Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 1971"

The relation of role taking to the development of moral judgment in children.

Abstract: SELMAN, ROBERT L. The Relation of Role Taking to the Development of Moral Judgment in Children. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1971, 42, 79-91. In order to explore the relationship in middle childhood between two socialcognitive processes, role-taking ability and moral reasoning, 60 middle-class children (10 boys and 10 girls each at ages 8, 9, and 10) were administered Kohlberg's (1963) moral-judgment measure, two role-taking tasks, and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, a conventional measure of intelligence. Results indicated that at this age range, with intelligence controlled, the development of reciprocal role-taking skills related to the development of conventional moral judgment. Results of a reexamination 1 year later of 10 subjects whose role-taking and moral-judgment levels were low in the original study supported the hypothesis that the development of the ability to understand the reciprocal nature of interpersonal relations is a necessary but not suficient condition for the development of conventional moral thought.

A Reexamination of the Development of Moral Judgments in Children.

Abstract: ARMSBY, RICHARD E. A Reexamination of the Development of Moral Judgments in Children. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1971, 42, 1241-1248. A battery of 6 revised moral judgment story-pairs that clearly contrast a purposive act with an accidental act was administered with 3 standard Piaget story-pairs to 240 Catholic and public school children ages 6, 8, and 10. It was found that a higher percentage and majority of the younger children made intentionality judgments in response to the revised story-pairs as compared with the standard story-pairs; younger children were more likely to revert to consequence-based judgments as the level of accidental consequences increased; Catholic school children were no more likely than public school children to make intentionality judgments in response to the revised story-pairs.

Social Determinants of Moral Ideas

Abstract: "Moral facts are facts like any others, they consist of rules of action which can be recognized by some distinctive characteristics; thus it must be possible to observe them, to describe and classify them."-Emile Durkheim A leading philosopher of the Warsaw school, Maria Ossowska here seeks to show that moral ideas can be examined with scientific rigor. She offers a sociology of morals that can be verified by observation and is philosophically based on the development of descriptive ethics. Ossowska goes on to examine how her approach to ethnical theory is related to the most important schools of moral philosophy, and considers how the model individual is related to social harmony. A central chapter demonstrates that the moral values a culture assigns to ideas and events are variables depending on social factors: the value put on human for instance, may vary with the birthrate. Among the social influences investigated in this book are the physical environment, demography, and urban ways of life, degree of industrialization, and many other factors. In the book's final section, Maria Ossowska addresses herself to a problem that is vexing in all ethical systems: how the ideal personality, the model individual, is related to social harmony. Among the ideal types of past societies, she singles out the Homeric warrior, the knight, the courtier, and the eighteenth-century bourgeois as case studies that illuminate different relations between society and the individual. Thoroughly at home in literature as well as in sociology and anthropology, Ossowska illustrates her approach with examples drawn from sources as familiar to English-speaking audiences as Benjamin Franklin and Robinson Crusoe.

Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson’s Ethical Theory

Abstract: Hutcheson's Life and Works- Method of Treatment- IHutcheson's Theory of Motivation- The Origins and Distinctive Characteristics of Hutcheson's- Theory of Motivation- Hutcheson's Refutation of Egoism- Hutcheson's Treatment of Desire and Pleasure- The Calm Desires- The Place of Reason in Conduct- Concluding Comments on Hutcheson's Theory of Motivation- II Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory- Shaftesbury's Influence- The Epistemological Background of Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory- The Nature and Function of the Moral Sense- The Nature of Moral Judgments- III The Moral Sense and Motivation- Introductory Statement of Problem- Hutcheson's Criticisms of the Rationalists- The Moral Sense and Motivation- Obligation and motivation- Concluding Remarks- IV Motivation and the Moral Sense in Hutgheson's Later Works- V Concluding Remarks- The Moral Sense and Moral Feelings- The Justification of Moral Judgments- The Nature of Moral Judgments- Motivation and the Moral Sense- Selected Bibliography

Situation Ethics, Moral Notions, and Moral Theology

Abstract: The situation ethics debate seems to be slowly coming to an end. This may not be due to the fact that the issue has been settled, but as so often happens in intellectual disputes the adversaries simply become bored and begin to turn their interests eleswhere.’ It may be that the best thing to do is to let the debate end because it would seem that just about all that is valuable has been mined from the issue. However, I wish to reopen some of the problems in the debate. I do so for two reasons. First, even though I agree with most of the criticism of Fletcher’s position: I believe that there is something essentially right about the main thrust of his view. It is my feeling however that Fletcher made an error when he identified his position with that of situationalism, because what he was really concerned with was the applicability of our moral notions to varioas kinds of situations. Fletcher’s position finds its moral warrant and persuasiveness in the experience that we all have at times when we wish to say that it is not necessarily always wrong, for example, to tell a lie. The problem with Fletcher was that in his attempt to state his theory of ethical behaviour to account for this aspect of moral experience he came very close to destroying any meaningful ethical discourse.s In order to bring some coherence to this issue I will try to reconceptualize the problem with which Fletcher was trying to deal so that it does not entail untenable consequences. My second reason for reopening the issue is that a restatement of the problem in terms of the nature of moral notions gives an important insight into the proper business of theological ethics. Therefore the argument that I develop here is an attempt not only to say something that I hope

Visuomeninio moralinio auklėjimo poreikio atsiradimas

Abstract: In the paper historical prerequisites of the emergence of social moral education as the social phenomenon are analysed When the individual had come to satisfy his requirements on the basis of private property the immediate relation between the individual and the collective body disappeared Under the conditions of complicated social structure and estrangement of human relations, behaviour regulation of the individual, the combination of his private interests with social ones formed a special social problem As a result of this morals was singled out of the totality of customs and the necessity of social moral education arose Partly, due to the necessity factor morals extended its significance beyond the definite realm of customs to the totality of the desired behaviour standards The specific character of moral imperatives under the conditions of estrangement, the role of religion and ethical theory in the process of moral education are underlined in the paper

The Moral Sense and Motivation

Abstract: Morality is practical; it shapes, guides and directs behavior. It is doubtful that any philosopher has ever disagreed with the foregoing claims. Disagreement arises, however, when we press for further specification of just how morality is practical and how it provides this influence. In this chapter I intend to examine and evaluate Hutcheson’s position as regards this question of how morality is practical.