Simulations and games in economics education

Abstract: Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realized how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centered not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioral programs. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behavior, and of the closely related interactions among species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions that can alter the basis of their success, i.e., to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions that punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms. Comprehensive treatment of ecological and game theoretic dynamics Invasion dynamics and permanence as key concepts Explanation in terms of games of things like competition between species

Abstract: Although most agree that games can be engaging and that games can be instructive, there is little consensus regarding the essential characteristics of instructional games. Implicit in the research literature is the notion that if we pair instructional content with certain game features, we can harness the power of games to engage users and achieve desired instructional goals. In this article, the authors present an input-process- output model of instructional games and learning that elaborates (a) the key features of games that are of interest from an instructional perspective; (b) the game cycle of user judgments, behavior, and feedback that is a hallmark of engagement in game play; and (c) the types of learning outcomes that can be achieved. The authors discuss the implications of this approach for the design and implementation of effective instruc- tional games.

Abstract: Two machine-learning procedures have been investigated in some detail using the game of checkers. Enough work has been done to verify the fact that a computer can be programmed so that it will learn to play a better game of checkers than can be played by the person who wrote the program. Further-more, it can learn to do this in a remarkably short period of time (8 or 10 hours of machine-playing time) when given only the rules of the game, a sense of direction, and a redundant and incomplete list of parameters which are thought to have something to do with the game, but whose correct signs and relative weights are unknown and unspecified. The principles of machine learning verified by these experiments are, of course, applicable to many other situations.

Abstract: This book presents a unified treatment of optimization theory, game theory and a general equilibrium theory in economics in the framework of nonlinear functional analysis. It not only provides powerful and versatile tools for solving specific problems in economics and the social sciences but also serves as a unifying theme in the mathematical theory of these subjects as well as in pure mathematics itself.

Abstract: This is an advanced textbook covering topics in game theory which are of potential use in economics. The presentation of game theory is rigorous with theorems stated formally. Also included are a large number of integrated economic examples taken from current economics literature. The book maintains a balance between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, and exercises and problems are included.