Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 1994"

The Moral Problem

Abstract: 1. What is the Moral Problem? 2. The Expressivist Challenge. 3. The Externalist Challenge. 4. The Humean Theory of Motivation. 5. An Anti-Humean Theory of Normative Reasons. 6. How to Solve the Moral Problem.

Moral Development in the Professions : Psychology and Applied Ethics

Abstract: Contents: Preface. J.R. Rest, Background: Theory and Research. S.P. McNeel, College Teaching and Student Moral Development. L.J. Duckett, M.B. Ryden, Education for Ethical Nursing Practice. F-Y. Chang, School Teachers' Moral Reasoning. N.A. Sprinthall, Counseling and Social Role Taking: Promoting Moral and Ego Development. L.A. Ponemon, D.R.L. Gabhart, Ethical Reasoning Research in the Accounting and Auditing Professions. M.J. Bebeau, Influencing the Moral Dimensions of Dental Practice. D.J. Self, D.C. Baldwin, Jr., Moral Reasoning in Medicine. D.J. Self, M. Olivarez, D.C. Baldwin, Jr., Moral Reasoning in Veterinary Medicine. B.J.L. Bredemeier, D.L.L. Shields, Applied Ethics and Moral Reasoning in Sport. T. Westbrook, Tracking the Moral Development of Journalists: A Look at Them and Their Work. S. Thoma, Moral Judgments and Moral Action. J.R. Rest, D. Narvaez, Summary: What's Possible?

Moral Perception and Particularity

Abstract: Part I. Particularity: 1. Introduction 2. Iris Murdoch and the domain of the moral 3. Moral perception and particularity Part II. Moral Excellence: 4. Moral exemplars: reflections on Scindler, the Trocmes, and others 5. Vocation, friendship, community: limitations of the personal/impersonal framework 6. Altruism and the moral value of rescue: Resisting persecution, racism, and genocide 7. Virtue and community Part III. The Morality of Care: 8. Compassion 9. Moral development and conceptions of morality 10. Gilligan and Kohlberg: implications for moral theory 11. Gilligan's two voices and the moral status of group identity.

Moral Classrooms, Moral Children: Creating a Constructivist Atmosphere in Early Education

Abstract: This work addresses the question of how to establish an interpersonal classroom atmosphere that fosters children's intellectual, social, moral, emotional and personality development. The authors draw upon and extend the constructivist work of Jean Piaget in sociomoral development.

The moral sensitivity of gifted children and the evolution of society

Abstract: In this article, I use a combination of clinical observations and theoretical propositions to demonstrate that the cognitive complexity and certain personality traits of the gifted create unique experiences and awarenesses that separate them from others. A central feature of the gifted experience is their moral sensitivity, which is essential to the welfare of the entire society. These inner qualities of the gifted are overlooked in most of the formulations of giftedness and talent. Giftedness defined as asynchronous development, a phenomenological approach, focuses on the inner world of gifted children, and stresses their vulnerability in society. I conclude by emphasizing the relationship between abstract reasoning, complexity, moral values and the evolution of society.

Software Piracy: Is It Related to Level of Moral Judgment?

Abstract: The possible relationship between widespread unauthorized copying of microcomputer software (also known as software piracy) and level of moral judgment is examined through analysis of over 350 survey questionnaires that included the Defining Issues Test as a measure of moral development. It is hypothesized that the higher one's level of moral judgment, the less likely that one will approve of or engage in unauthorized copying. Analysis of the data indicate a high level of tolerance toward unauthorized copying and limited support for the hypothesis. The most plausible explanation for these findings is that software copying is perceived as an issue of low moral intensity. This study calls into question the software industry's strategy of concentrating exclusively on institutional compliance with copyright rules, rather than working to raise the perceived moral intensity about software piracy at the individual level. As long as the issue remains low in moral intensity, the industry cannot expect significant shifts in copying behaviors. Individuals must become more aware of and concerned about the nature and magnitude of harm to society and to the rightful copyright owners from unauthorized copying before their attitudes and behaviors come to reflect higher levels of moral judgment.

Evolutionary theories of morality and the manipulative use of signals

Abstract: Several attempts have recently been made to explain moral systems and moral sentiments in light of evolutionary biological theory. It may be helpful to modify and extend this project with the help of a theory of communication developed by ethologists. The core of this approach is the idea that signals are best seen as attempts to manipulate others rather than as attempts to inform them. This addition helps to clarify some problematic areas in the evolutionary study of morals, and it generates new, testable predictions about moral statements.

