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Rivalry

About: Rivalry is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5652 publications have been published within this topic receiving 108511 citations.


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01 Jan 1956
TL;DR: In this paper, a series of hypotheses as to the conditions of entry, and the probable degree to which they serve as barriers to new competition are presented, and a bold attempt is made to measure the height of these barriers in 20 manufacturing industries.
Abstract: Conditions of entry into markets where sellers are few are analyzed intensively by Professor J. S. Bain in his Barriers to New Competition.1 In the tightly written first chapter the theory of entry is developed far beyond what was previously in the literature. There emerges a series of hypotheses as to the conditions of entry, and the probable degree to which they serve as barriers to new competition. A bold attempt is then made to measure the height of these barriers in 20 manufacturing industries. Predictions stemming from these empirical findings are compared with observed performance of these industries. Finally, the conclusions with respect to the significance of types of entry barriers lead to a number of observations as to public policy. All of this comprehensive analysis is carried out explicitly within the framework of comparative statics. Specifically excluded from the circumstances considered as having a significant effect on entry, and through that on the maximum level of the equilibrium price, are secular or cyclical [or episodic?] movements of demand, capacity or costs. Nor, except for a few notable cases of product innovation, does Bain believe that new sellers are able to alter the condition of entry. Instead, "It is definitely posited for purposes of the present study-on the basis of extensive empirical observation-that the condition of entry as defined and its ultimate determinants are usually stable and slowly changing through time . . ." (p. 18). Such stability is elsewhere said to exist "persistently . . . over a period of time." Repeatedly this or a similar phrase appears to emphasize that observation ex post can be tied conceptually to the ex ante long-term equilibrium. Such stable and slowly changing conditions of entry are held to determine the ceiling price for an industry or the amount by which its price can, persistently, exceed the level ". . . hypothetically attributed to long-run equilibrium in pure competition" (p. 6). The actual persistent level of price may fall short of this entry-inviting level because of the nature of interfirm rivalry. The latter opens up the whole of oligopoly theory, but the author moves into that area only to indicate how the alternative solutions to interfirm rivalry would affect the price expectations of a would-be entrant. Entry is marked off from other sources of capacity expansion by the require-

2,854 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors take a critical view of contemporary doctrine in this area and present data which suggest that this doctrine offers a dangerous base upon which to build a public policy toward business.
Abstract: UANTITATIVE work in industrial organization has been directed mainly to the task of searching for monopoly even though a vast number of other interesting topics have been available to the student of economic organization. The motives for this preoccupation with monopoly are numerous, but important among them are the desire to be policy-relevant and the ease with which industrial concentration data can be secured. This paper takes a critical view of contemporary doctrine in this area and presents data which suggest that this doctrine offers a dangerous base upon which to build a public policy toward business.

2,331 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In a noncooperative equilibrium, the terms of trade move against the subsidizing country, but its welfare can increase because, under imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal cost of exports as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for profitable international markets. In such a world export subsidies can appear as attractive policy tools, from a national point of view, because they improve the relative position of a domestic firm in noncooperative rivalries with foreign firms, enabling it to expand its market share and earn greater profits. In effect, subsidies change the initial conditions of the game that firms play. The terms of trade move against the subsidizing country, but its welfare can increase because, under imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal cost of exports. International noncooperative equilibriumis characterized by such subsidies on the part of exporting nations, even though they are jointly suboptimal.

1,742 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated an organizational field where competing institutional logics existed for a lengthy period of time and identified four mechanisms for managing the rivalry of competing logics that facilitated and strengthened the separate identities of key actors.
Abstract: We investigated an organizational field where competing institutional logics existed for a lengthy period of time We identified four mechanisms for managing the rivalry of competing logics that facilitated and strengthened the separate identities of key actors, thus providing a way for competing logics to co-exist and separately guide the behaviour of different actors We contribute to the institutional literature by showing that competing logics can co-exist and rivalry between logics can be managed through the development of collaborative relationships

1,395 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The international system is not only an expression of domestic structures, but a cause of them as discussed by the authors, and two schools of analysis exploring the impact of international system upon domestic politics (regime types, institutions, coalitions, policies) may be distinguished: those that stress the international economy, and those which stress political-military rivalry, or war.
Abstract: The international system is not only an expression of domestic structures, but a cause of them. Two schools of analysis exploring the impact of the international system upon domestic politics (regime types, institutions, coalitions, policies) may be distinguished: those which stress the international economy, and those which stress political-military rivalry, or war. Among the former are such arguments as: late industrialization (associated with Gershenkron); dependencia or core-periphery arguments (Wallerstein); liberal development model (much American writing in the 50s and 60s); transnational relation-modernization (Nye, Keohane, Morse); neo-mercantilists (Gilpin); state-centered Marxists (Schurmann). Arguments stressing the role of war include those which focus on the organizational requirements of providing security (Hintze, Anderson), the special nature of foreign relations (classical political theory), territorial compensation (diplomatic history), and strains of foreign involvement (analysis of revolutions). These arguments provide the basis for criticism of much of the literature which uses domestic structure as an explanation of foreign policy, in particular those which (such as the strong-state weak-state distinction) tend, by excessive focus on forms, to obscure the connection between structures and interests, and the role of politics. These arguments also permit criticism of the notion of a recent fundamental discontinuity in the nature of international relations.

1,298 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20241
2023497
20221,013
2021209
2020253
2019250