Showing papers on "Social cognitive theory of morality published in 2010"

Moral Self-Licensing: When Being Good Frees Us to Be Bad

Abstract: Past good deeds can liberate individuals to engage in behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or otherwise problematic, behaviors that they would otherwise avoid for fear of feeling or appearing immoral. We review research on this moral self-licensing effect in the domains of political correctness, prosocial behavior, and consumer choice. We also discuss remaining theoretical tensions in the literature: Do good deeds reframe bad deeds (moral credentials) or merely balance them out (moral credits)? When does past behavior liberate and when does it constrain? Is self-licensing primarily for others’ benefit (self-presentational) or is it also a way for people to reassure themselves that they are moral people? Finally, we propose avenues for future research that could begin to address these unanswered questions. How do individuals face the ethical uncertainties of social life? When under the threat that their next action might be (or appear to be) morally dubious, individuals can derive confidence from their past moral behavior, such that an impeccable track record increases their propensity to engage in otherwise suspect actions. Such moral self-licensing (Monin & Miller, 2001) occurs when past moral behavior makes people more likely to do potentially immoral things without worrying about feeling or appearing immoral. We argue that moral self-licensing occurs because good deeds make people feel secure in their moral self-regard. For example, when people are confident that their past behavior demonstrates compassion, generosity, or a lack of prejudice, they are more likely to act in morally dubious ways without fear of feeling heartless, selfish, or bigoted. In this article, we review the state of research on moral self-licensing, first by documenting in some detail empirical demonstrations of self-licensing and kindred phenomena, then by analyzing remaining questions about the model, and finally by sketching out directions for future research to cast light on these unresolved issues.

Urban America as a Context for the Development of Moral Identity in Adolescence

Abstract: Moral identity, defined as a self-consistent commitment to lines of action benefiting others, is described in the contexts of adolescence and poor, urban neighborhoods. A model of moral identity development is proposed. According to the model, stable characteristics of the individual and the individual's family, in conjunction with social attitudes, self-conceptions, and opportunities for the exploration of prosocial action, influence the development of moral identity. Analyses from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth provide support for the model, and demonstrate that urban poverty is associated with few opportunities for development of moral identity. We argue that the provision of these opportunities should be given a high priority both to foster good individual development and as a means for increasing social capital in neighborhoods.

The Psychology of Moral Conviction

Abstract: This paper reviews current theory and research that indicates that attitudes held with strong moral conviction (‘moral mandates’) represent something psychologically distinct from other constructs (e.g., attitude strength, partisanship, or religiosity), and that variance in moral conviction has important social and political consequences, such as increased intolerance of attitudinally dissimilar others, difficulties in conflict resolution, increased political participation, willingness to accept violent means to achieve preferred ends, strong ties to positive and negative emotions, and inoculation against the usual pressures to obey authorities, obey the law, or to conform to majority group influence. The normative implications of these findings are both reassuring (moral convictions can protect against obedience to potentially malevolent authorities) and terrifying (moral convictions are associated with rejection of the rule of law, and can provide a motivational foundation for violent protest and acts of terrorism). Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

Pro-environmental behavior

Abstract: The determinants of individual behaviors that provide shared environmental benefits are a longstanding theme in social science research. Alternative behavioral models yield markedly different predictions and policy recommendations. This paper reviews and compares the literatures from two disciplines that appear to be moving toward a degree of convergence. In social psychology, moral theories of pro-environmental behavior have focused on the influence of personal moral norms while recognizing that external factors, such as costs and incentives, ultimately limit the strength of the norm-behavior relationship. Rational choice models, such as the theory of planned behavior in social psychology and the theories of voluntary provision of public goods in economics, have sought to incorporate the effects of personal norms and to measure their importance in explaining behaviors, such as recycling and the demand for green products. This paper explores the relationship between these approaches and their implications for the theory and practice of ecological economics.

The Role of the Human Prefrontal Cortex in Social Cognition and Moral Judgment

Abstract: Results from functional magnetic resonance imaging and lesion studies indicate that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) is essential for successful navigation through a complex social world inundated with intricate norms and moral values. This review examines regions of the PFC that are critical for implicit and explicit social cognitive and moral judgment processing. Considerable overlap between regions active when individuals engage in social cognition or assess moral appropriateness of behaviors is evident, underscoring the similarity between social cognitive and moral judgment processes in general. Findings are interpreted within the framework of structured event complex theory, providing a broad organizing perspective for how activity in PFC neural networks facilitates social cognition and moral judgment. We emphasize the dynamic flexibility in neural circuits involved in both implicit and explicit processing and discuss the likelihood that neural regions thought to uniquely underlie both processes heavily interact in response to different contextual primes.

Moral satisficing: Rethinking moral behavior as bounded rationality

Abstract: What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: Behavior needs to be studied in social groups as well as in isolation, in natural environments as well as in labs. It also has implications for moral policy: Only by accepting the fact that behavior is a function of both mind and environmental structures can realistic prescriptive means of achieving moral goals be developed.

Robot rights? Towards a social-relational justification of moral consideration

Abstract: Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach which incurs several problems. In response to these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual resource in order to be able to grant some degree of moral consideration to some intelligent social robots: it sketches a novel argument for moral consideration based on social relations. It is shown that to further develop this argument we need to revise our existing ontological and social-political frameworks. It is suggested that we need a social ecology, which may be developed by engaging with Western ecology and Eastern worldviews. Although this relational turn raises many difficult issues and requires more work, this paper provides a rough outline of an alternative approach to moral consideration that can assist us in shaping our relations to intelligent robots and, by extension, to all artificial and biological entities that appear to us as more than instruments for our human purposes.

Moral reasoning: hints and allegations.

Abstract: Recent research in moral psychology highlights the role of emotion and intuition in moral judgment. In the wake of these findings, the role and significance of moral reasoning remain uncertain. In this article, we distinguish among different kinds of moral reasoning and review evidence suggesting that at least some kinds of moral reasoning play significant roles in moral judgment, including roles in abandoning moral intuitions in the absence of justifying reasons, applying both deontological and utilitarian moral principles, and counteracting automatic tendencies toward bias that would otherwise dominate behavior. We argue that little is known about the psychology of moral reasoning and that it may yet prove to be a potent social force.

Moral Education in an Age of Globalization

Abstract: Care theory is used to describe an approach to global ethics and moral education. After a brief introduction to care ethics, the theory is applied to global ethics. The paper concludes with a discussion of moral education for personal, political, and global domains.

Gender-related differences in moral judgments

Abstract: The moral sense is among the most complex aspects of the human mind. Despite substantial evidence confirming gender-related neurobiological and behavioral differences, and psychological research suggesting gender specificities in moral development, whether these differences arise from cultural effects or are innate remains unclear. In this study, we investigated the role of gender, education (general education and health education) and religious belief (Catholic and non-Catholic) on moral choices by testing 50 men and 50 women with a moral judgment task. Whereas we found no differences between the two genders in utilitarian responses to non-moral dilemmas and to impersonal moral dilemmas, men gave significantly more utilitarian answers to personal moral (PM) dilemmas (i.e., those courses of action whose endorsement involves highly emotional decisions). Cultural factors such as education and religion had no effect on performance in the moral judgment task. These findings suggest that the cognitive-emotional processes involved in evaluating PM dilemmas differ in men and in women, possibly reflecting differences in the underlying neural mechanisms. Gender-related determinants of moral behavior may partly explain gender differences in real-life involving power management, economic decision-making, leadership and possibly also aggressive and criminal behaviors.

Children's interpretive understanding, moral judgments, and emotion attributions: Relations to social behaviour

Abstract: The study investigated interpretive understanding, moral judgments, and emotion attributions in relation to social behaviour in a sample of 59 5-year-old, 123 7-year-old, and 130 9-year-old children. Interpretive understanding was assessed by two tasks measuring children's understanding of ambiguous situations. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were measured using two moral rule transgressions. Social behaviour was assessed using teachers' ratings of aggressive and prosocial behaviour. Aggressive behaviour was positively related to interpretive understanding and negatively related to moral reasoning. Prosocial behaviour was positively associated with attribution of fear. Moral judgments and emotion attributions were related, depending on age. Interpretive understanding was unrelated to moral judgments and emotion attributions. The findings are discussed in regard to the role of interpretive understanding and moral and affective knowledge in understanding children's social behaviour.

The Effect of Empathy in Environmental Moral Reasoning

Abstract: Based on Batson’s Model of Altruism, in the present work it is argued that moral reasoning about the environment (number of moral reasons given for pro-environmental behaviors) can be improved by m...

Exemplarist virtue theory

Abstract: In this essay I outline a radical kind of virtue theory I call ‘‘exemplarism,’’ which is foundational in structure but which is grounded in exemplars of moral goodness, direct reference to which anchors all the moral concepts in the theory. I compare several different kinds of moral theory by the way they relate the concepts of the good, a right act, and a virtue. In the

Automatic ethics: the effects of implicit assumptions and contextual cues on moral behavior.

Abstract: We empirically examine the reflexive or automatic aspects of moral decision making. To begin, we develop and validate a measure of an individual's implicit assumption regarding the inherent morality of business. Then, using an in-basket exercise, we demonstrate that an implicit assumption that business is inherently moral impacts day-to-day business decisions and interacts with contextual cues to shape moral behavior. Ultimately, we offer evidence supporting a characterization of employees as reflexive interactionists: moral agents whose automatic decision-making processes interact with the environment to shape their moral behavior.

Moral Identity in Psychopathy

Abstract: Several scholars have recognized the limitations of theories of moral reasoning in explaining moral behavior. They have argued that moral behavior may also be influenced by moral identity, or how central morality is to one’s sense of self. This idea has been supported by findings that people who exemplify moral behavior tend to place more importance on moral traits when defining their self-concepts (Colby & Damon, 1995). This paper takes the next step of examining individual variation in a construct highly associated with immoral behavior — psychopathy. In Study 1, we test the hypothesis that individuals with a greater degree of psychopathic traits have a weaker moral identity. Within a large online sample, we found that individuals who scored higher on a measure of psychopathic traits were less likely to base their self-concepts on moral traits. In Study 2, we test whether this reduced sense of moral identity can be attributed to differences in moral judgment, which is another factor that could influence immoral behavior. Our results indicated that the reduced sense of moral identity among more psychopathic individuals was independent of variation in moral judgment. These results suggest that individuals with psychopathic traits may display immoral behavior partially because they do not construe their personal identities in moral terms.

The Costs and Benefits of Calculation and Moral Rules

Abstract: There has been a recent upsurge of research on moral judgment and decision making. One important issue with this body of work concerns the relative advantages of calculating costs and benefits versus adherence to moral rules. The general tenor of recent research suggests that adherence to moral rules is associated with systematic biases and that systematic cost-benefit analysis is a normatively superior decision strategy. This article queries both the merits of cost-benefit analyses and the shortcomings of moral rules. We argue that outside the very narrow domain in which consequences can be unambiguously anticipated, it is not at all clear that calculation processes optimize outcomes. In addition, there are good reasons to believe that following moral rules can lead to superior consequences in certain contexts. More generally, different modes of decision making can be seen as adaptations to particular environments.

Moral panic and social theory: Beyond the heuristic

Abstract: Chas Critcher has recently conceptualized moral panic as a heuristic device, or ‘ideal type’. While he argues that one still has to look beyond the heuristic, despite a few exceptional studies there has been little utilization of recent developments in social theory in order to look ‘beyond moral panic’. Explicating two current critical contributions — the first, drawing from the sociologies of governance and risk; the second, from the process/figurational sociology of Norbert Elias — this article highlights the necessity for the continuous theoretical development of the moral panic concept and illustrates how such development is essential to overcome some of the substantial problems with moral panic research: normativity, temporality and (un)intentionality.

Moral education and caring

Abstract: Michael Slote’s very interesting work on moral sentimentalism and moral education raises some important questions on the meaning of empathy, the limitations of ‘inductions’, and the development of moral education from the perspective of care ethics. These questions are addressed in this commentary.

Developing Moral Agency through Narrative

Abstract: This paper poses the following question: When, in spite of knowing that it is wrong, people go on to hurt others, what does this mean for the development of moral agency? We begin by defining moral agency and briefly sketching relations between moral agency and other concepts. We then outline what three extant literatures suggest about this question: social domain theory, moral intuitionist theories, and theories of moral identity development. Building on these literatures, but moving beyond them, we propose that experiences of harming others are catalysts for the development of what we term moral agency. In the remainder of the paper, we outline a model for how moral agency develops that draws on research about the narrative development of self. We close by outlining some of the critical directions for future work that are suggested by our approach.

Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It’s Not What You Do but What You Know

Abstract: Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person’s control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn’t drown. Previous theories of moral luck suggest that this asymmetry reflects primarily the influence of unlucky outcomes on moral judgments. In the current study, we use behavioral methods and fMRI to test an alternative: these moral judgments largely reflect participants’ judgments of the agent’s beliefs. In “moral luck” scenarios, the unlucky agent also holds a false belief. Here, we show that moral luck depends more on false beliefs than bad outcomes. We also show that participants with false beliefs are judged as having less justified beliefs and are therefore judged as more morally blameworthy. The current study lends support to a rationalist account of moral luck: moral luck asymmetries are driven not by outcome bias primarily, but by mental state assessments we endorse as morally relevant, i.e. whether agents are justified in thinking that they won’t cause harm.

Varieties of moral personality: beyond the banality of heroism.

Abstract: Four perspectives dominate thinking about moral heroism: One contends that moral action is primarily instigated by situational pressures, another holds that moral excellence entails the full complement of virtues, the third asserts a single superintending principle, and the fourth posits different varieties of moral personality. This research addresses these competing perspectives by examining the personalities of moral heroes. Participants were 50 national awardees for moral action and 50 comparison individuals. They responded to personality inventories and a life-review interview that provided a broadband assessment of personality. Cluster analysis of the moral exemplars yielded three types: a “communal” cluster was strongly relational and generative, a “deliberative” cluster had sophisticated epistemic and moral reasoning as well as heightened self-development motivation, and an “ordinary” cluster had a more commonplace personality. These contrasting profiles imply that exemplary moral functioning can take multifarious forms and arises from different sources, reflecting divergent person × situation interactions.

How clinicians make (or avoid) moral judgments of patients: implications of the evidence for relationships and research

Abstract: Physicians, nurses, and other clinicians readily acknowledge being troubled by encounters with patients who trigger moral judgments. For decades social scientists have noted that moral judgment of patients is pervasive, occurring not only in egregious and criminal cases but also in everyday situations in which appraisals of patients' social worth and culpability are routine. There is scant literature, however, on the actual prevalence and dynamics of moral judgment in healthcare. The indirect evidence available suggests that moral appraisals function via a complex calculus that reflects variation in patient characteristics, clinician characteristics, task, and organizational factors. The full impact of moral judgment on healthcare relationships, patient outcomes, and clinicians' own well-being is yet unknown. The paucity of attention to moral judgment, despite its significance for patient-centered care, communication, empathy, professionalism, healthcare education, stereotyping, and outcome disparities, represents a blind spot that merits explanation and repair. New methodologies in social psychology and neuroscience have yielded models for how moral judgment operates in healthcare and how research in this area should proceed. Clinicians, educators, and researchers would do well to recognize both the legitimate and illegitimate moral appraisals that are apt to occur in healthcare settings.

Colloquium paper: the difference of being human: morality.

Abstract: In The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, published in 1871, Charles Darwin wrote: “I fully … subscribe to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important.” I raise the question of whether morality is biologically or culturally determined. The question of whether the moral sense is biologically determined may refer either to the capacity for ethics (i.e., the proclivity to judge human actions as either right or wrong), or to the moral norms accepted by human beings for guiding their actions. I propose that the capacity for ethics is a necessary attribute of human nature, whereas moral codes are products of cultural evolution. Humans have a moral sense because their biological makeup determines the presence of three necessary conditions for ethical behavior: (i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's own actions; (ii) the ability to make value judgments; and (iii) the ability to choose between alternative courses of action. Ethical behavior came about in evolution not because it is adaptive in itself but as a necessary consequence of man's eminent intellectual abilities, which are an attribute directly promoted by natural selection. That is, morality evolved as an exaptation, not as an adaptation. Moral codes, however, are outcomes of cultural evolution, which accounts for the diversity of cultural norms among populations and for their evolution through time.

Children's moral emotions and moral cognition: Towards an integrative perspective

Abstract: This chapter presents a brief introduction to the developmental and educational literature linking children’s moral emotions to cognitive moral development. A central premise of the chapter is that an integrative developmental perspective on moral emotions and moral cognition provides an important conceptual framework for understanding children’s emerging morality and designing developmentally sensitive moral intervention strategies. The subsequent chapters present promising conceptual approaches and empirical evidence linking children’s moral emotions to moral cognition. Examples of integrated educational interventions intended to enhance children’s moral development are presented and discussed. © Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Robot minds and human ethics: the need for a comprehensive model of moral decision making

Abstract: Building artificial moral agents (AMAs) underscores the fragmentary character of presently available models of human ethical behavior. It is a distinctly different enterprise from either the attempt by moral philosophers to illuminate the "ought" of ethics or the research by cognitive scientists directed at revealing the mechanisms that influence moral psychology, and yet it draws on both. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have tended to stress the importance of particular cognitive mechanisms, e.g., reasoning, moral sentiments, heuristics, intuitions, or a moral grammar, in the making of moral decisions. However, assembling a system from the bottom-up which is capable of accommodating moral considerations draws attention to the importance of a much wider array of mechanisms in honing moral intelligence. Moral machines need not emulate human cognitive faculties in order to function satisfactorily in responding to morally significant situations. But working through methods for building AMAs will have a profound effect in deepening an appreciation for the many mechanisms that contribute to a moral acumen, and the manner in which these mechanisms work together. Building AMAs highlights the need for a comprehensive model of how humans arrive at satisfactory moral judgments.

Creating Workplace Environments That Support Moral Courage

Abstract: Nurses practicing in today's healthcare environment are confronted with increasingly complex moral and ethical dilemmas. Nurses encounter these dilemmas in situations where their ability to do the right thing is frequently hindered by conflicting values and beliefs of other healthcare providers. In these circumstances, upholding their commitment to patients requires significant moral courage. Nurses who possess moral courage and advocate in the best interest of the patient may at times find themselves experiencing adverse outcomes. These issues underscore the need for all nurses in all roles across all settings to commit to working toward creating work environments that support moral courage. In this manuscript the authors describe moral courage in nursing; and explore personal characteristics that promote moral courage, including moral reasoning, the ethic of care, and nursing competence. They also discuss organizational structures that support moral courage, specifically the organization's mission, vision, and values; models of care; structural empowerment; shared governance; communication; a just culture; and leadership that promotes moral courage. Citation: LaSala, CA., Bjarnason, D., (Sept 30, 2010) "Creating Workplace Environments that Support Moral Courage" OJIN: The Online Journal of Issues in Nursing Vol. 15, No. 3, Manuscript 4. DOI: 10.3912/OJIN.Vol15No03Man04 Keywords: ethical work environment, shared governance in nursing, professional practice models, leadership, evidence-based leadership, moral development, moral courage, organizational empowerment, support for moral courage, the ethic of care "Our lives begin to end the day we become silent about things that matter." (Martin Luther King, Jr.; Barden. 2008. p. 16). Moral distress has been defined as physical and/or emotional suffering that is experienced when internal or external constraints prevent a person from taking the action that one believes is right fPendry, 2007). dilemmas in practice arise when one feels drawn both to do and not to the same thing. They can cause clinicians to experience significant distress in dealing with patients, families, other members of interdisciplinary team, and organizational leaders. Nurses experience distress, for example, when financial constraints or inadequate compromise their ability to provide quality patient care. These situations challenge nurses to act with moral courage and result In nurses feeling morally distressed when they cannot do what they believe is appropriate ( Cohen & Erickson, 2006). Nurses who consistently practice with moral courage base their decisions to act upon the ethical principle of beneficence (doing good for others) along with internal motivation predicated on virtues, values, and standards that they believe uphold what is right, regardless of personal risk. Ethical values and practices are the foundation upon which moral actions in professional practice are based. Morally responsible nursing consists of being able to recognize and respond to unethical practices or failure to provide quality patient care. The foundation of quality nursing care includes nurse practice acts, specialty practice guidelines, and professional codes of ethics. Familiarity with these documents is necessary to enable nurses to question practices or actions they do not believe are right. Although a code of ethics and ethical principles can guide actions, in themselves they are not sufficient for providing morally courageous care. Moral ideals are needed to transcend individual obligations and rights. The moral commitment that nurses make to patients and to their coworkers includes upholding virtues such as sympathy, compassion, faithfulness, truth telling, and love. Nurses who act with moral courage do so because their commitment to the patient outweighs concerns they may have regarding risks to themselves. Deciding whether to act with moral courage may be influenced by the degree of conflict between personal standards and organizational directives; by fear of retaliation, such as job termination; or lack of peer and/or leadership support. …