Showing papers on "Realism published in 1979"

Perception and its Objects

Abstract: Ayer has always given the problem of perception a central place in his thinking. Reasonably so; for a philosopher’s views on this question are a key both to his theory of knowledge in general and to his metaphysics. The movement of Ayer’s own thought has been from phenomenalism to what he describes in his latest treatment of the topic as ‘a sophisticated form of realism’.1The epithet is doubly apt. No adequate account of the matter can be simple; and Ayer’s account, while distinguished by his accustomed lucidity and economy of style, is notably and subtly responsive to all the complexities inherent in the subject itself and to all the pressures of more or less persuasive argument which have marked the course of its treatment by philosophers. Yet the form of realism he defends has another kind of sophistication about which it is possible to have reservations and doubts; and, though I am conscious of being far from clear on the matter myself, I shall try to make some of my own doubts and reservations as clear as I can. I shall take as my text chapters 4 and 5 of The Central Questions of Philosophy; and I shall also consider a different kind of realism — that advocated by J. L. Mackie in his book on Locke.2 There are points of contact as well as of contrast between Ayer’s and Mackie’s views.

Scientific Realism: The New Debates

Abstract: In place of earlier instrumentalist and phenomenalist interpretations of science both Quine and Sellars have developed highly influential realist positions centering around the doctrine that accepting a theory as explanatory and irreducible rationally entails accepting the entities posited by the theory. A growing reaction against this realism is partially based on perceived inadequacies in the doctrines of Quine and Sellars, but even more on reconstructions of scientific explanations which do not involve such ontic commitments. Three types of anti-realistic positions are considered and criticized. Hesse's neo-Duhemian position couples a statistical theory of inference to a downgrading of purely theoretical statements. Sneed uses the method of axiomatrization through set-theoretic predicates to supply a reconstruction of Kuhn's account of scientific development. Here Ramsey-reduction sentences serve to eliminate purely theoretical terms. The longest section deals with van Fraassen's semantic model based o...

The Insistent I

Abstract: Critical attention to the eighteenth-century English novel almost always centers on one of five writers, and the result has been historically crippling. It may well be that Defoe, Richardson, Fielding, Smollett, and Sterne wrote, among them, all of the best English novels in the eighteenth century, but in looking only at the best we serve the narrowest interests of literary criticism at the expense of the broadest and most useful interests of literary history. Students of eighteenth-century fiction today seldom can provide a cogent account of how work developed from work or author from author, and a proper criticism demands a greater contextual sense than that readily available to us for individual texts, not to mention the richer interpretations that would be possible if we had a fuller sense of the novel's origins and its relationship to competing genres and modes. And because recent criticism has concentrated so totally on landmarks, broader attention to the nature of the eighteenth-century novel has become virtually nonexistent, so that questions about the distinguishing characteristics of the novel are very indifferently addressed when addressed at all. In this essay I want to suggest some of the facets of that character by discussing a writer who is neither a novelist nor a very talented writer of any kind, but whose work may tell us something about the books that follow in his wide wake. My subject is John Dunton, the bookseller and publisher of the 1680s and 90s, and journalist, anthologist, and occasional writer through the 1720s, and my thesis is that he deserves, for some rather complex reasons, an extensive chapter in any history of narrative. I want to suggest that traditional literary history makes a serious mistake in considering only the geniuses and accomplished craftsmen who create masterpieces in new genres while ignoring the cultural conditions, events, and minor or failed personages who set the stage. I am not going to claim that John Dunton is a neglected genius or a great writer, or that his works should now all be issued in Norton Critical Editions, but I do want to suggest what his pervasive presence on the landscape of print means for the way narrative began to go in the early eighteenth century. My hope is to illuminate the nature of the new form of fiction that became prominent in England and on the Continent during the eighteenth century, suggesting a few of the many features that define what was then new about the "novel," for one of our most insistent needs is to transcend the old simplistic distinctions that divide novel from romance and that find the identity of novels in one single, allimportant feature such as "realism," "organic unity," or "individualism."

