Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 2001"

The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

Abstract: Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent than rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.

An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment

Abstract: The long-standing rationalist tradition in moral psychology emphasizes the role of reason in moral judgment. A more recent trend places increased emphasis on emotion. Although both reason and emotion are likely to play important roles in moral judgment, relatively little is known about their neural correlates, the nature of their interaction, and the factors that modulate their respective behavioral influences in the context of moral judgment. In two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using moral dilemmas as probes, we apply the methods of cognitive neuroscience to the study of moral judgment. We argue that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment. These results may shed light on some puzzling patterns in moral judgment observed by contemporary philosophers.

Is gratitude a moral affect

Abstract: Gratitude is conceptualized as a moral affect that is analogous to other moral emotions such as empathy and guilt. Gratitude has 3 functions that can be conceptualized as morally relevant: (a) a moral barometer function (i.e., it is a response to the perception that one has been the beneficiary of another person's moral actions); (b) a moral motive function (i.e., it motivates the grateful person to behave prosocially toward the benefactor and other people); and (c) a moral reinforcer function (i.e., when expressed, it encourages benefactors to behave morally in the future). The personality and social factors that are associated with gratitude are also consistent with a conceptualization of gratitude as an affect that is relevant to people's cognitions and behaviors in the moral domain.

Education in the Moral Domain

Abstract: This book brings together the results of 25 years of research on the domain theory of social cognitive development. On the basis of that research - which shows that morality is a domain distinct from other social values - the author provides concrete suggestions for creating a moral classroom climate, dealing with student discipline, and integrating moral values within the curriculum. Among questions addressed are: Is morality a set of rules we acquire like any other? Are there universal aspects to morality, or is it culture specific? Is there such a thing as moral character? How best can teachers make use of our knowledge about children's moral and social growth in their everyday classroom practices? Integrated answers to these questions result in a comprehensive approach that does not reduce moral education to a process of induction or inculcation, but rather harnesses children's intrinsic motivation to comprehend and master their social worlds.

The emergence of social cognitive neuroscience.

Abstract: Social cognitive neuroscience is an emerging interdisciplinary field of research that seeks to understand phenomena in terms of interactions between 3 levels of analysis: the social level, which is concerned with the motivational and social factors that influence behavior and experience; the cognitive level, which is concerned with the information-processing mechanisms that give rise to social-level phenomena; and the neural level, which is concerned with the brain mechanisms that instantiate cognitive-level processes. The social cognitive neuroscience approach entails conducting studies and constructing theories that make reference to all 3 levels and contrasts with traditional social psychological and cognitive neuroscientific research that primarily makes reference to 2 levels. The authors present an introduction to and analysis of the field by reviewing current research and providing guidelines and suggested directions for future work.

Dimensions of Moral Intensity and Ethical Decision Making: An Empirical Study

Abstract: Moral intensity is a construct that relates to issues in terms of their perceived moral significance. Individuals' perceptions of moral intensity should impact their recognition of issues as posing moral dilemmas and should also affect ethical judgments and behavioral intentions regarding issues. This study examined the relationship between 4 dimensions of moral intensity and the ethical decision-making process. Two work-related actions were presented to respondents, who then completed measures of the 4 dimensions of moral intensity, whether the actions posed an ethical issue, ethical judgments regarding the actions, and the likelihood that they would engage in the actions. Results indicate that moral intensity dimensions were associated with individuals' ethical decisions. Social consensus and seriousness of consequences were particularly important influences on the ethical decision-making process.

Why Don't Moral People Act Morally? Motivational Considerations

Abstract: Failure of moral people to act morally is usually attributed to either learning deficits or situational pressures. We believe that it is also important to consider the nature of moral motivation. Is the goal actually to be moral (moral integrity) or only to appear moral while, if possible, avoiding the cost of being moral (moral hypocrisy)? Do people initially intend to be moral, only to surrender this goal when the costs of being moral become clear (overpowered integrity)? We have found evidence of both moral hypocrisy and overpowered integrity. Each can lead ostensibly moral people to act immorally. These findings raise important questions for future research on the role of moral principles as guides to behavior.

