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Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 1997"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, implicit theories about the malleability of one's social-moral reality were found to predict duty-based vs. rights-based moral beliefs, and the results from five studies supported the proposed framework.
Abstract: In this article, the authors propose that individuals' moral beliefs are linked to their implicit theories about the nature (i.e., malleability) of their social-moral reality. Specifically, it was hypothesized that when individuals believe in a fixed reality (entity theory), they tend to hold moral beliefs in which duties within the given system are seen as fundamental. In contrast, when individuals believe in a malleable reality (incremental theory), one that can be shaped by individuals, they hold moral beliefs that focus on moral principles, such as human rights, around which that reality should be organized. Results from 5 studies supported the proposed framework: Implicit theories about the malleability of one's social-moral reality predicted duty-based vs. rights-based moral beliefs.

410 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The moral approbation model as discussed by the authors proposes that individuals consider four factors when determining their own or someone else's level of moral responsibility in a given situation: the severity of the act's consequences, the certainty that the act is moral or immoral, the actor's degree of complicity in the act, and the extent of pressure the actor feels to behave unethically.
Abstract: Existing models of ethical decision making cannot yet explain the disparity between what organization members decide is “right” to do in a given situation and what they actually do. The current paper advances these models with the development of a new idea called moral approbation, defined as moral approval from oneself or others. By arguing that people rely on the opinions of their referent groups when deciding how to behave, the paper also explains how organizational or environmental factors can affect individuals' ethical behavior. This theory proposes that individuals consider four factors when determining their own or someone else's level of moral responsibility in a given situation: the severity of the act's consequences, the certainty that the act is moral or immoral, the actor's degree of complicity in the act, and the extent of pressure the actor feels to behave unethically. A moral agent in an organizational predicament uses these four factors to determine the level of moral responsibility that his or her referent group will attribute to him or her. Based on that perceived level of responsibility, he or she will plan a certain course of action and estimate how much moral approbation can be expected from that referent group based on that behavior. The agent then compares this anticipated level of moral approbation to the minimum that he or she can tolerate. If the anticipated moral approbation meets that threshold, the agent is likely to establish a formal intention of behaving according to the projected plan, and is more likely to act in accordance with that plan. On the other hand, if the comparison shows that the threshold will not be met, the actor is likely to rethink his or her course of action and continue to go through the moral approbation process until a plan is developed that will lead to the necessary level of approbation. The moral approbation model begins to fill the theoretical gap between moral judgment and moral action in organizations, with some explicit observations about the effect of organizational influences. These issues are of both scholarly interest and practical concern.

201 citations


Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a model of organizational moral development that emphasizes the role of top management in creating organizational processes that shape the organizational and institutional components of corporate social performance.
Abstract: This article begins with an explanation of how moral development for organizations has parallels to Kohlberg’s categorization of the levels of individual moral development. Then the levels of organizational moral development are integrated into the literature on corporate social performance by relating them to different stakeholder orientations. Finally, the authors propose a model of organizational moral development that emphasizes the role of top management in creating organizational processes that shape the organizational and institutional components of corporate social performance. This article represents one approach to linking the distinct streams of business ethics and business-and-society research into a more complete understanding of how managers and firms address complex ethical and social issues.

171 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the role of norms in the development of cognitive operations and social co-operations in a co-operative setting and discuss five general principles of teaching that apply to all levels of education.
Abstract: Current debate in education on the role of individual and social factors in development often presents Piaget as giving primacy to individual cognitive processes in contrast to Vygotsky's view of the primacy of social and cultural factors. It has even become popular to say that Piaget's child is a solitary scientist, constructing knowledge apart from the social context. This view is in error. To counter the often inaccurate assumptions, Piaget's social theory is summarized, including an account of his consideration of the relations between the individual and the social in sociomoral, affective, and intellectual development. His emphasis on the role of norms in development is discussed. Piaget's view of the identity of cognitive operations and social co-operations is explained with examples. Issues related to Piaget's social theory are raised. The co-operative context favoring operational development is discussed in terms of five general principles of teaching that apply to all levels of education

139 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors validated the use of such models by showing that both issue-contingent variables and individual characteristics affect two commonly-proposed model components: i.e., moral judgment and moral intent.
Abstract: Despite the existence of a large number of models to explain the ethical decision-making process, rarely have the models been tested. This research validated the use of such models by showing that both issue-contingent variables and individual characteristics affect two commonly-proposed model components: i.e., moral judgment and moral intent. As proposed by Jones' (1991) ethical decision-making model and elaborated on by the author, the main effect of an issue-contingent variable, social consensus, and a closely-related variable, seriousness of consequences, influenced both moral judgment and moral intent. Many ethical decision-making models also argue for the inclusion of individual characteristics in the decision-making process. This study proposed and found that the individual characteristics of rule orientation and denial of responsibility influenced moral judgment and moral intent, respectively. However, contrary to some models, interactions between issue-contingent variables and individual characteristics were insignificant relative to the main effects variables. The relationships found have implications for future model testing, as well as for practising managers.

