Showing papers on "Resource dependence theory published in 1976"

Environments of Organizations

Abstract: The relationship between organizations and environments has drawn increasing attention in the recent literature of the sociology of organizations. We consider the subject of interorganizational relations to be a special case of the more general study of organizations and their environments. Dimensions of interorganizational rela­ tions have been listed (Marrett 1971), and partially developed paradigms for analyz­ ing organization-environment relations have been proposed. The natural selection model, developing the strongest argument for an environmental perspective, posits that environmental factors select those organizational characteristics that best fit the environment (Hannan & Freeman 1974, Aldrich' 1971b). A complementary model, variously called a political economy model (Benson 1975, Wamsley & Zald 1973), a dependence exchange approach (Jacobs 1974, Hasenfeld 1972), and a resource dependence model (Pfeffer 1972b), argues for greater attention to internal organiza­ tional political decision-making processes and also for the perspective that organiza­ tions seek to manage or strategically adapt to their environments. The two models agree on the importance of organizational environments for understanding organizational decisions and structures, but differ in their evaluation of the importance of the role of environmental selection. Current literature has elements of both incompletely developed perspectives and the shape of organiza­ tional sociology will be determined by the implicit debate taking place. As it is impossible to ascertain the ultimate resolution of this argument, we have chosen to examine both perspectives in this chapter, and to include literature from industrial organization, and administrative science and organizational behavior, as well as from organizational sociology.

Resource Dependence and in Terorganiza Tional Relations Local Employment Service Offices and Social Services Sector Organizations

Abstract: A resource dependence model is proposed as a conceptual scheme to account for organizational behavior observed under conditions where interorganizational relations are a critical environmental contingency. The model is used to explain the pattern of transactions between 19 local Employment Service offices and 249 social service organizations in New York State. Four aspects of interorganization transaction are taken as problematic: intensity, reciprocity, standardization of interaction, and the degree of perceived cooperation in the relationship. The results support the important role assigned to the manipulation of authority by the resource dependence perspective, and the findings document the minimal role played by domain consensus.

Resource theory and ameliorative strategy in a minimal information political convention game

Abstract: Coalition formation literature indicates that strategies more ameliorative than minimum resource theory appear under a variety of conditions of the competitive environment. These conditions include uncertainty of outcome and indivisibility of payoff. Some investigators have hypothesized that the inadequacies of minimum resource theory can be attributed to strong players using a parity norm and weak players using an equality norm in the bargaining process. The present study examines the plausibility of this hypothesis in the initial partner selection stage of the bargaining process phase of decision processes in systems at the small group level. An analytical paradigm is presented for discriminating among four strategic goals in the mixed motive three-person game: maximization, security, intracoalition compatibility, and competition. The last three goals are nonoptimal under minimum resource theory. Some earlier results that relatively indivisible payoffs lead to a greater incidence of nonpay-off-maximizing strategies than expected under minimum resource theory were supported under conditions of play involving indirect interpersonal interaction. The appropriateness of taking resource position alone as the determinant of a norm for strategy selection consequently must be questioned.