Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 1986"

Moral Development: Advances in Research and Theory

Abstract: This book focuses on a theoretical framework (the Four-Component Model) and evaluations of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) developed by Rest and his coworkers. The authors assess their own work with the DIT and that of hundreds of other investigators. Among their conclusions are: formal education is correlated with moral judgment; there is evidence for Kohlberg's higher stages; moral education programs produce modest gains, and, there are no sex differences. The book is important for libraries wishing a complete collection on moral development. Choice

Sex Differences in Interaction Style as a Product of Perceived Sex Differences in Competence.

Abstract: Males' and females' interaction styles were observed while they worked in four-person, mixed-sex groups on a discussion task. In some groups, members were only given information about each others' names and gender. In this circumstance, men were perceived by themselves and other group members to be higher in competence than women. Further, men engaged in a greater amount of active task behavior than women (e.g., giving information, giving opinions), and women exhibited a greater amount of positive social behavior than men (e.g., agreeing, acting friendly). In other groups, members' competency-based status was manipulated by providing false feedback that they were high or low relative to their group in intellectual and moral aptitude. High status members were then perceived to be more competent than low status ones and, further, high status individuals engaged in more active task and less positive social behavior than low status ones. In this condition, no sex differences were obtained on perceived competence or on active task or positive social behavior. Overall, these findings support the idea that the gender differences obtained in interaction when status was not specified were partially a function of group members' belief that the sexes differ in competence. Direct information concerning members' intellectual and moral competence apparently blocked the perceived gender-to-competence link, and status alone affected perceived competence and interaction style.

Gender differences in moral reasoning

Abstract: This research tests Gilligan's hypothesis that men are more likely to consider moral dilemmas chiefly in terms of justice and individual rights, whereas women are more likely to be chiefly concerned with questions of care and relationships with others. In addition, we have investigated the effects of dilemma content upon orientation of moral judgment. Protocols from interviews with 50 college students, half women and half men, to three moral dilemmas were coded according to moral orientation. Results indicated that both moral orientations were widely used by both men and women, but that women were more likely to employ prodominantly care considerations. In a test of mean differences in proportion of justice responses, content of the specific moral dilemma showed a strong influence upon moral reasoning. Results suggest that both gender and situational factors need to be considered in our understanding of moral reasoning.

Athletic Aggression: An Issue of Contextual Morality

Abstract: The designation of an act as aggressive involves an implicit or explicit moral judgment. Consequently, research on aggression must address the value issues involved. The present article suggests that Haan’s theory of interactional morality can be used to provide a framework for social scientific research into moral issues. Haan’s model, however, must be adapted to the unique context of sport. This study applies the concept of frame analysis as a procedure for clarifying the moral reasoning associated with athletic aggression. In contrast to similar acts in everyday life, moral ambiguity characterizes some sport acts intended to deliver minor noxious stimuli. The label of aggression must be used with caution when designating such acts.

Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Rejoinder to Baumrind.

Abstract: WALKER,, LAWRENCE J. Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Rejoinder to Baumrind. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1986, 57, 522-526. Baumrind criticizes the procedures of my review and meta-analysis of the research literature on sex differences in moral reasoning development and disagrees with my conclusion that the overall pattern is one of nonsignificant differences. This rejoinder addresses these criticisms, discussing issues such as the nature of moral development, the focus on adulthood, the choice of statistics, the effect of differing sample sizes and scoring systems, and the role of social experiences in explaining variability in moral development. Baumrind's data are interpreted in this context. An updated review and meta-analysis of the research literature again support the conclusion that there are no consistent sex differences in moral reasoning development.

Assignment of Moral Responsibility and Punishment.

Abstract: SHULTZ, THOMAS R.; WRIGHT, KEVIN; and SCHLEIFER, MICHAEL. Assignment of Moral Responsibility and Punishment. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1986, 57, 177-184. A theory of the assignment of moral responsibility and punishment for harm was tested with children 5-11 years of age. The results indicated a fairly sophisticated use of a variety of moral concepts by children from 5 years of age. They showed evidence of knowing that judgments of moral responsibility are presupposed by judgments of punishment and that causal judgments are presupposed by moral responsibility judgments. They also used information on intention and negligence to assign moral responsibility and information on restitution to assign punishment. Developmental trends included an increasing sensitivity to these concepts, greater tolerance for harm doing, and more emphasis on restitution rather than punishment with increasing age.

