Showing papers on "Rationality published in 2010"

Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization

Abstract: 1. The Purpose of this Book 2. Intentionality 3. Collective Intentionality and the Assignment of Function 4. Language as Bilogical and Social 5. The General Theory of Institutions and Institutional Facts: Language and Social Reality 6. Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts 7. Deontic, Background, Political and Other

Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality

Abstract: In psychological games the payoff to each player depends not only on what every player does but also on what he thinks every player believes, and on what he thinks they believe others believe, and so on. In equilibrium, beliefs are assumed to correspond to reality. Yet psychological games and psychological equilibria allow one to model belief-dependent emotions such as anger and surprise that are problematic for conventional game theory. We are particularly interested in issues of sequential rationality for psychological games. We show that although backward induction cannot be applied, and “perfect” psychological equilibria may not exist, subgame perfect and sequential equilibria always do exist.

Rationality and the Reflective Mind

Abstract: Preface CHAPTER I: Dual-Process Theory and the Great Rationality Debate The Great Rationality Debate Individual Differences in the Great Rationality Debate Dual Process Theory: The Current State of Play Properties of Type 1 and Type 2 Processing Dual-Process Theory and Human Goals: Implications for the Rationality Debate The Rest of This Book: Complications in Dual Process Theory and Their Implications for the Concepts of Rationality and Intelligence CHAPTER II: Differentiating the Algorithmic Mind and the Reflective Mind Unpacking Type 2 Functioning Using Individual Differences Cognitive Ability and Thinking Dispositions Partition the Algorithmic and the Reflective Mind Intelligence Tests and Critical Thinking Tests Partition the Algorithmic from the Reflective Mind Thinking Dispositions as Independent Predictors of Rational Thought CHAPTER III: The Key Functions of the Reflective Mind and the Algorithmic Mind that Support Human Rationality So-Called "Executive Functioning" Measures Tap the Algorithmic Mind and Not the Reflective Mind CHAPTER IV: The Tri-Process Model and Serial Associative Cognition The Cognitive Miser and Focal Bias Converging Evidence in the Dual Process Literature CHAPTER V: The Master Rationality Motive and the Origins of the Nonautonomous Mind Metarepresentation and Higher-Order Preferences What Motivates the Search for Rational Integration? The Master Rationality Motive as a Psychological Construct Evolutionary Origins of the Master Rational Motive and Type 2 Processing CHAPTER VI: A Taxonomy of Rational Thinking Problems (with Richard F. West) Dual-Process Theory and Knowledge Structures The Preliminary Taxonomy Heuristics and Biases Tasks in Terms of the Taxonomy Multiply-Determined Problems of Rational Thought Missing Input from the Autonomous Mind CHAPTER VII: Intelligence as a Predictor of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks (with Richard F. West) Intelligence and Classic Heuristics and Biases Effects Belief Bias and Myside Bias Why Thinking Biases Do and Do Not Associate with Cognitive Ability Cognitive Decoupling, Mindware Gaps, and Override Detection in Heuristics and Biases Tasks CHAPTER VIII: Rationality and Intelligence: Empirical and Theoretical Relationships and Implications for the Great Rationality Debate Intelligence and Rationality Associations in Terms of the Taxonomy Summary of the Relationships Individual Differences, the Reflective Mind, and the Great Rationality Debate Skepticism About Mindware-Caused Irrationalities CHAPTER IX: The Social Implications of Separating the Concepts of Intelligence and Rationality Broad Versus Narrow Concepts of Intelligence Intelligence Imperialism Intelligence Misidentified as Adaptation and the Deification of Intelligence Strategies for Cutting Intelligence Down to Size Society's Selection Mechanisms CHAPTER X: The Assessment of Rational Thought (with Richard F. West and Maggie E. Toplak) A Framework for the Assessment of Rational Thinking Operationalizing the Components of Rational Thought The Future of Research on Individual Differences in Rational Thought References Figures and Tables

Rational choice in an uncertain world : the psychology of judgment and decision making