129 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A comprehensive survey of the use of the term "moral panic" from its coinage in 1972 until the present day can be found in this paper, where the authors provide a more speculative analysis of the word, drawing on the work of moral philosophers and attempting to predict how moral panic may develop in the future.
Abstract: This article provides a comprehensive survey of the use of the term «moral panic» from its coinage in 1972 until the present day. It traces the evolution of the term in academic sociology and criminology, its adoption by the media in the mid-1980s and its subsequent employment in the national press. It shows how and why the term changed its meaning, and how far its use in academic discourse affected its use in the media. The article traces the development of «moral panic» in the media, where it was first used pejoratively, then rejected for being pejorative, and finally rehabilitated as a term of approval. It explains why the term developed as it did : how it enabled journalists to justify the moral and social role of the media, and also to support the reassertion of «family values» in the early 1990s. The article concludes by considering the relationship between «moral panic» and moral language in general. This is a more speculative analysis of the term, drawing on the work of moral philosophers and attempting to predict how «moral panic» may develop in the future. «Moral panic», he suggests, is an unsatisfactory form of moral language which may adversely affect the media's ability to handle moral issues seriously

125 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Singer et al. as discussed by the authors investigated whether an observer's scope of justice with reference to either the moral agent or the target person of a moral act, would affect his/her judgements of the ethicality of the act, and whether observer judgments of ethicality parallel the decision processes in sys tematically evaluating the intensity of the moral issue.
Abstract: The study ascertained (1) whether an observer's scope of justice with reference to either the moral agent or the target person of a moral act, would affect his/her judgements of the ethicality of the act, and (2) whether observer judgements of ethicality parallel the moral agent's decision processes in sys tematically evaluating the intensity of the moral issue. A scenario approach was used. Results affirmed both research questions. Discussions covered the implica tions of the findings for the underlying cognitive processes of moral judgements, for the link between judgements of fairness and ethicality, as well as for the debate of ethical absolutism versus relativism. The literature on business ethics is extensive in scope and diverse in perspective (for reviews, see DeGeorge, 1990; Kahn, 1990; Tsalikis and Fritzsche, 1989). Models of ethical decision making have focused on one or more of three variables: the moral agent, the moral climate and the moral issue. Studies focusing on the moral agent have identified several individual differences Dr. Ming Singer is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology. Her main research areas include social and organizational justice, ethical decision making, selection and motivation. She has published widely on these topics in academic journals. She is also author of Fairness in Personnel selection and Diversity-based hiring. Dr. Alan Singer is a senior lecturer in strategic management and business ethics at Canterbury University. He has published various papers in academic journals including Omega: The International Journal of Management Science, Decision Sciences, International Journal of Forecasting, International Journal of Research in Marketing, ?wd Journal of Business Ethics. variables that significantly impact on ethical decision making (e.g., Knouse and Giacalone, 1992). These variables include machiavellianism (e.g., Giacalone and Knouse, 1990), locus of control (e.g., Connolly and McCarrey, 1978; Trevino, 1986), and motive to create favorable impression upon others (e.g., DePaulo et al, 1989; Moberg, 1989; Schlenker, 1980). The cognitive processes underlying the moral agent's decision behavior have also been analysed from various theoretical perspectives (e.g., Dubinsky and Loken, 1989; Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Kohlberg, 1973; Singer et al, 1990). Many theorists consider ethical or unethical behavior as part of the corporate internal environment and culture (e.g., Khalil, 1993; Victor and Cullen, 1988). Organizational culture or climate conveys implicit organizational values and goals hence prescribes general codes of conduct. An organi zational culture which values democracy (Trevino, 1986) or rewards ethical behavior (Trevino et al, 1985) has been found to foster ethical decision making. Relative to the role of the moral agent and the moral climate, the nature of uthe moral issue itself has not been given due attention in any existing models of ethical decision making (Jones, 1991, p. 366). The moral intensity model (Jones, 1991) was recently proposed to fill in this gap in the literature. The model contends that ethical decision making is contingent upon the ethical issue itself. The intensity of a moral issue is determined collectively by the magnitude of consequence of the moral act; the degree of social consensus that the moral act is unethical; the likelihood that the moral act would take Journal of Business Ethics 16: 473-484, 1997. ? 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.251 on Fri, 13 May 2016 06:41:50 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 474 M. S. Singer and A. E. Singer effect; the temporal immediacy of the effect of the moral act for the target of the moral act; as well as the concentration of the effect. The model further contends that the overall intensity of a moral issue would influence the recognition of a moral issue and the intention as well as the engagement of a moral act. Underlying many theories of ethical decision making is the assumption that an individual or moral agent typically adopts rational strategies in moral reasoning and action (e.g., Dubinsky and Loken, 1989). However, rationality has many dimensions (Singer, 1994) including the idea that being rational or irrational resides in the eyes of the beholder. This idea is explicit in Ackoff's (1983) concept of interactive rationality. To the extent that rationality constitutes the building blocks of ethical decision making, ethical behavior then becomes a socially constructed reality. A similar position regarding ethical behavior was independently developed