Showing papers on "Rationality published in 2018"

Planning with Complexity : An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy

Abstract: In an era of rapid change, uncertainty, and hyperpartisanship, when wicked problems abound, tools for solving public problems are more essential than ever. The authors lay out a new theory for collaborative practice in planning, public administration, and public policy. Planning with Complexity provides both theoretical underpinnings and extensive case material on collaboration and offers ways of understanding and conducting effective practice. Collaborative rationality means collaboration that is inclusive, informed, grounded in authentic dialogue, and that results in wise and durable outcomes. The scholar-practitioner author team builds on more than 40 years of research, teaching, and practice addressing environmental issues, housing, and transportation. This second edition updates the case studies and adds new examples reflecting the global spread of collaborative practices. It builds on insights that have recently emerged in the literature. More than 75 new references have been incorporated, along with new tables. This book is essential for students, educators, scholars, and reflective practitioners in public policy fields in the 21st century.

A Relational Theory of World Politics

Abstract: Culture matters in social theory construction because the metaphysical component of the theoretical hard core is primarily shaped by the background knowledge of a cultural community. Individual rationality, a key concept abstracted from Western culture, constitutes the nucleus for much of mainstream Western International Relations Theory. This article proposes a relational theory of world politics with relationality as the metaphysical component of its theoretical hard core. It conceives the International Relations (IR) world as one composed of ongoing relations, assumes international actors as actors-in-relations, and takes processes defined in terms of relations in motion as ontologically significant. It puts forward the logic of relationality, arguing that actors base their actions on relations in the first place. It uses the Chinese zhongyong dialectics as its epistemological schema for understanding relationships in an increasingly complex world. This theoretical framework may enable us to see the IR world from a different perspective, reconceptualize key elements such as power and governance, and make a broader comparison of international systems for the enrichment of the Global IR project.

Why Bounded Rationality

Abstract: This chapter considers four principles about decision-making by following Herbert Simon’s arguments. (1) The principle of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is an alternative conception of rationality that models the cognitive processes of decision-makers more realistically. The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems rationally is bounded. (2) The principle of satisficing. Optimizing is replaced by satisficing—the requirement that satisfactory levels of the criterion variables be attained. An individual establishes his or her goal as an aspiration level. (3) The principle of search. Alternatives of action and consequences of action are discovered sequentially through search processes. An individual sequentially searches for alternatives, and selects one that meets the aspiration level. (4) The principle of adaptive behavior. An individual continually adjusts his or her behavior to changing environments. Human rationality cannot be understood merely by considering the mental mechanisms that underlie human behavior. Instead, we should elucidate the relationship between the mental mechanisms and the environments in which they work.

The Importance of Being Rational

Abstract: The Importance of Being Rational systematically defends a novel reasons-based account of rationality. The book’s central thesis is that what it is for one to be rational is to correctly respond to the normative reasons one possesses. The book defends novel views about what it is to possess reasons and what it is to correctly respond to reasons. It is shown that these views not only help to support the book’s main thesis, they also help to resolve several important problems that are independent of rationality. The account of possession provides novel contributions to debates about what determines what we ought to do, and the account of correctly responding to reasons provides novel contributions to debates about causal theories of reacting for reasons. After defending views about possession and correctly responding, it is shown that the account of rationality can solve two difficult problems about rationality. The first is the New Evil Demon problem. The book argues that the account has the resources to show that internal duplicates necessarily have the same rational status. The second problem concerns the ‘normativity’ of rationality. Recently it has been doubted that we ought to be rational. The ultimate conclusion of the book is that the requirements of rationality are the requirements that we ultimately ought to comply with. If this is right, then rationality is of fundamental importance to our deliberative lives.

The rational choice perspective

Abstract: A pressing need for cash, and a lack of other practical alternatives, criminal or noncriminal, can make armed robbery an attractive option for some individuals. And knowing where to find cash-rich victims and how to overcome opposition can make the rewards well worth the risk and effort. In the rational choice perspective, criminal acts are never "senseless," but are viewed as purposive acts intended to bring some benefit to the offender. The benefits of theft are obvious, but the rewards of crime can also include excitement, fun, prestige, sexual gratification, and the defiance or domination of others. The rational choice perspective takes the view of Simon that an individual's decision-making behavior is characterized by "limited" or "bounded" rationality. Criminal choices can be divided into two broad groups: "involvement" and "event" decisions. Event decisions relate to the commission of a particular offense.