Abstract: Chapter 1 - Thinking and Deciding 1.1 Decision Making Is a Skill 1.2 Thinking: automatic and Controlled 1.3 The Computational Model of the Mind 1.4 Through the Darkest Psychoanalytical Theory and Behaviorism to Cognition 1.5 Quality of Choice: Rationality 1.6 The Invention of Modern Decision Theory Chapter 2 - What Is Decision Making? 2.1 Definition of a Decision 2.2 Picturing Decisions 2.3 Decision Quality, Revisited 2.4 Incomplete Thinking: A Legal Example 2.5 Over-Inclusive Thinking: Sunk Costs 2.6 The Rationality of Considering Only the Future 2.7 The Rest of This Book Chapter 3 - A General Framework for Judgment 3.1 A Conceptual Framework for Judgment and Prediction 3.2 Research With the Lens Model Framework 3.3 Capturing Judgment in Statistical Models 3.4 How Do Statistical Models Beat Human Judgment? 3.5 Practical Implications of the Surprising Success of the Linear Model 3.6 Objections and Rebuttals 3.7 The Role of Judgment in Choices and Decisions Chapter 4 - The Fundamental Judgment Strategy: Anchoring and Adjustment 4.1 Salient Values 4.2 Anchoring and (Insufficient) Adjustment 4.3 Anchoring on Ourselves 4.4 Anchoring the Past in the Present Chapter 5 - Judging Heuristically 5.1 Going Beyond the Information Given 5.2 Estimating Frequencies and probabilities 5.3 Availability of Memories 5.4 Biased Samples in Memory 5.5 Biased Sampling From Memory 5.6 Availability to the Imagination 5.7 From Availability to Probablility and Causality 5.8 Judgment by Similarity: Same Old Things 5.9 Representative Thinking 5.10 The Ratio Rule Chapter 6 - Explanation-Based Judgments 6.1 Everyone Likes a Good Story 6.2 The Conjunction Probabliity Error (Again) 6.3 Judging From Explanations 6.4 Legal Scenarios: The Best Story Wins in the Courtroom 6.5 Scenarios About Ourselves 6.6 Scenarios About the Unthinkable 6.7 Hindsight: Reconstructing the Past 6.8 Sometimes It's Better to Forget Chapter 7 - Chance and Cause 7.1 Misconceptions About Chance 7.2 Illusions of Control 7.3 Seeing Causal Structure Where It Isn't 7.4 Regression Toward the Mean 7.5 Reflections on Our Inability to Accept Randomness Chapter 8 - Thinking Rationally About Uncertainty 8.1 What to Do About the Biases 8.2 Getting Started Thinking in Terms of Probabilities 8.3 Comprehending the Situation Being Judged 8.4 Testing for Rationality 8.5 How to Think About Inverse Probabilities 8.6 Avoiding Subadditivity and Conjunction Errors 8.7 The Other Side of the Coin: The Probability of a Disjunction of Events 8.8 Changing Our Minds: Bayes's Theorem 8.9 Statistical Decision Theory 8.10 Concluding Comment on Rationality Chapter 9 - Evaluating Consequences: Fundamental Preferences 9.1 What Good is Happiness? 9.2 The Role of Emotions in Evaluations 9.3 The Value of Money 9.4 Decision Utility -- Predicting What We will Value 9.5 Constructing Values Chapter 10 - From Preferences to Choices 10.1 Deliberate Choices Among Complex Alternatives 10.2 Ordering Alternatives 10.3 Grouping Alternatives 10.4 Choosing Alternatives 10.5 How to Make Good Choices Chapter 11 - A Rational Decision Theory 11.1 Formally Defining Rationality 11.2 Making Theories Understandable -- The Axiomatic Method 11.3 Defining Rationality: Expected Utility Theory 11.4 Traditional Objections to the Axioms 11.5 The Shoulds and Dos of the System 11.6 Some Bum Raps for Decision Analysis Chapter 12 - A Descriptive Decision Theory 12.1 Non-expected Utility Theories 12.2 Gain-Loss Framing Effects 12.3 Loss Aversion 12.4 Look to the Future Chapter 13 - What's Next? New Directions in Research on Judgment and Decision Making 13.1 The Neuroscience of Decisions 13.2 Emotions in Decision Making 13.3 The Rise of Experimental Methods to Study Dynamic Decisions 13.4 Do We Really Know Where We're Headed? Chapter 14 - In Praise of Uncertianty 14.1 Uncertainty as Negative 14.2 The Illusion of Hedonic Certainty 14.3 The Price of Denying Uncertainty 14.4 Two Cheers for Uncertainty 14.5 Living With Uncertainty

