Showing papers on "Social theory published in 1976"

The restructuring of social and political theory

Abstract: In this volume, Bernstein forsees and outlines the development of a social theory that is at once empirical, interpretive, and critical.

Social Theory as Science

Abstract: Part one Conceptions of science 1. Positivist philosophy of science 2. Realist philosophy of science 3. Forms of conventionalism Part two Conceptions of science as social theory 4. Sociology and positivism 5. Marx and realism 6. Structure and structuralism Part 3 Meaning and ideology 7. The explantion and understanding of social action 8. Reification and realism 9. Values theory and reality

Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory

Abstract: Spend your time even for only few minutes to read a book. Reading a book will never reduce and waste your time to be useless. Reading, for some people become a need that is to do every day such as spending time for eating. Now, what about you? Do you like to read a book? Now, we will show you a new book enPDFd law in modern society toward a criticism of social theory that can be a new way to explore the knowledge. When reading this book, you can get one thing to always remember in every reading time, even step by step.

Classical Social Theory and the Origins of Modern Sociology

Abstract: My aims in this essay are both iconoclastic and constructive. An iconoclast, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is a ‘breaker of images’, ‘one who assails cherished beliefs’. I begin by taking to task a series of widely held views, relating above all to Durkheim’s writings, of the past development of social theory. These views, as I have tried to show elsewhere,1 are myths; here I try not so much to shatter their images of the intellectual origins of sociology as to show that they are like reflections in a hall of distorting mirrors. I do not, however, propose to analyse the development of classical nineteenth- and early twentieth-century social theory for its own sake alone, but wish to draw out some implications for problems of sociology today.

SOCIAL THEORY AS METAPHOR: On the Logic of Discovery for the Sciences of Conduct

Abstract: The history of science is a history of scientists doing what philosophers and methodologists told them was impossible to do on a priori grounds So today, in the scientific realism of contemporary philosophy of science, we are told that sociology can not be "scientific" except when conducted by objectivist methods Yet, as such philosophers themselves have admitted, their recommended logic-among other difficulties-tells us little of how scientific theories get invented 2

Eugenics in Britain.

Abstract: part of this century is an important example of the relationship between scientific ideas and the interests and purposes of social groups The eugenists possessed a social theory, and a set of social policies, which claimed scientific foundation Social position, they argued, was largely the result of individual qualities such as mental ability, predisposition to sickness or health, or moral tendency These qualities were inherited, and thus a rough equation could be drawn between social standing and hereditary worth On this basis a programme of social action to improve the quality of the population was put forward Central to this was the alteration of the relative birth-rate (or survival rate) of the 'fit' and 'unfit' Those with good hereditary qualities should marry with care and have large numbers of children (this came to be called positive eugenics), while those with hereditary disabilities should be discouraged from parenthood (negative eugenics) The eugenists supported schemes of social reform which would, either directly or indirectly, have this effect, while condemning policies which appeared to encourage procreation of the 'unfit' Thus, they sought to raise the fertility of some groups in society (generally those of higher social status) and lower that of others (those of lowest status) Eugenics was backed by arguments based on commonsense and medical knowledge of heredity, Darwinian biology and, increasingly, specialized scientific research\ While largely relying on pre-existing

Citizen Participation: Practice in Search of a Theory

Abstract: Although citizen participation may be a worldwide phenomenon, its meaning, role, function, and importance vary from one culture and political system to another. The author reviews some of the conceptual problems in the current emphasis on public participation to suggest points at which both normative and empirical social theory may have something to contribute toward putting citizen involvement and public participation into a philosophic perspective. He emphasizes that it is the seeking after the public interest that is the important ingredient of citizen participation.

Herbert Spencer's Four Theories of Social Evolution.

Abstract: Although there is at present a revival of critical interest in Spencer, more disagreement than agreement exists among scholars regarding the exact nature of his social evolutionism. It is here argued that the single term "social evolution" was actually applied by Spencer to four quite different theories-an inherent source of difficulty for his readers. This essay, which strongly affirms each discipline's need for an accurate history of itself, provides a novel but fully documented analysis of what Spencer himself understood by "social evolution." It is concluded that an entirely new chapter on Spencer is required before either his historical or contemporary relevance can be accurately gauged.

Transhistorical and Transcultural Theory

Abstract: The issues in the controversy over "social psychology as history" are seen as resolvable through interdisciplinary work resulting in the development of comprehensive social theory. Such theory must interweave person, situation, social context, and sub cultures into a matrix of interacting structures and processes that cut across time periods.