Children's Moral Reasoning and Their Assertive, Aggressive, and Submissive Tendencies in Sport and Daily Life

Abstract: The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between children's moral reasoning and their assertive, aggressive, and submissive action tendencies in sport and daily life contexts. The 106 fourth- through seventh-grade children were asked to reason about hypothetical sport and daily life moral dilemmas and to respond to two behaviorally validated, self-report instruments designed to assess action tendencies in sport and daily life conflict situations. Multiple regression analyses indicated that moral reasoning scores were predictive of action tendencies, with reasoning positively related to assertion and negatively related to aggression. Results were interpreted in light of a congruence between Haan's (1978) descriptions of moral levels and the moral implications of the action tendencies under consideration. Gender and school-level differences in action tendencies were also noted; no gender or school-level differences in moral reasoning were found.

Strategy as Moral Philosophy

Abstract: A conceptual framework of ‘Strategy as Moral Philosophy’ is developed, with the corporation cast as a Moral Agent. This framework represents a counterpart, at the level of strategic management, to an emerging integration of economics with ethics at the aggregate level. Several implications are traced out for strategic management theories, practices, problems and pedagogy.

Moral Passages: Toward a Collectivist Moral Theory

Abstract: This work brings together philosophy, feminist theory and sociology to examine many of today's most pressing social and moral problems. Its basic principle is that knowledge and morality are generated in collective action and it sets this principle in opposition to the individualist theories of ethics. Analyzing how moral theories are implemented, the author looks at historical cases and contemporary moral problems such as teen pregnancy, abortion, contraception and gay rights. She demonstrates how the knowledge and lives of some people are hidden, declared deviant or immoral, while those of others are taken to show the public consensus. For example, the case of Margaret Sanger and her early work on birth control with the anarchist movement is considered. The author argues that the transition from Sanger's early approach to the "planning" methods advocated by later groups marked a major change in the theories of knowledge and morality being officially implemented in the US. The theories of knowledge, morality and truth which underlie the authority of professionals and theorists are also questioned.

Sport and Moral Education

Abstract: It is suggested that there are three broadly held views about sport in relation to the moral life‐‐the positive view, the neutral view and the negative view. Following a brief examination of morality and moral education the first of these views is upheld by arguing that sport as fairness is inherently concerned with the moral. It is further argued that sport is a valued human practice concerned with the virtues and that as a part of the curriculum is an integral part of moral education. An initiation into sport, like other aspects of moral education, involves such processes as judging, caring and acting. In all these processes the role of the teacher is considered. Finally two manifestations of a successful initiation into sport are presented with particular reference to the development of character and to the phenomenon of sportspersonship.

The Relation between Moral Judgment and Behavior: A Social-Cognitive and Decision-Making Analysis

Abstract: It is commonly assumed that there are discrepancies between moral judgments and moral behaviors because greater self-interest is at stake in behavior. Some of these discrepancies may be due instead to

Family patterns of moral judgment during adolescence and early adulthood.

Abstract: This study of familial patterns of moral judgment compares relationships between parent and offspring moral reasoning from early adolescence to adulthood in a cross-sectional sample from the Oakland Growth Study (Jones, 1939a, 1939b) and a longitudinal sample from Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) 20-year study of moral judgment development. The findings presented here are part of an expanding body of cognitive-developmental research on the role of parents and family processes in the development of moral judgment. In his classic "Stage and Sequence" paper, Kohlberg (1969) described the cognitive-developmental approach to socialization and his six-stage model of moral judgment development. Strongly influenced by Piaget's (1932/1965) theory of cognitive development, Kohlberg focused on moral cognition and viewed moral development as a process of increasing differentiation and integration of perspectives of self and other in resolving moral conflict. Accordingly, Kohlberg's approach to socialization emphasized the importance of social experiences that produce cognitive disequilibrium, challenge and reveal inadequacies in the child's reasoning, provide exposure to higher stage reasoning, and encourage social perspective taking. Like Piaget (1932/1965), Kohlberg (1969) downplayed the role of the family in the development of moral reasoning and

Moral reasoning, classroom behavior, and sociometric status among elementary school children.

