Reasonable person

About: Reasonable person is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 442 publications have been published within this topic receiving 3716 citations. The topic is also known as: reasonable man & reasonable persons.

Defeasible logic

Abstract: We often reach conclusions partially on the basis that we do not have evidence that the conclusion is false. A newspaper story warning that the local water supply has been contaminated would prevent a person from drinking water from the tap in her home. This suggests that the absence of such evidence contributes to her usual belief that her water is safe. On the other hand, if a reasonable person received a letter telling her that she had won a million dollars, she would consciously consider whether there was any evidence that the letter was a hoax or somehow misleading before making plans to spend the money. All to often we arrive at conclusions which we later retract when contrary evidence becomes available. The contrary evidence defeats our earlier reasoning. Much of our reasoning is defeasible in this way. Since around 1980, considerable research in AI has focused on how to model reasoning of this sort. In this paper, I describe one theoretical approach to this problem, discuss implementation of this approach as an extension of Prolog, and describe some application of this work to normative reasoning, learning, planning, and other types of automated reasoning.

Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act

Abstract: It is an open question whether the prohibition on employment discrimination in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) protects plaintiffs who have not attempted to mitigate the effect of their disability on their ability to work. Suppose, for example, that a job applicant has severely impaired vision because of a corneal disease. He can have corneal transplant surgery that his doctors recommend and expect will allow him to see much more clearly, but he does not want to have the surgery because of the complications sometimes associated with the operation and the possibility that the surgery will not work. He applies for a job that has been structured for people who can see clearly, and asks the employer to purchase work equipment (like a new computer) that will enable him to perform the job with limited eyesight. Purchasing this equipment will be costly, and the employer asks why it should have to bear those costs when the applicant could have surgery to enable him to see better. The question raises a core issue of rights and responsibilities under a civil rights law. But Title I of the ADA, which protects a qualified individual with a disability from employment discrimination based on his disability, never indicates whether there is a duty to mitigate, either by undergoing medical procedures, using medication, pursuing physical therapy, losing weight, abstaining from alcohol and cigarettes, or taking other measures to improve health and eliminate obstacles to employment. The Supreme Court has not yet considered the question, and legal commentators have all but ignored it. The few lower courts to address a duty to mitigate under Title I are divided on whether mitigation should be required, and those in favor of the duty have not developed a clear standard for when that duty should apply. To the extent that the decisions supporting a duty to mitigate imply any principle for implementing the duty, most appear to suggest that Title I plaintiffs are obligated to mitigate whenever mitigation is possible. I reject both extremes of the existing debate. This Article argues that plaintiffs seeking Title I protection should be under a duty to mitigate, but that this duty should require plaintiffs to pursue only those mitigating measures that could reduce their need for workplace accommodation and that a reasonable person in the same situation would pursue.

Defeasible logic

Abstract: We often reach conclusions partially on the basis that we do not have evidence that the conclusion is false. A newspaper story warning that the local water supply has been contaminated would prevent a person from drinking water from the tap in her home. This suggests that the absence of such evidence contributes to her usual belief that her water is safe. On the other hand, if a reasonable person received a letter telling her that she had won a million dollars, she would consciously consider whether there was any evidence that the letter was a hoax or somehow misleading before making plans to spend the money. All to often we arrive at conclusions which we later retract when contrary evidence becomes available. The contrary evidence defeats our earlier reasoning. Much of our reasoning is defeasible in this way. Since around 1980, considerable research in AI has focused on how to model reasoning of this sort. In this paper, I describe one theoretical approach to this problem, discuss implementation of this approach as an extension of Prolog, and describe some application of this work to normative reasoning, learning, planning, and other types of automated reasoning.

How Reasonable Is the Reasonable Man?: Police and Excessive Force

Abstract: The authority of the police to use force represents one of the most misunderstood powers granted to representatives of government. Police officers are authorized to use both psychological and physical force to apprehend criminals and solve crimes.' This Article focuses on issues of physical force. After a brief introduction and a review of current legal issues in the use of force, this Article presents an assessment of current police policy development. After establishing the fundamental foundation for the use of force, the Article discusses "reasonableness" and the unrealistic expectation which is placed on police to understand, interpret, and follow vague "reasonableness" guidelines. Until the expectations and limitations on the use of force are clarified, in behavioral terms, police officers will be required to adhere to the vague standards of the "reasonable person."

The empirical basis for the reasonable woman standard.

Abstract: In Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said that the perspective of a reasonable woman, rather than just a reasonable person, should be used in deciding whether or not the plaintiff has experienced sexual harassment. One of the assumptions underlying the Ellison opinion, traceable to findings from research, is that men and women perceive and define sexual harassment differently. In this article, we review the research to see if the conclusion is warranted. In general, the finding that women define sexual harassment more broadly and inclusively than men is reliable, but the difference is small, often smaller than intrasex differences, and is affected by a variety of factors, including characteristics of the study itself. After reviewing the evidence, we evaluate the use of a reasonable woman standard, concluding that this standard is not helpful.