Mental models and human reasoning

Abstract: To be rational is to be able to reason. Thirty years ago psychologists believed that human reasoning depended on formal rules of inference akin to those of a logical calculus. This hypothesis ran into difficulties, which led to an alternative view: reasoning depends on envisaging the possibilities consistent with the starting point—a perception of the world, a set of assertions, a memory, or some mixture of them. We construct mental models of each distinct possibility and derive a conclusion from them. The theory predicts systematic errors in our reasoning, and the evidence corroborates this prediction. Yet, our ability to use counterexamples to refute invalid inferences provides a foundation for rationality. On this account, reasoning is a simulation of the world fleshed out with our knowledge, not a formal rearrangement of the logical skeletons of sentences.

The logic of habit in International Relations

Abstract: IR theory is dominated by the logics of consequentialism and appropriateness. But Max Weber offered four logics of choice, not just two. Beyond the instrumental rationality of Zweckrationalitat and the normative rationality of Wertrationalitat are affect and habit. Drawing on Weber, James, Dewey, and Bourdieu, and habit’s microfoundations in neurocognitive psychology, I explore the logic of habit and its consequences for several fundamental puzzles in IR theory. The logic of habit necessarily precludes rationality, agency, and uncertainty, and so offers a different interpretation of cooperation, security dilemmas, enduring rivalries, and security communities in international politics. The logic of habit also fills a gap in mainstream constructivism’s theorization of intersubjective structures, returning the taken-for-granted lifeworld to the center of attention.

The Emotionalization of Reflexivity

Abstract: Reflexivity refers to the practices of altering one’s life as a response to knowledge about one’s circumstances. While theories of reflexivity have not entirely ignored emotions, attention to them has been insufficient. These theories need emotionalizing and this article proposes that emotions have become central to a subjectivity and sociality that is relationally constructed. The emotionalization of reflexivity not only refers to a theoretical endeavour but is a phrase used to begin to explore whether individuals are increasingly drawing on emotions in assessing themselves and their lives. It is argued that dislocation from tradition produces a reflexivity that can be very dependent on comparing experiences and can move others to reflect and reorder their own relations to self and others. Thus, emotions are crucial to how the social is reproduced and to enduring within a complex social world.

As-if behavioral economics: Neoclassical economics in disguise?

Abstract: For a research program that counts improved empirical realism among its primary goals, it is surprising that behavioral economics appears indistinguishable from neoclassical economics in its reliance on “as-if” arguments. “As-if” arguments are frequently put forward in behavioral economics to justify “psychological” models that add new parameters to fit decision outcome data rather than specifying more realistic or empirically supported psychological processes that genuinely explain these data. Another striking similarity is that both behavioral and neoclassical research programs refer to a common set of axiomatic norms without subjecting them to empirical investigation. Notably missing is investigation of whether people who deviate from axiomatic rationality face economically significant losses. Despite producing prolific documentation of deviations from neoclassical norms, behavioral economics has produced almost no evidence that deviations are correlated with lower earnings, lower happiness, impaired health, inaccurate beliefs, or shorter lives. We argue for an alternative non-axiomatic approach to normative analysis focused on veridical descriptions of decision process and a matching principle – between behavioral strategies and the environments in which they are used – referred to as ecological rationality. To make behavioral economics, or psychology and economics, a more rigorously empirical science will require less effort spent extending “as-if” utility theory to account for biases and deviations, and substantially more careful observation of successful decision makers in their respective domains.

The Institutionalization of Social Investment: The Interplay of Investment Logics and Investor Rationalities

Abstract: Across the world, a new landscape of social investment has been developing rapidly over the last 10–15 years, yet there has not been an academic study of the phenomenon to date. This paper aims to address this important gap in social entrepreneurship research with new empirical and theoretical work. Theoretically, the paper takes an interpretive approach drawing on institutional theory and other work on the sociology of markets to conceptualize social investment as a socially constructed space within which different investment logics and investor rationalities are currently in play. Using a Weberian analytic lens this paper identifies two ideal type investor rationalities (zweckrational; wertrational) that drive different institutional forms of social investment but also suggests that a third – systemic – rationality can be discerned that combines aspects of both in practice. This analysis suggests a three-part typology of social investment organized according to investor rationality that, in turn, generates a Social Investment Matrix consisting of nine distinct models. Empirically, this paper presents – for the first time – an attempt to quantify the flows of capital within the inchoate social investment landscape. The paper concludes by setting out three possible future scenarios for social investment each representing the ultimate dominance of a singular investor rationality.