Abstract: Relations among moral reasoning, classroom behavior, and sociometric status were investigated in a sample of 133 2nd and 3rd graders. It was hypothesized that hedonistic and needs-oriented moral reasoning, 2 forms of L. Kohlberg's (1984) Stage 2 moral reasoning, would be differentially related to teachers' ratings of classroom behavior and to sociometric status. Among boys, hedonistic moral reasoning was associated with the lack of social competencies, acting-out behavior, and low social preference. In addition to influencing sociometric status indirectly through social behavior, moral reasoning was found to explain variance in sociometric status not accounted for by either acting-out or social competencies

Applied Ethics and Moral Reasoning in Sport

Abstract: Sport is a social practice brimming with moral dilemmas. As a rule-governed activity, many of the moral decisions that take place in sport concern the rules. Athletes must decide whether to use illegal, performance-enhancing drugs, whether to surreptitiously violate the rules of play, whether to commit a strategically advantageous intentional foul, and so on. And even if an athlete decides to observe the rules scrupulously, there are other moral decisions that need to be made. Should one play when injured? Should one use aggressive but legal tactics? Should one employ harassing techniques designed to disrupt the opponent’s concentration? These are just a few examples of the kinds of dilemmas encountered by athletes. A similar list could be generated reflecting the moral decisions that need to be made by coaches, fans, sports writers, and others involved in the world of sport.

The relation between moral judgment and behavior: A social-cognitive and decision-making analysis. Commentary

Abstract: It is commonly assumed that there are discrepancies between moral judgments and moral behaviors because greater self-interest is at stake in behavior. Some of these discrepancies may be due instead to differences in the way the moral situation is construed in deciding how to behave vs. how to evaluate a behavior. Specifically, the moral situation is interpreted from the self's perspective prior to a behavioral decision, whereas in the case of evaluation it is construed from the perspective of an observer judging the actor's decision after the event. Judgment-behavior differences may also arise out of differences in the complexity of the moral issue being decided

Human Rights Violations in the Inner City: implications for moral educators

Abstract: The pervasive violence that is occurring in US urban communities involves not only violent acts against individuals, but also systemic violence perpetrated against the ethnic‐minority poor. It represents a breakdown in interpersonal relationships and the social order within these communities, and as such, it is a moral issue. Systemic violence refers to the inequities in the distribution of resources in urban communities, along with the immoral social policies and programmes that constitute the maintenance of this poverty. In this paper it is argued that systemic violence is a unique form of human rights violations. These violations affect the moral climate surrounding violence, which interferes with urban adolescents’ efforts to resolve moral questions. Applying a human rights perspective to violence contextualises the problem in such a way that youth can be helped to explore the aetiology of violence and the inherent moral questions from both micro‐ and macro‐systemic levels. Moral educators sh...

Kohlberg's original study of moral development.

Abstract: v. 1. Defining perspectives in moral development -- v. 2. Fundamental research in moral development -- v. 3. Kohlberg's original study of moral development -- v. 4. The great justice debate -- v. 5. New research in moral development -- v. 6. Caring voices and women's moral frames -- v. 7. Reaching out.

Communities Need More Than Autonomy

Abstract: The past twenty-five years have witnessed the transmutation of autonomy from a battle cry of the oppressed to a rallying cry for those who elevate certain kinds of moral commitments--those chosen voluntarily and competently--over all other moral concerns and values. The business contract becomes the supreme model of a sound moral relationship; informed consent, the esseential moral content of the physician-patient relationship. Loyalty, integrity, solidarity, and other such moral concepts, when they do not disappear completely, are shoved aside as little more than interesting curiosities or idiosyncratic preoccupations. When the contract becomes the paradigm of a moral relationship, and the market the regnant model of a just community, much of what makes us human, and our communities livable, is excluded. The concept of autonomy, like all other products of culture, has a history and a context that help to account for its appeal and shed light on its limitations. In the development of bioethics, autonomy emerged as a powerful protest against evil or thoughtless researchers and paternalistic physicians. It found deep ideological resonances within American popular, legal, and political culture: our celebration of the individual, our anger at infringements by others, our constitutionalized protections of personal liberty, and our faith in markets as fair and efficient methods for distributing social goods from bathtubs to--babies? Autonomy was an exceptionally apt tool with which to confront the problems bioethics faced at its birth. But it is not the all-purpose solution that some of its enthusiasts claim. Autonomy sometimes appears to be regarded as a kind of universal moral solvent, at least for some bioethics theorists. That the parties to an encounter come together voluntarily and with full understanding and consent casts a favorable moral glow on the encounter. It does not, however, tell us the whole moral story about that interaction. Nor does it assure us that the sum total of such encounters will provide the cultural support needed for a vibrant and just community, one in which love, loyalty, peace, and other vitally important human values flourish. A near-exclusive emphasis on autonomy is attractive in part because it permits us to avoid many unpleasant and complex realities--the strains of living in communities in which others not only have different interests, but may be ornery and unreasonable besides; the gnawing difficulties and deep satisfactions of enduring family relationships; the confusing, embarrassing, and sometimes ugly particulars of the human psyche. When autonomy is the answer, the question is largely limited to asking whether the person decided freely. Autonomy counsels us not to ask if the decision was wise, or even good in the short run for the person making it. For many decisions, that is sound counsel. …