The sociology of moral panics: toward a new synthesis

Abstract: There are two alternative theoretical perspectives developed in the sociological study of a moral panic: the moral perspective and the interest perspective. Using as illustration a May 1982 national moral panic about drugs that occurred in Israel, this article argues that both perspectives must be used and integrated into one coherent model for a better and fuller sociological explanation of moral panics. The article provides a detailed account of the Israeli panic and an analysis clustered along two axes. One axis uses the interest perspective to analyze the timing of the panic by focusing on the question of why it happened when it did. The other axis uses the moral perspective to interpret the specific content of the panic, focusing on why the panic was about drugs.

Experiential and Cognitive Sources of Moral Development in Adulthood

Abstract: This study examined three issues in adult moral development: (a) the relationship between cognitive and moral development; (b) the relationship between social experiences and rate of moral development

Prosocial Moral Judgment and Behavior in Children The Mediating Role of Cost

Abstract: In the past, researchers generally have examined the issue of whether moral behavior is related to moral judgment, not under which conditions the two are associated. In the present research, a potential mediator of the relation between prosocial behavior and moral reasoning (cost of the prosocial behavior) was examined. Preschoolers and third graders were given opportunities to donate both costly and less costly commodities and could assist another at a cost or little cost to the self. Moreover, prosocial moral judgment was assessed. High -and low-cost donating were not significantly related; high-cost helping was significantly correlated with only low-cost donating for older children, and with high-cost donating for preschoolers. High-cost, but not low-cost, donating was related to developmentally mature moral judgment. Similarly, low-cost helping was unrelated to reasoning; high-cost helping was related to level of moral judgment for preschoolers only. The results are discussed in terms of their implica...

Relations between moral judgment, moral courage, and field independence.

Abstract: GIBBS, JOHN C; CLARK, PHILIP M; JOSEPH, JACK A; GREEN, JULIE L; GOODRICK, TERRY S; and MAKOWSKI, DAVID G Relations between Moral Judgment, Moral Courage, and Field Independence CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1986, 57, 185-193 The relationship of moral judgment to moral action as well as to certain cognitive style variables was examined 134 male and female eleventhand twelfth-grade students completed measures of moral judgment, field dependence-independence, locus of control, and other variables and nominated teachers who then rated the students for tendency to evidence morally courageous action Moral judgment was examined in terms of not only Kohlbergian moral judgment stage but also moral judgment type, where type B represents ethical ideality (role reversal, conscience, fundamental valuing), and type A limitation to existing social arrangements, in moral decision making Results were consistent with exploratory hypotheses that type B is a social-cognitive manifestation of field independence and is conducive to socially independent and ethically ideal action (eg, moral courage) Both moral judgment type B and moral judgment stage maturity were related to moral courage, p < 01, as well as to field independence, p < 01, although not to internal locus of control

Preschoolers' Moral Actions and Emotions in Prisoner's Dilemma

Abstract: The moral acts of 19 dyads of 4-year-olds in a cognitively simplified version of Prisoner's Dilemma were analyzed in relationship to their friendship, emotions, and processes of conflict resolution. Degree of friendship was rated by teachers; two sociologists used a Q-sort of Group Processes to describe the dyads' interactions; the emotions of each child were coded from videotape--independently of his or her partner's and with the sound turned off--in accordance with Ekman and Friesen's (1983) Emotion Facial Action Coding System. Moral acts were categorically identified as equalization, reparation, stalemate, default, and betrayal; these acts were also assigned scale scores on a dimension of moral sensitivity that was independently derived from separate work with a sample of 143 undergraduates. They judged the five acts in all possible paired comparisons and then rated the moral difference between each pair. These data almost perfectly fitted a model of increasing monotonic function according to Kruskal's (1964) criterion. The degree of friendship between the dyads and their interactive processes---group orientation, positive emotional tone, and active involvement--were positively related to sensitive moral action. Their emotions were related to concurrent acts, and more importantly, predicted their subsequent acts even though they seldom talked about morality. These results suggest that if social scientists' search for practical morality is to be successful, emotional communication needs to be brought into the account. A substantial and still growing number of investigations (for a few of the many examples, see Main & George, 1985; Rheingold & Hay, 1980, Strayer, 1980; and an extensive review by Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chapman, 1983) suggest that young children may be neither as morally insensitive nor incapable as held in theories that define morality and its development as primarily due to cognitive development or socialization. These contrary findings especially seem to occur in investigations that concern young children's moral actions rather than their judgments about hypothetical dilemmas. Still those cognitive scientists (for instance, Anderson, 1980) who have taken special care in simplifying and clarifying the cognitive requirements of their tasks also report such findings. Thus this growing body of work raises questions about the nature of young children's morality. Here we are concerned only with the conditions of their action, which is surely the more convincing test of moral capability. An obvious but not frequently studied feature of moral action is its heat--its "hot cognitions" in contrast to the cool cognitions evoked by hypothetical problems

Applying moral theories

Abstract: Preface. 1. What Is Ethics? 2. Morality: Subjective or Objective? 3. Moral Theories. 4. The Ethics of Self-Interest. 5. The Ethics of Natural Law. 6. The Ethics of Utilitarianism. 7. The Ethics of Respect for Persons. 8. Virtue Ethics. Appendix I: Applying the Moral Theories. Appendix II: Cases for Analysis. Index.