by Payne and Giacalone (1990). For this reason, the social or interpersonal mechanisms underlying this reality deserves more consideration. While the literature is replete with theories and research addressing the issue of ethical decision making from a decision maker or moral agent's viewpoint, relatively little attention has been paid to the judgements of such ethical decisions from a third party or an observer's perspective. The present study taking the latter approach by exploring whether the judgement of a ethical decision is moderated by the inter personal relationships between the observer and the moral agent as well as the target person affected by the decision. Specifically, the idea explored was that an observer's "scope of justice" with regard to either the moral agent or the target of the moral act would affect the observer's judgements about the overall ethicality of the act. The concept of scope of justice has its origin in organizational justice literature on distribu tive and procedural justice (e.g., Deutsch, 1985; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Scope of justice refers to the extent to which an individual extends his/her justice concerns to another person having either a similar in-group membership status (i.e., inclu sionary concerns) or a dissimilar out-group membership status (i.e., exclusionary concerns). The scope of justice concept has been used interchangeably with Opotow's (1988) term moral inclusion (Brockner, 1990). Tyler and Lind (1990) argue that group membership is central to scope of justice. An individual's own member ship status within a group determines his/her degree of justice concerns; with peripheral membership being associated with the greatest concern for fairness or justice. Moreover, indi viduals typically are more concerned about whether "in-group", rather than "out-group" members are treated in a fair or just manner. When in-group vs. out-group membership status was defined in terms of personal friendship and similarity in attitudes, Brockner (1990) found that when layoff survivors included within their scope of justice the layoff victims, the survivors judged the layoff decision as unfair and they also became less committed to their organization making the decision. Duarte, Goodson and Klich (1993) have also shown that in performance appraisal, supervisors tended to give inflated ratings to in-group subordinates, supervisor judgements about the performance of out-group subordinates were however more in line with their actual performance measured objectively. Given these findings, it is plausible to assume that in making judgements about a morally ques tionable decision, an observer would judge the decision in a more favorable light if the moral agent making the decision is considered an in-group, as compared to an out-group, member by the observer. This was the first assumption tested in this study. H^ An observer's scope of justice with reference to the moral agent would have a significant effect on judgements of the overall ethicality of the moral act. In addition, judgements of an ethical decision may also differ depending on whether the target of the moral act is within the observer's scope of justice. Brockner's (1990) findings would suggest that an observer is likely to judge a moral act in a less favorable light if the decision adversely affects its target who is considered an in-group member by the observer. Conversely, a This content downloaded from 157.55.39.251 on Fri, 13 May 2016 06:41:50 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Moral Agents' Ethical Decisions 475 plausible extension is that if the decision unduly benefits an in-group target person, the decision would perhaps be judged more favorably. These assumptions were also ascertained in the present study: H2: An observer's scope of justice regarding the target of a moral act would interact with the consequence of the act in affecting ethicality judgements. When the target is within the observer's scope of justice, an act harming the target would be judged as more unethical; whereas an act benefitting the same target would be judged as less unethical. A further aim of the study was to explore the cognitive processes underlying an observer's judgement about an ethical decision. The study presumes that observers' ethical judgements are also issue-contingent. In other words, an observer's moral judgements would involve similar mental processes as a moral agent's ethical decision making, an observer may also consider systematically the intensity of the moral issue as prescribed by the Jones (1991) model. The present study also tested this assumption. H3: An observer's overall judgements about the ethicality of a moral decision is significantly associated with his/her evaluation of the moral intensity of the issue.

118 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Mark B. Tappan1
TL;DR: In this article, a sociocultural perspective on the study of moral development is presented, grounded in Vygotsky's exploration of the developmental relationship between speech and thinking, highlighting the semiotic mediation of moral functioning via inner speech as inner moral dialogue.

109 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper found that moral commitment was correlated with the meaning of the relationship and investment in the relationship, whereas enthusiastic commitment was highly correlated with satisfaction, and moral commitment predicted negative affect and illness symptoms for those whose relationships ended.
Abstract: The uncertainty of relationship transitions should elicit more elaborate cognitive processing about one's relationship. As a result, reports of a type of relationship commitment distinctive from satisfaction-moral commitment-might be obtained from those about to begin long distance relationships. Students assessed prior to the academic year reported 2 types of commitment: moral and enthusiastic. Moral commitment was highly correlated with the meaning of the relationship and investment in the relationship, whereas enthusiastic commitment was highly correlated with satisfaction. Moral (but not enthusiastic) commitment predicted the subsequent survival of the relationship. Moral commitment also predicted appraisals of increased investment in and meaning of the relationship by the end of the term. Finally, moral commitment predicted negative affect and illness symptoms for those whose relationships ended. For people remaining in relationships, a new construct of moral burden emerged at Time 2. Burden was related to relationship dissatisfaction and stress and predicted the initiation of a subsequent breakup.