Philosophy of Mind

Abstract: Philosophy of mind concerns questions about mental phenomena that empirical research alone can't settle, such as the nature of mental states and which sorts of things can have them—only living things, or also machines? Settling them requires reflection on such phenomena as consciousness, rationality, and intentionality; the ‘explanatory gaps’ that seem to exist between these; and underlying physical phenomena and the different strategies—dualist, eliminativist, physicalist, and functionalist—that have been proposed for dealing with them. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website

Moral satisficing: Rethinking moral behavior as bounded rationality

Abstract: What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: Behavior needs to be studied in social groups as well as in isolation, in natural environments as well as in labs. It also has implications for moral policy: Only by accepting the fact that behavior is a function of both mind and environmental structures can realistic prescriptive means of achieving moral goals be developed.

Complex Economics: Individual and Collective Rationality

Abstract: The economic crisis is also a crisis for economic theory. Most analyses of the evolution of the crisis invoke three themes, contagion, networks and trust, yet none of these play a major role in standard macroeconomic models. What is needed is a theory in which these aspects are central. The direct interaction between individuals, firms and banks does not simply produce imperfections in the functioning of the economy but is the very basis of the functioning of a modern economy. This book suggests a way of analysing the economy which takes this point of view. The economy should be considered as a complex adaptive system in which the agents constantly react to, influence and are influenced by, the other individuals in the economy. In such systems which are familiar from statistical physics and biology for example, the behaviour of the aggregate cannot be deduced from the behaviour of the average, or "representative" individual. Just as the organised activity of an ants' nest cannot be understood from the behaviour of a "representative ant" so macroeconomic phenomena should not be assimilated to those associated with the "representative agent". This book provides examples where this can clearly be seen. The examples range from Schelling's model of segregation, to contributions to public goods, the evolution of buyer seller relations in fish markets, to financial models based on the foraging behaviour of ants. The message of the book is that coordination rather than efficiency is the central problem in economics. How do the myriads of individual choices and decisions come to be coordinated? How does the economy or a market, "self organise" and how does this sometimes result in major upheavals, or to use the phrase from physics, "phase transitions"? The sort of system described in this book is not in equilibrium in the standard sense, it is constantly changing and moving from state to state and its very structure is always being modified. The economy is not a ship sailing on a well-defined trajectory which occasionally gets knocked off course. It is more like the slime described in the book "emergence", constantly reorganising itself so as to slide collectively in directions which are neither understood nor necessarily desired by its components.

Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs

Abstract: Delusional people are people saying very bizarre things like they are dead, their spouse is a robot, the TV star is talking to them, they are possessed by the devil, aliens are following them, and so on Even though we know that they are not identical, terms like “delusion” and “mental illness” are often used as synonyms in ordinary language This comes from what psychopathology tradition handed down: delusion is the key psychopathological phenomenon, although essentially un-understandable (Jaspers, 1959) In her book Delusion and Other Irrational Beliefs, Lisa Bortolotti explores the topic of delusion from the epistemological perspective of analytical philosophy Do delusional people really believe what they say? This question is as interesting as it is pressing for clinics From the very beginning however this work is engaged in defending two core ideas First, understanding belief, regardless of whether it is a “real pattern” or not (Dennett, 1991), is relevant to understanding what delusions are Second, delusions can be beliefs like others This is only a small part of what makes this book a fascinating and indispensable work The aim of the book is arguing against accounts which deny the doxastic nature of delusion In philosophy of mind, the claim that delusions are not beliefs is taken as a modus tollens argument deriving from the general premise that all beliefs presuppose a background rationality, as assumed by belief attribution theory in the Davidson-Dennett tradition In other words, since delusions do not meet the rationality constraint (since they are irrational phenomena), they are not beliefs at all Chapter 1 is an opening background section devoted both to the rationality constraint in belief attribution theory and to conceptions and taxonomy of

