Social cognitive theory of morality

About: Social cognitive theory of morality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5842 publications have been published within this topic receiving 250337 citations.

Preschool children's conceptions of moral and social rules.

Abstract: SMETANA, JUDITH G. Preschool Children's Conceptions of Moral and Social Rules. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1981, 52, 13883-1336. This study examined preschool children's conceptions of moral and social-conventional rules. 44 children between the ages of 2-6 and 4-9 were divided into 2 groups of 21 and 23 children according to age (X = 3-3, 4-2). Children made judgments concerning the seriousness, rule contingency, rule relativism, and amount of deserved punishment for 10 (depicted) moral and conventional preschool transgressions. Analyses of variance with age and sex as between-group factors and domain as the within-group factor indicated that, constant across both sexes and the ages studied, children evaluated moral transgressions as more serious offenses and as more deserving of punishment than conventional transgressions. Moreover, moral events were less likely than conventional events to be regarded as contingent on the presence of a rule and relative to the social context. Test-retest reliability of the ratings of the seriousness of transgressions was .66 over a 2-3 week period. The findings were discussed in relation to the developmental differentiation model and the distinct conceptual domain approach.

Handbook of Moral Development

Abstract: Contents: Preface. Part I: Introduction. Part II: Structuralism and Moral Development Stages. E. Turiel, Thought, Emotions, and Social Interactional Processes in Moral Development. D.K. Lapsley, Moral Stage Theory. S.J. Thoma, Research on the Defining Issues Test. L.J. Walker, Gender and Morality. Part III: Social Domain Theory and Social Justice. J.G. Smetana, Social-Cognitive Domain Theory: Consistencies and Variations in Children's Moral and Social Judgments. M. Killen, N.G. Margie, S. Sinno, Morality in the Context of Intergroup Relationships. C. Helwig, Rights, Civil Liberties, and Democracy Across Cultures. C. Wainryb, Moral Development in Culture: Diversity, Tolerance, and Justice. Part IV: Conscience and Internalization. J.E. Grusec, The Development of Moral Behavior and Conscience From a Socialization Perspective. R.A. Thompson, S. Meyer, M. McGinley, Understanding Values in Relationships: The Development of Conscience. L. Kuczynski, G.S. Navara, Sources of Innovation and Change in Socialization, Internalization, and Acculturation. Part V: Social Interactional, Sociocultural, and Comparative Approaches. J. Dunn, Moral Development in Early Childhood and Social Interaction in the Family. M.B. Tappan, Mediated Moralities: Sociocultural Approaches to Moral Development. J.G. Miller, Insights Into Moral Development From Cultural Psychology. D.P. Fry, Reciprocity: The Foundation Stone of Morality. P. Verbeek, Everyone's Monkey: Primate Moral Roots. P.H. Kahn, Jr., Nature and Moral Development. Part VI: Empathy, Emotions, and Aggression. P.D. Hastings, C. Zahn-Waxler, K. McShane, We Are, by Nature, Moral Creatures: Biological Bases of Concern for Others. N. Eisenberg, T. Spinrad, A. Sadovsky, Empathy-Related Responding in Children. G. Carlo, Care-Based and Altruistically Based Morality. W.F. Arsenio, J. Gold, E. Adams, Children's Conceptions and Displays of Moral Emotions. M.S. Tisak, J. Tisak, S.E. Goldstein, Aggression, Delinquency, and Morality: A Social-Cognitive Perspective. Part VII: Moral Education, Character Development, and Community Service. D. Hart, R. Atkins, T.M. Donnelly, Community Service and Moral Development. L. Nucci, Education for Moral Development. M.W. Berkowitz, S. Sherblom, M. Bier, V. Battistich, Educating for Positive Youth Development. D. Narvaez, Integrative Ethical Education.

The emergence of social cognitive neuroscience.

Abstract: Social cognitive neuroscience is an emerging interdisciplinary field of research that seeks to understand phenomena in terms of interactions between 3 levels of analysis: the social level, which is concerned with the motivational and social factors that influence behavior and experience; the cognitive level, which is concerned with the information-processing mechanisms that give rise to social-level phenomena; and the neural level, which is concerned with the brain mechanisms that instantiate cognitive-level processes. The social cognitive neuroscience approach entails conducting studies and constructing theories that make reference to all 3 levels and contrasts with traditional social psychological and cognitive neuroscientific research that primarily makes reference to 2 levels. The authors present an introduction to and analysis of the field by reviewing current research and providing guidelines and suggested directions for future work.

Moral Distress, Moral Residue, and the Crescendo Effect

Abstract: First defined by Jameton in 1984 as a phenomenon that occurs when nurses cannot carry out what they believe to be ethically appropriate actions because of institutional constraints, moral distress has recently gained attention as an important problem experienced by multiple healthcare disciplines.1 Although it is not a new topic, recent attention to moral distress (specifically, an article in the New York Times by surgeon Pauline W. Chen, “When doctors and nurses can’t do the right thing,”2 and a fourfold increase in articles on the topic in MEDLINE in the past two years) has highlighted its presence and effect on healthcare providers and on the delivery of healthcare. While the majority of published research has been in nursing journals, current work has expanded to other disciplines, including medicine, psychology, pharmacy, and respiratory therapy.3 It is increasingly clear that moral distress is not solely a nursing issue, but one that potentially influences all healthcare professionals. Jameton described moral distress as having two parts: initial distress and reactive distress.4 Initial distress occurs in the moment, as a situation unfolds (from this point forward, we will use the phrase moral distress to refer to this acute phase). After the situation that elicited moral distress ends, reactive distress (now referred to as moral residue) remains. Hence, moral distress and moral residue are closely related but separate concepts. Thus far, distinctions between the two have largely not been addressed empirically or conceptually; however, the two phenomena have differing characteristics and their interrelationship poses important implications for members of healthcare teams. The aim of this article is to propose a preliminary model that we call the crescendo effect, which describes the interrelationship between moral distress and moral residue. Our intent is to spark debate, encourage further study, and provide additional insight for ethics consultants as they analyze clinical situations. While the crescendo effect model arose from an empirical study of experienced nurses and physicians in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU),5 mounting evidence from other disciplines and settings indicates that the phenomenon is shared across many specialties. We will provide examples from these sources and settings in this article.