Showing papers on "Realism published in 2010"

Realism in political theory

Abstract: In recent decades, a ‘realist’ alternative to ideal theories of politics has slowly taken shape. Bringing together philosophers, political theorists, and political scientists, this countermovement ...

Realism as a Stance for Mixed Methods Research

Abstract: ions from behavior or constructions of the observer. Realism in this sense therefore does not entail materialism, nor is it simply a cover for a reductionist agenda that would attempt to eliminate mental concepts from scientific discourse (Putnam, 1999, p 74 ff.). Maxwell & Mittapalli, Realism and mixed methods 1 7 However, realists are not dualists, postulating two different realms of reality, the physical and the mental. In our view, the clearest and most credible analysis of this issue has been that of Putnam (1990, 1999), who argued for the legitimacy of both “mental” and “physical” ways of making sense of the world. He advocated a distinction between mental and physical perspectives or languages, both referring to reality, but from different conceptual standpoints. He argued that “The metaphysical realignment we propose involves an acquiescence in a plurality of conceptual resources, of different and mutually irreducible vocabularies . . .coupled with a return not to dualism but to the ‘naturalism of the common man.’” (1999, p. 38) Thus, while realism rejects the idea of "multiple realities" in the sense of independent and incommensurable worlds in which different individuals or societies live, it is quite compatible with the idea that there are different valid perspectives on the world. However, it holds that these perspectives, as held by the people we study, are part of the world that we want to understand, and that our understanding of these perspectives can be more or less correct (Phillips, 1990). A realist approach thus recognizes the reality and importance of meaning, as well as of physical and behavioral phenomena, as having explanatory significance, and the essentially interpretive nature of our understanding of the former (Sayer, 2000, pp. 17-18). Combining this view with a process-oriented approach to causality can resolve the long-standing perceived contradiction between “reason” explanations and “cause” explanations, and integrate both in explanatory theories. Weber's sharp distinction between causal explanation and interpretive understanding (1905) obscured the importance of reasons as causal influences on actions, and thus their role as essential components of any full explanation of human action. Realism can deal with the apparent dissimilarity of reason explanations and cause explanations by showing that reasons can plausibly be seen as real events in a causal nexus leading to the action. Realism also supports the idea that individuals' social and physical contexts have a causal influence on their beliefs and perspectives. While this proposition is widely accepted in everyday life, constructivists have tended to deny the “reality” of such influences, while positivism and some forms of post-positivist empiricism tend to simply dismiss the reality or importance of individuals’ perspectives, or to “operationalize” these to behavioral variables. From a realist perspective, not only are both individuals’ perspectives and their situations real phenomena, they are separate phenomena that causally interact with one another. Maxwell & Mittapalli, Realism and mixed methods 1 8 In doing this, a realist perspective can provide a framework for better understanding the relationship between individuals’ perspectives and their actual situations. This issue has been a prominent concern in the philosophy of social science for many years (e.g., MacIntyre, 1967; Menzel, 1978), and is central to “critical” approaches to qualitative research. Critical realism treats both individuals’ perspectives and their situations as real phenomena that causally interact with one another. In this, realism supports the emphasis that critical theory places on the influence that social and economic conditions have on beliefs and ideologies. Sayer (1992, pp. 222223) stated that the objects of “interpretive” understanding (meanings, beliefs, motives, and so on) are influenced both by the material circumstances in which they exist and by the cultural resources that provide individuals with ways of making sense of their situations. However, critical realism approaches the understanding of this interaction without assuming any specific theory of the relationship between material and ideational phenomena, such as Marxism. A realist perspective also legitimates and clarifies the concept of “ideological distortion”—that cultural forms may obscure or misrepresent aspects of the economic or social system or the physical environment—while affirming the causal interaction between the physical and social environment and cultural forms. In particular, realism is compatible with what have been called “ideological” or “non-reflectionist” approaches to culture, in which cultural forms that contradict aspects of social structure may serve ideological functions that act to sustain the social system or constitute adaptive responses to the physical or social environment (e.g., Maxwell, 1978). An emphasis on causal processes, rather than regularities or laws, in explaining sociocultural phenomena also allows explanations to be tailored to single cases and unique circumstances, so that different individuals or social groups may have different responses to similar situations, depending on differences in specific personal or cultural characteristics that are causally relevant to the outcome. 