Using Europe: Strategic action in multi-level politics

Abstract: This article examines the importance of action-theoretical considera- tions in European studies. By outlining the notion of 'usage' of the European Union, we argue for a more systematically sociological consideration of strategic action in the study of European transformations. The recent turns towards constructivism and comparative political sociology allow analyzing the rationality of political actors without falling in the trap of overly reductionist rational choice assumptions. Concentrating on intentional action helps to reveal the importance of three aspects of the multi-level polity: (1) informal and non-constraining procedures; (2) the effects of ways in which actors move in between the different levels of the European political system; and (3) the ambiguous and often surprising coalitions that come together despite often considerable disagreement over their final goals. Comparative European Politics (2010) 8, 110-126. doi:10.1057/cep.2010.7

Planning With Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy

Abstract: Judith E. Innes & David E. Booher, London: Routledge, 2010, ISBN 139780415779326 (pb) Judith Innes and David Booher have been at the forefront of the development of communicative planning theory an...

Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness

Abstract: Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness by Richard H Thaler and Cass R Sunstein Penguin 2009 312 pages ISBN: 978-0143115267 Reviewed by Scott Flanagan In higher education, the power to influence is often more potent than position authority (Bergquist 1992; Birnbaum 1988) Nudge explores the relationship between decision process design (choice architecture) and decision making and suggests that conscious choices about choice architecture can improve decision making College campuses are full of intelligent people who sometimes struggle to understand behavior that is not rational Nudge helps to explain the reasons why and how rational decision making can be supported by choice architecture The authors, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, worked on this book during the course of their years together as faculty members at the University of Chicago Since then, the authors have reportedly become part of a "behavioral dream team" (Grunwald 2009, p 29) that influenced then-Senator Obama's campaign, and President Obama has appointed Sunstein to a leadership role in reviewing and crafting federal policies While college and university planners are not its primary target authence Nudge carries implications that planners can use to enhance the effectiveness of their work Thaler and Sunstein collaborated during weekly lunches at the same restaurant At times the book has the comfortable, colloquial feel of a conversation among colleagues The book is written in an accessible manner for a broad authence with examples liberally and skillfully used to illustrate key points It is not the result of new research, but is rather the distillation of previous work in the field of behavioral sciences, presented in a manner easy to understand and apply In this respect, it is similar to Freakonomics (Levitt and Dubner 2005), 77ie Tipping Point (Gladwell 2000), Outliers (Gladwell 2008), The Black Swan (Taleb 2007), and other recent works that communicate complex ideas simply The book contains sufficient scholarly background, which gives its observations and recommendations more weight than other recent popular works that seem to be only a series of anecdotes loosely organized around a theme Nudge is organized in five parts: an introductory exploration of the concept of libertarian paternalism, the impact of nudges upon financial, health, and lifestyle decisions (respectively), and a concluding section suggesting other specific applications of the concept The book is built on two key foundations The first is that there is no such thing as neutral design Whether intended or not, the choice architecture of every process influences the likelihood of particular outcomes Exposing the myth of neutral design is one of the most powerful ideas in the book Second, individuals do not tend to act rationally Most of us have every good intention to pursue financial and physical health, yet we often buy more investments when the stock market is increasing in value, save less than we know we should, eat unhealthy food too frequently, exercise too infrequently, etc Thaler and Sunstein describe this pheonmenon by contrasting the decisions of two groups of people: Econs (mythical individuals who make perfectly rational decisions) and Humans (who are subject to flaws in decision making) While the non-existent Econs have no trouble translating their rationality into action Humans are easily confused and sometimes paralyzed by decisions with many options Further, Humans have difficulty associating short-term decisions with the long-term impact of those decisions (hence the difficulties with the saving habits and waistlines of many Americans) Taken together, these two foundations lead to a conclusion that Thaler and Sunstein term "libertarian paternalism" The authors summarize the logic behind the idea of libertarian paternalism accordingly: "Choice architecture and its effects cannot be avoided, and so the short answer is an obvious one …

