Shadow (psychology)

About: Shadow (psychology) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 8396 publications have been published within this topic receiving 117158 citations.

Shadow economies all over the world : new estimates for 162 countries from 1999 to 2007

Abstract: This paper presents estimations of the shadow economies for 162 countries, including developing Eastern European, Central Asian, and high income OECD countries over the period 1999 to 2006/2007. According to our estimations, the average size of the shadow economy (as a percent of "official" GDP) in 2006 in 98 developing countries is 38.7%, in 21 Eastern European and Central Asian (mostly transition) countries it is 38.1%, and in 25 high income OECD countries it is 18.7%. We find that the driving forces of the shadow economy are an increased burden of taxation (both direct and indirect), combined with labor market regulations and the quality of public goods and services, as well as the state of the “official” economy.

The powers of problem definition: The case of government paperwork

Abstract: Problem definition is a package of ideas that includes, at least implicitly, an account of the causes and consequences of undesirable circumstances and a theory about how to improve them. As such, it serves as the overture to policymaking, as an integral part of the process of policymaking, and as a policy outcome. In each of these roles it seems to exert influence on government action. Distinguishing among the roles clarifies the nature of that influence. A case study examines the transition from one problem definition to another in the domain of information collection by the federal government. The rise of the Paperwork Reduc- tion definition illustrates the variety of ways in which problem definition has powerful con- sequences. Problem definition is widely regarded as the first stage of the policy cycle, a stage that lays fundamental groundwork for the ensuing struggle over the construction of useful policy alternatives, authoritative adoption of a policy choice, implementation, and assessment (Brewer and deLeon 1983). Defini- tion in this sense is not merely a label for a set of facts and perceptions. It is a package of ideas that includes at least implicitly an account of the causes and consequences of some circumstances that are deemed undesirable, and a theory about how a problem may be alleviated (Defy 1984, Gusfield 1981). By the frame imposed on circumstances, a problem definition highlights some aspects of the situation, throwing other aspects into shadow. It pushes forward some potential solutions, neglecting others (Gamson and Modigliani 1987). The definition of problems at the outset of the policy process may have various sources: the lonely analyst wrestling to impose intellectual structure on a messy array of facts and dilemmas; savvy politicians crafting issues to appeal to the winning mix of voter demographics; a crisis event splashed across the front page to galvanize attention to previously neglected corners of social life; the insistence of disenfranchised groups that their concerns be taken seriously by those more comfortably circumstanced. Whatever the pre- cipitating factors, problem definition determines how people think about the problems that are (and are not) on the public agenda. 2 I endorse the importance of the initial definition of the problem, as it has been typically considered in the policy literature. A problem definition at the outset of the policy process has implications for later stages: which kinds of

Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities

Abstract: A large literature identifies unique organizational capabilities as a potent source of competitive advantage, yet our knowledge of why capabilities fail to diffuse more rapidly—particularly in situations in which competitors apparently have strong incentives to adopt them and a well-developed understanding of how they work—remains incomplete. In this paper we suggest that competitively significant capabilities often rest on managerial practices that in turn rely on relational contracts (i.e., informal agreements sustained by the shadow of the future). We argue that one of the reasons these practices may be difficult to copy is that effective relational contracts must solve the twin problems of credibility and clarity and that although credibility might, in principle, be instantly acquired, clarity may take time to develop and may interact with credibility in complex ways so that relational contracts may often be difficult to build.

Fields of Vision: Landscape Imagery and National Identity in England and the United States

Abstract: List of IllustrationsAcknowledgementsIntroduction11The Prince of Wales and the Shadow of St. Paul's112Joseph Wright and the Spectacle of Power433Humphry Repton and the Improvement of the Estate804J. M. W. Turner and the Circulation of the State1125Thomas Cole and the Course of Empire1466Frances Palmer and the Incorporation of the Continent1747John Constable and the making of Constable Country200Conclusion243Index247

How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow economy

Abstract: This paper analyzes a simple model that captures the relationship between institutional quality, the shadow economy, and corruption. It shows that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy and affects the corruption market. The exact relationship between corruption and institutional quality is, however, ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of institutional quality in the shadow and corruption markets. The analytics also show that the shadow economy and corruption are substitutes. The predictions of the model are empirically tested and confirmed.