Side channel attack

About: Side channel attack is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 4470 publications have been published within this topic receiving 105722 citations.

Differential Power Analysis

Abstract: Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. We also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.

Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems

Abstract: By carefully measuring the amount of time required tm perform private key operalions, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems. Against, a valnerable system, the attack is computationally inexpensive and often requires only known ciphertext. Actual systems are potentially at risk, including cryptographic tokens, network-based cryptosystems, and other applications where attackers can make reasonably accurate timing measurements. Techniques for preventing the attack for RSA and Diffie-Hellman are presented. Some cryptosystems will need to be revised to protect against the attack, and new protocols and algorithms may need to incorporate measures to prevenl timing attacks.

Correlation Power Analysis with a Leakage Model

Abstract: A classical model is used for the power consumption of cryptographic devices. It is based on the Hamming distance of the data handled with regard to an unknown but constant reference state. Once validated experimentally it allows an optimal attack to be derived called Correlation Power Analysis. It also explains the defects of former approaches such as Differential Power Analysis.

Examining smart-card security under the threat of power analysis attacks

Abstract: This paper examines how monitoring power consumption signals might breach smart-card security. Both simple power analysis and differential power analysis attacks are investigated. The theory behind these attacks is reviewed. Then, we concentrate on showing how power analysis theory can be applied to attack an actual smart card. We examine the noise characteristics of the power signals and develop an approach to model the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). We show how this SNR can be significantly improved using a multiple-bit attack. Experimental results against a smart-card implementation of the Data Encryption Standard demonstrate the effectiveness of our multiple-bit attack. Potential countermeasures to these attacks are also discussed.

Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results

Abstract: Although the possibility of attacking smart-cards by analyzing their electromagnetic power radiation repeatedly appears in research papers, all accessible references evade the essence of reporting conclusive experiments where actual cryptographic algorithms such as des or RSA were successfully attacked This work describes electromagnetic experiments conducted on three different cmos chips, featuring different hardware protections and executing a des, an alleged comp128 and an rsa In all cases the complete key material was successfully retrieved