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Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 1969"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper discusses the development of a 64-item self-report measure of empathy, constructed by comparing the responses of groups with high- and low-rated empathy, using the combined MMPI-CPI item pool.
Abstract: The concept of empathy—the intellectual or imaginative apprehension of another's condition or state of mind— is central for understanding a broad range of social phenomena including, in particular, moral development. Within this latter context, an empathic disposition can be regarded as the capacity to adopt a broad moral perspective, that is, to take "the moral point of view." This paper discusses the development of a 64-item self-report measure of empathy, constructed by comparing the responses of groups with high- and low-rated empathy, using the combined MMPI-CPI item pool. After providing evidence concerning the scale's reliability and validity, an attempt is made to show its relevance for specifically moral conduct by relating empathy scale scores to real life indexes of socially appropriate behavior and to certain previously wellvalidated measures of personality. Some form of empathic disposition, roletaking ability, or social sensitivity is assumed by all approaches to personality which take the interpersonal situation as a major focus of concern. Accordingly, most writers in the role-theoretical tradition (Cottrell, 1942; Gough, 1948; Mead, 1934; Sarbin, 1968) have given careful attention to this aspect of social functioning. Mead, for example, has argued that role-taking ability is the key variable in social and moral development; extending this line of reasoning he equates the "g" factor in intelligence with social sensitivity, the origins of which can be found in the central nervous system. In a similar vein, Cottrell and Dymond (1949) also maintained that empathy is the basic process in all social interaction. Empathy, seen as an everyday manifestation of the disposition to adopt a broad moral

1,368 citations






Journal ArticleDOI
R. Hallam1
TL;DR: In this article, PIAGET and MORAL JUDGEMENTS in HISTORY are discussed. But they do not discuss the role of gender in the process of choosing a judge.
Abstract: (1969). PIAGET AND MORAL JUDGEMENTS IN HISTORY. Educational Research: Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 200-206.

10 citations


Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the question of what is the function of moral principles within the body of moral knowledge and what must be the nature of moral principle in order for them to carry out this function is discussed.
Abstract: What is the function of moral principles within the body of moral knowledge ? And what must be the nature of moral principles in order for them to carry out this function? A specific set of answers to these questions is widely accepted among moral philosophers — so widely accepted as almost to constitute a sort of orthodoxy. The answers embody a view of the place of principles within the body of morality which crosses the lines between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Though I have put the question in cognitivist terms and shall discuss it in those terms, I think a similar question and a more or less parallel discussion could be given in non-cognitivist terms. Perhaps the time-honoured debate between the two positions can be suspended, at least temporarily, while we examine, not the nature of morality, but its structure.

7 citations


Journal Article
TL;DR: The Moral Judgment of the Child (1965) as mentioned in this paper is probably the most widely discussed theory of how children's understand ing of morality develops. It may also be the most misunderstood.
Abstract: Piaget has provided, in The Moral Judgment of the Child (1965), what is probably the most widely discussed theory of how children's understand ing of morality develops. It may also be the most misunderstood. Descrip tions of his position on the nature of moral development frequently bear only the slightest resemblance to what he actually said. Many investiga tions purporting to test Piaget's ideas are conducted or interpreted in a way that reveals little understanding of his formulations. The purpose of this paper is to call attention to the misinterpretations of Piaget that have passed unchallenged into the literature on moral development, and to ex amine some of the ways in which research reflecting these misunderstand ings has been used to discredit his theory. What follows are statements of eight criticisms of Piaget's theory, each followed by an attempt to clarify his position on the particular issues raised by the critics. The discussion of these issues will also serve as a framework for elucidating some of the broader aspects of Piaget's view of child de velopment.

