Social cognitive theory of morality

About: Social cognitive theory of morality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5842 publications have been published within this topic receiving 250337 citations.

Moral Address, Moral Responsibility, and the Boundaries of the Moral Community*

Abstract: When we hold someone morally responsible for her actions, we are acknowledging, reiterating, or perhaps even making it the case that, among other things, she’s a member of a particular sort of club, namely, the moral community. Members of the club are eligible for such assessments, and nonmembers are exempt. But what does it take to be or to become a member? Why are assessments of moral responsibility intelligible and appropriate only for those on the inside? And what does it take to lose membership or not to be a member in the first place? It is my aim in this article to address these questions by advancing a theory of the relation between moral responsibility, moral address, and moral community. I will simply take it for granted, following Peter Strawson, Lawrence Stern, Gary Watson, Stephen Darwall, and many others, that there is an important relation between these features. This is in part because our practices in voicing the praise and blame expressive of holding someone morally responsible, in the paradigm case, consist of an interplay between at least two agents, one who addresses a moral demand to the

An overview of the Minnesota approach to research in moral development.

Abstract: This article traces the history of the Minnesota approach to moral judgement research. It is claimed that this history can be subdivided into four phases, each one associated with a different goal and theoretical consideration. Attention is also given to the issues motivating the different research goals as well as highlights of the outcomes of this work. It is concluded that the Minnesota approach has been a progressive force in the field, promoting change in both theory and measurement and also serving as a stabilising force by reaffirming Kohlberg's basic view that moral judgements are both cognitive and developmental.

Principles of Development and Developmental Change Underlying Theories of Cognitive and Moral Development

Abstract: My introduction to moral development came when I participated in a new program on values clarification being introduced in the public school system where I taught. I was excited to learn more about teaching values, and then astonished that a program on values was intentionally designed to be value-neutral. Shortly thereafter (and not by coincidence), I was enrolled in a graduate class in educational psychology that helped me put this program and my reaction in perspective. One influential reading criticized values clarification as an educational end. Aptly titled, “Development as the Aim of Education,” it opens with this sentence:

Constructing a theoretical model of moral distress

Abstract: Moral distress has been characterised as one of the main ethical problems affecting nurses in all health systems, and has been depicted as a threat to nurses' integrity and to the quality of patient care. In recent years, several studies tried to investigate moral distress, its causes and consequences for health professionals, clients and organisations. However, such studies are considered controversial and vulnerable, mainly because they lack a solid philosophical and empirical basis. The present article aimed at elaborating a theoretical model for moral distress, considering the process of moral deliberation, spaces of power and resistance and patient advocacy, and sought to carry out a reflection that culminated with the creation of a broader concept of moral distress.

Emotion, moral perception, and nursing practice

Abstract: Many of the activities of clinical practice happen to, with or upon vulnerable human beings. For this reason numerous nursing authors draw attention to or claim a significant moral domain in clinical practice. A number of nursing authors also discuss the emotional involvement and/or emotional labour which is often experienced in clinical practice. In this article I explore the importance of emotion for moral perception and moral agency. I suggest that an aspect of being a good nurse is having an emotional sensitivity to other human beings (patients), because this emotional sensitivity allows the nurse to perceive more accurately the context and perspective of the patient. It is thus important to the moral agency of the nurse and to morally sensitive clinical practice. As such education of the emotions should be a feature of the moral education of the nurse. A useful conception of the role of educated emotion in the moral life can be discovered in Aristotelian ethics.