Artificial intelligence and ethics: An exercise in the moral imagination

Abstract: The possibility of constructing a personal AI raises many ethical and religious questions that have been dealt with seriously only by imaginative works of fiction; they have largely been ignored by technical experts and by philosophical and theological ethicists. Arguing that a personal AI is possible in principle, and that its accomplishments could be adjudicated by the Turing Test, the article suggests some of the moral issues involved in AI experimentation by comparing them to issues in medical experimentation. Finally, the article asks questions about the capacities and possibilities of such an artifact for making moral decisions. It is suggested that much a priori ethical thinking is necessary and that, that such a project cannot only stimulate our moral imaginations, but can also tell us much about our moral thinking and pedagogy, whether or not it is ever accomplished in fact.

A theory of moral reasoning

Abstract: approval or disapproval. In other words, appeal to further specification of the situation is relevant as a defeater. This can be captured as follows. Let us say that one situation-type C is narrower than another B just in case, necessarily, any situation of type C is also of type B but not conversely. A narrower situation-type takes account of more information. A reason based upon a more detailed conception of the actual situation takes precedence over a reason based upon a less detailed conception. This is ensured by the following defeater: D 1: 'C is an impersonal situation-type narrower than B., the actual situation is of type C, and my abstract approval or disapproval of doing X in situations of type C differs from my abstract approval or disapproval of doing X in situations of type B' is an undercutting defeater for the prima facie reasons described in MI and M2. To illustrate how M 1, M2, and DI work, suppose I witness Connie taking poisoned candy from a baby. The actual situation is one of a baby being about to eat a piece of candy, and I find that I abstractly disapprove of a person taking candy from the baby in such a situation. Thus, by M2 I have a prima facie reason for thinking that it is morally impermissible for Connie to take the candy in the actual situation. However, the actual situation is also one of a baby being about to eat a piece of poisoned candy, and I find that I abstractly approve of a person taking candy from the baby in such a situation. Thus, by M1 I have a prima facie reason for thinking that it is morally permissible for Connie to take the candy. These conclusions conflict. This is where D1 comes in. Being a situation in which a baby is about to eat a piece of poisoned candy is narrower than being a situation in which a baby is about to eat a piece of candy. Thus, by DI, my abstractly approving of a person's taking the candy in the former case and disapproving of a person's taking the candy in the latter constitutes an undercutting defeater for a moral judgment based upon the latter. That moral judgment is defeated, removing it from contention and leaving me only with a reason for thinking it permissible for Connie to take the candy from the baby. Actually, I can draw an even stronger conclusion in this example. I also abstractly disapprove of a person's not taking poisoned candy from a baby and so have an undefeated prima facie reason for judging it morally impermissible for Connie not to do so, that is, morally obligatory for her to take the candy.8 8. A slight modification of these principles provides us with prima facie reasons for subjective moral judgments. The difference between subjective and objective judgments is that the former are relative to what the agent believes to be the case rather than what is actually the case. Thus the subjective analogue of MI is: SM1: 'B is an impersonal situation-type, S believes that the actual situation is of type B, and I manifest abstract approval of a person doing X in situations of type B' is a prima facie reason for me to believe that it is subjectively morally permissible for S to do X in the actual situation. Pollock Moral Reasoning 517 The universalizability of moral judgments is explained by taking them to be based upon MI and M2. The problem in formulating a viable principle of universalizability has always been to explain along what dimensions of the present situation a moral judgment should be generalized. That question now has an easy answer. A moral judgment based upon MI or M2 appeals directly to an abstract situation-type B, and insofar as M1 or M2 gives us a reason for a judgment regarding one person, it gives us the same reason for a judgment regarding anyone else who is in a situation of type B. Universalizability is automatic. Principles MI, M2, and Dl provide the core of an account of moral reasoning, but the account is not yet complete. One obvious addition to the account is the observation that we can reason inductively about what is morally permissible or impermissible. For example, I may inductively confirm that it is almost always impermissible to let a baby be run over by a bus, and then, in a concrete case, I may base my judgment on that generalization rather than taking the trouble to indulge in serious moral reflection. If moral judgments are to have an action-guiding role, such inductive reasoning must be permissible because in many actual situations we must decide quickly what to do and we do not have time to indulge in