The Understanding of Morality, Convention, and Personal Preference in an African Setting Findings from Zambia

Abstract: Forty-three Zambian secondary school teachers and 121 of their students were interviewed to examine distinctions between direct moral, belief-mediated moral, social-conventional, and personal events. Additionally, 17 Zambian villagers and 15 American college students made judgments about a belief-mediated moral event Two main predictions were made: Zambian secondary school teachers and students would make distinctions between the four types of events, and subjects' understanding of belief-mediated moral and social-conventional transgressions would be patterned by sociocultural orientations. These predictions were confirmed. Discussed and deduced from the results is the proposition that as applied to individuals per se the concepts of unfairness, harm, justice, violation of human rights, and obligation form an insufficient basis for morality. A collective sense of well-being should, in addition, be part of this foundation.

Autonomy, Interdependence, and Moral Governance: Pluralism in a Rocking Boat

Abstract: Drawing on key themes in the work of Sir Geoffrey Vickers, this article outlines the need for a moral perspective that can address the pluralistic social realities of the dawning 21st century. The trends of globalism and localism are traced out against the material advances that our technologies make possible and the often conflicting moral claims to a share of that wealth that our distinct but increasingly interdependent cultures make inevitable. We have come to see these moral claims as entitlements of membership in society and have designed an array of institutions that we hold responsible for their fulfilment. This status quo, however, is systemically unstable, unsustainable, and, therefore, morally unjustifiable. To achieve an acceptable form of stability (in terms of human systems, the virtuous mean between chaos and stagnation), we must, at the very least, learn to manage both conflicting moral claims and conflicting standards of morality—we must develop a system of moral governance that can enable...

Rational Interaction for Moral Sensitivity: A Postmodern Approach to Moral Decision-making in Business

Abstract: Moral dissensus is a distinct feature of our time. This is not only true of our post-modern culture in general, but also of business culture specifically. In this paper I start by explaining how modernist rationality has produced moral dissensus without offering any hope of bringing an end to it in the foreseeable future. Opting for a form of post-modernist rationality as the only viable way of dealing with moral dissensus, I then make an analysis of a number of ways proposed by both specialists in the field of business ethics, as well as philosophers to deal with moral decision-making in this situation of moral dissensus. The conclusion reached is that none of these attempts succeeds in coming to terms with moral dissensus. I then formulate an alternative approach to moral decision-making which I call: “Rational interaction for moral sensitivity”. After explaining this approach, I defend it against some of the most obvious objections that might be raised against it in a business environment. When you're talking birth control, what blocks it and freezes it out is that it's not a matter of more or fewer babies being argued. That's just on the surface. What's underneath is a conflict of faith, of faith in empirical social planning versus faith in the authority of God as revealed by the teachings of the Catholic Church. You can prove the practicality of planned parenthood till you get tired of listening to yourself and it's going to get nowhere because your antagonist isn't buying the assumption that anything socially practical is good per se. Goodness for him has other sources which he values as much as or more than social practicality. (, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.)

Are Moral Intuitions Self-Evident Truths?