The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence

Abstract: For many epistemologists, and for many philosophers more broadly, it is axiomatic that rationality requires you to take the doxastic attitudes that your evidence supports. Yet there is also another current in our talk about rationality. On this usage, rationality is a matter of the right kind of coherence between one's mental attitudes. Surprisingly little work in epistemology is explicitly devoted to answering the question of how these two currents of talk are related. But many implicitly assume that evidence-responsiveness guarantees coherence, so that the rational impermissibility of incoherence will just fall out of the putative requirement to take the attitudes that one's evidence supports, and so that coherence requirements do not need to be theorized in their own right, apart from evidential reasons. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake, since coherence and evidence-responsiveness can in fact come into conflict. More specifically, I argue that in cases of misleading higher-order evidence, there can be a conflict between believing what one's evidence supports and satisfying a requirement that I call “inter-level coherence”. This illustrates why coherence requirements and evidential reasons must be separated and theorized separately.

A “Refugee Crisis” Unfolding: “Real” Events and Their Interpretation in Media and Political Debates

Abstract: This article offers a comparative overview of the case studies included in this Special Issue with the aim of providing a narrative of how the refugee emergency in Europe has unfolded during the pe...

On becoming a reflective practitioner

Abstract: The tension between theory, experiment, and practice plays out in genetic and evolutionary computation (GEC) as it plays out in other areas of science and technology. Back in the 80s, 90s, and 00s, I was always compelled to mix theory, experiment, and practical application in vigorous ways to achieve both understanding and effective computation, but my methodology often seemed to irritate more people than it satisfied. Theoreticians didn't think the work was quite "proper theory", and experimentalists/practitioners didn't think the work was sufficiently "real worldly." Although these concerns were always present in my GEC work, I haven't been thinking about them specifically over the last few years. Since resigning my tenure in 2010, I've been on a global quest to improve engineering education, a quest described in the book, A Whole New Engineer (www.wholenewengineer.org), and partially as a result of that journey, I think I can now better articulate some of the intuitions that led to the methodology of my earlier GEC career. I start philosophically by sharing some of Don Schon's thoughts about the epistemology of practice. He asks, how is it, that practitioners, whether they be physicians, architects, engineers, accounts, computer scientists, or even physical scientists, know things in practice? The conventional wisdom, Schon claims, is that practitioners know things by first, mastering a body of well understood and accepted theory, then applying that theory in practice. Schon calls this theory of practical knowing, technical rationality, and he claims that it (1) is the dominant paradigm of epistemology of practice and that (2) it is largely mistaken (or at least, incomplete and misleading). As an alternative, he suggests that practitioners come to know through a process of reflection-in-action, and the talk discusses some of the key ideas behind this model of practice. Thereafter, I revisit two case studies in early GEC work, the idea and use of deception and the idea and use of approximate little models through the lenses of technical rationality and reflection-in-action. The aim of this examination is to better understand the objections to and the intentions of the work, both. These are found to line up nicely along Schon's lines. Thereafter, I introduce Barry Johnson's notion of a polarity, and frame technical rationality and reflection-in-action. Johnson suggests that polarities are often regarded as solutions, but suggests that the appropriate stance is that poles must be managed. Here I suggest that the complexity of GEC demands the development of a population of reflective practitioners who actively manage the polarities of technical rationality and reflection-in-action, both. The talk discusses some of the key practices, particularly conversational practices, that can help do this. The talk concludes with some theoretical and practical observations regarding the education of A Whole New Engineer and what these might offer the educators and education of the next generation of genetic algorithmists and evolutionary computationers.

Learning About Voter Rationality

Abstract: We model the accountability relationship between voters and politicians to clarify what can and can’t be learned about voter rationality from existing evidence from the behavior literature. We make two key points. First, we show that evidence on the electoral consequences of natural disasters and economic shocks|typically interpreted as evidence for voter irrationality|is consistent with a canonical model with rational voters. Second, we show that the evidence on the electoral consequences of disaster response|typically interpreted as evidence for voter rationality|is consistent with the same model with irrational voters. Hence, neither body of evidence can adjudicate between rational and irrational voting behavior. We also derive new hypotheses that can better guide future empirical work attempting to assess voter rationality.