The interplay of moral norms and instrumental incentives in crime causation

Abstract: Rational choice theories (RCTs) of crime assume actors behave in an instrumental, outcome-oriented way. Accordingly, individuals should weight the costs and benefits of criminal acts with subjective probabilities that these outcomes will occur. Previous studies either do not directly test this central hypothesis or else yield inconsistent results. We show that a meaningful test can be conducted only if a broader view is adopted that takes into account the interplay of moral norms and instrumental incentives. Such a view can be derived from the Model of Frame Selection (Kroneberg, 2005) and the Situational Action Theory of Crime Causation (Wikstrom, 2004). Based on these theories, we analyze the willingness to engage in shoplifting and tax fraud in a sample of 2,130 adults from Dresden, Germany. In line with our theoretical expectations, we find that only respondents who do not feel bound by moral norms show the kind of instrumental rationality assumed in RCTs of crime. Where norms have been strongly internalized, and in the absence of neutralizations, instrumental incentives are irrelevant.

A Note on Rationalizability and Restrictions on Belief

Abstract: Rationalizability is a widely accepted solution concept in the study of strategic form game with complete information and is fully characterized in terms of assumptions on the rationality of the players and common certainty of rationality. Battigalli and Siniscalchi extend rationalizability and derive the solution concept called Δ-rationalizability. Their analysis is based on the following assumptions: (a) players are rational; (b) their first-order beliefs satisfy some restrictions; and (c) there is common belief of (a) and (b). In this note I focus on games with complete information and I characterize Δ-rationalizability with a new notion of iterative dominance which is able to capture the additional hypothesis on players' beliefs.

Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model

Abstract: A decision maker (DM) is characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects choices that are rational in an "objective" sense: the DM can convince others that she is right in making them. The second relation models choices that are rational in a "subjective" sense: the DM cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them. In the context of decision under uncertainty, we propose axioms that the two notions of rationality might satisfy. These axioms allow a joint representation by a single set of prior probabilities and a single utility index. It is "objectively rational" to choose f in the presence of g if and only if the expected utility of f is at least as high as that of g given each and every prior in the set. It is "subjectively rational" to choose f rather than g if and only if the minimal expected utility of f (with respect to all priors in the set) is at least as high as that of g. In other words, the objective and subjective rationality relations admit, respectively, a representation a la Bewley (2002) and a la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Our results thus provide a bridge between these two classic models, as well as a novel foundation for the latter.

Risk Rationalities in Contemporary Social Work Policy and Practice

Abstract: Social work and risk have become increasingly linked, and contemporary social work has been significantly influenced by the risk paradigm. However, the concept of ‘risk’ in social work is by no means uniform or uncontested. This paper will review the varying rationalities of risk currently deployed in social work, and will contrast the differing policy responses and practices such differing rationalities of risk give rise to. Differing rationalities of risk constitute the social work subject differently, as ‘the rational actor’ or the ‘responsibilised’ user, although the extent to which subsequent practice responses actually differ is a moot point. Limits to the prudential actor are explored, for both users and practitioners, and the notion of situated rationality is offered as a more useful concept for understanding responses to risk in social work. In addition, risk rationalities are rarely translated into policy or practice in pure form; various ‘firewalls’ and barriers to transfer mediate such transference, and the paper will identify the most salient in contemporary policy.

As-if behavioral economics : Neoclassical economics in disguise?

Abstract: For a research program that counts improved empirical realism among its primary goals, it is surprising that behavioral economics appears indistinguishable from neoclassical economics in its reliance on “as-if” arguments “As-if” arguments are frequently put forward in behavioral economics to justify “psychological” models that add new parameters to fit decision outcome data rather than specifying more realistic or empirically supported psychological processes that genuinely explain these data Another striking similarity is that both behavioral and neoclassical research programs refer to a common set of axiomatic norms without subjecting them to empirical investigation Notably missing is investigation of whether people who deviate from axiomatic rationality face economically significant losses Despite producing prolific documentation of deviations from neoclassical norms, behavioral economics has produced almost no evidence that deviations are correlated with lower earnings, lower happiness, impaired health, inaccurate beliefs, or shorter lives We argue for an alternative non-axiomatic approach to normative analysis focused on veridical descriptions of decision process and a matching principle – between behavioral strategies and the environments in which they are used – referred to as ecological rationality To make behavioral economics, or psychology and economics, a more rigorously empirical science will require less effort spent extending “as-if” utility theory to account for biases and deviations, and substantially more careful observation of successful decision makers in their respective domains