3. Validity and inference quality Validity and quality are issues for which there have been substantial disagreements between qualitative and quantitative researchers. The types of “validity” (many qualitative researchers don’t even use this term) employed in each tradition have little overlap (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003), and the basic assumptions involved in the two approaches are radically different. Teddlie and Tashakkori went so far as to recommend abandoning the term “validity” entirely in mixed method research, arguing that the term has taken on such diverse meanings that it is losing its ability to communicate anything (pp. 12, 36-37). Maxwell & Mittapalli, Realism and mixed methods 1 9 Despite these differences, there is an important similarity between the typical quantitative and qualitative approaches to validity. Both focus largely on the procedures used in collecting data and drawing inferences from these data. This is particularly obvious in the movement for “evidence-based” research, which relies almost entirely on the type of research design as the bases for assessing the validity of the results, with randomized experiments as the “gold standard” for design quality. However, it also characterizes prominent approaches to validity (or its analogues) in qualitative research. A realist concept of validity is quite different from these procedurebased approaches. Validity, from a realist perspective, is not a matter of procedures, but of the relationship between the claim and the phenomena that the claim is about (Norris, 1983; House, 1991; Hammersley, 1992; Maxwell, 1992). Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, in what is currently the definitive work on experimental and quasi-experimental research, state that Validity is a property of inferences. It is not a property of designs or methods, for the same designs may contribute to more or less valid inferences under different circumstances. . . . No method guarantees the validity of an inference. (2002, p. 34; emphasis in original) Also, as argued by Keller in the passage quoted earlier (Example 2), a realist approach to validity does not entail that concepts, theories, or claims “reflect” or “correspond to” reality, only that whether these claims “work” depends on their relationship to a reality independent of our constructions (cf. Barad, 2007). While critical realism denies that we can have any “objective” perception of these phenomena to which we can compare our claims, it does not abandon the possibility of testing these claims against evidence about the nature of the phenomena. We see this process of testing claims against the evidence that is relevant to the claims as fundamental to a scientific approach in general. However, the nature of the evidence that is relevant to a claim depends on the nature of the claim. A claim about a person’s beliefs requires a different sort of evidence from a claim about the outcome of a randomized trial of a new drug. Specifically, claims about meanings and perspectives, which fall under the general category of “interpretive” claims, require quite different sorts of evidence from claims about behavior, let alone claims about the relationships between variables. A realist approach to validity also entails that a valid description, explanation, or interpretation must not only be supported by evidence, but must address plausible alternative descriptions, explanations, or interpretations of the phenomenon about which the claim is made. Maxwell & Mittapalli, Realism and mixed methods 2 0 For these reasons, the main approach to validity in experimental research (e.g., Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002) is grounded in the concept of a validity threat—a possible way that a conclusion might be wrong—and ways to address these threats. However, the emphasis has largely been on the designs and methods used to deal with these threats. This has been facilitated by the fact that this literature has, consistently with a regularity view of causality as inherently general, dealt mainly with types of validity threats, rather than emphasizing the actual ways a specific conclusion might be wrong in a given study. The importance of the latter point is implicit in the realist argument above, that validity is not simply determined by procedures (although procedures are obviously relevant to the validity of a conclusion), but must be assessed in the specific context of a particular study. It is also an implication of a realist view of causality as inherently local rather than general. A realist perspective on validity can thus be of value to mixed method researchers by focusing attention on the spe

Routine, Reflexivity, and Realism*:

