Showing papers on "Skeptical theism published in 2003"
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermining inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning.
Abstract: Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.
50 citations
TL;DR: The Overrider Response as discussed by the authors argues that the existence of moral evil is a special difficulty for theism and that natural theology and/or religious experience provide adequate reasons or warrant for theistic explanations.
Abstract: 98119 Theists can respond to the problem of evil in four general ways. First, they can offer a theodicy, that is, an attempt to provide God's reasons (actual or possible) for permitting evil.1 Second, theists may seek to show that arguments purporting to demonstrate a problem of evil for theism are flawed, e.g., such arguments may involve a questionable inference from "As far as we know, there is no reason that would justify God in permitting horrors" to "There is no such reason." This response to the problem of evil has sometimes been called "Skeptical Theism."2 Third, theists may simply admit that the problem of evil is a special difficulty for theism (i.e., a greater difficulty for theism than for its metaphysical rivals - some of which may have no problem of evil); nevertheless, natural theology and/or religious experience provide adequate reasons or warrant for theism. We might call this response to the problem of evil, "The Overrider Response" as it involves the claim that some reason or warranting factor overrides the evidence evil provides against theism.3 Fourth, theists may argue that, although theism does not explain the presence of all evils well, it provides an explanation that is as good as (or better than) the explanation provided by some (or all) of theism's metaphysical rivals. Let us call this fourth approach "The Comparative Response" since it involves comparing theistic explanations of evil with explanations provided by theism's metaphysical rivals. In a recent paper I tried to develop the Comparative Response to moral evil, arguing that theism explains moral evil at least as well as naturalism does.4 To that paper a naturalist might well
3 citations
TL;DR: The "Overrider Response" as mentioned in this paper is an alternative approach to the "Skeptical theodicy" of the problem of evil, which is defined as "the claim that some reason or warranting factor overrides the evidence evil provides against theism".
Abstract: Theists can respond to the problem of evil in four general ways. First, they can offer a theodicy, i.e., an attempt to provide God's reasons (actual or possible) for permitting evil.1 Second, theists may seek to show that arguments purporting to demonstrate a problem of evil for theism are flawed, e.g., such arguments may involve a questionable inference from "As far as we know, there is no reason that would justify God in permitting horrors" to "There is no such reason." This response to the problem of evil has sometimes been called "Skeptical Theism."2 Third, theists may simply admit that the problem of evil is a special difficulty for theism (i.e., a greater difficulty for theism than for its metaphysical rivals some of which may have no problem of evil); nevertheless, natural theology and/or religious experience provide adequate reasons or warrant for theism. We might call this response to the problem of evil, "The Overrider Response" as it involves the claim that some reason or warranting factor overrides the evidence evil provides against theism.3 Fourth, theists may argue that, although theism does not explain the presence of all evils well, it provides an explanation that is as good as (or better than) the explanation provided by some (or all) of theism's metaphysical rivals. Let us call this fourth approach "The Comparative Response" since it involves comparing theistic explanations of evil with explanations provided by theism's metaphysical rivals. The Comparative Response has received little attention in recent discussions of the problem of evil, and I propose to develop it in this paper. Specifically, I shall argue that although theism may not explain all evils well, on the whole theism explains the presence of moral evil as well as (or better than) naturalism does. (I suspect that theism can explain the totality of evil as well as, or better than, naturalism does, but a discussion of natural evil is beyond the scope of this paper.) It will prevent some misunderstandings if, at the outset, I make three observations about the nature and significance of the Comparative Response. First, what would be accomplished if one were to show that although theism does not explain all evils well, overall it explains evil as well as (or better than) its metaphysical rivals? Minimally, showing this would undermine
1 citations