Social cognitive theory of morality

About: Social cognitive theory of morality is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5842 publications have been published within this topic receiving 250337 citations.

The Death of Character: Moral Education in an Age Without Good or Evil

Abstract: "James Hunter has a talent for writing important books...With The Death of Character he has done it again."--Wilfred M. McClay, University of Tennessee. The Death of Character is a broad historical, sociological, and cultural inquiry into the moral life and moral education of young Americans based upon a huge empirical study of the children themselves. The children's thoughts and concerns-expressed here in their own words-shed a whole new light on what we can expect from moral education. Targeting new theories of education and the prominence of psychology over moral instruction, Hunter analyzes the making of a new cultural narcissism.

Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory, and Extreme Destructiveness

Abstract: The article describes how certain motives can combine with the exclusion of people from the moral universe, leading to torture, genocide, and mass killing. Personal goal theory is presented as a framework. Personal goals and moral values have ranges of applicability from which certain groups may be excluded. When there is conflict between goals and values, stringent moral values can be replaced by others that allow harm doing—a process termed moral equilibration. The psychological and motivational sources of exclusion include devaluation of groups, just-world thinking, self-distancing by euphemisms or by an objectifying perceptual stance that reduces empathy, and ideologies that identify enemies. Certain cultural characteristics create a predisposition for group violence. Together with intensely difficult life conditions, they give rise to powerful motives and lead to ways of fulfilling them that turn the group against a subgroup of society. As they harm their victims, the perpetrators and the whole society change, progressing along a continuum of destruction that can end in genocide. Bystanders often encourage perpetrators, and they themselves are changed as they passively face the suffering of victims. However, bystanders also have great potential power to inhibit the evolution of increasing destructiveness.

The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making

Abstract: We critically review the mushrooming literature addressing the neural mechanisms of moral cognition (NMMC), reaching the following broad conclusions: (1) research mainly focuses on three inter-related categories: the moral emotions, moral social cognition, and abstract moral reasoning. (2) Research varies in terms of whether it deploys ecologically valid or experimentally simplified conceptions of moral cognition. The more ecologically valid the experimental regime, the broader the brain areas involved. (3) Much of the research depends on simplifying assumptions about the domain of moral reasoning that are motivated by the need to make experimental progress. This is a valuable beginning, but as more is understood about the neural mechanisms of decision-making, more realistic conceptions will need to replace the simplified conceptions. (4) The neural correlates of real-life moral cognition are unlikely to consist in anything remotely like a "moral module" or a "morality center." Moral representations, deliberations and decisions are probably highly distributed and not confined to any particular brain sub-system. Discovering the basic neural principles governing planning, judgment and decision-making will require vastly more basic research in neuroscience, but correlating activity in certain brain regions with well-defined psychological conditions helps guide neural level research. Progress on social phenomena will also require theoretical innov- ation in understanding the brain's distinctly biological form of computation that is anchored by emotions, needs, drives, and the instinct for survival.

Planet of the Durkheimians: Where Community, Authority, and Sacredness Are Foundations of Morality

Abstract: Most academic efforts to understand morality and ideology come from theorists who limit the domain of morality to issues related to harm and fairness. For such theorists, conservative beliefs are puzzles requiring non-moral explanations. In contrast, we present moral foundations theory, which broadens the moral domain to match the anthropological literature on morality. We extend the theory by integrating it with a review of the sociological constructs of community, authority, and sacredness, as formulated by Emile Durkheim and others. We present data supporting the theory, which also shows that liberals misunderstand the explicit moral concerns of conservatives more than conservatives misunderstand liberals. We suggest that what liberals see as a non-moral motivation for system justifi cation may be better described as a moral motivation to protect society, groups, and the structures and constraints that are often (although not always) benefi cial for individuals. Finally, we outline the possible benefi ts of a moral foundations perspective for system justifi cation theory (SJT), including better understandings of (a) why the system justifying motive is palliative despite some harmful effects, (b) possible evolutionary origins of the motive, and (c) the values and worldviews of conservatives in general. It has not yet been revealed to the public, but we have it on good authority that intelligent life was recently discovered on a planet several light years away. The planet has been given an unpronounceable technical name, but scientists refer to the planet informally as “Planet Durkheim.” Judging by the television signals received, Durkheimians look rather like human beings, although their behavior is quite different. Durkheimians crave, above all else, being tightly integrated into strong groups that cooperatively pursue common goals. They have little desire for self-expression or individual development, and when the requirements of certain jobs force individuals to spend much time alone, or when the needs of daily life force individuals to make their own decisions or express their own preferences, Durkheimians feel drained and unhappy. In extreme cases of enforced individualism, they