Resource dependence theory

About: Resource dependence theory is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2732 publications have been published within this topic receiving 184871 citations.

Exploring board formation and evolution of board composition in academic spin-offs

Abstract: An in-depth analysis of 11 cases is used to provide insight into the neglected area of the dynamics of boards in academic spin-offs. Drawing on stage-based, resource dependence, and social network theories, we explore board formation and changes in board composition occurring in Norwegian and US spin-offs. We find that these theories are important complements to earlier research on boards in technology-based new ventures. The process of board formation is mainly driven by social networks of the founders. Although we find differences in the initial board compositions in Norwegian and US spin-offs, there is convergence over time in subsequent board changes, which are mainly driven by the social networks of the board chair. Additions of key board members are associated with the progress of a spin-off developing from one stage to another. Several avenues for future research and implications are discussed.

Defining the social capital of the board of directors: An exploratory study

Abstract: This paper advances the resource dependence and social networks literature by investigating a board's structural social capital created as a consequence of interlocking directorates. Using approaches and measures developed by social network analysis we compare the interpersonal directorship networks of the top 250 companies in the United States and Australia. We find that the smaller, sparser Australian network is only marginally less compact and connected than the larger US network at the firm level of analysis. However, at the director level of analysis the US network is much larger and more connected than its Australian counterpart. As a result, we argue that scholars studying the resource dependence role of boards should consider using measures of interpersonal links as well as traditional measures of inter-firm links. Understanding how boards impact on corporate performance is a question central to the corporate governance research agenda. Agency theory, for example, argues that the key way a board adds value is by ensuring the interests of the managers of the firm are aligned with the interests of the owners (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen & Meckling 1976). A quite distinct area of inquiry, however, relates to the role that the board plays in providing access to important resources such as customers (Pennings 1980), capital (Mizruchi & Stearns 1988), the business elite (Uscem 1984) and power in general (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). We aim to broaden understanding of the resource dependence theory of corporate governance by examining the links provided to a board by interlocking directorships. We commence by reviewing existing research on the resource dependence role of the board before outlining how the emerging construct of social capital can be adapted and applied to investigate this role. In particular, we highlight how it is the personal director network that is critical to the development of social capital rather than the corporate network (i.e. network of corporations). While this study is primarily exploratory and descriptive, we contribute to the literature by employing a new methodology to measure the 'opportunity network' that interlocking directorates provide a board within a national corporate governance system (Adams 2002a; 2002b; 2002c). We show how the formal models, procedures and techniques developed in social network analysis can be applied to individual-level networks among directors. We stress that we are not considering the formation of social capital at the individual level; rather we are examining the systemic connections of individual directors in order to illustrate the opportunity network available to a board within the national corporate governance system. A comparison of the Australian and US systems highlights the divergence in network attributes between corporate networks and the networks of interlocking directors. We conclude with implications and areas for further research.

Corporate Public Affairs: Commitment, Resources, and Structure

Abstract: Using resource dependency and institutional theories, we create and test a model examining the relationships among senior management commitment, resource allocations, and the structure of public affairs departments. Using a large sample of U.S.-based firms, we find a positive relationship between senior management commitment to the public affairs function and the level of human and monetary resources allocated to the public affairs department. Furthermore, firms structure their public affairs responsibilities into three common activity sets: communications, collaborations, and local activities. These common activities are, in turn, positively associated with senior management commitment and resources allocated to the public affairs department.

Organizational and environmental factors in hospital alliance membership and contract management: a resource-dependence perspective.

Abstract: Using a resource-dependence perspective, we analyze the association between organizational and environmental characteristics and the likelihood that non-profit hospitals will enter into one of two forms of interorganizational relationship (IOR): hospital alliance membership or contract management (n = 1,661). The former is representative of high autonomy IORs, while the latter is representative of low autonomy IORs. Results of logistic regression analysis indicate that hospitals with greater resources and more favorable payer mix are more likely to join alliances, an IOR form which minimizes loss of autonomy. In addition, facilities operating in less favorable environments are more likely to be contract managed and less likely to be alliance members.

Political Choice, Public Policy, and Distributional Outcomes

Abstract: I address the functioning of the U.S. governing system by analyzing distributional outcomes from 1947 to 2000. The key question is whether public policy influences distributional outcomes. The macropolitics model and power resource theory suggest that left policies should equalize the distribution of income. I utilize single equation error correction models to assess the impact of policy on income inequality through two mechanisms—market conditioning and redistribution. Since nearly every government action influences markets in some way, I examine policy in the aggregate rather than focusing only on policies explicitly designed to redistribute income. The analysis indicates that policy influences inequality through both mechanisms, with left policy producing more equality. The results are consistent with power resource theory and strongly support the macropolitics model. Furthermore, I find that market conditioning is as important as, and works in tandem with, explicit redistribution.