Governing the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality

Abstract: A key debate within International Relations (IR) centers on the character of globalization and what globalization means for the principle of state sovereignty and for the power and functioning of states. Among theorists, realists who argue in favour of the continued importance of states confront constructivists who contend that a number of political entities challenge states while the logic of globalization itself undermines their sovereignty. Drawing on the literatures on state formation and social theory, particularly the works of Weber and Foucault, Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending question the terms of the realist-constructivist debate. Through a series of detailed case studies, they demonstrate that the growing importance of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) tends to increase the power of states, because states are able to draw on them indirectly in the effort to uphold social order. Neumann and Sending conclude that the power of states not only depends on the predominance of the states-based system in global politics, but ultimately rests on the individual states' social power. Furthermore, the key to globalization is the neo-liberal rationality of government--a rationality that is creating a global polity where new hierarchies among states as well as between states and other actors have emerged.

Decision Theory as Practice: Crafting Rationality in Organizations

Abstract: This paper explores the underlying practices whereby rationality — as defined in rational choice theory — is achieved within organizations. The qualitative coding of 58 case study reports produced by decision analysts, working in a wide range of settings, highlights how organizational actors can make decisions in accord with the axioms of rational choice theory. Our findings describe the emergence of ‘decision-analysis’ as a field and reveal the complex and fragile socio-technical infrastructure underlying the craft of rationality, the central role of calculability, and the various forms of bricolage that decision analysts deploy to make rational decisions happen. Overall, this research explores the social construction of rationality and identifies the practices sustaining the performativity of rational choice theory within organizations.

Practical wisdom in managerial decision making

Abstract: Purpose – The aim of this paper is to present the necessity for practical wisdom in the managerial decision making process and its role in such a process. The paper seeks to contrast the position with two conventional approaches based on maximizing and satisficing behaviors respectively.Design/methodology/approach – Following Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas it is argued that a correct decision should consider an “integral rationality” which includes not only “instrumental rationality” but also “practical rationality”. The latter permits the evaluation of both means and ends from the perspective of human good. Practical wisdom helps the decision maker to determine how a decision will contribute to the human good in each particular situation.Findings – Maximizing and satisficing behaviors are based on the facts‐values dichotomy, which separates business and ethics and presents a rationalistic and incomplete view of the reality. The alternative presented here sees the decision as a whole, and this is a more com...

The competition state today: from raison d’État to raison du Monde

Abstract: In a globalising world, states are undergoing a fundamental transformation in their underlying rationality, what Foucault has called ‘governmentality’ Raison d’Etat is being superseded by a transnationalising, globalising rationality that I call raison du Monde, at the core of which is the imperative of maintaining and promoting competitiveness in a world marketplace and multi-level political system – the Competition State The state still has a major national yet paradoxical role to play – to expose the domestic to the transnational in order to ensure that citizens keep up with the multiple pressures and demands of that increasingly interpenetrated political, economic and social ecosystem The foreign or external is thereby being internalised In this process the state is becoming increasingly pluralistic, although, to be viable and effective groups must widen and deepen their transnational connections There is thus an ongoing struggle between those groups that can capture the benefits of globalisation

Political Myth, Mythology and the European Union*

Abstract: The EU, as is commonly held, is a different form of political rule: a polity based on rationality and functional interests, not emotional appeals. Without reference to the narrative of the nation or the state, the question emerges as to whether the European Union needs or has myths? If it does, what are they and how successful have they been? The aim of this article – indeed of the special issue – is to explore the role of political myth in creating normative and cognitive foundations for governing in the EU and to examine whether these are applicable to the case of the European Union.

A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997

Abstract: Extensive empirical evidence and theoretical developments in multiple disciplines stimulate the need to expand the range of rational choice models to be used as a foundation for the study of social dilemmas and collective action. After an introduction to the problem of overcoming social dilemmas through collective action, the remainder of this article is divided into six sections. The first briefly reviews the theoretical predictions of currently accepted rational choice theory related to social dilemmas. The second section summarizes the challenges to the sole reliance on a complete model of rationality presented by extensive experimental research. In the third section, I discuss two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are “better than rational” by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest. The fourth section raises the possibility of developing second-generation models of rationality, the fifth section develops the initial theoretical scenario, and the final section concludes by examining the implications of placing reciprocity, reputation, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of collective action.