Showing papers on "Skeptical theism published in 2019"

The Problem of Evil

Abstract: Chapter 1 addresses some preliminary issues that it is important to think about in formulating arguments from evil. Chapter 2 is then concerned with the question of how an incompatibility argument from evil is best formulated, and with possible responses to such arguments. Chapter 3 then focuses on skeptical theism, and on the work that skeptical theists need to do if they are to defend their claim of having defeated incompatibility versions of the argument from evil. Finally, Chapter 4 discusses evidential arguments from evil, and four different kinds of evidential argument are set out and critically examined.

Perspectival Skeptical Theism

Abstract: Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not subject to closure-of-inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents reasonable belief that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.

Skeptical theism and the challenge of atheism

Abstract: Skeptical theists hold that we should be skeptical about our ability to know the reasons that God would have for permitting evil, at least in particular cases. They argue for their view by setting aside actions that are wrong in themselves and focusing their attention on actions that are purportedly right or wrong simply in terms of their consequences. However, I argue in this paper that once skeptical theists are led to take into account actions that are wrong in themselves, as they must, they cannot escape the conclusion that there is a logical contradiction between the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God and what would have to be God’s permission of the significant and horrendous evil consequences of immoral actions found in our world.

The Nature of Skeptical Theism: Answering Nonstandard Objections to Skeptical Theism

Abstract: Skeptical theism is a popular response to arguments from evil. Recently, Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs have argued that the theses that ground skeptical theism are either false or limited in scope. In this article, I show that their objections rest on dubious assumptions about the nature of skeptical theism. Along the way, I develop and clarify the ambiguous parts of skeptical theism. The upshot of this is that—once the nature of skeptical theism is made clearer—it is far more difficult to resist.

The Skepticism of Skeptical Theism

Abstract: Edward Wierenga* Skeptical theism is a type of reply to arguments from evil against God’s existence. The skeptical theist declines to accept a premise of some such argument, professing ignorance, for example, about whether God is justified in permitting certain evils or about the conditional probability that the world contains as much evil as it does, or evils of a particular sort, on the hypothesis that God exists. Skeptical theists are thus not supposed to be skeptical about theism; rather, they are theists who are skeptical about something else. But that raises the question of exactly what else. In particular, does skepticism with respect to some claims about God and evil lead to a more pervasive skepticism? More precisely, is skeptical theism committed to additional skepticism about God? Is skeptical theism committed to global skepticism, including skepticism about ordinary, commonplace beliefs? Or is skeptical theism at the very least committed to a broader skepticism about matters of morality? This paper takes up these questions. * Ph.D. in Philosophy, Professor of Religion and of Philosophy Emeritus, University of Rochester, NY, USA, Email: edward. ׀ wierenga@rochester.edu 🞕 Wierenga, E. (2019). The Skepticism of Skeptical Theism. The Journal of Philosophical-Theological Research, 21(81), pp. 27۔ 42. doi: 10.22091/jptr.2019.4608.2171.

Skeptical Theism to the Rescue

Abstract: In this chapter, I consider whether skeptical theism can successfully defend traditional theism against a logical argument from evil grounded in the fundamental requirements of our morality that are captured by the exceptionless minimal components of the Pauline Principle.

Skeptical Theism, Free Will Skepticism and Atheism: Pondering the Scope of Moral Paralysis

Abstract: In this paper, I aim to show that Skeptical Theism (ST) implies the rejection of Free Will Skepticism (FWS). This is so because ST holds the so-called evidential argument from evil against theism. This argument presupposes free will (as a hidden premise), conducting this way to a skeptical conclusion without questioning the plausibility of FWS in the first place. I argue that this kind of conflict between two skeptical scenarios removes the validity of ST and FWS: It is ad hoc to assume a skeptical scenario S1 (ST) that supports thesis T1, and implicitly rejects the consequences of another skeptical scenario S2 (FWS) that discards T1. This implies the rejection of the so-called Moral Paralysis (MP) and shows a tension between Moral Skepticism (MS), ST and FWS. Moreover, the links between skepticism, dogmatism and atheism, as a case of epistemic defeasibility, are discussed.

Skeptical Theism and Morriston’s Humean Argument from Evil

Abstract: There’s a growing sense among philosophers of religion that (i) Humean arguments from evil are some of the most formidable arguments against theism, and (ii) skeptical theism fails to undermine those arguments because they fail to make the inferences skeptical theists criticize. In line with this trend, Wes Morriston has recently formulated a Humean argument from evil, and his chief defense of it is that skeptical theism is irrelevant to it. Here I argue that skeptical theism is relevant to Humean arguments. To do this, I reveal the common structure of skeptical theism’s critiques. Seeing the common structure reveals why some versions of skeptical theism are irrelevant to Humean arguments from evil. It also points the way forward to formulating a relevant version. By combining skeptical theism with a plausible principle concerning reasonable belief, I formulate a version of skeptical theism that undermines Morriston’s argument that is also immune from his objections.