On the Inverted Use of the Terms ‘Realism’ and ‘Idealism’ Among Scientists and Historians of Science

Abstract: While perhaps nothing is more common than for successive generations to use many words in slightly different ways and for the history of philosophy to be significantly influenced by these shifts, there can be something a bit odd in a total reversal of definitions, particularly of expressions which are as familiar in everyday life as 'realism' and 'idealism'. At first, one might suppose that since these particular terms have long been used in a great many different ways that there are no standard uses and hence one cannot properly speak of 'opposite', 'inverted', or even 'non-standard' definitions. At second glance, however, it should become clear that these different uses largely apply to different fields or areas of application. 'Realism' in the business world is not 'realism' in art or literature. Nor is 'idealism' as a generally optimistic attitude the same as it is in technical branches of philosophy such as epistemology or ontology. And even in philosophy 'Platonic Idealism', 'Scholastic Idealism', and modern 'Berkeleyan' and 'Hegelian idealism' all have to be very carefully distinguished with the normal starting point being that 'idea-lism' can be very different from 'ideal-ism', Platonic or Scholastic 'Ideas' from empirical 'ideas', and 'ideas' as images from 'ideas' as either concepts or relations. The particular inversion analysed in this paper is philosophical in general and epistemological in particular.' It is not a deliberate repudiation of the standard epistemological definitions of 'realism' and 'idealism' listed in most dictionaries and encyclopedias of philosophy, rather, it is one feature of a widespread amateur philosophical movement among

The Aesthetics of Politics: Walter Benjamin's "Theories of German Fascism"

Abstract: "Theories of German Fascism"* is the heading Walter Benjamin gives his review of a collection of essays edited by Ernst Jiinger. In this collection, eight authors including Jiinger himself, with his essay "Total Mobilization" present a picture of World War I and of the "warrior" within the ideological landscape around 1930.1 With this title, Benjamin captures not merely the theoretical content of the individual contributions but also the fundamental role of the war experience and its subsequent transformation into myth by the German fascist ideology of the 1920s. At the same time, he finds in the essays material for an explanation of the phenomenon of fascism as the "aestheticization of politics" art explanation worked out more precisely in his later works. In his foreword Ernst Jiinger writes: "The inner connection which lies at the basis of the essays collected in this volume is that of German nationalism. It is characteristic of this nationalism that it has lost its connection to both the idealism of our grandfathers and the rationalism of our fathers. Its stance [Haltung] is rather that of an historical realism, and what it is wishes to comprehend is that substance, that layer of an absolute reality of which ideas as well as rational deductions are mere expressions. This stance is thus also a symbolic one, in so far as it comprehends every act, every thought and every feeling as the symbol of a unified and unchangeable being which cannot escape its own inherent laws." (KuK, p. 5) If this excerpt is read in connection with the first sentences of Jiinger's essay, one can begin to recognize in outline form the principle of expression2 here claiming political validity which will subsequently be used by fascism to dominate the masses: "The heroic spirit is opposed to seeking the idea of war in a stratum which can be determined by human action. Yet the multifarious transformations and disguises endured in changing times and places by the pure form

Sociology and the Twilight of Man: Homocentrism and Discourse in Sociological Theory

Abstract: A critique of modern sociological theory, this brilliant new work rather than announcing the twilight of man accepts the event both as an intellectual conclusion and an empirical fact, and proceeds systematically to examine the alternatives beyond the Weber-Durkheim-Parsons episteme.Addressing himself to the issues of pluralism in sociological theory, Lemert rigorously examines representative writings of important theorists in America and Europe, including the writings of Homans (Lexical Explanation), Blalock (Theory Constructionism), Parsons (Analytic Realism), Blumer (Symbolic Interactionism), Schutz, Berger, Luckmann (Phenomenology), Cicourel (Ethnomethology), and Habermas (Critical Theory). Lemert challenges the celebrated pluralism hypothesis in his argument that recent sociological theory is not so pluralistic after all and has not made particular use of available styles of thinking."""Sociology and the Twilight of Man "is an important contribution to the modern sociological enterprise for several reasons. First, it raises basic questions about the progress made beyond earlier theoretical writings. Second, it questions the explanatory force of current theories. Third, it questions whether contemporary theory can continue to develop in a meaningful way without a profound reexamination of its assumptions and premises. And fourth, it demonstrates the value of discursive analysis to theoretical studies. Lemert s critique could lead to fundamental revisions of sociologists perception of their discipline."