A conceptual framework for understanding the perspectives on the causes of the science-practice gap in ecology and conservation.

Abstract: Applying scientific knowledge to confront societal challenges is a difficult task, an issue known as the science-practice gap. In Ecology and Conservation, scientific evidence has been seldom used directly to support decision-making, despite calls for an increasing role of ecological science in developing solutions for a sustainable future. To date, multiple causes of the science-practice gap and diverse approaches to link science and practice in Ecology and Conservation have been proposed. To foster a transparent debate and broaden our understanding of the difficulties of using scientific knowledge, we reviewed the perceived causes of the science-practice gap, aiming to: (i) identify the perspectives of ecologists and conservation scientists on this problem, (ii) evaluate the predominance of these perspectives over time and across journals, and (iii) assess them in light of disciplines studying the role of science in decision-making. We based our review on 1563 sentences describing causes of the science-practice gap extracted from 122 articles and on discussions with eight scientists on how to classify these sentences. The resulting process-based framework describes three distinct perspectives on the relevant processes, knowledge and actors in the science-practice interface. The most common perspective assumes only scientific knowledge should support practice, perceiving a one-way knowledge flow from science to practice and recognizing flaws in knowledge generation, communication, and/or use. The second assumes that both scientists and decision-makers should contribute to support practice, perceiving a two-way knowledge flow between science and practice through joint knowledge-production/integration processes, which, for several reasons, are perceived to occur infrequently. The last perspective was very rare, and assumes scientists should put their results into practice, but they rarely do. Some causes (e.g. cultural differences between scientists and decision-makers) are shared with other disciplines, while others seem specific to Ecology and Conservation (e.g. inadequate research scales). All identified causes require one of three general types of solutions, depending on whether the causal factor can (e.g. inadequate research questions) or cannot (e.g. scientific uncertainty) be changed, or if misconceptions (e.g. undervaluing abstract knowledge) should be solved. The unchanged predominance of the one-way perspective over time may be associated with the prestige of evidence-based conservation and suggests that debates in Ecology and Conservation lag behind trends in other disciplines towards bidirectional views ascribing larger roles to decision-makers. In turn, the two-way perspective seems primarily restricted to research traditions historically isolated from mainstream conservation biology. All perspectives represented superficial views of decision-making by not accounting for limits to human rationality, complexity of decision-making contexts, fuzzy science-practice boundaries, ambiguity brought about by science, and different types of knowledge use. However, joint knowledge-production processes from the two-way perspective can potentially allow for democratic decision-making processes, explicit discussions of values and multiple types of science use. To broaden our understanding of the interface and foster productive science-practice linkages, we argue for dialogue among different research traditions within Ecology and Conservation, joint knowledge-production processes between scientists and decision-makers and interdisciplinarity across Ecology, Conservation and Political Science in both research and education.

The Community of Advantage: A Behavioural Economist's Defence of the Market

Abstract: Normative analysis in economics has usually aimed at satisfying individuals’ preferences. Its conclusions have supported a long-standing liberal tradition of economics that values economic freedom and views markets favourably. However, behavioural research shows that individuals’ preferences, as revealed in choices, are often unstable, and vary according to contextual factors that seem irrelevant for welfare. The Community of Advantage proposes a reformulation of normative economics that is compatible with what is now known about the psychology of choice. Other such reformulations have assumed that people have well-defined ‘latent’ preferences which, because of psychologically-induced errors, are not always revealed in actual choices. According to these reformulations, the economist’s job is to reconstruct latent preferences and to design policies to satisfy them. I argue that latent preference and error are psychologically ungrounded concepts, and that economics needs to be more radical in giving up rationality assumptions. I advocate a kind of normative economics that does not use the concept of preference. Its recommendations are addressed, not to an imagined ‘social planner’, but to citizens, viewed as potential parties to mutually beneficial agreements. Its normative criterion is the provision of opportunities for individuals to participate in voluntary transactions. Using this approach, I reconstruct many of the normative conclusions of the liberal tradition. I argue that a well-functioning market economy is an institution that individuals have reason to value, whether or not their preferences satisfy conventional axioms of rationality, and that individuals’ motivations in such an economy can be cooperative rather than self-interested.