Constructing social metrics for health status indexes.

Abstract: Health status indexes used to make collective decisions satisfying the principles of equality and social minimum must incorporate a social metric for health. Any index or indicator applied to populations for determining health status or to health programs for evaluating outcome must confront the question of who prefers which states of health under which circumstances? Utility models, psychometric scaling, and empirical social decision valuation have been used to measure preferences for states of health. Efforts should be directed toward constructing social metrics for health that are prospective, context-independent, relevant, community-wide, ratio scaled, sensitive, empirically validated, and applicable to program evaluation. These efforts represent the application of normative social theory to research, an important advance in uncovering the mysteries of social action and its consequences.

Social theory and medicine

Abstract: Three sociolgists-Talcott Parson, Eliot Freidson, and Mechanic-have explained medical phneomena within a broader theoretical framework. Although all three have made significant contributions, their conclusions remain incomplete on the theoretical level and seldom have been helpful for workers concerned with ongoing problems of health care. Our purpose here is to summarize some of the strengths and weakness of each theoretical position. Parsons has elucidated the sick role as a deviant role in society, the function of physicians as agents of social control, and the normative patterns governing the doctor-patient relationship. The principal problems in Parsons' analysis center on an uncritical acceptance of physicians' social control functions, his inattention tot the ways in which physicians' behavior may inhibit change in society, and overoptimism about the medical profession's ability to regulate itself and to prevent the exploitation of patients. Viewing medical phenomena within a broader theory of the professions in general, Freidson has formulated w wide ranging critique of the medical profession and professional dominance. On the other hand, Freidson's work neglects the full political implications of bringing professional autonomy under control. Mechanic's coceptual approach emphasizes the social psychologic factors, rather than the institutional conditions, which are involved in the genesis of illness behavior. Mechanic also overlooks the ways in which illness behavior, by permitting a controllable from of deviance, fosters institutional stability. In conclusion, we present a breif overview of a theoretical framework whose general orientation is that of Marixian analysis. Several themes recur in this framework: illness as a source of exploitation, the sick role as a conservative mechanism fostering social stability, stratification in medicine, and the imperialsm of large medical institutions and health-related industries.

Empirical Knowledge and Social Values in the Cumulative Development of Sociology

Abstract: The task of our Symposium is to answer the question whether there is a crisis in sociology.* I think the fact that such a question has been asked at an international meeting of sociologists constitutes at least a partial answer to it. It implies that there are a sufficient number of sociologists who feel that their discipline might be in a critical situation. Before trying to answer the question directly, let us consider what kind of crisis they might have in mind, because a crisis in a science may mean any of at least three different things: (1) First, it can mean that the given science cannot develop or even cannot exist in a certain set of social conditions, because these conditions do not, in the most simple and external sense, permit it to do so. The means used can range from the pressure of public opinion not to develop it, through denial of the economic means necessary to the science, to simple bureaucratic decision blocking the development of the science as a whole or in certain essential sub-areas. (2) Second, it can mean that the science, developing more or less ‘correctly’ from the point of view of certain internal standards, does not fulfill some of its external social functions in the way it should according to certain normative standards of its social functions. In such case we may be inclined to blame the situation on either the society for not using the science in the ‘proper’ way, or the scientists themselves for developing their discipline in such a way that it is of little social relevance.

Paying Homage to the Father: C. Wright Mills and Radical Sociology*

Abstract: Radical sociologists have, in general, failed to produce a substantive social theory out of which their critique of society can be mounted. The only alternative to what is perceived as conservative...

A Critique of the Labeling Approach: toward a Social Theory of Deviance

Abstract: This is an essay on the labeling literature, some reflec­ tions, some critical comments, some tenative ideas. The essay is an unfamiliar form for a sociological thesis. A reader demands to know one’s hypothesis, or at least theoretical position where no empirical evidence is available. But label­ ing has been plagued by hypotheses and theoretical stances, so much so that some of its insights into deviance have been obscured. It needs a fresh interpretation, one that high­ lights the social issues it seeks to explain, and a fresh assessment in light of those issues. That is the goal of this essay. What follows presents an inventory of labeling1s ideas, a critical assessment of their conceptual and empirical use­ fulness and a methodological strategy for understanding the central issues described by labeling. In particular, the essay concentrates on labeling’s assertion that social mean­ ings and social reactions are important components of an understanding of deviance in modern societies. Although labeling’s treatment of these components is found wanting, the components themselves are still seen as essential to sociological and criminological inquiry. An ideal type framework is developed, using Weber as an authority. Four types are distinguished: respectable, involuntary, aberrant and dissident deviance. Each is suggested as having distinct social meanings; and each meaning is suggested as having a distinct influence on the likelihood that labeling or deterrence will result from official sanctioning. A brief application of this methodological strategy to juvenile delinquency suggests its heuristic validity. A CRITIQUE OF THE LABELING APPROACH TOWARD A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE

Herbert Spencer and scientism

Abstract: Summary Scientism applies the ideas and methods of the natural sciences to the humanities and social sciences. Herbert Spencer applied the law of the conservation of energy to social questions and arrived at formula answers to the issues of the day. The kind of certitude that Spencer aimed for was possible only by ignoring a system of values. Much as he may have believed that he was above personal beliefs, there are values implicit in Spencer's theories and they are the values of the nineteenth-century British middle class. Reasoning by analogy is as valid in social theory as it is in the natural sciences. Spencer's error was in universally applying the idea of the conservation of energy to social systems by means of identity rather than by analogy. Scientists in Britain, where there was a self-assured scientific community, dismissed Spencer's theories as being unscientific, but he enjoyed a vogue in the United States.

Two Factors Contributing to the Perception of the Theoretical Intractability of Social Psychology

Abstract: The main reason for suspecting that transhistorical validity may be more difficult to achieve for social than for physical theories is that incorporating enlightenment effects into social theories may lead to an infinite regress. Such infinite regresses are not an uncommon problem in science, however, and effective strategies for dealing with them have been developed. Unfamiliarity with such strategies is but one manifestation of our field's failure to model two crucial lessons from several centuries' experience with the physical sciences: the need for formally stated theories and the need to distinguish between the success of a theory in highly com plex applied settings and the validity of that theory as established in more tightly controlled situations.

On Some Autonomy Arguments in Social Science

Abstract: Arguments, suggested by readings of Durkheim and Kroeber, for the integrity and autonomy of social theory are examined. These arguments may be construed as closure arguments on domains of social events and of social facts. Causal closure, ontic closure, and several kinds of nomic and explanatory closure are distinguished. Discussion of the relations of various kinds of closure, integrity, autonomy, etc. under plausible assumptions concerning causation and explanation leads to the conclusion that (a) one main strand of the integrity arguments is defensible; (b) special ontological assumptions (ontic closure) are not necessary and are dubiously sufficient for autonomy. This general conclusion accords with the positions of the later Kroeber and of D. Kaplan, that integrity-autonomy is best considered a methodological, not an ontological issue--a matter of distinct levels of description and explanation, not distinct levels of reality.

Dwelling on the Everyday World: Phenomenological Analyses and Social Reality

Abstract: Anthropological interest in the phenomenological approach has been virtually nil-at least in Anglo-American traditions (there are, of course, exceptions, e.g., Fabian 1970 or Lansing 1974). This is unfortunate for several reasons. For one, the intent of phenomenological description is closely akin to that of ethnography (see Psathas 1968). For another, some anthropologists can be considered phenomenological in their approach, if implicitly so. This is the case, for example, with Evans-Pritchard (see Horton and Finnegan 1973: 60ff.) and perhaps Clifford Geertz (1960). Most importantly, anthropology can learn from phenomenology. Its potential contribution, especially to ethnographic description, should not be neglected. At the same time, anthropology cannot, in my estimation, remain content with a phenomenological approach. What is phenomenology? There are, of course, many phenomenologies (as there are empiricisms, structuralisms, Marxisms, etc.) but Psathas' introduction nevertheless reveals its central paradigmatic features. Phenomenology is interested in the "subjective aspects of human conduct" (p. 3) as expressed in and by the "essential features of the world of everyday life" (p. 8). This requires attentiveness to the constitutive, intersubjective, and interactional processes by which human beings in society sustain and create shared meanings, that is, "how people live with and renew their assumptions" (p. 16). We can hope to arrive at this social world of common consensus by bracketing our own assumptions (a sort of intentional disinterestedness). We will know that we have succeeded if "the results of an inquiry fit, make sense, and are true to the understanding of ordinary actors in the everyday world" (p. 12). All this sounds familiar, especially in an ethnographic context. In theory at least, anthropological description also seeks to capture the everyday worlds of native peoples. In actual practice, I think we can learn a great deal from the phenomenological approach (as the one properly ethnographic study in Psathas' volume attests). But is this all that should concern us? The comparative ethnologist is not likely to think so and neither, for that matter, does the editor of Phenomenological Sociology. Psathas strains to bring phenomenological method (a reflexive and radical empiricism) into the realm of abstract social theory: "Eidetic analysis aims at seeing through the particulars (concrete, existential) to discover what is essential (ideal, typical)" (p. 10). We thus move from the microlevel to the macrolevel and back again (e.g., how social systems are intended and/or experienced by the social actor). In other words, the subjective and existential reality of the person must be weighed against the objective and encountered reality of social institutions, cultural ideologies, etc. Even criteria of verification are effected: the sense ordinary actors make of our scientific analyses is no longer sufficient. In fact, we are enjoined not to naively accept informants' statements as sufficient explanation (pp. 15ff.).

