Social cognitive theory of morality

About: Social cognitive theory of morality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5842 publications have been published within this topic receiving 250337 citations.

Religiosity and Moral Identity: The Mediating Role of Self-Control

Abstract: The ethics literature has identified moral motivation as a factor in ethical decision-making. Furthermore, moral identity has been identified as a source of moral motivation. In the current study, we examine religiosity as an antecedent to moral identity and examine the mediating role of self-control in this relationship. We find that intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions of religiosity have different direct and indirect effects on the internalization and symbolization dimensions of moral identity. Specifically, intrinsic religiosity plays a role in counterbalancing the negative impact of extrinsic religiosity on the internalization of moral identity. Further, intrinsic religiosity also counterbalances the negative and indirect impact of extrinsic religiosity on symbolization of moral identity via self-control. Lastly, self-control does not play a mediating role in the impact of religiosity on the internalization dimension of moral identity. We conclude that this study presents important findings that advance our understanding of the antecedents of moral identity, and that these results may have implications for the understanding of ethical decision-making.

Virtual morality: emotion and action in a simulated three-dimensional "trolley problem".

Abstract: Experimentally investigating the relationship between moral judgment and action is difficult when the action of interest entails harming others. We adopt a new approach to this problem by placing subjects in an immersive, virtual reality environment that simulates the classic "trolley problem." In this moral dilemma, the majority of research participants behaved as "moral utilitarians," either (a) acting to cause the death of one individual in order to save the lives of five others, or (b) abstaining from action, when that action would have caused five deaths versus one. Confirming the emotional distinction between moral actions and omissions, autonomic arousal was greater when the utilitarian outcome required action, and increased arousal was associated with a decreased likelihood of utilitarian-biased behavior. This pattern of results held across individuals of different gender, age, and race.

Moral Character in Person Perception

Abstract: Understanding how people form impressions of others is a key goal of social cognition research. Past theories have posited that two fundamental dimensions—warmth and competence—underlie impression formation. However, these models conflate morality with warmth and fail to capture the full role that moral character plays in impression formation. An emerging perspective separates moral character (or morality) from warmth on both theoretical and empirical grounds. When morality is pitted against warmth, morality is clearly a more important driver of impression formation, as revealed by correlational, experimental, and archival studies. Yet social warmth remains important and conveys distinct information that morality does not. Alongside competence, both factors matter not only for person perception but also for other aspects of social cognition, including group perception. Important unanswered questions remain regarding the perceived structure of moral character and the way it is appraised in everyday life.

Moral Distress and Moral Conflict in Clinical Ethics

Abstract: Much research is currently being conducted on health care practitioners' experiences of moral distress, especially the experience of nurses. What moral distress is, however, is not always clearly delineated and there is some debate as to how it should be defined. This article aims to help to clarify moral distress. My methodology consists primarily of a conceptual analysis, with especial focus on Andrew Jameton's influential description of moral distress. I will identify and aim to resolve two sources of confusion about moral distress: (1) the compound nature of a narrow definition of distress which stipulates a particular cause, i.e. moral constraint, and (2) the distinction drawn between moral dilemma (or, more accurately, moral conflict) and moral distress, which implies that the two are mutually exclusive. In light of these concerns, I argue that the definition of moral distress should be revised so that moral constraint should not be a necessary condition of moral distress, and that moral conflict should be included as a potential cause of distress. Ultimately, I claim that moral distress should be understood as a specific psychological response to morally challenging situations such as those of moral constraint or moral conflict, or both.

Prolegomena to ethics

Abstract: Preface Introduction: The idea of a natural science of morals Book I. Metaphysics of Knowledge: 1. The spiritual principle in knowledge and in nature 2. The relation of man, as intelligence, to the spiritual principle in nature 3. The freedom of man as intelligence Book II. The Will: 1. The freedom of the will 2. Desire, intellect, and will Book III. The Moral Ideal and Moral Progress: 1. Good and moral good 2. Characteristics of the moral ideal 3. The origin and development of the moral ideal 4. The development of the moral ideal - continued 5. The development of the moral ideal - continued Book IV. The Application of Moral Philosophy to the Guidance of Conduct: 1. The practical value of the moral ideal 2. The practical value of a theory of the moral ideal 3. The practical value of a hedonistic moral philosophy 4. The practical value of utilitarianism compared with that of the theory of the good as human perfection.