A case for critical realism in the pursuit of interdisciplinarity and impact

Abstract: In recent years, much social scientific scholarship in sport, exercise and health (SEH) has repudiated (post) positivist research and has instead persuasively argued in favour of qualitative research from constructivist–interpretivist paradigmatic approaches. While this scholarship has enriched the field in numerous ways, this paper contends that constructivist–interpretivist assumptions elicit a modus operandi which is inimical to the accomplishment of two associated contemporary research agendas: interdisciplinarity and impact. In seeking an alternative philosophy of science, the purpose of this paper is to explore how critical realism–meta-theoretical position that has been somewhat absent to date in SEH research–might offer qualitative researchers a new conceptual framework with which greater interdisciplinarity and impact can be achieved. Two main critical realist claims are introduced: (1) the epistemic fallacy can be avoided by adopting a stratified ontology and judgemental rationality, and (2) social science would benefit from seeking causal explanations underpinned by a transformational model of social activity. By de-coupling interpretive epistemologies from constructivist ontologies, it is argued that critical realism permits greater methodological plurality and hence can help transcend persistent paradigmatic boundaries. Indeed, by adopting a realist social ontology and complex, emergent conception of causality, this paper suggests that critical realism permits and encourages impact by asking researchers to focus on explaining the enduring social relations that produce real-world problems. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of critical realism and highlighting other ways that interdisciplinarity and impact can similarly be achieved.

Mind, rationality, and cognition: An interdisciplinary debate

Abstract: This paper features an interdisciplinary debate and dialogue about the nature of mind, perception, and rationality. Scholars from a range of disciplines — cognitive science, applied and experimental psychology, behavioral economics, biology and physiology — offer critiques and commentaries of a target article by Felin, Koenderink and Krueger (2017), “Rationality, perception, and the all-seeing eye,” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review. The commentaries raise a number of criticisms and issues about rationality and the all-seeing eye argument, including: the nature of judgment and reasoning, biases versus heuristics, organism-environment relations, perception and situational construal, equilibrium analysis in economics, efficient markets, and the nature of empirical observation and the scientific method. The debated topics have far-reaching consequences for the rationality literature specifically and the cognitive, psychological and economic sciences more broadly. The commentaries are followed by a response by the authors of the target article. The response is organized around three central issues: 1) the problem of cues, 2) what is the question? and 3) equilibria, $500 bills, and the axioms of rationality.

Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality

Abstract: What kind of thing is a reason for action? What is it to act for a reason? And what is the connection between acting for a reason and rationality? There is controversy about the many issues raised by these questions. In this paper I shall answer the first question with a conception of practical reasons that I call ‘Factualism’, which says that all reasons are facts. I defend this conception against its main rival, Psychologism, which says that practical reasons are mental states or mental facts, and also against a variant of Factualism that says that some practical reasons are facts and others are false beliefs. I argue that the conception of practical reasons defended here (i) provides plausible answers to the second and third questions above; and (ii) gives a more unified and satisfactory picture of practical reasons than those offered by its rivals.

Social Media Techno-Discursive Design, Affective Communication and Contemporary Politics

Abstract: The paper examines the intersection of technological design of Social Media communication, the notion of post-politics-affective turn in contemporary (Western) societies and the rise of populism as a trend in political communication. Following on conceptualizations for a Social Media approach to a broadly defined critical discourse studies framework (KhosraviNik, in: Kalyango and Kopytowska (eds) Why discourse matters: negotiating identity in the mediatized world, Peter Lang, New York, 2014, in: Flowerdew and Richardson, Routledge handbook of critical discourse studies, Routledge, London, 2017b), the paper attempts to integrate discussions on affective nature of communication in participatory web ecology and consequences of algorithmic regimentation of meaning bearing resources (e.g., news and entertainment) on Social Media. Issues around quality and distribution of digital discursive practices and their relations to traditional perceptions of rational politics, within the internalised ethos of visibility-as-legitimacy, are critically elaborated and examined. While the rise of right wing populism (e.g., Trump presidency, Brexit vote) should primarily be explicated within qualities of the context on the ground, i.e., the deliberate and well-orchestrated misplacement of real grievances in society through discursive operation and manipulation (KhosraviNik in Insight Turk 19(3):53–68, 2017a), it is equally important to critically elaborate the function and consequences of (digital) media practices as a main part of this socialization context. The overall argument here is that the hyper-normalization and triumph of neo-liberal rationality together with new media technological affordances, design and requirements have created a momentum for the growth of haphazard populist politics, i.e., the valorization of affective relevance over rational significance.