93 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation, and found that the content of moral judgments was related to their structure.
Abstract: To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.

90 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors attempt to capture the essence of morality and ethics in the African context and to elucidate forms of moral wisdom and behaviour grounded in the web of the African community.
Abstract: For centuries researchers have studied the universality of matters of ethics and morality. Now, the challenge is to make theoretical contributions which account not only for the universals, but also for the life conditions and cultural circumstances of various people in different societies. This paper attempts to capture the essence of morality and ethics in the African context and to elucidate forms of moral wisdom and behaviour grounded in the web of the African community.

MonographDOI
TL;DR: The question of moral restraint in American culture has been studied extensively in the literature as mentioned in this paper, with a focus on the relationship between work and money, and the role of materialism and moral restraint.
Abstract: AcknowledgmentsIntroduction: The Question of Moral Restraint3Ch. 1Having It All - and Wanting More: The Social Symptoms of Cultural Distress17Ch. 2Making Choices: From Short-Term Adjustments to Principled Lives37Ch. 3Moral Tradition: The Lost Ambivalence in American Culture59Ch. 4Shifting Perspectives: The Decoupling of Work and Money85Ch. 5Accounts: The Changing Meanings of White-Collar Work105Ch. 6(Not) Talking about Money: The Social Sources and Personal Consequences of Subjectivization138Ch. 7Getting and Spending: The Maintenance and Violation of Symbolic Boundaries169Ch. 8The Working Class: Changing Conditions and Converging Perspectives206Ch. 9Family LIfe: The New Challenges of Balancing Multiple Commitments241Ch. 10Rediscovering Community: The Cultural Potential of Caring Behavior and Voluntary Service265Ch. 11The Quest for Spirituality: Ambiguous Voices from America's Religious Communities292Ch. 12Materialism and Moral Restraint: The Role of Ascetic and Expressive Values331Ch. 13The Possibilities of Moral Discourse: Limitations, Pathologies, and Challenges357Methodology375Notes377Index427

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors connect conceptually the professional ethics of teaching and moral education by exploring the function of teacher education to prepare teachers to understand the moral and ethical complexities of their role and thus enable them to reflect ethical actions and decisions in their professional practice.
Abstract: Increasing societal concern about the perceived decline of moral and ethical values in contemporary life is promoting renewed interest in moral education or character education (Beck, 1990; Chazan, 1985; Cohen, 1995; Jarrett, 1991; Kelsey, 1993; Lickona, 1991; Nucci, 1989; Ryan & McLean, 1987; Spiecker & Straughan, 1988; Wynne & Ryan, 1993). Some argue that the current educational climate has contributed to a culture in which many do not know what a genuinely moral standard is (Delattre & Russell, 1993, p. 24); they believe that by removing such words as right and wrong from the school vocabulary, schools have been values-neutral for so long that our ability to engage students in conversations about moral issues had become rusty. We were not even sure what our role was in the moral education of our students (Gecan & Mulholland-Glaze, 1993, p. 46). Others, exploring the moral and ethical dimensions of schools, claim schooling is a moral endeavor by its very nature (Goodlad, Soder, & Sirotnik, 1990; Jackson, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993; Kirschenbaum, 1994; Sergiovanni, 1992, 1996; Sockett, 1993). Both groups acknowledge the growing public demand that schools more directly stand for, reflect, and impart valued principles (Cohen, 1995; Lickona, 1991; Wynne & Ryan, 1993). This recognition, accompanied by support for formal character education or not, has been fueled in part by the greater acceptance of the belief that--regardless of our diversity--at root we share a basic morality that includes such virtues as responsibility, respect, trustworthiness, fairness, caring, and civic virtue (Sergiovanni, 1996, p. 123). Strike and Ternasky (1993) identify three areas in education to which ethics apply: deliberation and reflection on educational policy, moral education, and professional ethics. The last area, which Strike and Ternasky describe as the most neglected until recently, provides the focus for the following discussion. In this article, I connect conceptually the professional ethics of teaching and moral education by exploring the function of teacher education to prepare teachers to understand the moral and ethical complexities of their role and thus enable them to reflect ethical actions and decisions in their professional practice. Teachers' practice inevitably has a strong influence on the moral lessons students directly and indirectly acquire in the classroom (Jackson et al., 1993). To be guides for the young in morality and ethics, teachers must understand the complex moral role that they occupy as ethical professionals and appreciate the significance of their own actions and decisions on the students in their care. Moral education is a term applicable to the preparation of future teachers, as much as to children and adolescent students (Bricker, 1993). The recognition that enhanced awareness of teachers of their own ethical practice can be a powerful force on moral education as it evolves in schools. In the following sections, I review briefly recent theoretical attention to the concept of the teacher as moral agent and exemplar; consider the implications of this concept for teacher education, specifically related to a reconceptualization of foundations courses in educational philosophy and policy; explore the case study method to the teaching of applied ethics; and, using examples from my own practice, provide an overview of potential moral and ethical dilemmas in teaching that some preservice teachers identified in their interpretations of professional and practical experiences. The Teacher as Moral Agent and Exemplar Recent educational literature has focused on the teacher's role as fundamentally concerned with the state of moral agency (Fullan, 1993; Grace, 1995; Sergiovanni, 1992, 1996; Sockett, 1990, 1993; Strike & Ternasky, 1993; Strom, 1989). Some argue that the components of teaching as a knowledge endeavor and as a moral enterprise are essentially inseparable and that recognition of this fusion must be central to the conception of the teacher's role (Ball & Wilson, 1996). …

