings that jointly indicate the meaning of the phrase "human beings are endowed with rationality." For such a heuristic, the search is for elements which jointly cover most people's intuition of rationality as applied to humans. In fact, the list should be such that a human being who is lacking one or more of the elements would be considered pathological to various degrees by a

Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World

Abstract: Introduction: On Philosophical Method I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIVE WORLD 1. Truth and Relativism Is Truth Relative? Who Wants Relativism? Truth in Space and Time The Truth Property Is a Theory of Truth Possible? Is Truth Socially Relative? Does Relativism Undercut Itself? The Correspondence Theory 2. Invariance and Objectivity Objective Facts Admissible Transformations Two Types of Philosophical Account The Ordering of Objectiveness Intersubjectivity Objective Beliefs and Biasing Factors Dimensions of Truth The Objectivity of Science The Functional View Underdetermination of Theory Rationality, Progress, Objectivity, and Veridicality 3. Necessity and Contingency Epistemology of Necessity Cross-Classifications On the Supposed Necessity of Water's Being H2O The Withering of Metaphysical Necessity Explaining Away Necessities Logical and Mathematical Necessity Degrees of Contingency The Nature of Actuality The Ultimate Theory of the World II. THE HUMAN WORLD AS PART OF THE OBJECTIVE WORLD 4. The Realm of Consciousness The Function of Consciousness Gradations of Awareness The Context of Consciousness The Zoom-Lens Theory Synthesizing and Filtering Data Common Knowledge The Functions of Phenomenology Mind-Body Relations 5. The Genealogy of Ethics The Theory of Ethics The Ubiquity of Ethics Coordination to Mutual Benefit Coordination via Ethical Norms The Evaluation of Systems of Coordination The Core Principle of Ethics Normative Force and the Normativity Module Evaluative Capacities Higher Layers of Ethics Ethical Truth and Ethical Objectivity The Unpredictability of Human Behavior Ethics and Conscious Self-Awareness Notes Index

Science and Poetry

Abstract: Part 1: Visions of Rationality 1. The Sources of Thought 2. Knowledge Considered as Weed-Killer 3. Rationality and Rainbows 4. The Origin of Disillusion 5. Atomistic Dreams The Quest for Permanence 6. Memes and Other Unusual Life-Forms Part 2: Mind and Body The End of Apartheid 7. Putting Our Selves Together Again 8. Living in the World 9. The Strange Persistence of Fatalism 10. Chess-Boards and Presidents of the Immortals 11. Doing Science on Purpose 12. One World but a Big One 13 A Plague on both their Houses 14. Being Scientific about Our Selves Part 3: In What Kind of World? 15. Widening Responsibilities 16. The Problem of Humbug 17. Individualism and the Concept of Gaia 18. Gods and Goddesses The Role of Wonder 19. Why There is Such a Thing as Society 20. Paradoxes of Sociobiology and Social Darwinism 21. Mythology, Rhetoric and Religion

Analytical paradigms: the epistemological distances between scientists, policy makers, and the public.

Abstract: The effective use of evidence and its resultant knowledge is increasingly recognized as critical in risk analysis. This, in turn, has led to a growing concern over issues of epistemology in risk communication, and, in particular, interest in how knowledge is constructed and employed by the key players in risk--scientists, policy makers, and the public. This article uses a critical theoretical approach to explore how evidence is recognized and validated, and how limits are placed on knowledge by scientists, policy makers, and the public. It brings together developments in the sociology of science, policy and policy development, public understandings of science, and risk communication and analysis to explicate the differing forms of rationality employed by each group. The work concludes that each group employs different, although equally legitimate, forms of rationality when evaluating evidence and generating knowledge around risky environment and health issues. Scientists, policy makers, and the public employ scientific, political, and social rationality, respectively. These differing forms of rationality reflect underlying epistemological distances from which can develop considerable misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

Assessing communicative rationality as a transportation planning paradigm

Abstract: Communicative rationality offers a new paradigm for transportation planning. Drawing on the literature and lessons from transportation planning practice, this paper describes the characteristics of a “communicative” form of transportation planning and compares them with conventional practices. A communicative rationality paradigm would place language and discourse at the core of transportation planning. The paper argues that it would lead to greater attention to desired transportation ends (goals), better integration of means and ends, new forms of participation and learning, and enhanced deliberative capacity. The paper explains the implications of this paradigm for the role of the transportation planner, the purpose of planning, the planning process, communicative practices, problem framing, and the nature of planning analysis. The paper concludes with an assessment of communicative rationality's ability to promote more effective transportation planning. It seeks to create a dialogue that will support the investigation of new transportation planning processes.

Rationality, Meaning, and the Analysis of Delusion

Abstract: ON WHAT I will call a rationalist approach to delusion, delusion is a matter of topdown disturbance in some fundamental beliefs of the subject, which may consequently affect experiences and actions. On an empiricist approach, in contrast, delusion is a rational response to highly unusual experiences that the subject has, perhaps as a result of organic damage. Ellis and Young (1990) recently provided an empiricist analysis of the Capgras and Cotard delusions. I want to begin with some remarks on just why it is important to the empiricist approach that it should acknowledge the rationality of the subject’s delusional responses to unusual stimuli. We will see that when the rationale for the rationality constraint is fully set out, it is questionable whether Ellis and Young’s approach actually succeeds in giving its place to the rationality constraint. In conclusion, I will look briefly at the prospects for a rationalist approach and at what other approaches might be possible.