Rationality

About: Rationality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 20459 publications have been published within this topic receiving 617787 citations.

The duality of mind: an historical perspective

Abstract: [About the book] This book explores the idea that we have two minds - automatic, unconscious, and fast, the other controlled, conscious, and slow. In recent years there has been great interest in so-called dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality. According to such theories, there are two distinct systems underlying human reasoning - an evolutionarily old system that is associative, automatic, unconscious, parallel, and fast, and a more recent, distinctively human system that is rule-based, controlled, conscious, serial, and slow. Within the former, processes the former, processes are held to be innate and to use heuristics that evolved to solve specific adaptive problems. In the latter, processes are taken to be learned, flexible, and responsive to rational norms. Despite the attention these theories are attracting, there is still poor communication between dual-process theorists themselves, and the substantial bodies of work on dual processes in cognitive psychology and social psychology remain isolated from each other. This book brings together leading researchers on dual processes to summarize the state-of-the-art, highlight key issues, present different perspectives, explore implications, and provide a stimulus to further work. It includes new ideas about the human mind both by contemporary philosophers interested in broad theoretical questions about mental architecture and by psychologists specialising in traditionally distinct and isolated fields. For all those in the cognitive sciences, this is a book that will advance dual-process theorizing, promote interdisciplinary communication, and encourage further applications of dual-process approaches.

How probabilities reflect evidence

Abstract: Many philosophers think of Bayesianism as a theory of practical rationality. This is not at all surprising given that the view’s most striking successes have come in decision theory. Ramsey (1931), Savage (1972), and De Finetti (1964) showed how to interpret subjective degrees of belief in terms of betting behavior, and how to derive the central probabilistic requirement of coherence from reflections on the nature of rational choice. This focus on decision-making can obscure the fact that Bayesianism is also an epistemology. Indeed, the great statistician Harold Jeffries (1939), who did more than anyone else to further Bayesian methods, paid rather little heed to the work of Ramsey, de Finetti, and Savage. Jeffries, and those who followed him, saw Bayesianism as a theory of inductive evidence, whose primary role was not to help people make wise choices, but to facilitate sound scientific reasoning. This paper seeks to promote a broadly Bayesian approach to epistemology by showing how certain central questions about the nature of evidence can be addressed using the apparatus of subjective probability theory. Epistemic Bayesianism, as understood here, is the view that evidential relationships are best represented probabilistically. It has three central components:

Power, rationality, and the art of living through socio-technical change

Abstract: Most information systems research takes for granted the assumption that IS practice and associated organizational change can be effectively understood as a process of technical reasoning and acting governed by a mix of concerns about software construction, administrative control, and economic gain. Its mission has been to empower managers, IS engineers, and information and communication technology users with knowledge and techniques for effective decision making. However, empirical research frequently encounters human activity that is at odds with the assumed pattern of rational behavior. Recent work tries to explain behavior in IS and organizational change in terms of social processes rather than as a consideration of rational techniques of professional practice. In this paper we address this ambivalence of the IS field with regard to technical/rational knowledge and practice. We draw from the theoretical work of Michel Foucault on power/knowledge and the aesthetics of existence to argue that the rational techniques of IS practice and the power dynamics of an organization and its social context are closely intertwined, requiring each other to be sustained. Furthermore, we develop a context-specific notion of rationality in IS innovation, through which interested parties judge the value of an innovation for their lives and consequently support or subvert its course. We demonstrate these ideas with a case study of a social security organization in Greece.

The Interplay between Intuition and Rationality in Strategic Decision Making: A Paradox Perspective

Abstract: Both intuition and rationality can play important roles in strategic decision making. However, a framework that specifically accounts for the interplay between intuition and rationality is still missing. This study addresses this gap by using a paradox lens and conceptualizes the intuition–rationality duality as a paradoxical tension. We draw on seven case studies of innovation projects to empirically derive a three-step process for managing this intuition–rationality tension through paradoxical thinking. Our empirical data suggest that management of the tension starts with preparing the ground for paradoxical thinking by creating managerial acceptance for the contradictory elements of rational and intuitive approaches to decision making. The process then continues by developing decision-making outcomes through the integration of intuitive and rational practices. Finally, the outcomes of paradoxical thinking are embedded into the organizational context. For each step of the model, we indicate a set of practices that, by leveraging intuitive or rational characteristics of decision making, practitioners can use to deal with this cognitive tension in the different steps of our model.

Accounting for Agency

Abstract: Children are increasingly described as agents and agency is important to arguments for children’s rights and participation. Yet agency is rarely defined or theorised in childhood studies. This article reviews common uses and meanings of agency and argues that critical, social conceptualisations have yet to be extensively taken up in childhood studies but offer much to the field. Based on the work of Giddens, his critics and feminist theory, I propose a model of agency that is more ambivalent than that usually presented in childhood studies. Given the conventional emphasis of agency on articulation, rationality and strategy, a failure to incorporate a critical, embodied, engendered, material account of agency into childhood studies risks reinscribing a model in which privileged children will be accorded more agency than those who do not display rationality and choice in conventional ways.