6 citations



Journal Article

3 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
01 Apr 1969-Ethics
TL;DR: A rational ethic is defined as "a set of values which can be rationally defended as holding good for all men at all times" as mentioned in this paper, i.e., "a rational act is one which makes use of the most efficient or suitable means to a given end".
Abstract: THE view that moral progress is meaningful but not measurable could be taken to suggest either that it is in principle immeasurable or that it could be measured but not with our present conceptual (or other) tools. The former of these possibilities would leave us with the difficult situation of recognizing that there is such a thing as moral progress but we would never be able to recognize it, for we would never be able to tell whether one pattern of action was \"better\" than another, that is, whether moral progress had taken place. This would be, theoretically, a most unsatisfactory state of affairs, though it might conceivably enhance some mystical system. The suggestion that we have not yet developed (or discovered) the tools with which to measure moral progress is a fascinating proposal, but is unlikely to be true. (An interesting version of this view is that others do not recognize the way in which we measure ethical progress; i.e., the ideological enemy fails to recognize our truth.) An understanding of moral progress that considers it to be both meaningful and measurable is the only one on which a satisfactory theory of progress could be constructed. If moral progress is measurable, even in the minimal sense of a crude hierarchy of states rather than a precise calibration of scale, then it will be legitimate to speak of one action or institution or social system or society being morally better than another, or of these units progressing in a moral sense over time. To do this it is necessary to start with what moral philosophers and writers on ethics have generally termed \"a rational ethic.\" It is difficult to discover exactly what is meant by a rational ethic, but simply, if not simplistically, it may be characterized as a set of values which can be rationally defended as holding good for all men at all times. This must be seen in opposition to the view that has been called ethical relativity and in relation to the thesis of the diversity of morals. Ethical relativity argues that each culture or society must be judged on its own merits and on these only, that the observer who evaluates in terms of his own standards or in terms of some abstract ideal is reasoning in an illicit fashion. Therefore, on this theory a rational ethic is neither desirable nor possible. The diversity-of-morals argument is less extreme and certainly more helpful in the solution of these problems. This points out that there is no denying the very great differences that are to be found in moral and social practices carried out by people living under widely divergent social arrangements, but (in the words of Morris Ginsberg, the foremost modern proponent of the view) \"there is no necessary connection between the diversity of morals and the relativity of ethics.\"' Ginsberg goes on to suggest that behind the apparent diversity of moral content there exists an essential and universal similarity of form of the moral life, which he summarizes under six main categories. The logical objections to any rational ethic are formidable, and it is well to examine briefly the notion of rationality in this connection. It would be pedantic to attempt a precise definition of the term; nevertheless, most usages of it approximate to something like \"a rational act is one which makes use of the most efficient or suitable means to a given end.\" Max Weber distinguished two types of rational action, namely, zweckrational and wertrational, and the key to this distinction is to be found in Weber's analysis of ethical attitudes, as Parsons points out.2 Briefly, zweckrational action is the normative type logically implied by what Weber terms the \"ethics of responsibility,\" roughly, recognition of several different, legitimate values, while wertrational action is implied by \"ethics of absolute values,\" total commitment to a single specific value. It is significant that a deeply pessimistic strain runs






10 Nov 1969
TL;DR: Nelson and Linden as discussed by the authors proposed a general hypothesis that the saliency of an individual's concept of reciprocity in a particular situation is related to the cooperative and moral behavior of the individual in that situation.
Abstract: DOCUMENT RESUME Nelson, Linden The Concept of Reciprocity and the Development of Moral and Cooperative Behavior in Late Childhood. California Univ., Los Angeles. Dept. of Psychology. 10 Nov 69 75p. EDRS Price MF-$0.50 HC-$3.85 *Behavior Patterns, Behavior Standards, Children, *Conflict Resolution, Ethics, Games, Group Activities, *Group Dynamics, Individual Characteristics, *Moral Values, *Social Development The first part of this paper is a theoretical discussion which presents an argument for considering the concept of reciprocity to be a moral orientation. A general hypothesis is proposed which states that the salience of an individual's concept of reciprocity in a particular situation is related to the cooperative and moral behavior of the individual in that situation. A certain type of cooperation game is proposed as a paradigm for investigating this hypothesis and for teaching the concept of reciprocity to children of late childhood ages. A major concern of the experimental studies will be to describe the development of cooperative and competitive abilities in late childhood, ages five to ten. A question of particular interest is whether or not children become more adept with age at resolving conflicts of interesting situations where cooperation is required for goal attainment. Another important object of these studies will be to examine the effects of various prior game experiences upon subsequent interaction. A total of three experiments relevant to these issues are reported and two experiments are proposed in order to provide evidence for other hypotheses and to the matters discussed above. (Author/KJ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE OFFICE OF EDUCATiON THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECES SARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDU CATION POSITION OR POLICY. THE CONCEPT OF RECIPROCITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL AND COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR IN LATE CHILDHOOD Linden Nelson Psychology Department University of California, Los Angeles November 10, 1969 The pilot studies reported in this dissertation were carried out 4t under the supervision of Dr. Millard Madsen with financial support by co the UCLA Head Start Evaluation and Research Center, 0E0 Project No. 4117, Dr. Carolyn Stern, Director. The proposed studies will also receive u, partial support from the same funding source. CD CD