Relational contract

About: Relational contract is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 454 publications have been published within this topic receiving 24079 citations.

Developing Cooperative Project Client-Supplier Relationships: How Much to Expect from Relational Contracts?

Abstract: In recent years, infrastructure promoters have become interested in translating the Toyota lean management paradigm into new infrastructure development projects. This approach assumes client and project suppliers are willing to work cooperatively. To enable this prerequisite, clients have started to experiment with relational contracts. An empirical study on the use of a relational contract in the £4.2bn extension of Heathrow airport in London confirms, however, the old adage that the devil is in the details. Unarguably, relational contracts enable the project client and suppliers to work together for a common purpose. However, the interwoven ways in which the client implements the contract—writing up the commercial details, as well as adjusting and interpreting these details throughout the project—are critical to encourage the suppliers to work cooperatively and meet the expectations of the client. This study unpacks five factors for making relational contracts work in projects: suppliers are keen to reap reputation benefits from project participation; suppliers have flexibility in their production processes; client and suppliers choose the right people for the jobs; client learns to relationally contract in response to supplier feedback; and client aligns its practices to control and improve performance with the suppliers' skills.

An empirical investigation of interorganizational opportunism and contracting mechanisms

Abstract: This study investigates contracting mechanisms in situations of opportunistic disputes between organizations. The authors specifically explore the relationships between the formal versus informal nature of opportunism and the formal versus informal nature of contractual governance. They use a unique data set of 102 buyer–supplier disputes to explore in depth different types of opportunism – that is, strong form versus weak form opportunism – and different types of contracting mechanisms – that is, the controlling and coordinating functions of formal contracts and the cooperative and competitive sides of relational contracts. The authors’ detailed empirical analysis suggests distinct relationships between the different contracting mechanisms, the different types of opportunism, and the level of legal fees necessary to deal with the dispute. From these findings the authors derive implications for research on the role of contractual mechanisms in dealing with interorganizational opportunism.

Relational contract norms and the effectiveness of commercial banking relationships

Abstract: Bases the present study, on Macneil’s relational contract theory and illustrates the conceptual and managerial importance of relational norms in a business‐to‐business service context. Demonstrates a clear link between the client’s perception of the strength of the bank‐client relationship, as measured by relational norms, and the client’s intention to continue to purchase financial services and to purchase new financial services, willingness to recommend both the account manager and the bank to business colleagues and, assessment of satisfaction and judgement of service quality. Finds significant differences between the assessment of the strength of the relationship by account managers and client‐company representatives; these differences would have important managerial implications in the context of commercial banking.

Competition and relational contracts: the role of unemployment as a disciplinary device

Abstract: When workers are faced with the threat of unemployment, their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable. As a result, a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party. But can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs? We examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor. Long-term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment. However, stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency: higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity.

Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law

Abstract: I Il buon Governo Revisited II Private Law in a Fragmented SocietyIIIReconstructing Relational Contract (1) Contract as non-individual obligation (2) Contract as discursive project (3) Contract as interdiscursive translationIV Normative Perspectives: Freedom of TranslationV Discourse Rights in the Private Sphere