Advanced Capitalism and Social Theory: Habermas On the Problem of Legitimation:

Abstract: As is the case with most of the other books by Jfrgen Habermas, so it is with Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus , translated Legitimation Crisis, that one must read Habermas in the context of the history of social thought. Whatever the final appraisal by social philosophy of Habermas’ contribution, it must be admitted by those who attempt to labor in those vineyards that the genius of Habermas has been to reappropriate an historical reflection on the development of social thought that was left dominant by twentieth-century thought. I do not mean to suggest that Habermas’ immediate predecessors in Critical Theory did not make an original contribution to the orientation that Habermas has attempted to extend. However, it must be stated that Habermas rightly perceived the historical inadequacy of that position. One need only appraise the significant achievements of the so-called Frankfurt School such as ’Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment’ from Dialectic of Enlightenment or ’Traditional and Critical Theory’ or even Negative Dialectics to perceive the historical inadequacy. In those works critique itself becomes elevated to an eternal, a-historical principle, beyond categories of social development. The consequence was that Habermas attempted to address specifically the historical context in which social theory developed. Beyond that, he has attempted to advance social thought beyond its eighteenthand nineteenth-century development by penetrating the entire field of modern social thought. In this sense, as Thomas McCarthy’s introduction to his English translation of the book is so anxious to point out, Habermas participates in the Marxist tradition. Whether Habermas advances it or not is a subject open to considerable debate.

Marx on ideology, power and force

Abstract: As Marx matured as a thinker, he became more acutely aware of the obstinate hold which capitalism exercised upon society. Consequently, he was forced to complement his theory of revolution with a theory of social structures. In this paper, I aim to explore Marx's ideas on this point as they emerge in three of his more mature works, i.e.,Capital, Grundrisse, and theTheories of Surplus Value. My enterprise is guided by my convictions that (i) the notions of ideology, power and force are still central to debates in modern social theory, and (ii) Marx's development of these notions has the intrinsic merit of providing a useful and sophisticated contribution to such debates.

Distributionism Versus Justice

Abstract: Certain putative theories of justice consist of (a) a principle which ranks alternative distributions of goods and (b) the view that the actualizable distribution which ranks highest is the just distribution. I shall call such theories and the ranking principles they rely upon "distributionist." My contention is that distributionist theories cannot be genuine theories of justice. This contention rests on the standard premise that "the rights secured by justice are not subject . . . to the calculus of social interests"' and the claim, developed in this paper, that the (alleged) rights assigned in the name of distributionist principles are subject to such a calculus. In the first section of this paper I introduce a number of different distributionist principles by indicating how they would yield different judgments as to which among some set of distributions is preferable. I then give a general characterization of distributionist principles and argue that the (alleged) rights ascribed under them are subject to-that is, determined by-a calculus of social interests. This argument leaves open the possibility that under distributionism persons may have rights which, though initially determined by a social calculus, are then not open to revisions demanded by subsequent recalculation. The second section of this paper is an examination of whether there are any rights ascribed under distributionism which are not subject to such revision. The conclusion is that, even in the latter sense, rights ascribed under distributionist principles are subject to a calculus of social interests-the specific calculus being a function of the specific distributionist principle which is employed. In this paper, therefore, I am concerned with establishing whether certain putative principles of justice, namely, distributionist principles, are principles of justice. Distributionist principles are considered in isolation from any broader social theory of which they may be a part. Since the status of a distributionist principle as a principle of justice is not established by reference to the adequacy or inadequacy of the specific judgments about rights which it yields, no modification or elaboration of a distributionist principle of the sort which would merely alter