Situational ethics

About: Situational ethics is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 4023 publications have been published within this topic receiving 145379 citations.

The personal and professional selves of teachers: stable and unstable identities

Abstract: In much educational literature it is recognised that the broader social conditions in which teachers live and work, and the personal and professional elements of teachers' lives, experiences, beliefs and practices are integral to one another, and that there are often tensions between these which impact to a greater or lesser extent upon teachers' sense of self or identity. If identity is a key influencing factor on teachers' sense of purpose, self‐efficacy, motivation, commitment, job satisfaction and effectiveness, then investigation of those factors which influence positively and negatively, the contexts in which these occur and the consequences for practice, is essential. Surprisingly, although notions of ‘self’ and personal identity are much used in educational research and theory, critical engagement with individual teachers' cognitive and emotional ‘selves’ has been relatively rare. Yet such engagement is important to all with an interest in raising and sustaining standards of teaching, particularly in centralist reform contexts which threaten to destabilise long‐held beliefs and practices. This article addresses the issue of teacher identities by drawing together research which examines the nature of the relationships between social structures and individual agency; between notions of a socially constructed, and therefore contingent and ever‐remade, ‘self’, and a ‘self’ with dispositions, attitudes and behavioural responses which are durable and relatively stable; and between cognitive and emotional identities. Drawing upon existing research literature and findings from a four‐year Department for Education and Skills funded project with 300 teachers in 100 schools which investigated variations in teachers' work and lives and their effects on pupils (VITAE), it finds that identities are neither intrinsically stable nor intrinsically fragmented, as earlier literature suggests. Rather, teacher identities may be more, or less, stable and more or less fragmented at different times and in different ways according to a number of life, career and situational factors.

Situational Crime Prevention

Abstract: Situational prevention seeks to reduce opportunities for specific categories of crime by increasing the associated risks and difficulties and reducing the rewards. It is composed of three main elements: an articulated theoretical framework, a standard methodology for tackling specific crime problems, and a set of opportunity-reducing techniques. The theoretical framework is informed by a variety of "opportunity" theories, including the routine activity and rational choice perspectives. The standard methodology is a version of the action research paradigm in which researchers work with practitioners to analyze and define the problem, to identify and try out possible solutions, and to evaluate and disseminate the results. The opportunity-reducing techniques range from simple target hardening to more sophisticated methods of deflecting offenders and reducing inducements. Displacement of crime has not proved to be the serious problem once thought, and there is now increasing recognition that situational measu...

Helping Crisis Managers Protect Reputational Assets: Initial Tests of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory.

Abstract: A situational crisis communication theory (SCCT), which articulates the variables, assumptions, and relationships that should be considered in selecting crisis response strategies to protect an organization’s reputation, is advanced. Although various studies taking a situational approach have touched on certain of the theory’s variables and relationships, this study represents the first attempt to articulate and begin to test a situational theory of crisis communication. SCCT is premised on matching the crisis response to the level of crisis responsibility attributed to a crisis. The study explores one of the basic assumptions of SCCT by assessing whether the predicted correlational relationship between crisis responsibility and organizational reputation occurs across a range of crisis types. Results support the theory’s predictions and suggest ways to refine the theory.

Influences of Individual and Situational Characteristics on Measures of Training Effectiveness

Abstract: A model of individual and situational influences on individuals’ training-related motivation and training effectiveness based on valence-instrumentality-expectancy theory was developed. A training ...

Profiting from controversy. Lessons from the person-situation debate.