Study on the “high-quality development” economics

Abstract: Purpose As China embarks upon a new era of high-quality development, it is increasingly important and imperative for China’s economic development to live up to its real nature, which is to satisfy people’s growing needs for a better life. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach The paper attempts to discuss the implication of HQD and its related theoretical issues from the basic theory of economics, and literature review. It is necessary to return to Marx’s “dual character of commodity” to check the theoretical foundation of this issue, based on the duality methodology, namely, the duality of the value of use and the value of exchange. Findings Moving from HSG phase to HQD phase constitutes a major challenge and an arduous task that is extremely difficult both theoretically and practically. A series of new problems crop out as to the theoretical understanding and practical resolution. Fundamentally speaking, this new dynamic mechanism intrinsically requires a perfect integration of the instrumental rationality of market economy and the value-based rationality of economic development. Originality/value This new momentum requires a perfect match between the instrumental rationality of market economy and the value-based rationality of economic development.

Rationality and Reasons

Abstract: When Ingmar and I discuss metaphysics or morality, our views are seldom far apart. But on the subjects of this paper, rationality and reasons, we deeply disagree. I had intended this paper to inclnde some discussion of Ingmar's views about these subjects. But, when I reread some of the relevant parts ofIngmar's published and unpublished work, it soon became clear that his arguments are much too subtle and wide-ranging for a brief discussion. So I shall say only that I don't yet have what seem to me good answers to some oflngmar's arguments. He is one of the people .whom I would most like to convince. But perhaps, when I tty to answer his arguments, he will convince me.

What is Reasoning

Abstract: Reasoning is a certain kind of attitude-revision. What kind? The aim of this paper is to introduce and defend a new answer to this question, based on the idea that reasoning is a goodness-fixing kind. Our central claim is that reasoning is a functional kind: it has a constitutive point or aim that fixes the standards for good reasoning. We claim, further, that this aim is to get fitting attitudes. We start by considering recent accounts of reasoning due to Ralph Wedgwood and John Broome, and argue that, while these accounts contain important insights, they are not satisfactory: Wedgwood’s rules out too much, and Broome’s too little. We then introduce and defend our alternative account, discuss some of its implications and attractions, and, finally, consider objections.

Intellectual capital research and practice: 7 myths and one golden rule

Abstract: Abstract The intellectual capital research and practice entered in the last years into a visible decline due to some barriers in understanding its intangible nature and designing Newtonian metrics for its measurement and reporting. Inertial thinking is very powerful in promoting new approaches for the need of a new perspective in working with intellectual capital. Unfortunately, even some top journals in the domain of intellectual capital remained trapped into this Newtonian logic and standard statistical analysis, as a result of the mind-set of their editorial staff and reviewers. The purpose of this paper is to present a critical analysis of the intellectual capital research and practice today and to reveal some of the most important barriers in understanding the complexity and nature of the intellectual capital. These barriers manifest like myths in approaching the research into intellectual capital, myths that create a false reality and false research questions, which enter into collision with the real life of companies and their business. The paper identifies seven myths which created a Newtonian version of the non-Newtonian reality, and a golden rule for further research into the intellectual capital of organizations. The conclusion of the present critical analysis is that we need a new approach to understand the complexity of the intellectual capital and new metrics to measure it.

Could s 17 of the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) represent a Derridean justice-based approach to animal protections?