Book
20 Nov 1997
TL;DR: In this article, the authors take disagreement seriously and map the Relativist Domain Relativism, Ethnocentrism, and the Decline of Moral Confidence to a kind of Historiography.
Abstract: Acknowledgments Introduction Taking Disagreement Seriously Mapping the Relativist Domain Relativism, Ethnocentrism, and the Decline of Moral Confidence The Empirical Underdetermination of Descriptive Cultural Relativism Cultural Authority, Cultural Complexity, and the Doctrine of Cultural Integration The Perspicuous "Other": Relativism "Grown Tame and Sleek" The Use and Abuse of History History, Ethnography, and the Blurring of Cultural Boundaries Relativism as a "Kind of Historiography"? Moral Debate, Conceptual Space, and the Relativism of Distance Plus ca change...:The Myths of Moral Invention and Discovery Morality and Its Discontents On the Supposed Inevitability of Rationally Irresolvable Moral Conflict Pluralism, Conflict, and Choice On the Alleged Methodological Infirmity of Moral Inquiry Does Pessimism about Moral Conflict Rest on a Mistake? Moral Inquiry and the Moral Life Moral Inquiry as an Interpretive Enterprise The Interpretive Turn and the Challenge of "AntiTheory" A Pyrrhic Victory? Objectivity and the Aspirations of Moral Inquiry Morality and Culture through Thick and Thin The Need for Thick Descriptions of Moral Inquiry Moral Conflict, Moral Confidence, and Moral Openness toward the Future Critical Pluralism, Cultural Difference, and the Boundaries of Cross-Cultural Respect The Strange Career of "Culture" Epilogue Notes Works Cited Index

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors describe the nature of and necessity for moral reasoning in everyday life and in programs in teacher education, consider ways teacher educators can consider moral issues with their students, and provide examples of how some educators have incorporated such issues in actual and proposed programs.
Abstract: In this article, I describe the nature of and necessity for moral reasoning in everyday life and in programs in teacher education, consider ways teacher educators can consider moral issues with their students, and provide examples of how some educators have incorporated such issues in actual and proposed programs. Exchanges over school issues with moral connotations often focus on controversies such as censorship of books, appropriateness of sex education, or the legitimacy of creationism versus evolutionism. The Christian Coalition, other fundamentalist organizations, and groups with different perspectives have provoked controversies like these. Some recent efforts of the New Right have sought to regain what they perceive as lost intellectual ground, with cultural and ethical repercussions (Bennett, 1989; Cheney, 1988; Wynne, 1987; Wynne & Ryan, 1993). This ground was lost, so the argument goes, because of changes in the canon in higher education; progressive alternatives to more mainstream educational programs in public schools, especially during the 1960s; movements that promoted greater diversity and inclusiveness within the curriculum as well as among students; and a focus on issues of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation in public school and college classrooms. Those with alternative intellectual and political commitments (Asante, 1991,1992; Delpit, 1995; Gates, 1992; hooks; 1994; Kozol, 1991) have, in turn, challenged the perspective and agenda of the New Right. Such debates demonstrate that education is an ethically and politically contested domain, that the articulation of different points of view on basic moral questions is a central element of the educative process (Beyer & Liston, 1996). At the same time, these debates may be misleading, for they tend to be characterized by particularly heated, even inflammatory exchanges, accompanied by shrill, sometimes personalized accusations and counter-accusations that divide people into sides that talk past, rather than to or with, each other. Debates that grab headlines in the local and national media like those between proponents of creationism and evolutionism may hide the fact that value-laden perspectives underlie a good deal of the commonplace in education, and indeed help shape daily school practice. Moral Issues and Moral Reasoning Moral discourse operates on questions or dilemmas resolved neither by reference to empirical realities nor by logical or linguistic analyses, though the latter may clarify the relevant issues involved in moral disagreements. Moral questions arise whenever we ponder what is the right thing to do, or when we are puzzled about competing claims to action and the values on which those claims rest. Moral deliberation is central to daily lives as well as to decisions about social justice; for instance, in issues ranging from how I treat others on a day-to-day basis, to what my obligations are to members of my community, to what public policies will most help the least advantaged members of society. We may disagree about what makes for a good, responsible, or fulfilling life, as well as about the actions most likely contributing to the realization of that life. Discussion of alternative conceptions of the good life may not be commonplace outside some university classrooms and religious institutions, but issues concerning the politics of affirmative action and the legitimacy of capital punishment frequently contain implicit conceptions of what a good or worthwhile life is. Similarly, concrete classroom questions like those concerning which curriculum content should be selected, what student socialization patterns should be reinforced, what pedagogical practices should be emphasized, and when, how, and by whom evaluative activities should be incorporated, must be understood in relation to ideas about what constitutes a good or rewarding life (Beyer & Apple, in press; Macdonald, 1975). …