Investigating Influences on Managers' Moral Reasoning The Impact of Context and Personal and Organizational Factors

Abstract: Managers often face situations that challenge their ability to reason morally. Avariety of factors, including the issue itself and personal and organizational influences, may affect their responses...

Education as a Moral Practice

Abstract: The interest in moral education has focused largely on the teaching of morality or on nurturing moral qualities and virtues or on the "moral atmosphere" of the school; but little, comparatively speaking, has been written about education itself as essentially a moral practice. Failure, in this respect, has damaging results. First, the practice of education goes adrift from its moral roots — and serves particular ends such as economic well-being or citizenship as conceived by those in power. Secondly, the programmes of moral or personal and social education are isolated from the moral context in which they make sense. These issues are addressed in the lecture.

the role of presidential rhetoric in the creation of a moral panic: reagan, bush, and the war on drugs

Abstract: Although it is known that state initiatives can help produce moral panics, the role policy rhetoric assumes in creating, sustaining, and terminating moral panics has not been theoretically addressed. This article offers a typology of drug policies and illustrates how each is used at varying stages of a moral panic. It is argued that moral panics begin when proactive and punitive statements are used in combination. Moral panics subside when reactive and rehabilitative rhetorical statements are issued concurrently. The argument is empirically tested by analyzing the presidential addresses of the Reagan and Bush administrations for drug-related statements. Regression analysis, analysis of variance, and crosstabular analyses are used to test several hypotheses derived from the theoretical discussion. The empirical evidence supports the theoretical discussion and the constructionist perspective of social problems.

Morality without foundations : a defense of ethical contextualism

Abstract: Morality Without Foundations investigates fundamental metaethical questions about the meaning, truth, and justification of moral thought and discourse. Mark Timmons maintains that all versions of descriptivism in ethics, particularly certain accounts of moral realism, fail. He argues instead that a correct metaethical theory should embrace some version of non-descriptivism. Timmons defends what he calls "assertoric non-descriptivism" which, unlike traditional non-descriptivist views, holds that moral sentences are typically used to make genuine assertions. In defending this view, he exploits contextual semantics, providing him with the semantic flexibility to develop an irrealist account of moral discourse. Timmons goes on to support a contextualist moral epistemology, completing his overall version of contextualism in ethics. Like his foundationalist rivals, Timmons recognizes that there are moral beliefs that are epistemically basic in providing a basis for the justification of non-basic moral beliefs. Yet, he agrees with the coherentist in maintaining that there are no intrinsically justified beliefs that can serve as a single foundation for a system of moral knowledge. Timmons ultimately finds that regresses of justification of moral belief end with contextually basic beliefs-moral beliefs which, in the relevant context, are responsibly held, but in other contexts might not be suitable as regress stoppers. Timmons' novel defense of morality without foundations offers provocative reading for philosophers working in the areas of ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. Yet, written with the student in mind, his lucid presentation of difficult ideas makes this book accessible to students and newcomers to the field of metaethics.

Do advanced moral reasoners also show wisdom? Linking moral reasoning and wisdom-related knowledge and judgement

Abstract: Wisdom and morality are both discussed as developmental ideals. They are often associated in theoretical contexts but the nature of their empirical relation is still an open question. We hypothesised that moral reasoning (one facet of morality), would be related to wisdom-related knowledge and judgement, but that the two represent different facets of high level psychological functioning. A sample of 220 adults ranging in age from 20 to 87 years completed measures of wisdom-related performance, moral reasoning, and a battery of cognitive and personality measures. As predicted, moral reasoning was positively associated with wisdom-related performance, although we also found evidence for divergent validity of these two constructs. This association was mediated by person characteristics (e.g., personality, intelligence, and additional measures). In addition, as predicted by a threshold model, very high levels of wisdom-related performance were unlikely among those with very low moral reasoning performance. In...

