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Roberts Court
About: Roberts Court is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 397 publications have been published within this topic receiving 1468 citations.
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TL;DR: In this article, the influence of amicus curiae briefs on judicial behavior on the U.S. Supreme Court has been analyzed using a logistic regression model, showing that amicus briefs have an impact on the justices across the ideological spectrum.
Abstract: Objectives Our objective is to assess the influence of amicus curiae briefs on judicial behavior on the U.S. Supreme Court. Our primary hypothesis is that amicus briefs have an impact on the justices across the ideological spectrum. Our secondary hypothesis is that this influence will be greater for justices nearer the ideological center. Methods Our analysis is confined to the Roberts Court (2005 through 2014 terms, inclusive). The unit of analysis is the justice‐vote in each of the 793 full‐opinion decisions during this 10‐term period; thus, our data set contains 7,135 observations. We employ logistic regression to test the impact of amicus filings on the ideological direction of the vote cast by each justice in each case. We control for the direction of the lower court decision, the ideological orientations of the justices, the presence of the federal government (or agency or official) as party, and the presence of the solicitor general as amicus curiae. Results We find statistical support for both the primary and secondary hypotheses. Amicus briefs appear to influence the justices across the ideological spectrum. The influence is somewhat greater among the more moderate justices, although the relationship between amicus influence and judicial moderation is a weak one. Conclusions Supreme Court justices appear to respond positively to the persuasive attempts of amici. This impact is most noticeable for the justices in the middle of the Court—those who tend to be most influential in steering the Court's decision making.
2 citations
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TL;DR: In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the number of cases in which parties sought Supreme Court review declined by more than 36 percent from the 1991-2000 decade compared to the 2001-2010 decade as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: This article describes the drop in Supreme Court election law cases in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and offers at least a partial explanation as to the reasons for the drop. Although the general amount of election law litigation has risen dramatically since 2000, the number of cases in which parties sought Supreme Court review declined by more than 36 percent from the 1991–2000 decade compared to the 2001–2010 decade. Factoring that decline into account, the data show that the Court issued written opinions in nearly the same percentage of election law cases each decade in which parties sought Supreme Court review—11.9% of cases in the 1991–2000 decade, and 10.5% of cases in 2001–2010. While I cannot exclude the possibility that the Court shied away from hearing some election law cases out of Bush v. Gore fatigue or as the result of random noise, the drop in the number of election law cases in which litigants sought Supreme Court review cases seems to explain a great deal of the d...
2 citations
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TL;DR: For example, the authors examined the environmental and natural resources law record of the Roberts Court and concluded that the majority was in the majority an astonishing 97 percent of the time in Environmental and Natural Resources law cases.
Abstract: Justice Anthony Kennedy, now clearly the pivot of the Roberts Court, is the Court's crucial voice in environmental and natural resources law cases. Kennedy's central role was never more evident than in the two most celebrated environmental and natural resources law cases of 2006: Kelo v. New London and Rapanos v. U.S. He supplied the deciding vote in each, upholding local use of the condemnation power for economic development under certain circumstances in the first, and affirming federal regulatory authority over wetlands which have a significant nexus to navigable waters in the second. In both cases Kennedy's sole concurrence was outcome determinative. Justice Kennedy has in fact been the barometer of the Supreme Court's environmental and natural resources law compass since his nomination to the Court in 1988. Although Kennedy wrote surprisingly few environmental and natural resources law opinions during his tenure on the Rehnquist Court, over his first eighteen years on the Court, he was in the majority an astonishing 97 percent of the time in environmental and natural resources law cases - as compared to his generic record of being in the majority slightly over 60 percent of the time. And Kennedy now appears quite prepared to assume a considerably more prominent role on the Roberts Court in the environmental and natural resources law field. This article examines Kennedy's environmental and natural resources law record over his first eighteen years on the Supreme Court and also on of the Ninth Circuit in the thirteen years before that. The article evaluates all of the environmental law and natural resources law cases in which he wrote an opinion over those three decades, and it catalogues his voting record in all of the cases in which he participated on the Supreme Court in an appendix. One striking measure of Justice Kennedy's influence is that, after eighteen years on the Court, he has written just one environmental dissent - and that on states' rights grounds, which is one of his chief priorities. The article maintains that Kennedy is considerably more interested in allowing trial judges to resolve cases on the basis of context than he is in establishing broadly applicable doctrine. Kennedy is therefore a doctrinal minimalist. By consistently demanding a demonstrated nexus between doctrine and facts, he has shown that he will not tolerate elevating abstract philosophy over concrete justice. For example, he is interested in granting standing to property owners alleging regulatory takings, but he is quite skeptical about the substance of their claims. Another example of his nuanced approach concerns his devotion to states' rights - which is unassailable - yet he has been quite willing to find federal preemption when it serves deregulation purposes. On the other hand, as his opinion in Rapanos reflects, Kennedy is far from an anti-regulatory zealot. But he does seem to prefer only one level of governmental regulation. At what might be close to the mid-point in his Court career - and with his power perhaps at its zenith - Justice Kennedy is clearly not someone any litigant can ignore. By examining every judicial opinion he has written in the environmental and natural resources law field, this article hopes to give both those litigants and academics a fertile resource to till. Although Kennedy has been purposefully difficult to interpret in this field (writing very few opinions until lately), his record suggests that he may be receptive to environmental and natural resources claims if they are factually well-grounded and do not conflict with Kennedy's overriding notions of states' rights. The article concludes with some comparisons between Justice Kennedy and Justice Holmes.
2 citations
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TL;DR: The role of presidential signing statements in facilitating inter-branch dialogue is discussed in this article, with the focus on the role of signing statements as a means of promoting clarity, cooperation, and compromise in constitutional interpretation.
Abstract: When the Supreme Court held that the executive branch has exclusive authority to recognize foreign sovereigns in the Jerusalem passport case, Zivotojsky v. Kerry (Zivotojsky lI), Jack Goldsmith hailed the decision as a "vindication" of presidential signing statements and executive power. Indeed, in the context of the debate over the treatment of the terror suspects, the New York Times had called such signing statements the "constitutionally ludicrous" work of an overreaching, "imperial presidency." Others in this Symposium and elsewhere have covered what a "bonanza" Zivotojsi II is for foreign relations law, the competing visions of foreign relations at the case's center, the justices' reliance on historical practice in constitutional interpretation, and the ways in which the opinion departs from or reinforces the Roberts Court trend toward "normalizing" foreign relations law.Building on these themes, the focus of this essay is on how Zivotojsi II demonstrates the role that presidential signing statements can play in facilitating inter-branch dialogue, as a means of promoting clarity, cooperation, and compromise in constitutional interpretation. Notwithstanding my earlier criticism of specific signing statements in the context of the treatment of terror suspects -- a position I maintain today based on my disagreement with the substance of those statements -- I am not against signing statements per se.In fact, I agree with Goldsmith that "[s]igning statements are not in themselves cause for concern....Poor interpretations of Article II articulated in a signing statement can be a cause for concern -- especially in the rare signing statement that leads to non-compliance." Criticism of signing statements are often really debates about the proper reach of presidential power. Zivotojsky II provides an opportunity to assess the value of signing statements in a different light and to build on my earlier work on dialogic approaches to the Constitution.
2 citations