The limits of health reform : the search for realism

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Socialist realism and literary theory

Abstract: FOR UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS, most discussions of socialist realism resemble elegies more than analyses. They usually lament the passing of the pre-revolutionary tradition, deplore the brutal methods by which literature has been emasculated and writers silenced, and condemn the government policies that have rewarded a Fadeev with a Stalin prize and removed Dostoevsky from the secondary school curriculum. Now, I also prefer Dostoevsky to Fadeev and think that literature in the Soviet Union is not fulfilling the social functions I would most like to see literature fulfill. That said, however, I also think that the elegiac is not the only mode for writing about socialist realism. There is, or should be, room for the sort of analysis that would treat socialist realism as a literary fact, not simply an unfortunate political consequence, without being accused of apologizing for it. The aim of this essay is to suggest some fruitful ways of looking at socialist realism and the socialist realist novel-fruitful, that is, for our understanding of the nature and function of literature as a whole. However poor socialist realism may be when judged by the standards usually employed in the West to praise Dostoevsky and Dickens, it can still serve as a useful test case for thinking about key problems in contemporary literary theory, literary history, and comparative literature.

The Model Muddle: Proposals for an Immodest Realism (1966) in Models: Representation of the Scientific Understanding.

Abstract: Reedition d'un article de 1966. L'A. propose une version representationaliste de la nature et du role des modeles dans la science.

Instrumentalism, realism, and research on the diffusion of innovation

Abstract: Research on the diffusion of innovation has been dominated for many years by an approach to scientific reasoning developed most thoroughly and influentially by Hagerstrand. Recently there has been a shift away from this approach. However, this shift has not been previously noted in the literature. After presenting the characteristics of the two perspectives in terms of the instrumentalist and realist conceptions of science, this article provides some evidence for the shift and identifies several key issues for future research.

Putnam's argument against realism

Abstract: IN "Realism and Reason"' Hilary Putnam attempts to show that a certain picture "of the relation of any correct theory to all or part of THE WORLD" is incoherent. According to this picture, which he dubs "metaphysical realism," there is "a determinate relation of reference between terms in [any language L] and pieces (or sets of pieces) of THE WORLD, "2 in terms of which truth for L is to be defined. Moreover, "THE WORLD is supposed to be independent of any particular representation [or theory] we have of it-indeed, it is held that we might be unable to represent THE WORLD at all."

Realism and Idealism in Avicenna's Political Philosophy

Abstract: The legitimate goals of political communities and the proper objectives of law have been themes of political philosophy since its inception. Philosophers' disagreements about the nature of political life and law have occasioned divergent accounts of the best or ideal government and have generated an even deeper controversy as to whether the best case should be the measure of political phenomena in the first place. For the purpose of analysis, three kinds of political theories can be distinguished. Characteristic of the first kind is the belief that people can attain a wide range of excellences and that the function of a political community is to foster in a direct manner the best or most complete form of human excellence, regardless of how rare the individuals who profit from this guidance. Accordingly, a central concern of “idealistic” or “utopian” political philosophy is elaborating the nature of the absolutely best political order and the conditions of its emergence. Among the central activities of governments so conceived are moral and intellectual education, as presented, for example, in the works of Plato and Aristotle. A second kind of political theory shares the belief in a multiplicity of hierarchically ranked human ends but denies that the highest possibility for human development should serve as the foremost principle determining political institutions and governing political decisionmaking.