Abstract: Section 17(1) of the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) (‘ACPA’) provides that ‘[a] person in charge of an animal owes a duty of care to it’. Until the Northern Territory adopted that same expression in its Animal Welfare Act, the ACPA was the only animal protection statute in Australia that suggested that a nonhuman animal is owed a duty. What is at stake in this thesis is the contrasting of that legal duty, posited to derive legal justice, with Derridean justice that demands that a duty is owed to other beings. This research addresses the question: could s 17 of the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) represent a Derridean justice-based approach to animal protections? To address this question, this thesis develops a legal and contextual analysis of ACPA s 17. It also applies Derrida’s proposition of deconstructions to ferret-out how rationality, embedded in the metaphysics of presence, gets-to-work in law. The purpose is to test if ACPA s 17 delivers what it promises. This research examines whether ACPA s 17 provides any undoing of the Western inheritance, which through rationality justifies using, mistreating, and slaughtering nonhuman animals for human animal ends. Within this research, ACPA s 17 is examined in context to the Western cultural trace that Derrida described as a ‘culture of sacrifice’. Derrida’s lens offers a unique perspective since he provided a different accounting of beingness. That is one that breaks down human-animal difference. It enables contrasting of Western conceptions of duties and rights that continue to rely on rationality as bases for ‘ethics’. The deconstructive approach highlights our Western modes of thinking and reasoning that reinstitute that violent culture of sacrifice. This research offers: a rich discussion of relevant Derridean propositions; a contrasting of Anglo-American and Continental perspectives of what is thought to be owed to nonhuman animals, a survey of neurosciences to ascertain if Derrida’s propositions of beingness remain credible, and various approaches to legal contextualisation of ACPA s 17. The new knowledge developed in the research includes a rich legal characterisation of ACPA s 17. The research finds that, in contrast to existing commentary, ACPA s 17 is not an implementation of ‘negligence’, and neither could it be properly described as implementing a ‘guardianship’ model. It is a regulatory type offence that is constrained by many layers of anthropocentric law. Various problems that limit the effect of ACPA s 17 are highlighted. The research makes suggestions for law reform. The thesis finally brings together the traces gathered in the research, through a legal analysis, and a deconstructive reading, of a relevant appeal case. Unfortunately, ACPA s 17 does not institute a legal duty that is owed to nonhuman animals. Neither does it appear to be an opening toward Derridean justice.

An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to apply the accuracy based approach to epistemology to the case of higher order evidence: evidence that bears on the rationality of one's beliefs. I proceed in two stages. First, I show that the accuracy based framework that is standardly used to motivate rational requirements supports steadfastness—a position according to which higher order evidence should have no impact on one's doxastic attitudes towards first order propositions. The argument for this will require a generalization of an important result by Greaves and Wallace for the claim that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. The generalization I provide will, among other things, allow us to apply the result to cases of self-locating evidence. In the second stage, I develop an alternative framework. Very roughly, what distinguishes the traditional approach from the alternative one is that, on the traditional picture, we're interested in evaluating the expected accuracy of conforming to an update procedure. On the alternative picture that I develop, instead of considering how good an update procedure is as a plan to conform to, we consider how good it is as a plan to make. I show how, given the use of strictly proper scoring rules, the alternative picture vindicates calibrationism: a view according to which higher order evidence should have a significant impact on our beliefs. I conclude with some thoughts about why higher order evidence poses a serious challenge for standard ways of thinking about rationality.

Whose Pentecostalism? Which rationality? : the Foursquare Gospel and Pentecostal biblical pragmatism of the Elim tradition

Abstract: The aim of the thesis is to provide a tradition-specific 'Pentecostal rationality.' To do this it will first analyse and evaluate some of the main contemporary Pentecostal rationalities and' epistemologies (chapter 1), before proposing that Alasdair Macintyre's tradition-focused and historically-minded narrative approach is conducive in providing a more tradition-constituted Pentecostal rationality (chapter 2). Utilising the methodological insight of Macintyre, the thesis will then provide a philosophically informed historical narrative of a Pentecostal tradition, namely, the Elim Pentecostal Church, by exploring its underlying context and roots as a classical British Pentecostal movement (chapter 3), its emergence as a religious tradition (chapter 4), and its two major 'epistemological crises' (chapters 5 & 6). Based on this historical narration, the thesis will argue that Elim's tacit Pentecostal rationality is best defined as Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism in a Foursquare Gospel framework. This form of rationality will then be developed vis-a-vis Elim's Pentecostal concept of truth (chapter 7), biblical hermeneutics (chapter 8), and pragmatic epistemic justification in dialogue with William Alston (chapter 9).

