Topic
Rationality
About: Rationality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 20459 publications have been published within this topic receiving 617787 citations.
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11 Aug 2000
TL;DR: Owens as discussed by the authors argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief, and argues that our responsibility for beliefs is profoundly different from our rationality and agency, and that memory and testimony can preserve justified belief without preserving the evidence which might be used to justify it.
Abstract: We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens focuses on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume - the founders of epistemology - and presents a critical discussion of the current trends in contemporary epistemology. He proposes that the problems we confront today - scepticism, the analysis of knowlege, and debates on epistemic justification - can be tackled only once we have understood the moral psychology of belief. This can be resolved when we realise that our responsibility for beliefs is profoundly different from our rationality and agency, and that memory and testimony can preserve justified belief without preserving the evidence which might be used to justify it. Reason Without Freedom should be of value to those interested in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, ethics, and the history of 17th and 18th century.
118 citations
01 Jan 1980
TL;DR: My topics will include the discovery/justification ‘dichotomy’ and its recent abandonment in favor of a three-fold distinction; the degree to which contemporary discussion has advanced beyond the bold and stimulating challenge of N. R. Hanson; reasons why, after more than a century, scientific discovery itself is once again widely perceived to be a philosophically important topic.
Abstract: In this essay I shall try to help the general reader find his way about the issues by sketching in the relevant background or by pointing out the papers which do, either in this volume or in its companion,Scientific Discovery: Case Studies.2 Most of the papers which follow are accessible to the nonexpert, as philosophers of science themselves are just now finding their sea legs in the hitherto unnavigable waters of scientific discovery. But I also want to critically analyze, clarify, and expand upon several themes and new developments discernible in the many and varied contributions to the first Leonard Conference. My topics will include the discovery/justification ‘dichotomy’ and its recent abandonment in favor of (at least) a three-fold distinction; the degree to which contemporary discussion has advanced beyond the bold and stimulating challenge of N. R. Hanson; reasons why, after more than a century, scientific discovery itself is once again widely perceived to be a philosophically important topic; the emergence of the scientific problem and of scientific judgment as important units of and for the philosophical analysis of science; the move from logic to rationality and the rejection of the received conception of rationality; and some large-scale proposals for the future of philosophy of science by Larry Laudan, Dudley Shapere, and Marx Wartofsky. I shall present the issues and evaluate the arguments as fairly as I can, but I shall hardly be writing from a neutral perspective.
117 citations
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TL;DR: The authors showed that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of "requirement" and that Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived from such a scope.
Abstract: This paper is a response to ‘Why Be Rational?’ by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for ‘requirement’. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of ‘requirement’. Consequently Kolodny’s conclusion cannot be derived.
117 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that auditing no longer knows "itself" as a hermeneutical practice, with the further consequence that auditors may lose their capacity for moral and critical reasoning and hence for moral agency with respect to their actions qua auditor.
Abstract: I argue that our understanding of auditing as a normatively hermeneutical (interpretative) practice is deformed by the emergence of scientism and technocratic rationality in auditing, and, relatedly, that the auditor's understanding of auditing's judgmental character is displaced by the recent development of and reliance on highly structured audit methodologies. The result is that auditing no longer knows “itself” as a hermeneutical practice, with the further consequence that auditors may lose their capacity for moral and critical reasoning and hence for moral agency with respect to their actions qua auditor. For this claim I draw on Aristotelian arguments about phronesis or practical ethical reasoning about good action. The point is not that there is an earlier Golden Age of auditing to recover, but rather that the auditor's potentiality for realizing “the good” in auditing through phronesis is eroded by the technocratic deformity of practice.
117 citations
TL;DR: Lowe as mentioned in this paper offers a broad and wide-ranging introduction to the philosophy of mind, using a problem-centred approach designed to stimulate as well as instruct, starting with a general examination of the mind-body problem and moving on to detailed examination of more specific philosophical issues concerning sensation, perception, thought and language, rationality, artificial intelligence, action, personal identity and self-knowledge.
Abstract: In this book Jonathan Lowe offers a lucid and wide-ranging introduction to the philosophy of mind. Using a problem-centred approach designed to stimulate as well as instruct, he begins with a general examination of the mind-body problem and moves on to detailed examination of more specific philosophical issues concerning sensation, perception, thought and language, rationality, artificial intelligence, action, personal identity and self-knowledge. His discussion is notably broad in scope, and distinctive in giving equal attention to deep metaphysical questions concerning the mind and to the discoveries and theories of modern scientific psychology. It will be of interest to any reader with a basic grounding in modern philosophy.
117 citations