Abstract: Many scholars continue to accord routine action a central role in social theory and defend the continuing relevance of Bourdieu's habitus. Simultaneously, most recognize the importance of reflexivity. In this article, I consider three versions of the effort to render these concepts compatible, which I term "empirical combination," "hybridization," and "ontological and theoretical reconciliation." None of the efforts is ultimately successful in analytical terms. Moreover, I argue on empirical grounds that the relevance of habitus began to decrease toward the end of the 20th century, given major changes in the structures of the advanced capitalist democracies. In these circumstances, habitual forms prove incapable of providing guidelines for people's lives and, thus, make reflexivity imperative. I conclude by arguing that even the reproduction of natal background is a reflexive activity today and that the mode most favorable to producing it-what I call "communicative reflexivity"-is becoming harder to sustain.

Realism, liberal moralism and a political theory of modus vivendi

Abstract: This article sets out some of the key features of a realist critique of liberal moralism, identifying descriptive inadequacy and normative irrelevance as the two fundamental lines of criticism. It then sketches an outline of a political theory of modus vivendi as an alternative, realist approach to political theory. On this account a modus vivendi should be understood as any political settlement that involves the preservation of peace and security and is generally acceptable to those who are party to it. In conclusion, some problems with this conception of modus vivendi and with a realist political theory more generally are discussed. In particular, the question is raised of whether a realist political theory should be understood as an alternative to liberal moralism or only a better way of doing basically the same kind of thing.

Quantum Mechanics on Spacetime I: Spacetime State Realism

Abstract: What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological picture; and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an opposing picture: what we call spacetime state realism; a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature; even one which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden

The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it

Abstract: Metaethical—or, more generally, metanormative—realism faces a serious epistemological challenge. Realists owe us—very roughly speaking—an account of how it is that we can have epistemic access to the normative truths about which they are realists. This much is, it seems, uncontroversial among metaethicists, myself included. But this is as far as the agreement goes, for it is not clear—nor uncontroversial—how best to understand the challenge, what the best realist way of coping with it is, and how successful this attempt is. In this paper I try, first, to present the challenge in its strongest version, and second, to show how realists—indeed, robust realists—can cope with it. The strongest version of the challenge is, I argue, that of explaining the correlation between our normative beliefs and the independent normative truths. And I suggest an evolutionary explanation (of a pre-established harmony kind) as a way of solving it.

Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social Construction

Abstract: Part I. Introduction: 1. The dismal queen of the social sciences Uskali Maki Part II. Setting the Scene: 2. Ugly currents in modern economics Mark Blaug 3. Modern economics and its critics Partha Dasgupta 4. Some non-reasons for non-realism about economics Uskali Maki Part III. Economic Theory and Economic Reality: 5. Credible worlds: the status of theoretical models in economics Robert Sugden 6. Models, stories and the economic world Mary Morgan 7. The limits of causal order, from economics to physics Nancy Cartwright 8. Econometrics and reality Kevin Hoover 9. Economic models and reality: the role of informal scientific methods Roger Backhouse 10. Truthlikeness and economic theories Ilkka Niiniluoto Part IV. The Constitution of Economic Reality: 11. Rational choice, functional selection and empty black boxes Philip Pettit 12. The reality of common cultures Shaun Hargreaves Heap 13. Collective acceptance and collective attitudes: on the social construction of social reality Raimo Tuomela and Wolfgang Balzer 14. Putting evidence in its place: John Mill's early struggles with 'facts in concrete' Neil DeMarchi 15. Hayek and cultural evolution Bruce Caldwell Part V. The Institutions of Economics: 16. You shouldn't want a realism if you have a rhetoric Deirdre McCloskey 17. The more things change, the more they stay the same: social realism in contemporary science studies Wade Hands 18. Economists: truth-seekers or rent-seekers Jesus Zamora Bonilla.