Conceptual role semantics for moral terms

Abstract: One of the central questions of metaethics is semantical. An answer to this semantical question would be an account of the meaning of moral statements. There are three main approaches to this semantical question that are most familiar in contemporary metaethics: (i) noncognitivism or expressivism, (ii) noncircular conceptual analysis, and (iii) the causal theory of reference. In this paper, I shall present a new approach to this question, an approach that I call "conceptual role semantics for moral terms." In conclusion, I shall try to indicate briefly why my approach is preferable to those three more familiar alternatives. First, however, I shall say something about this semantical question, and why it matters to the rest of metaethics.

Determinants of moral reasoning : Sex role orientation, gender, and academic factors

Abstract: Mixed results regarding the role of gender in moral reasoning prompted an investigation of an alternative characteristic that may be more influential in the process: sex role orientation. We present an empirical assessment of the relationship between an individual’s moral reasoning level and his/her sex role orientation, gender, and several academic factors. Our results indicate that sex role orientation is not related to moral reasoning level. Gender is related to moral reasoning in our study, women reasoning at higher levels than men. We found a positive relationship between education and moral reasoning level, and moral reasoning levels differed across academic institutions. Our results also show business students have lower moral reasoning levels than students in other fields, although this result did not reach statistical significance.

Moral Testimony and its Authority

Abstract: A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person's moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person's actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes fails to meet this requirement when she relies on another person's moral testimony, and so there are moral limits on such reliance.

Moral Text Comprehension: Implications for Education and Research.

Abstract: Several studies are reviewed that examine differences in moral schema development using techniques intermediate between measuring implicit knowledge (such as with the Dee ning Issues Test) and explicit knowledge (such as with the Moral Judgment Interview). Findings include signie cant differences in the comprehension of moral narratives based on age/education and on level of expertise. Also, intended moral themes in stories are not understood by younger children.

The Questionable Use of Moral Development Theory in Studies of Business Ethics: Discussion and Empirical Findings

Abstract: The topic of the article is how moral development theory can enlighten the understanding of ethical behaviour in business. It discusses previous research on the subject, and reports an empirical study of academics (engineers and business economists with a master degree) working in the private sector in Norway.

Teaching health care ethics: the importance of moral sensitivity for moral reasoning

Abstract: My discussion reflects on the nature of moral sensitivity. The inquiry is guided by a pedagogical concern: if the goal of teaching practical-minded nurses about health care ethics is to develop the capacity to be aware of ethical implications of certain acts, events and treatments in the health care setting as well as the skills to resolve ethical dilemmas, it seems important to have a clear sense of what it means to be morally sensitive. How, for example, does a health care worker come to recognize in a particular and institutionally defined situation his or her moral responsibilities towards the other? What exactly is moral sensitivity? Is it something that academic philosophers can teach? I argue that moral sensitivity is a capacity for relatedness indispensable to moral theorizing that can be either cultivated or undermined and therefore ought not to be ignored by educators nor those responsible for ethically weighted decision-making situations.

The Directional Effects of Discussion on Auditors' Moral Reasoning*

Abstract: Auditors' professional judgements are typically made following a discussion of contentious issues with other auditors (Gibbins and Mason 1988). These discussions may be with others at various levels in the hierarchy of the audit firm, with informal discussion with peers often taking place prior to formal discussions with audit supervisors (see, e.g., Solomon 1987). This study uses an experiment, involving 286 public accountants, to consider how discussion with peers may influence auditors' subsequent resolution of realistic audit-specific moral dilemmas. Auditors were asked to prescriptively discuss how an accountant ideally should resolve a moral dilemma, or to deliberatively discuss how an accountant actually would resolve a moral dilemma. The results showed that auditors have higher moral reasoning scores after prescriptive discussion with peers and lower moral reasoning scores after deliberative discussion with peers. Thus, the study findings point to the significance of discussion of contentious dilemmas with peers and the importance of type of discussion for predicting and explaining auditors' moral reasoning. More specifically, the results indicate that discussion with peers may provide information and/or signal what is important and acceptable to the resolution of a moral dilemma, which facilitates transformation of an auditor's moral reasoning. This suggests the importance of informal mechanisms, such as peer discussion, as part of the social control system in audit firms.

