Rationality

About: Rationality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 20459 publications have been published within this topic receiving 617787 citations.

Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk

Abstract: In this book, Paul Anand examines the normative interpretation of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). He tests the philosophical and logical basis for associating SEU with rational choice. Decision theorists have increasingly come to accept the experimental evidence that subjects systematically violate the axiomatic assumptions of SEU, and as a result the past decade has witnessed an explosion of mathematical models that seek to capture this behaviour. A current issue is whether axioms of SEU really are canons of rationality. Anand discusses whether the new decision-theoretic models are more than just accounts of irrational behaviour. The main themes of the book are that, empirically, SEU is false, and that normatively it imposes unnecessary constraints on rational agency. Problems with Bayesianism are introduced and it is shown that useful distinctions between risk and uncertainty (in a Keynesian sense) can be made. Some of the radical methodological changes in economics that underpin theoretical developments in decision theory and economics are also discussed.

Rationality in Political Behavior

Abstract: Public choice theory borrows the basic assumptions of neoclassical economics about the nature of human rationality and applies them to the explanation and prediction of behavior in the political domain (Downs, 1957). An attractive, and seductive, feature of the theory is a very strong rationality assumption (maximization of subjective expected utility) that appears to permit a great deal of explanation and prediction without the painful necessity of first constructing an empirically based theory of human behavior, in particular, a theory of the nature and limits of human rationality. To an important extent, deductive reasoning from the theory's basic postulates of rationality substitutes for a great deal of costly empirical inquiry. The frequent use of public choice theory today in political science calls for an examination of the assumptions of rationality that the theory employs. This paper carries out such an examination. The analysis focuses on three issues: the nature of the rationality assumption, the orthogonality of rationality and selfishness, and the possibility of altruism. Our inquiry will lead us to the conclusion that human rationality is much more complex than it is portrayed to be in neoclassical and public choice theories, and that much less can be derived by deductive means from the (amended) assumptions of rationality than has been supposed by the exponents of those theories. An important corollary to this conclusion is that a veridical theory of public choice requires a solid foundation of empirical fact about the nature of human goals and about the processes that people use in reasoning from their actions to their values.

White Queen psychology and other essays for Alice

Abstract: Ruth Millikan's extended argument for a biological view of the study of cognition in Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories caught the attention of the philosophical community. Universally regarded as an important, even brilliant, work, its complexity and dense presentation made it difficult to plumb. This collection of essays serves both as an introduction to that much discussed volume and as an extension and application of Millikan's central and controversial themes, especially in the philosophy of psychology. The title essay, referring to the White Queen's practice of exercising her mind by believing impossible things, discusses meaning rationalism and argues that rationality is not in the head, indeed, that there is no legitimate interpretation under which logical possibility and necessity are known a priori. Nor are there any laws of rational psychology. Rationality is not a lawful occurrence but a biological norm that is effected in an integrated head-world system under biologically ideal conditions. In other essays, Millikan clarifies her views on the nature of mental representation, explores whether human thought is a product of natural selection, examines the nature of behavior as studied by the behavioral sciences, and discusses the issues of individualism in psychology, psychological explanation, indexicality in thought, what knowledge is, and the realism/antirealism debate.

Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs

Abstract: Delusional people are people saying very bizarre things like they are dead, their spouse is a robot, the TV star is talking to them, they are possessed by the devil, aliens are following them, and so on Even though we know that they are not identical, terms like “delusion” and “mental illness” are often used as synonyms in ordinary language This comes from what psychopathology tradition handed down: delusion is the key psychopathological phenomenon, although essentially un-understandable (Jaspers, 1959) In her book Delusion and Other Irrational Beliefs, Lisa Bortolotti explores the topic of delusion from the epistemological perspective of analytical philosophy Do delusional people really believe what they say? This question is as interesting as it is pressing for clinics From the very beginning however this work is engaged in defending two core ideas First, understanding belief, regardless of whether it is a “real pattern” or not (Dennett, 1991), is relevant to understanding what delusions are Second, delusions can be beliefs like others This is only a small part of what makes this book a fascinating and indispensable work The aim of the book is arguing against accounts which deny the doxastic nature of delusion In philosophy of mind, the claim that delusions are not beliefs is taken as a modus tollens argument deriving from the general premise that all beliefs presuppose a background rationality, as assumed by belief attribution theory in the Davidson-Dennett tradition In other words, since delusions do not meet the rationality constraint (since they are irrational phenomena), they are not beliefs at all Chapter 1 is an opening background section devoted both to the rationality constraint in belief attribution theory and to conceptions and taxonomy of

Rationalization and the Deprofessionalization of Physicians

Abstract: The Weberian theory of rationalization, especially the concepts of formal and substantive rationality and the conflict between them, are used to analyze contemporary changes affecting the medical profession. Three major types of changes are discussed-changes in government policies, the changing nature of medical delivery systems, and changes within medical delivery systems. It is argued that these changes are impelling the medical profession away from substantive rationality and in the direction of formal rationality. Increasing formal rationality is likely to lead to greater external control over physicians and to a decline in the ability of the medical profession to distinguish itself from bureaucrats and capitalists. These changes, in turn, are likely to lead to some degree of deprofessionalization of physicians. Alternative future scenarios are also mentioned.