Actors and Icons of the Ancient Theater

Abstract: List of illustrations vi Preface viii List of abbreviations xiii 1 A Portrait of the Artist I: Theater-Realistic Art in Athens, 500--330 BC 1 2 A Portrait of the Artist II: Theater-Realistic Art in the Greek West, 400--300 BC 38 3 The Spread of Theater and the Rise of the Actor 83 4 Kallippides on the Floor Sweepings: The Limits of Realism in Classical Acting 117 5 Cooking with Menander: Slices from the Ancient Home Entertainment Industry? 140 6 The Politics of Privatization: A Short History of the Privatization of Drama from Classical Athens to Early Imperial Rome 168 Bibliography 205 Index 227

Bernard Williams and the possibility of a realist political theory

Abstract: This article explores the prospects for developing a realist political theory via an analysis of the work of Bernard Williams. It begins by setting out Williams’s theory of political realism and pl...

What Is Ontological Realism

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to clarify what metaontological realism, as discussed in contemporary metaontological literature, amounts to. Although metaontological debates are of relatively long standing, the terms ‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’ have only recently come to be regularly applied to metaontological positions. The new usage is not fully stable. This paper aims to: (1) distinguish three key claims associated with the term ‘realism’ in metaontology, and give some initial reasons why it is important to be very clear about the differences between these claims; (2) argue that the three ‘realist’ claims are independent of one other; and (3) argue that the label ‘ontological realism’ is best attached to just one of the three claims, namely the claim that the facts of ontology are objective.

Being in the World (of Warcraft): Raiding, Realism, and Knowledge Production in a Massively Multiplayer Online Game

Abstract: This paper discusses two main claims made about virtual worlds: first, that people become "immersed" in virtual worlds because of their sensorial realism, and second, because virtual worlds appear to be "places" they can be studied without reference to the lives that their inhabitants live in the actual world. This paper argues against both of these claims by using data from an ethnographic study of knowledge production in World of Warcraft. First, this data demonstrates that highly-committed ("immersed") players of World of Warcraft make their interfaces less sensorially realistic (rather than more so) in order to obtain useable knowledge about the game world. In this case, immersion and sensorial realism may be inversely correlated. Second, their commitment to the game leads them to engage in knowledge-making activities outside of it. Drawing loosely on phenomenology and contemporary theorizations of Oceania, I argue that what makes games truly "real" for players is the extent to which they create collective projects of action that people care about, not their imitation of sensorial qualia. Additionally, I argue that while purely in-game research is methodologically legitimate, a full account of member's lives must study the articulation of in-game and out-of-game worlds and trace people's engagement with virtual worlds across multiple domains, some virtual and some actual.

Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory

Abstract: Realism and constructivism, two key contemporary theoretical approaches to the study of international relations, are commonly taught as mutually exclusive ways of understanding the subject. Realist Constructivism explores the common ground between the two, and demonstrates that, rather than being in simple opposition, they have areas of both tension and overlap. There is indeed space to engage in a realist constructivism. But at the same time, there are important distinctions between them, and there remains a need for a constructivism that is not realist, and a realism that is not constructivist. Samuel Barkin argues more broadly for a different way of thinking about theories of international relations, that focuses on the corresponding elements within various approaches rather than on a small set of mutually exclusive paradigms. Realist Constructivism provides an interesting new way for scholars and students to think about international relations theory.

What is to be done? Political theory and political realism:

Abstract: This article argues for greater realism in political theory with respect to judgements about what politicians ought to do and how they ought to act. It shows that there are major problems in deduci...

Ontological realism: Methodology or misdirection?

Abstract: In a series of papers over a period of several years Barry Smith and Werner Ceusters have offered a number of cogent criticisms of historical approaches to creating, maintaining, and applying biomedical terminologies and ontologies. And they have urged the adoption of what they refer to as a “realism-based” approach. Indeed, at times they insist that the realism-based approach not only offers clear advantages and a well-founded methodological basis for ontology development and evaluation, but that such a realist perspective is in fact necessary for understanding and using terminologies and ontologies in science. This paper explores a number of questions surrounding such claims, provides a careful characterization of the type of realism recommended by Smith and Ceusters, and evaluates the role that realism plays in the critiques and recommendations that they offer. The conclusion reached is that while Smith's and Ceusters' criticisms of prior practice in the treatment of ontologies and terminologies in medical informatics are often both perceptive and well founded, and while at least some of their own proposals demonstrate obvious merit and promise, none of this either follows from or requires the brand of realism that they propose. Editor's note: A response to this paper from Barry Smith and Werner Ceusters is scheduled to appear in a future issue of Applied Ontology.

Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?

Abstract: This is a review essay discussing Brian Tamanaha’s book BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE (Princeton University Press, 2010). Regarding Tamanaha’s historical thesis that “formalism” was not widely accepted in the 19th-century and that realist themes long predate the American Legal Realists (hereafter “Realists”) of the 1920s, I argue that (1) Tamanaha adduces enough evidence to state at least a *prima facie* case against any historian who wants to claim that in the 19th-century jurists and scholars generally believed that common-law judges did not make law in new circumstances (“Natural Law Formalism”) and that judging was simply a mechanical exercise in deductive reasoning (“Vulgar Formalism”), although we still need to know how representative Tamanaha’s evidence is; (2) whether 19th-century jurists and scholars held or rejected more sophisticated (and philosophically interesting) forms of formalism is not addressed at all by Tamanaha’s evidence; (3) Tamanaha does not make even a *prima facie* case that the distinctive theses of the Realists had widespread traction in the 19th-century, partly because he emphasizes themes that were not, in fact, distinctive of Realism (e.g., the political influences on judicial decision), and partly because, when considering distinctive Realist themes, he adduces inapposite evidence or misrepresents the sources he quotes.Regarding Tamanaha’s jurisprudential thesis that we can now move beyond the formalist-realist divide, I argue that (1) what Tamanaha calls “balanced realism” is a somewhat less precise version of the account of Realism developed by Schauer and myself going back some twenty years; (2) Tamanaha is mistaken in arguing that everyone is now a “balanced realist” largely on the basis of remarks by post-Realist judges (some of whom, like Harry Edwards, recognize that it remains controversial) and without according adequate attention to countervailing evidence, such as the Vulgar Formalism characteristic of public political debate about adjudication in the U.S.; theoretical accounts of adjudication like Ronald Dworkin’s, which try to vindicate Natural Law Formalism without any hint of Vulgar Formalism; and the self-understanding of other common-law legal cultures, like England’s, which embody formalistic elements; and (3) Tamanaha’s attempt to show that “formalism” is “empty” actually demonstrates its substantive meaning for many contemporary theorists as a normative theory or ideal for adjudication, rule-application and/or legal reasoning. “Formalism” and “realism,” once precisely characterized, remain useful jurisprudential categories, whatever the historical verdict on whether 19th-century jurists held Vulgar or Natural Law versions of formalism.

Method in Social Science: Revised 2nd Edition

Abstract: In its second edition, Method in Social Science was widely praised for its penetrating analysis of central questions in social science discourse This revised edition comes with a new preface and a full bibliography The book is intended for students and researchers familiar with social science but having little or no previous experiences of philosophical and methodological discussion, and for those who are interested in realism and method

Contingency, Realism, and the Expansion Method

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between scientific realism and the expansion method. The frame of reference for our investigation is their joint conceptualization of “contingency.” We first explore the varied historical meanings of contingency; this is followed by a survey of its differential deployment within geographic thought. Attention then turns to theorizations of contingency in realism and the expansion method. The final portion of the paper assesses the potential for integrating these two analytic traditions within geographic research.

Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism

Abstract: Introduction 1. The theory of cosmopolitan power 2. Crucial-case textual analysis of the founding fathers of Realism: the classical inspirations 3. Crucial-case textual analysis of the founding fathers of Realism: the modern inspirations 4. Case studies of soft empowerment: free trade, the classical gold standard, and dollarization 5. Case study of hard disempowerment: US foreign policy and the Bush doctrine 6. Case study of soft empowerment: the power of modern American culture 7. Conclusions.