Abstract: For the past two decades the person-situation debate has dominated personality psychology and had important repercussions in clinical, social, and organizational psychology. This controversy strikes to the heart of each of these disciplines because it puts on trial the central assumption that internal dispositions have an important influence on behavior. According to emerging views of scientific progress, controversy serves the useful function of narrowing the field of competing hypotheses. In this light, we examine seven hypotheses that arose during the course of the person-situation debate, ranging from most to least pessimistic about the existence of consensual, discriminative personality traits. The accumulated evidence fails to support the hypotheses that personality traits are simply (a) in the eye of the beholder, (b) semantic illusions, (c) artifacts of base-rate accuracy, (d) artifacts of shared stereotypes, (e) due to discussion between observers (who ignore behavior in favor of verbal self-presentation or reputation), or (f) mere by-products of situational consistencies. Evidence also fails to support the hypothesis (g) that although traits are related to behavior, the relationship is too small to be important. Yet we have not simply come full circle to a reacceptance of traits as they were understood 20 years ago. Research generated by these hypotheses has allowed us to better specify the circumstances under which personality assessments will be valid. Whether we are acting as professional psychologists, as academic psychologists, or simply as lay psychologists engaging in everyday gossip, the assumption that people have "traits" (or enduring cross-situational consistencies in their behavior) provides a basis for many of our decisions. When a clinical or counseling psychologist uses a standard assessment battery, he or she assumes that there is some degree of trait-like consistency in pathological behavior to be measured. When an organizational psychologist designs a personnel selection procedure, he or she assumes that consistent individual differences between the applicants are there to be found. When an academic psychologist teaches a course in personality, he or she must either assume some consistency in behavior or else face a bit of existential absurdity for at least three hours a week. Likewise, a good portion of our courses on clinical and developmental psychology would be unimaginable unless we assumed some cross-situational consistency. Even in everyday lay psychology, our attempts to analyze the behaviors of our friends, relatives, and co-workers are riddled with assumptions about personality traits. Despite the wide appeal of the trait assumption, personality psychologists have been entangled for some time in a debate about whether it might be based more on illusion than reality (e.g., Alker, 1972; Allport, 1966; Argyle & Little, 1972; Bem, 1972; Block, 1968, 1977; Bowers, 1973; Epstein, 1977, 1979, 1980; Fiske, 1974; Gormly & Edelberg, 1974; Hogan, DeSoto, & Solano, 1977; Hunt, 1965; Magnusson & Endler, 1977; Mischel, 1968, 1983; West, 1983). Murmurs of the current debate could be heard more than 40 years ago (Ichheisser, 1943), but the volume increased markedly after Mischel's (1968) critique, and things have not quieted down yet (Bem, 1983; Epstein, 1983; Funder, 1983; Kenrick, 1986; Mischel, 1983; Mischel & Peake, 1982, 1983). Of late, discussants have begun to express yearning to end what some see as an endless cycle of repeating the same arguments. Mischel and Peake (1982) and Bem (1983), for instance, both use the term ddjd vu in the titles of recent contributions, suggesting that they feel as if they have been here before. Other commentators maintain that the debate has been a "pseudo-controversy" (Carlson, 1984; Endler, 1973)that never should have occurred in the first place. However fatiguing it may now seem to some of its erstwhile protagonists, the debate over the alleged inconsistency of personality has been more than an exercise in sophistry. In the course of the nearly two decades since Mischers (1968) critique, a number of provocative hypotheses have been put forward, along with a host of studies to evaluate them. Platt (1964) and Popper (1959), among others, maintained that science typically progresses through the accumulation of negative informat iontha t is, by eliminating hypotheses that data suggest are no longer tenable. From this perspective, it may be worth taking a look back at the hypotheses suggested during the consistency controversy, this time in the improved light shed by two decades of research. In this light, the debate can be seen as an intellectually stimulating chapter in the history of the discipline, replete with useful lessons for professionals who include assessment in their repertoire. The "Pure Trait" Mode l and Its Alternatives Discussions of the "person versus situation" debate traditionally begin with the "pure trait" model (Alston, 1975; January 1988 9 American Psychologist Copyright 1988 by the Amtxican Psychological Association. Inc. 0003-066X/88/$00.75 Vol. 43, No. 1, 23-34 23 Argyle & Little, 1972; Mischel, 1968): that people show powerful, unmodulated consistencies in their behavior across time and diverse situations. This position has been attacked frequently over the years. However, it is really just a "straw man," and even traditional personality researchers find it unacceptable (see, e.g., Allport, 1931, 1966; Block, 1977; Hogan et al., 1977; Jackson, 1983; Wiggins, 1973; Zuroff, 1986). Complete invariance in behavior is associated more with severe psychopathology than with "normal" behavior. If the consensus rejects the "pure trait" position, then what can replace it? Several alternative hypotheses have been advanced over the years. These hypotheses differ with regard to four issues, which can be arranged into a logical hierarchy: 1. Consensus versus solipsism. Are traits merely idiosyncratic constructs that reside solely inside the heads of individual observers, or can observers reach agreement in applying trait terms? 2. Discriminativeness versus generality. I f observers can agree with one another in ascribing traits to targets, is it simply because they apply a nondiscriminative "one size fits all" approach? 3. Behavior versus labeling. I f observers can agree with one another, and can also differentiate between who is low or high on a given trait, does this occur because they really observe behavior? Or do they merely provide their judgments based on superficial stereotypes, targets' self-presentations, or other socially assigned labels? 4. Internal versus external locus of causal explanation. If observers can agree with one another and can distinguish individual differences on the basis of actual behavior of the people they are observing, are the causes ofthese consistencies located within each person or within his or her situation and role? Each of these issues depends on the resolution of those earlier in the list. For instance, if observers cannot agree with one another about who has which traits, there is no point in going on to debate whether traits have a behavioral basis. Ultimately, assumptions about traits must pass the tests of consensus, discriminativeness, behavioral foundation, and internality. We will discuss seven hypotheses that assume that traits fail one or more of these tests. In Table 1, we list the hypotheses in terms of the four hierarchical issues just discussed. As can be seen, the hypotheses can be arranged more or less in order of their pessimism regarding the existence of (consensually verifiable, discriminative, internal) trait-like consistencies. I We will consider each hypothesis in its purest form and, for the moment, disregard the various qualifications that have sometimes been attached to each. Placing each hypothesis in bold relief allows us to assess it most clearly, and philosophers of science tell us that we learn most when hypotheses are stated in such a way as to allow disproof(e.g., Platt, 1964; Popper, 1959). Moreover, each of these hypotheses has, at some time, actually been stated in its bold form. In 1968, for instance, one social psychologist argued that T a b l e 1 Hierarchy of Hypotheses From the Person-Situation Controversy, Arranged From Most to Least Pessimistic Cdtical assumptions Hypotheses