detailed reflection. Obviously, such rote moraljudgments are common. In case the reader wonders why I bother even to mention them, let me remind him that not all concepts are projectible. Observing that we can reason inductively in connection with moral permissibility and impermissibility is to observe that these moral concepts are projectible, and that, in turn, is to further specify their conceptual roles. By virtue of the fact that inductive reasoning can supply us with reasons for moral judgments, it can also supply us with defeaters for M1 and M2. We may begin by making a number of moral judgments based upon Ml and M2 and then use those moral judgments to inductively confirm generalizations. If a resulting generalization subsequently conflicts with a further judgment based upon MI or M2, it provides us with a reason for denying the latter judgment. We have conflicting reasons pro and con (both based upon defeasible reasoning), and hence they rebut one another. In deciding whether to accept the judgment based upon MI or M2, deny it, or withhold belief, we must consider how good our inductive evidence is for the generalization. It is at least possible for our inductive evidence to be sufficient to warrant rejection of the prima facie The subjective analogues of M2 and DI are obtained analogously. To illustrate, suppose Connie was unaware that the candy the baby is about to eat is poisoned. Just as before, we obtain a prima facie reason for believing that it is subjectively morally impermissible for Connie to take the candy from the baby, but now we no longer have a conflicting prima facie reason for thinking it is subjectively morally permissible for Connie to take the candy and hence we have no defeater for the first judgments. Thus we become epistemically justified in concluding that it is (objectively) morally permissible for Connie to take the candy but subjectively morally impermissible. 518 Ethics April 1986 judgment based upon M I or M2. Thus we get a kind of negative feedback from our prima facie reasons. This is a general phenomenon that occurs in connection with all prima facie reasons. For example, we begin by judging the colors of objects on the basis of what colors they look to us. We use the conclusions of these initialjudgments to confirm generalizations. For instance, we confirm that color is a relatively stable property of objects-one that does not usually change quickly and erratically. We then discover that we can change the apparent color of an object by changing the color of the lighting. This gives us a prima facie reason for thinking the color of the object changes, but that conflicts with our generalization about stability. We take this to provide us with an inductive defeater for the judgment based upon apparent color, and we thus become epistemically justified in believing that changes in illumination can change the apparent colors of objects without changing their actual colors. This is a kind of bootstrap phenomenon wherein prima facie reasons can generate their own defeaters through induction. This bootstrapping phenomenon is equally important in color perception and morality. An object's looking blue to a person gives him a prima facie reason for thinking that it is blue. But the person might be color-blind. A person who is blue/green color-blind, but does not know that he is, will have a tendency to make mistaken judgments about whether things are blue; but until he finds out that he is color-blind he is perfectly justified in the judgments he makes. Similarly, if a person has aberrant desires, he may have a tendency to make false moral judgments, but his judgments may be epistemically justified nevertheless. We might say that the person has a partial \"moral blindness\" (without implying that, like color blindness, it is a congenital defect). Furthermore, just as the colorblind person can discover that he is color-blind, the morally blind person may be able to discover that he is morally blind and he can correct his moral judgments accordingly. The color-blind person discovers that he is color-blind by discovering that other people disagree with certain kinds of color judgments he is prone to make. The morally blind person may be able to discover his moral blindness in the same way if it is of limited scope. Suppose he makes pretty much the same moral judgments as his peers on most matters, but he has a strong prejudice against people with green hair. Faced with greenhairs, he fully approves of burning their synagogues, killing their buffalo, and enslaving them. But because he agrees with his peers on other moral matters, he can acquire an inductive reason for believing that when his peers agree uniformly on moral matters, they are usually right. Thus the fact that his peers take issue with his moral judgments regarding greenhairs gives him a reason for thinking his moral judgments are wrong in that case. This reasoning is precisely parallel to the reasoning one goes through in discovering that he is colorblind. The predominant historical tradition in Western ethics focuses pretty much exclusively on actions, but it is a rather obvious point that we can Pollock Moral Reasoning 519 also bring moral criticism to bear on other \"things people do,\" or \"doings\" for short. We may observe that Jody should not desire to pull the wings off the fly, that Mary should not intend to cheat on the exam, that Keith should not lust after Henrietta, that Joel should not enjo

Theories of Moral Development.