Satire in an Age of Realism

Abstract: 1. Augustan satire and Victorian realism 2. Terminal satire and Jude the Obscure 3. George Gissing's ambivalent realism 4. The English critics and the Norwegian satirist 5. Truth and caricature in The Secret Agent Epilogue.

Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind

Abstract: 1. Making sense of emergence 2. The layered world: Metaphysical considerations 3. Emergence: Core ideas and issues 4. "Supervenient and yet not deducible": Is there a coherent concept of ontological emergence? 5. Reasons and the first person 6. Taking the agent's point of view seriously in action explanation 7. Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion 8. Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence 9. Hempel, explanation, metaphysics 10. Reduction and reductive explanation: Is one possible without the other? 11. Can supervenience and "non-strict" laws save anomalous monism? 12. Causation and mental causation 13. Two concepts of realization, mental causation, and physicalism 14. Why there are no laws in the special sciences: Three arguments Index

Evolution and Normative Scepticism

Abstract: It is increasingly common to suggest that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism leads inevitably to a general scepticism about our ability to reliably form normative beliefs. In what follows, I argue that this is not the case. In particular, I consider several possible arguments from evolutionary theory and normative realism to normative scepticism and explain where they go wrong. I then offer a more general diagnosis of the tendency to accept such arguments and why this tendency should be resisted.

The (classical) Realist vision of global reform

Abstract: Most Realists today oppose far-reaching global reform on the grounds that it represents unrealistic and potentially irresponsible ‘utopianism’. An earlier generation of mid-century Realists, however, not only supported serious efforts at radical international reform but also developed a theoretically impressive model for how to bring it about. They considered the possibility of post-national political orders and ultimately a world state as desirable long-term goals, but only if reformers could simultaneously generate the thick societal background (or what they called ‘supranational society’) required by any viable order ‘beyond the nation state’. As they fail to engage constructively with proposals for global reform, present-day Realists betray their own intellectual tradition. By reconsidering the subterranean legacy of Realist reformism as advanced by mid-century international thinkers (e.g. E.H. Carr, John Herz, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Frederick Schuman), the essay provides a revisionist reading of the history of twentieth-century international theory, while also highlighting its significance for ongoing debates about global reform.

Morgenthau, Law and Realism

Abstract: 1. Hans J. Morgenthau in International Relations 2. The justiciability of disputes 3. Hans Kelsen and the reality of norms 4. Legal realism and behaviouralist social science 5. Legalism, romanticism and irresponsible statecraft 6. The legacy of legal formalism.

Open Horizons: The Temporal Visions of Reflexive Realism

Abstract: This paper excavates another conceptual thread running through much of what has been termed “reflexive realism”—the importance of open temporality. We argue that the ethical and political cores of reflexive realism owe much to a theoretical confrontation with the ultimate reality of open-ended, indeterminate time. Where the legacy of classical realism embedded significant ambiguities in these tensions, reflexive realism can provide a more developed ethical framework for political action through an engagement, via open time, with research often viewed as outside the purview of political realism. We then uncover an aesthetic understanding of action and theory to show how classical realism’s indeterminate view of time, instead of limiting and even debasing any and all human efforts, can be mobilized as a resource for ethical evaluation and action. The paper’s concluding discussion demonstrates this by examining the contributions that open time can make to the perennial dilemma of humanitarian intervention.

Idealism: The History of a Philosophy

Abstract: There has been no comparable attempt at a comprehensive history of metaphysical idealism for over 70 years, and this book, ranging from Parmenides to Deleuze, exceeds all previous work in size and scope. It also puts forward arguments that are important, and controversial. Firstly, it presents compelling evidence that idealism begins much earlier than is commonly argued. Secondly we show that idealism is not a reductive metaphysics, but an inflationary one - a 'realism with respect to the idea'. This, contrary to many accounts, makes idealism compatible with naturalism, the sciences, and even many forms of materialism. Indeed we include detailed accounts of the work of contemporary biologists and physicists who's work is demonstrably idealist. Metaphysical idealism is currently at the centre not only of debates within continental philosophy, but is enjoying a great resurgence within the analytic tradition (as is evidenced by our own coverage of McDowell, Brandom etc.). This book is a timely and important intervention in those debates.