Agency and responsibility

Abstract: 1. Introduction: Moral Psychology and Common Sense 2. Classical Theories of Reasons and Motivations 3. Humean Accounts of Reason and Motivation: Davidson and Decision Theory 4. Wanting and Valuing 5. A Taxonomy of Agent-Control 6. Moral Failures and Moral Responsibility: Recklessness, Weakness, Compulsion 7. Moral Failure and Moral Responsibility: The Problem of Evildoers Bibliography, Index

Values: Psychological Perspectives

Abstract: Values are internalized cognitive structures that guide choices by evoking a sense of basic principles of right and wrong (e.g., moral values), as well as priorities (e.g., personal achievement vs. group good). Values can be studied at the individual level like other cognitive concepts, but are also amenable to social or group level analyses—in terms of the norms, priorities, and guidelines set up by societies, cultures, and other social groupings. When mobilized or made salient, individual values are linked with behavior and choices. Cultures may be said to provide concrete and social embodiments of values.

Theory, Literature, and Moral Considerations

Abstract: In 1967, a group of prominent African writers met in Stockholm, Sweden, to discuss the role of the writer in the modern African nation. We were still in the early days of decolonization, and although disenchantment with what was later to be characterized as a compromised post? coloniality was beginning to enter literary texts, writers and intellectuals still believed that their works and words had an innate and functional

Moral reasoning and achievement motivation in sport: a qualitative inquiry.

Abstract: This study examined the relationship between moral reasoning and achievement motivation in sport Eight male under-21 year old rugby union players were interviewed three times across a six-month rugby season During these interviews individuals were presented with a series of four moral dilemmas and were asked open-ended questions with regard to their moral reasoning and achievement goals in each dilemma Results revealed that an individual achievement goal orientation profile appeared to influence the level of moral reasoning used Individuals whose goal profiles were dominated by an ego orientation tended to use a less mature level of moral reasoning that was influenced by self-centeredness and a win-at-all-costs attitude In contrast, individuals whose goal profiles consisted of a combination of task and ego goal orientations tended to use more mature levels of moral reasoning Their moral reasoning was characterized by a concern for all the people involved in the moral dilemma However, all participants' moral reasoning was influenced by situational variables such as significant others The results of this study complement previous quantitative research and indicate that future research should more fully explore the interactions between individual differences (ie, goal profiles) and situational factors (ie, motivational climate) on moral reasoning in sport

On Knowing the ‘Why’: Particularism and Moral Theory

Abstract: If particularism is right, the broad moral claims we make are usually riddled with exceptions. But such generalizations can still be a useful, even necessary part of moral life. They help us show what we should do, and they are essential for understanding why we should do it.

Moral Facts and Best Explanations

Abstract: Do moral properties figure in the best explanatory account of the world? According to a popular realist argument, if they do, then they earn their ontological rights, for only properties that figure in the best explanation of experience are real properties. Although this realist strategy has been widely influential—not just in metaethics, but also in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science—no one has actually made the case that moral realism requires: namely, that moral facts really will figure in the best explanatory picture of the world. This issue may have been neglected in part because the influential dialectic on moral explanations between philosophers Gilbert Harman and Nicholas Sturgeon has focused debate on whether moral facts figure in relevant explanations. Yet as others have noted, explanatory relevance is irrelevant when it comes to realism: after all, according to the popular realist argument, it is inference to the best explanation of experience that is supposed to confer ontological rights. I propose to ask, then, the relevant question about moral explanations: should we think that moral properties will figure in the best explanatory account of the world?

Sport, Moral Development, and the Role of the Teacher: Implications for Research and Moral Education.

Abstract: Sport, when seen as a valued human practice, is a form of moral education. In particular, the virtues, which help characterize and sustain sport as a practice, are central to what it is to be morally educated. This paper underpins this general position further by pointing out the inadequacies of some empirically based models in their approach to a study of moral development, especially when observed from the perspective of virtue theory and in particular, the Aristotelian concepts of phronesis and habituation. The latter approach, it is argued, provides criteria that is more complete as a basis for the formulation of a new model of what constitutes the nature of the moral so that it can be examined in a less limited way. It also provides a more satisfactory foundation for the teaching of moral education in schools. The last section is concerned with the role of the teacher of sport in this endeavor.