Mirrors of Fiction Within Tom Jones: The Paradox of Self-Reference

Abstract: PROPOSING a "Great Tradition, with very different emphases from Mr. Leavis', from Cervantes to Fielding to Sterne and Diderot, and on to Joyce and Nabokov," Robert Alter observes that the "real subject of the novel ... [may be] the stubborn ambiguity of the relationship between literary creation and reality."' Whether or not this relationship is the subject of the novel, it is pivotal in Fielding's novels. Commentators agree that self-conscious exploitation of literary artifice distinguishes Fielding's novels, particularly Tom Jones, and that this manipulation calls attention to the issue of the relation between reality and art. Although not approaching anything like consensus, most critics agree, also, with Andrew Wright that if by "life" or "reality" one means "actual fact" or "detail in massive bulk," for Fielding "life was life and art art."2 Alter puts it strongly: "It is clear that this whole notion of fiction founded on a minutely realized world of familiar things, and of a dialectic between things and consciousness, has nothing to do with Fielding."3 Yet these same critics readily concede a type of realism to Fielding's artifice. Wright posits a moral realism.4 Alter differentiates the "exhaustive realism" of the factual from a "concessive realism" which, like Wright's, is "essentially social and moral in nature."5 That is, as

Sellarsian Realism and Conceptual Change in Science

Abstract: In his contribution, Prof. Rorty suggested that transcendental arguments are only useful as a means of providing self-referential ad hominem arguments against particular philosophical views, showing that those views fail to make good sense of our knowledge, such as it is, and of our dealings with the world. I do not know if Rorty is correct, for I still do not understand how to delimit transcendental arguments properly. But my argument fits his description. I will offer a self-referential ad hominem argument against the theory of (scientific) truth offered by Wilfrid Sellars and largely shared by Jay Rosenberg. In spite of its specific concern with Sellars, the argument is of general interest. It has two principal strands. One, picked up by Prof. Parsons in his comments, shows that Quine’s doctrine of indeterminacy of translation is incompatible with the most interesting forms of what Sellars, Putnam and Rosenberg call Peircean realism. During the last two years I have been persuaded, rather against my will, that the indeterminacy of translation cannot be evaded. Accordingly, I hold that Peircean articulations of scientific realism cannot be adequately defended. The other major strand of the argument concerns the correction of fact-stating claims forced on us by theory replacement and by conceptual change in science. Such correction undermines the vestiges of a ‘growth by accretion’ model of the development of science which are still to be found in Sellars’s and Rosenberg’s writings. In its general thrust, my argument supports Putnam’s contention that all viable articulations of scientific realism will land us in some form of what he calls “internal realism.”1

Style and the new journalism: A rhetorical analysis of Tom Wolfe

Abstract: This study analyzes the rhetorical appeal of Tom Wolfe. It argues that Wolfe's essays represent a non‐linear, oral‐sounding rhetoric that stylistically emulates television. The result is an exciting, immediate, but still credible “televisionic” journalism. Wolfe secures this unique rhetorical form through his use of the four stylistic devices associated with New Journalism—third‐person point of view, scene‐by‐scene construction, extensive dialogue, and recording of status‐life symbols—and through his particular employment of punctuation and typography, language and syntax, and organization. All contribute to the realism of Wolfe's prose—a realism sustained by a linguistic style that rejects many of the time‐honored rules and constraints of conventional journalism. Wolfe's work is part of a reportorial revolution which seeks to transform journalism from a craft to an art, thus allowing the writer to compete rhetorically with such popular mass audience persuaders as television.

"Don Quixote," "Ulysses," and the Idea of Realism

Abstract: Maybe, but in realism you are down to facts on which the world is based: that sudden reality which smashes romanticism into a pulp. What makes most people's lives unhappy is some disappointed romanticism, some unrealizable or misconceived ideal. In fact you may say that idealism is the ruin of man, and if we lived down to fact, as primitive man had to do, we would be better off. That is what we are made for. Nature is quite unromantic. It is we who put romance into her, which is a false attitude, an egotism, absurd like all egotisms. In Ulysses I tried to keep close to fact.