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a new method, called the youth charter, for promoting adolescent self-identification with a coherent set of moral standards, which is based on the idea that identity formation during adolescence is a process of forging a coherent and systematic sense of self.
Abstract: Studies of adolescent conduct have found that both exemplary and antisocial behaviour can be predicted by the manner in which adolescents integrate moral concerns into their theories and descriptions of self. These findings have led many developmentalists to conclude that moral identity‐‐in contrast to moral judgement or reflection alone‐‐plays a powerful role in mediating social conduct. Moreover, developmental theory and research have shown that identity formation during adolescence is a process of forging a coherent and systematic sense of self. Despite these well‐founded conclusions, many moral education programmes fail to engage a young person's sense of self, focus exclusively on judgement and reflection and make little or no attempt to establish coherence with other formative influences in a young person's life. The authors propose a new method, called “the youth charter”, for promoting adolescent self‐identification with a coherent set of moral standards.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that a functional model of moral judgement and moral behaviour derived from evolutionary theory may supply a better account of real-life morality than the Kohlbergian model, which often involves resolving hypothetical moral dilemmas like those on Kohlblberg's test, more often involve promoting good social relations, upholding favorable self-concepts and justifying self-interested behaviour.
Abstract: People rarely make the types of moral judgement evoked by Kohlberg's test when they make moral decisions in their everyday lives. The anticipated consequences of real‐life moral decisions, to self and to others, may influence moral choices and the structure of moral reasoning. To understand real‐life moral judgement we must attend to its functions, which, although they occasionally involve resolving hypothetical moral dilemmas like those on Kohlberg's test, more often involve promoting good social relations, upholding favourable self‐concepts and justifying self‐interested behaviour. We argue that a functional model of moral judgement and moral behaviour derived from evolutionary theory may supply a better account of real‐life morality than the Kohlbergian model.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that moral reasoning is premised upon more comprehensive worldviews and it is suggested that moral behaviors in part serve to maintain these worldviews, and that a moral behavior is predicated on a worldview.
Abstract: In this article, it is argued that moral reasoning is premised upon more comprehensive worldviews, and it is suggested that moral behaviors in part serve to maintain these worldviews. A worldview is d

Book
28 Nov 1997
TL;DR: The manifest and scientific images of morality: how can the authors integrate their ordinary and scientifically based views of moral agency integrate into a Personalistic and Naturalistic View of Agency.
Abstract: Part I. Moral Agency and Scientific Naturalism: 1. Understanding moral agency: what is a scientific naturalist view of moral agency? Part II. The Biological Bases of Moral Agency: 2. Evolution and moral agency: can evolution endow us with moral capacities? 3. Evolution and moral agency: Does Evolution endow us with moral capacities? 4. Developmental biology and psychology and moral agency: how do our biologically-based moral capacities develop? Part III. The Psychological Bases of moral Agency: 5. Behavioral psychology and moral agency: how do we learn to behave morally? 6. Social cognitive psychology and moral agency: how do we learn to act morally? 7. The neurophysiological bases of moral capacities: do the neurosciences have room for moral agents? Part IV. A Scientific Naturalist Account of Moral Agency: 8. The adequacy of moral beliefs, motivations and actions: how can biological and psychological explanations serve as justifications? 9. Moral ontology: what is the ontological status of moral values? Part V. Integrating a Personalistic and Naturalistic View of Agency: 10. The manifest and scientific images of morality: how can we integrate our ordinary and scientifically based views of moral agency?

