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Representation (systemics)

About: Representation (systemics) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 33821 publications have been published within this topic receiving 475461 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The consequences that brain-style processing may have on theories of cognition are explored, and connectionist models are used as examples to illustrate neural representation and computation in the pronouncing of English text, and in the extracting of shape parameters from shaded images.
Abstract: The types of representation and the styles of computation in the brain appear to be very different from the symbolic expressions and logical inferences that are used in sentence-logic models of cognition. In this chapter we explore the consequences that brain-style processing may have on theories of cognition. Connectionist models are used as examples to illustrate neural representation and computation in the pronouncing of English text, and in the extracting of shape parameters from shaded images. Levels of analysis are not independent in connectionist models, and the dependencies between levels provide an opportunity to co-evolve theories at all levels. This is a radical departure from the a priori, introspection-based strategy that has characterized most previous work in epistemology.

136 citations

Proceedings Article
05 Nov 1996

136 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is argued that the ability that characterizes and defines a true cognitive mind, as opposed to a merely adaptive system, is that of building representations of the non-existent, of what is not currently (yet) true or perceivable, ofwhat is desired.
Abstract: Humans and other animals are able not only to coordinate their actions with their current sensorimotor state, but also to imagine, plan and act in view of the future, and to realize distal goals. In this paper we discuss whether or not their future-oriented conducts imply (future-oriented) representations. We illustrate the role played by anticipatory mechanisms in natural and artificial agents, and we propose a notion of representation that is grounded in the agent's predictive capabilities. Therefore, we argue that the ability that characterizes and defines a true cognitive mind, as opposed to a merely adaptive system, is that of building representations of the non-existent, of what is not currently (yet) true or perceivable, of what is desired. A real mental activity begins when the organism is able to endogenously (i.e. not as the consequence of current perceptual stimuli) produce an internal representation of the world in order to select and guide its conduct goal-directed: the mind serves to coordinate with the future.

136 citations

01 Jan 2001
TL;DR: This article found that concreteness effects are localized at the lexical level, the semantic level, or both, without additional research and/or a reanalysis of existing data, it is impossible to determine whether concreteeness effects were localized at either lexical or semantic level.
Abstract: words will be slowed relative to concrete words, on average. Without additional research and/or a reanalysis of existing data, it is impossible to determine whether concreteness effects are localized at the lexical level, the semantic level, or both. 120

136 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The solution is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined byThe contents of motor representations, which enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions.
Abstract: Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content-determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions.

136 citations


Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202225
20211,580
20201,876
20191,935
20181,792
20171,391