Abstract: Mr. Wilson's Heresies The Moral Sense is an intellectually courageous book that will have relatively few friends among anthropologists or moral philosophers. It is an intellectually courageous book because it commits many heresies, in particular these four: (1) The heresy of moral cognitivism, which claims that moral appraisals should be interpreted and evaluated in terms of their degree of accuracy in representing some domain of moral "truth." As I understand The Moral Sense it suggests that the moral sense is not merely a feeling or a sensation but is a kind of sixth sense, which, like our other senses, is a source of valid knowledge about something (namely, "goodness") that is objective, natural, or real. (2) The heresy of intuitionism, which claims that valid or truthful moral appraisals are produced rapidly and unconsciously and that moral men and women know the "good" (and/or are inclined to do the "good") spontaneously or "reflexively", without being motivated by the conclusions of deliberative reason. (3) The heresy of romanticism, which claims that "the mind is in the heart" and that moral truths are represented to the senses (and motivate action) by means of the emotions, via feelings such as repugnance, indignation, or shame. (4) The heresy of pluralism, which claims that the ultimate "goods" of morality are many, not one, and that plurality is a terminal (rather than an intermediary) state. When joined with the heresy of cognitivism, the heresy of pluralism implies that there are universally valid moral "goods" (for example, fairness, sympathy, duty and self-control) but these various "goods" cannot be reduced, aggregated or translated into any single common denominator of moral evaluation, and cannot be rank ordered in terms of their relative efficiency as alternative means to some more ultimate moral end (such as pleasure, happiness, or "utility"). The heresy of pluralism also implies that those various universally valid and ultimate moral "goods" cannot be simultaneously maximized, either because they are inherently in conflict with each other (for example, fairness and sympathy drive out duty and self-control) or because they are practically difficult to combine in this or that setting, culture or institutional context. Permit me to confess from the outset that I am a fan of all of those heresies, including a fifth heresy, the heresy of thinking that it makes sense to commit all four heresies in the same book, or with the same breath. Shortly before I became aware of the publication of The Moral Sense, Jon Haidt and I wrote a review essay predicting and looking forward to the development of a cognitive-pluralist-intuitionist theory of moral psychology,(1) whose main tenets are brilliantly set forth in The Moral Sense. I find it exhilarating to discover that our prophecy had come true even before it had been made. I also find Wilson's four-fold classification of the virtues extremely insightful, and credible. The broad domains of moral sensibility that he portrays (fairness, sympathy, duty and self-control) are consistent with a tripartite division of the moral domain (the "Big Three of Morality") that my associates and I have induced from research on moral intuitions and judgments in India and the United States, where we distinguish an "ethics of autonomy" (including fairness and sympathy) from an "ethics of community" (including duty) from an "ethics of divinity" (including self-control).(2) Wilson's abstraction nicely captures some of the formal characteristics of substantive moral sensibilities and raises the possibility that diverse aspects of personal functioning (for example, planning, foresight and dependability) may well be in the service of the same moral ideal (for example, self-control). Permit me to also acknowledge up front that, based on my reading of The Moral Sense, I fancy that Wilson and I probably differ a bit in personal temperament. …

Reaching out : caring, altruism, and prosocial behavior

Abstract: v 1 Defining perspectives in moral development -- v 2 Fundamental research in moral development -- v 3 Kohlberg's original study of moral development -- v 4 The great justice debate -- v 5 New research in moral development -- v 6 Caring voices and women's moral frames -- v 7 Reaching out

Social and Political Complexity and Moral Development

Abstract: In this study the authors aim to investigate empirically the relationship between Kohlberg's stages of moral development and exposure to political and social complexity. The sample consisted of 68 Social Work I students of the University of the Witwatersrand, 35 white and 33 black subjects, ranging in age from 18-24 years. Data were obtained by the use of a biographical questionnaire and Taylor's Reason for Action Questionnaire. Each instrument, respectively, allowed for the generation of data concerning subjects' exposure to political and social complexity, and Kohlberg's levels of moral reasoning. The stage of moral reasoning attained by the respondents was represented by frequency counts. More than half of the subjects demonstrated a capacity to reason with stage five post-conventional moral reasoning, a stage rarely attained by individuals under the age of 24 years (Kohlberg). Significantly, these subjects did not reason at a 'pure' stage five level. Instead, they reflected a bimodal preconventional (stage two) and post-conventional (stage five) moral response set. Hypotheses were offered to explain the ability of the subjects to attain stage five moral reasoning as well as their apparent contradictory bimodal reasoning pattern.