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a discussion of how the phenomenon of asynchrony manifests in moral development of gifted children and the paradigms these children develop to give form to their moral concerns is presented.
Abstract: Starting from an early age, many gifted children show evidence of moral sensitivity. These children tend to care about others, want to relieve pain and suffering or show advanced ability to think about such abstract ideas as justice and fairness. The beginnings of moral sensitivity are found in the development of empathy between child and care‐taking parent. This is also the basis of identity formation and development of the self. This article also includes a discussion of how the phenomenon of asynchrony manifests in moral development of gifted children and the paradigms these children develop to give form to their moral concerns.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors respond to Patricia Werhane's 1994 Ruffin Lecture address, "Moral Imagination and the Search for Ethical Decision-making in Management,” using institutional theory as an analytical framework to explore conditions that either inhibit or promote moral imagination in organizational problem-solving.
Abstract: This essay responds to Patricia Werhane’s 1994 Ruffin Lecture address, “Moral Imagination and the Search for Ethical Decision-making in Management,” using institutional theory as an analytical framework to explore conditions that either inhibit or promote moral imagination in organizational problem-solving. Implications of the analysis for managing organizational change and for business ethics theory development are proposed.

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose new ways of linking Smith's moral theories to his economics, stressing that for Smith, a moral science of economics is not a contradiction in terms, and that moral questions actually lie at the heart of positive and normative economic analysis.
Abstract: This insightful book offers an original approach to the moral philosophy and economics of Adam Smith. The author proposes new ways of linking Smith’s moral theories to his economics, stressing that for Smith, a moral science of economics is not a contradiction in terms, and that moral questions actually lie at the heart of positive and normative economic analysis.

Book
15 Aug 1997
TL;DR: Introduction Administrative Work and Quick Fixes Values Past Views and Recent History Values Philosophical Context Moral Valuation Moral Practice Individuals and Organizations Teaching Consequence Analysis.
Abstract: Introduction Administrative Work and Quick Fixes Values Past Views and Recent History Values Philosophical Context Moral Valuation Moral Practice Individuals and Organizations Teaching Consequence Analysis Additional Vignettes and Cases


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, the authors found that principled reasoning strongly outranked deference to law or rules as their preferred basis for decision making in ambiguous moral situations, and this reinforced the assumption that if principled reasoning could ever guide public decision making, it would emerge strongly to guide those who assumed the mantle of public office in the new regime in Poland.
Abstract: Poland's transition from communism to democracy was marked by rhetoric that expressed democratic principles as the basis for organizing political life. Given the fundamentally moral message of the radical transformation throughout Eastern Europe, we would expect officials assuming office in these times to be strongly motivated by ethical principles as a basis for decision making. Arguably, office seekers would be idealists who believed that the principled rhetoric of the revolution could come to fruition in governmental actions. And this might be particularly true for elected officials who were obliged to organize beliefs based on principle into a political platform. Furthermore, we would expect the new decision makers in the initial stages to shun mindless deference to established rules, since their entire political context was marked by a rejection of established rules and the absence of a recent tradition that would provide a cultural framework for obedience to the law. In this context one might assume that only the former Communist Party officials who survived the transition in government would hold fast to the protection of the law as the basis for decision making in ambiguous moral situations. A focus group held with public administrators in Warsaw in the fall of 1990 reinforced these inferences. When we asked these officials to reflect on how they would handle an ethical dilemma in the workplace, we found that principled reasoning strongly outranked deference to law or rules as their preferred basis for decision making. This reinforced our assumption that if principled reasoning could ever guide public decision making, it would emerge strongly to guide those who assumed the mantle of public office in the new regime in Poland. With this set of expectations we undertook a study of the systems of moral reasoning which public officials in newly democratic Poland employed as they resolved ethical dilemmas in their work lives. Since most of our studies in the United States had focused on local officials, we held that focus in Poland. However, though our U.S. studies (Stewart and Sprinthall, 1994) included only appointed public administrators, the fluid political situation in Poland warranted including a comparison group of elected Polish local officials as well. The Background Though public administration literature is rich with analyses of codes (Chandler, 1983; Plant, 1994), climates (Bonczek, 1992; Bonczek and Menzel, 1994), and criminal sanctions (Doig, 1983; Doig, Phillips and Mason, 1984) as they relate to ethical decision making, research on individuals and their ethical choices in public office settings is not extensive. We do know much about how people generally reason in moral situations (Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1979, 1986) and that these reasoning patterns hold across cultures (Snarey, 1985). Working with Lawrence Kohlberg's stage model of moral maturity, we also know that there is a substantial degree of consistency between individual behavior and the moral judgment stage particularly at the more advanced levels (Blasi, 1980). Further, we know that the moral development research carried out in Poland since 1984 has confirmed the universal developmental trend toward principled reasoning determined by level of education and cognitive ability (Jasinska-Kania, 1988, 1989). In addition the research of Lind, Grocholweska, and Langer (1987) in Austria, West Germany, and Poland has further supported the cross-cultural validity of Kohlberg's moral development theory. However, only two empirical studies were relevant to a focus on public officials and their traits, beliefs, personal choices, and actions in relation to their ethical choices. Bowman (1990) has studied perceptions regarding ethics in society and government as well as overall organizational approaches to moral standards in a sample of 750 federal, state, and local officials who were members of ASPA in 1989. Stewart and Sprinthall have conducted studies of moral reasoning among North Carolina (1994) and Florida (1992) public administrators using an instrument built on the moral development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg. …

