Topic
Social cognitive theory of morality
About: Social cognitive theory of morality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5842 publications have been published within this topic receiving 250337 citations.
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01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: The Herzliya Series on Personality and Social Psychology as discussed by the authors explores the psychological processes involved, such as the cognitive mechanisms and motives underlying immoral behavior and moral hypocrisy, and discusses personality, developmental, and clinical aspects of morality as well as societal aspects of good and evil.
Abstract: Humans are universally concerned with good and evil, although one person's "evil" can be another person's "good." How do individuals arrive at decisions about what is right and what is wrong? And how are these decisions influenced by psychological, social, and cultural forces? Such questions form the foundation of the field of moral psychology. In trying to understand moral behavior, researchers historically adopted a cognitive-rationalistic approach that emphasized reasoning and reflection. However, a new generation of investigators has become intrigued by the role of emotional, unconscious, and intra- and interpersonal processes. Their explorations are presented in this third addition to the Herzliya Series on Personality and Social Psychology. The contributors to this volume begin by presenting basic issues and controversies in the study of morality; subsequent chapters explore the psychological processes involved, such as the cognitive mechanisms and motives underlying immoral behavior and moral hypocrisy. Later chapters discuss personality, developmental, and clinical aspects of morality as well as societal aspects of good and evil, including the implications of moral thinking for large-scale violence and genocide. The wide-ranging findings and discussions presented in this volume make this work a provocative and engaging resource for social psychologists and other scholars concerned with moral judgments and both moral and immoral behavior.
230 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the dual-process theory of moral judgment is described and the evidence supporting it is summarized. And the authors argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory.
Abstract: In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I close with some brief remarks concerning the bright future of ethics as an interdisciplinary enterprise.
230 citations
TL;DR: This work offers a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts, and can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments.
Abstract: Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts sho...
229 citations
26 Apr 2004
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a theory of the moral self and its relation with the self-concept, which they call Identity as Motivation, towards a Theory of the Moral Self.
Abstract: Contents: Preface. L.J. Walker, Gus in the Gap: Bridging the Judgment-Action Gap in Moral Functioning. R. Bergman, Identity as Motivation: Toward a Theory of the Moral Self. F.C. Power, The Moral Self in Community. R. Atkins, D. Hart, T.M. Donnelly, Moral Identity Development and School Attachment. D. Moshman, False Moral Identity: Self-Serving Denial in the Maintenance of Moral Self-Conceptions. L. Nucci, Reflections on the Moral Self Construct. M. Nisan, Judgement and Choice in Moral Functioning. B. Puka, Altruism and Character. D.K. Lapsley, D. Narvaez, A Social-Cognitive Approach to the Moral Personality. W. Edelstein, T. Krettenauer, Many Are Called, But Few Are Chosen: Moving Beyond the Modal Levels in Normal Development. T. Wren, C. Mendoza, Cultural Identity and Personal Identity: Philosophical Reflections on the Identity Discourse of Social Psychology. M. Keller, Self in Relationship. G. Nunner-Winkler, Sociohistoric Changes in the Structure of Moral Motivation. A. Blasi, Moral Functioning: Moral Understanding and Personality.
228 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that emotions are often reliable reflections of moral beliefs, and are open to conscious regulatory control, enabling the individual to use emotional responses to serve moral goals, and evidence is reviewed demonstrating the features of emotion-specifically the empathic response-that make it advantageous for the process of moral judgment.
Abstract: There is a powerful tradition that views emotions as harmful to the process of moral judgment and decision-making. Stemming from the writings of Kant and others, who viewed emotions as undependable forces that are largely outside of our control, this view has had a large influence on moral psychology. It is argued that this tradition is based on a definition of emotion that is no longer tenable given recent evidence concerning emotional processes. Rather, emotions are often reliable reflections of moral beliefs, and are open to conscious regulatory control, enabling the individual to use emotional responses to serve moral goals. In support of this, evidence is reviewed demonstrating the features of emotion-specifically the empathic response-that make it advantageous for the process of moral judgment. These features are then organized into a theoretical framework of moral judgment that describes the dialectic between affect and moral reasoning, thus allowing emotions to re-enter the arena of the study of moral reasoning and moral judgment.
227 citations