Charles Tilly, German Historicism, and the Critical Realist Philosophy of Science

Abstract: This paper examines Charles Tilly’s relationship to the schools of thought known as historicism and critical realism. Tilly was committed to a social epistemology that was inherently historicist, and he increasingly called himself a “historicist.” The “search for grand laws in human affairs comparable to the laws of Newtonian mechanics,” he argued, was a “waste of time” and had “utterly failed.” Tilly’s approach was strongly reminiscent of the arguments developed in the first half of the 20th century by Rickert, Weber, Troeltsch, and Meinecke for a synthesis of particularization and generalization and for a focus on “historical individuals” rather than abstract universals. Nonetheless, Tilly never openly engaged with this earlier wave of historicist sociology, despite its fruitfulness for and similarity to his own project. The paper explores some of the possible reasons for this missed encounter. The paper argues further that Tilly’s program of “relational realism” resembled critical realism, but with main two differences: Tilly did not fully embrace critical realism’s argument that social mechanisms are always co-constituted by social meaning or its normative program of explanatory critique. In order to continue developing Tilly’s ideas it is crucial to connect them to the epistemological ideas that governed the first wave of historicist sociology in Weimar Germany and to a version of philosophical realism that is interpretivist and critical.

Perceived digital game realism: A quantitative exploration of its structure

Abstract: A quantitative exploration is presented of the concept of perceived digital game realism, based upon the frameworks described by Malliet (2006), and Shapiro, Peona-Herborn, and Hancock (2006). The concepts and categories outlined in both studies are complemented with an additional literature study and subjected to an exploratory factor analysis. Principal axis factoring was performed on items completed by 385 respondents whose ages ranged between 15 and 19 years. Seven factors of perceived game realism were identified: simulation, freedom of choice, character involvement, perceptual pervasiveness, authenticity regarding subject matter, authenticity regarding characters, and social realism. These findings are to a considerable extent congruent with the theoretical framework.

The No‐Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation*

Abstract: I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no‐miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans‐statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA.

Power, realism, and the ideal of human emancipation in a climate of change

Abstract: Most attempts to formalize climate politics have focused on the reform of current governance regimes, including norms, rules, regulations, political will, and decision-making procedures. Emphasis on reform entails a realist political approach, which only accounts for those incremental changes in power that can be objectively justified in terms of solving practical problems. This paper argues that political realism implicitly supports developmentalist logics of perpetual material growth which are precisely at the root of global environmental problems. Therefore, climate researchers have to move beyond this tradition of political thought, and engage in ‘critical theories’ and idealist approaches that question contemporary power relations. A few scholars have drawn on critical theory, historical materialism, Foucault, and Gramsci to explore power and human emancipation in the context of global environmental politics. These scholars identify hegemonic structures as essential causes of climate change. Accordingly, current power relations need to be fundamentally challenged, not only whenever extreme poverty averts the basic exercise of adaptive capacities, but, more broadly, whenever modernity and globalization set societies on unsustainable paths. This entails, on the one hand, redefining climate change as an opportunity to transform the structures under which modernity and global capitalism take place. On the other hand, it calls for reinterpreting adaptation within a broader project of universal emancipation from the structures that constrain our essential freedom and, with that, hinder effective and just societal responses to the challenges of climate change. WIREs Clim Change 2010 1 781–785 DOI: 10.1002/wcc.87 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website

An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes

Abstract: Introduction 1. Liberalism 2. Realism 3. Structuralism 4. Critical theory 5. Postmodernism 6. Feminist Perspectives 7. Social Constructivism 8. Green Perspectives Conclusions, Key Debates and New Directions Glossary of key or problem terms