Dancing Pigs or Externalities?: Measuring the Rationality of Security Decisions

Abstract: Accurately modeling human decision-making in security is critical to thinking about when, why, and how to recommend that users adopt certain secure behaviors. In this work, we conduct behavioral economics experiments to model the rationality of end-user security decision-making in a realistic online experimental system simulating a bank account. We ask participants to make a financially impactful security choice, in the face of transparent risks of account compromise and benefits offered by an optional security behavior (two-factor authentication). We measure the cost and utility of adopting the security behavior via measurements of time spent executing the behavior and estimates of the participant's wage. We find that more than 50% of our participants made rational (e.g., utility optimal) decisions, and we find that participants are more likely to behave rationally in the face of higher risk. Additionally, we find that users' decisions can be modeled well as a function of past behavior (anchoring effects), knowledge of costs, and to a lesser extent, users' awareness of risks and context (R2=0.61). We also find evidence of endowment effects, as seen in other areas of economic and psychological decision-science literature, in our digital-security setting. Finally, using our data, we show theoretically that a "one-size-fits-all" emphasis on security can lead to market losses, but that adoption by a subset of users with higher risks or lower costs can lead to market gains.

The role of education interventions in improving economic rationality.

Abstract: Schooling rewards people with labor market returns and nonpecuniary benefits in other realms of life. However, there is no experimental evidence showing that education interventions improve individual economic rationality. We examine this hypothesis by studying a randomized 1-year financial support program for education in Malawi that reduced absence and dropout rates and increased scores on a qualification exam of female secondary school students. We measure economic rationality 4 years after the intervention by using lab-in-the-field experiments to create scores of consistency with utility maximization that are derived from revealed preference theory. We find that students assigned to the intervention had higher scores of rationality. The results remain robust after controlling for changes in cognitive and noncognitive skills. Our results suggest that education enhances the quality of economic decision-making.

Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality

Abstract: * This essay is a sequel to my “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,” in Simon Robertson, ed., Spheres of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Some of the ideas developed here are also in that earlier essay, but I hope in this present chapter to go somewhat beyond that earlier work. I do, however, see my overall argument in favor of (to use terminology to be introduced in the main text) the practical commitment view, in contrast with cognitivism, as drawing on both of these essays (as well as on the basic account presented in my Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987; reissued by CSLI Publications, 1999]). The present essay was motivated in part by Kieran Setiya’s “Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason: Response to Bratman” (2005), which constituted his very thoughtful and helpful comments on “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,” at the Conference on Practical Reason, University of Maryland, April 2005. My present chapter has also benefited from conversation with John Perry, Jennifer Morton, and Sarah Paul, detailed comments from Gideon Yaffe and John Broome on earlier drafts, and very helpful comments from George Wilson and from the editors of this volume. 1 Concerning the need for the belief that M requires that I intend M, see Robert Binkley, “A Theory of Practical Reason,” The Philosophical Review, 74 (1965): 423–448, at 443. The language of “requirement” comes from John Broome; see “Normative Requirements,” Ratio, 12 (1999): 398–419. 2 In other work I have focused on what I have called a requirement of means-end coherence of one’s intentions and plans. I see IR as a central aspect of that requirement, though the requirement of means-end coherence goes beyond IR, strictly speaking, in requiring that an agent fill in her plans with one or another sufficient means when what is needed is that the agent settle on some such means or other. And the requirement of means-end coherence allows for delay in filling in plans with means when there remains sufficient time. (For some of these complexities see Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason: 31–35.) But IR is at the heart of the requirement of means-end coherence, and it will simplify my discussion here to focus on it. Note that both IR and the requirement of meansend coherence specifically concern means-end rationality with respect to intended ends; there remain further issues about means-end rationality concerning things one wants, prefers, or values.

Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality

Abstract: In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first-order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher-order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying to resolve this tension and argue that the best way to do this is to reject the idea that strong evidential support is the stuff rationality is made of. In the course of doing this, I shall argue that there is a special class of propositions about the requirements of rationality that we cannot make rational mistakes about and explain how this can be.

Editorial: Twenty years after the Iowa Gambling Task: Rationality, emotion, and decision-making

Abstract: Department of Psychology, Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan, Graduate Institute of Biomedical Sciences, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan, 3 Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, National Central University, Taoyuan, Taiwan, Department of Psychology, Kaohsiung Medical University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 5 Research Center for Nonlinear Analysis and Optimization, Kaohsiung Medical University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan