Topic
Social cognitive theory of morality
About: Social cognitive theory of morality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5842 publications have been published within this topic receiving 250337 citations.
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TL;DR: Walker and Walker as discussed by the authors pointed out that there are no consistent sex differences in moral reasoning development and that the overall pattern is one of nonsignificant differences, and they also pointed out the role of social experiences in explaining variability in moral development.
Abstract: WALKER,, LAWRENCE J. Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Rejoinder to Baumrind. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1986, 57, 522-526. Baumrind criticizes the procedures of my review and meta-analysis of the research literature on sex differences in moral reasoning development and disagrees with my conclusion that the overall pattern is one of nonsignificant differences. This rejoinder addresses these criticisms, discussing issues such as the nature of moral development, the focus on adulthood, the choice of statistics, the effect of differing sample sizes and scoring systems, and the role of social experiences in explaining variability in moral development. Baumrind's data are interpreted in this context. An updated review and meta-analysis of the research literature again support the conclusion that there are no consistent sex differences in moral reasoning development.
101 citations
TL;DR: The authors distinguish between three different social functions of moral standards and moral judgments: identity defining function, group dynamic function and intergroup relations function of group morality, speaking to the way people tend to communicate with and behave towards members of other groups that have different moral standards.
Abstract: Applying what we know about group-based identities and concerns allows us to improve our understanding of the ways in which morality is relevant to social judgments of right and wrong. We distinguish between three different social functions of moral standards and moral judgments. The identity defining function of morality indicates where people want to belong, and how they are regarded by others. The group dynamic function indicates consensual definitions of what is right and wrong that guide individual behavioral choices. The intergroup relations function of group morality, speaks to the way people tend to communicate with and behave towards members of other groups that have different moral standards.
101 citations
Abstract: Preschool, second-, and fifth-grade children watched films and heard stories which portrayed an actor who intentionally or accidentally injured another for either good or bad motives. After each film or story, children were interviewed to determine their understanding of the actor motives and the intentionality of his act and their moral judgements. The results suggest that children of all ages understood the concepts of motive and intentionality, but that the ability to make accurate inferences about motives and intentionality develops with age. Motives affected children's evaluations at all ages, but intentionality affected only grade school children's evaluations. The results for moral judgment were discussed in terms of a theory which included features of both cognitive-developmental and social learning explanations of moral development.
101 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a theory of the assignment of moral responsibility and punishment for harm was tested with children 5-11 years of age, and the results indicated a fairly sophisticated use of a variety of moral concepts by children from 5 years to 11 years, indicating an increasing sensitivity to these concepts, greater tolerance for harm doing and more emphasis on restitution rather than punishment with increasing age.
Abstract: SHULTZ, THOMAS R.; WRIGHT, KEVIN; and SCHLEIFER, MICHAEL. Assignment of Moral Responsibility and Punishment. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1986, 57, 177-184. A theory of the assignment of moral responsibility and punishment for harm was tested with children 5-11 years of age. The results indicated a fairly sophisticated use of a variety of moral concepts by children from 5 years of age. They showed evidence of knowing that judgments of moral responsibility are presupposed by judgments of punishment and that causal judgments are presupposed by moral responsibility judgments. They also used information on intention and negligence to assign moral responsibility and information on restitution to assign punishment. Developmental trends included an increasing sensitivity to these concepts, greater tolerance for harm doing, and more emphasis on restitution rather than punishment with increasing age.
101 citations
TL;DR: Maternal power assertion was observed in "do" and 'don't" discipline contexts from 14 to 45 months and in the context of mother-child discourse about a recent misbehavior at 56 months.
Abstract: Parental power assertion is traditionally studied in the behavioral domain--discipline triggered by the child's immediate misbehavior--but rarely in the cognitive domain--parent-child discussions of the child's past misbehavior. Maternal power assertion was observed in "do" and 'don't" discipline contexts from 14 to 45 months and in the context of mother-child discourse about a recent misbehavior at 56 months. Mothers' use of power cohered across the "do," 'don't," and discourse contexts, but its implications were domain specific. Power assertion in the 'don't" discipline context predicted behavioral outcomes (more moral conduct at 56 and 73 months, less antisocial conduct at 73 months) but not cognitive outcomes (moral cognition at 56 and 73 months). Power assertion in the discourse context predicted less mature moral cognition but not moral or antisocial conduct. Mothers' high Neuroticism predicted more power assertion in all three contexts. Child effects were examined.
100 citations