Journal ArticleDOI
Alan Hunt1
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the originality of Gramsci's discussion of Fordism as moral regulation and draw lessons from both the strengths and weaknesses of the treatment for our understanding of the part played by projects of moral regulation in contemporary social issues.
Abstract: Today we are witnessing a significant moralization of social conflicts; projects of moral regulation abound over pornography, drugs, child abuse and many other issues. It is therefore pertinent to examine the nature and mechanisms of moral regulation. It is important to take account of the fact that moral regulation does not only involve a specific moral arena, but rather is a component of all fields of social relations. For this reason Antonio Gramsci's account of `Fordism' is significant because he focuses attention on the part played by moral and sexual regulation in the social construction of the new worker. This paper explores the originality of Gramsci's discussion of Fordism as moral regulation. It draws lessons from both the strengths and weaknesses of Gramsci's treatment for our understanding of the part played by projects of moral regulation in contemporary social issues.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors used children's philosophy as a hermeneutic tool to assess the morally relevant values and attitudes that children and adolescents hold with respect to nature and the patterns of reasoning with which they are expressed.
Abstract: Traditional moral philosophy, developmental psychology and moral education have generally been concerned with relationships between human beings. However, moral philosophy has gradually expanded to include plants, animals and ecosystems as legitimate moral objects, and aesthetics has rediscovered nature as an object of consideration. Thus it seems appropriate to begin to include this sphere in moral education and corresponding research as well. In this paper we wish to report on an investigation we have begun using children's philosophy as a hermeneutic tool to assess the morally relevant values and attitudes that children and adolescents hold with respect to nature and the patterns of reasoning with which they are expressed. In the first part of our presentation we will outline current positions in environmental ethics and aesthetics which provide a theoretical framework for such an investigation and the problems they present. Subsequently the difficulties involved with applying contemporary the...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined three approaches for understanding perceptions of ethics: moral philosophy, cognitive moral development, and ethical value systems, and found that the moral philosophy can be considered distinct entities, but the common underlying theme between the approaches was not as predicted.
Abstract: This paper examined three approaches for understanding perceptions of ethics: moral philosophies, cognitive moral development, and ethical value systems. First, the dimensionality of the moral philosophy approach was examined. Next, an attempt was made to integrate the models. Finally, each of the model's various components were used in a regression equation to isolate the best predictors of ethicality. Results indicated that the moral philosophies can be considered distinct entities, but the common underlying theme between the approaches was not as predicted. Also, individuals used a variety of approaches, not always the same ones, to determine the ethicalness of situations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the virtue approach can be distinguished from other main perspectives on moral education, in particular from the so-called cognitive-developmental approach (including the just community approach), and only the definition that refers to an ethics of virtue will have the required differentiating capacity.
Abstract: There is a lot of talking and writing on virtues and education nowadays. In spite of this, a clear and convincing account of the defining characteristics of the virtue approach to moral education is still lacking. This paper suggests and discusses three different definitions of such an approach. With reference to each definition it is examined whether the virtue approach can be distinguished from other main perspectives on moral education, in particular from the so-called cognitive-developmental approach (including the just community approach). It is argued that only the definition that refers to an ethics of virtue will have the required differentiating capacity. Consequently, only on the basis of this definition can the virtue approach be regarded as a qualitatively new development in research on moral education.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper argued that moral regulation should not be seen as a monolithic project, as merely action by and for the State, nor as activity by the ruling elite only, but as a form of social control based on changing the identity of the regulated.
Abstract: Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer introduced the concept of moral regulation to contemporary sociological debate in their historical sociology of English State formation, The Great Arch (1985). In their work they fuse Durkheimian and Foucauldian analysis with a basic Marxist theory. However, this framework gives too limited a perspective to their analysis. I suggest that moral regulation should not be seen as a monolithic project, as merely action by and for the State, nor as activity by the ruling elite only. It should be seen as a form of social control based on changing the identity of the regulated. Its object is what Weber calls Lebensfuhrung, which refers to both the ethos and the action constituting a way of life. The means of moral regulation are persuasion, education, and enlightenment, which distinguishes it from other forms of social control. Analyzing the social relations of moral regulation provides a useful perspective on this form of social action.