Abstract: Theory of Moral Development Piaget Educational TechnologyKohlberg's Stages of Moral Development ThoughtCoTheories and Models of Student DevelopmentStages of Moral Development and the FamilyTheories that Explain Emotional Development You are MomGilligan and Kohlberg’s Stage Theories of Moral 7 Major Theories of Child Development Explore Psychology(PDF) Theories of Development ResearchGateKohlberg's Theory of Moral Development Verywell MindThe Moral Development of the Child: An Integrated ModelTheories of Moral Development | Adolescent PsychologySocial Development Theories in Human Growth and Quiz & Worksheet Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development Four Major Theories Of Human Development | ipl.orgAn Explanation of Moral Theories & Traditions(PDF) Theories of Economic Development | 镇 秦 Academia.eduChapter 2 Theories of Economic DevelopmentTheories of the Common Law of Torts (Stanford Encyclopedia Moral development WikipediaMoral Courage: Definition and Development Ethics Resource Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development WikipediaMoral Development STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT ...Theories of human development SlideShareCurrent NursingFaith and Moral Development // Youth and Religion Moral Development – Human DevelopmentTheories of Moral Development Nursing Theory7. PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT THEORIES OF 7.1 WHAT IS Theories of Child Development: The MGH Clay CenterPiaget's Theory of Moral Development Child Development Theories of development – ReviseSociologyMedia Effects on Children's Social and Moral Development human behavior | Definition, Theories, Characteristics Carol Gilligan Moral Development Theory Explained HRFMoral Development symptoms, stages, Definition Theories of Moral Development Piaget &

How Learning Disabled Adolescent Boys Make Moral Judgments

Abstract: The purpose of this study was to investigate how learning disabled adolescents formulate moral judgments as compared to average achieving adolescents. Students were administered Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview. Compared to the average achieving adolescents, the learning disabled group showed less evidence of being able to view moral dilemmas from a community or societal perspective. Further, the LD group exhibited a substantial amount of reasoning from an egocentric perspective which focused on the needs and desires of the self. It is suggested that teachers implement strategies to facilitate the development of social perception and moral reasoning.

Moral Reasoning in Bahamian and United States Adults and Children: a Cross-Cultural Examination of Kohlberg's Stages:

Abstract: Cross-cultural studies of moral reasoning and moral development offer the opportunity to examine universals in development as well as to inform regarding the impact of culture on human reasoning ab...

Science Education and Moral Education

Abstract: Science education and moral education are mutually relevant. An education in science provides the factual information necessary to apply and revise ethical principles. In addition, science education aims to achieve certain propensities, e.g. impartiality, that are identical to some of the goals of moral education. Moral education, in turn, gives potential scientists the necessary principles and propensities to make certain decisions in the context of discovery, in the acceptance of hypotheses and in the conduct of inquiry. Science education and moral education can be combined in various ways although some recent theories of moral education, e.g. the values clarification approach, and Matthew Lipman's philosophy for children approach, have neglected the potential of science education for moral education.

Philosophy lessons from the clinical setting: Seven sayings that used to annoy me

Abstract: Traditional medical approaches to moral issues found in the clinical setting can, if properly understood, enlighten our philosophical understanding of moral issues. Moral problem-solving, as distinct from ethical and metaethical theorizing, requires that one reckon with practical complexities and uncertainties. In this setting the quality of one's answer depends not so much upon its content as upon the quality of reasoning which supports it. As the discipline which especially focuses upon the attributes of good-quality reasoning, philosophy therefore has much to contribute to the clinical enterprise of moral (and medical) problem-solving.

Race, Culture and Moral Education.

Abstract: Current debate on race, culture, religion and moral education is often bogged down in abstract definition and theoretical arguments, leading away from, instead of towards, practical action. Sometimes the false formulation of abstractions leads to misplaced actions. Where moral education is concerned, the great need at present is to look at general moral standards and arguments first, and apply these to behaviour affecting racial inequality, rather than to start from a concentration on racism, working back towards morality. It is seriously misleading to confuse ‘race’ and ‘culture’ or to see religion only as‐an aspect of culture. But because these matters are already often confused with each other in the perceptions of people of all colours, religions and cultures in this country, one must be sensitive to the consequences of this confusion.

The Relationship of Social-Moral Development With Cognitive and Ego Development: a Cross-Cultural Study

Abstract: Kohlberg and others have proposed that cognitive development is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for social-moral development and, in turn, that social-moral development is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ego development. This study examined these propositions within the cross-cultural context of an Israeli kibbutz. Cognitive and moral development were assessed among adolescent and young adult kibbutzniks; ego and moral development were assessed among senior kibbutz founders. In brief, 93 percent of the subjects scored at the same level or at a higher level in cognitive development than they did in moral development, and 86 percent of the subjects scored at the same level or at a higher level in moral development than they did in ego development. The results are consistent with the hypothesis of a decalage relationship between cognitive, moral, and ego development.