Showing papers on "Sovereignty published in 1974"
Book•
01 Jan 1974
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an analysis of the legacy of order in the Bodin and Hobbes federalism and pluralism, focusing on the role of women and women's empowerment.
Abstract: Part 1 Introduction: absolutism and pluralism the methodological relevance of history distinctive features of the present analysis indivudual and collective sovereignty in Bodin and Hobbes federalism and pluralism the legacy of order. Part 2 Absolutist perspectives: history - Italy and Machiavelli history, France and Bodin history, England and Hobbes. Part 3 Twilight of the pluralist state - Jean Bodin: Bodinian overview the family private corporate bodies the family and private corporate bodies public corporations - iuges et magistrats the sovereign - exposition the sovereign - analysis. Part 4 Dawn of the absolutist state - Thomas Hobbes: Hobbesian overview - facts and norms Hobbesian overview - family and state the individual mother and infant parent and child corporate structure state structure. Part 5 Conclusion: the ideology of order. Appendixes: Bodin on female rule the justice/order problem in the Bodininan concept of law the sovereign and legislator in Bodin Bodinian absolutism from the "Methodus" to the "Republique" comments on the source of political obligation in Hobbes.
31 citations
TL;DR: In a few quarters, the charge includes an accusation of secret U.S. participation in the military coup that overthrew Salvador Allende as President of Chile in September 1973 as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: A STRIKING aspect of the world reaction to the military coup that overthrew Salvador Allende as President of Chile in September 1973 has been the widespread assump tion that the ultimate responsibility for the tragic destruction of Chilean democracy lay with the United States. In a few quarters, the charge includes an accusation of secret U.S. participation in the coup. However, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, headed by Senator Gale McGee, has just investigated this accusation and concluded that there is no evi dence of any U.S. role whatever. More commonly, however, the bill of particulars relies on what President Allende himself, speaking before the United Na tions in December 1972, called the "invisible financial and eco nomic blockade" exercised by the United States against his gov ernment. Articles taking this line have appeared, for example, in The Washington Post, the National Catholic Reporter and The New York Review of Books. On the other hand, The Wall Street Journal has been critical of what it calls a "simplistic plot" theory espoused by members of the academic community? that "Washington by simply turning off the spigot of low-interest loans" was able to bring down Allende. Was there in fact an undeclared economic war between the Nixon administration and Salvador Allende?to use Allende's own words, "an oblique underhanded indirect form of aggres sion ... virtually imperceptible activities usually disguised with words and statements that extol the sovereignty and dignity of my country"? Did this warfare have a direct relationship to the bloody events in Santiago? A critical examination of the consid erable evidence on this subject available in this country and in Chile can help to answer these questions, and possibly suggest whether wider conclusions are in order about the relations be
29 citations
TL;DR: The authors assesses the impact on the host Canadian government of the 27 identifiable cases of politicized conflict that have been generated in Canada by the activities of United States-owned multi-national enterprise from 1945 through 1971, and which are publicly known to have occurred.
Abstract: Multinational private enterprise is perhaps the most prominent transnational organization active in world politics today. Increasing attention has been paid to the challenge to state sovereignty posed by multinational enterprise, either as an autonomous actor or as an instrument in interstate conflict. This question is of particular relevance to Canadian-American relations, because of the central role of foreign-owned (and especially American-owned) firms in the Canadian economy. This essay assesses the impact on the host Canadian government of the 27 identifiable cases of politicized conflict that have been generated in Canada by the activities of United States-owned multi-national enterprise from 1945 through 1971, and which are publicly known to have occurred.
11 citations
TL;DR: Metternich as discussed by the authors reported that Russian diplomats were busily attempting to undermine Austria's influence over the Italian princes by persuading them that her predominance threatened their sovereignty, that she had designs on their territory, and that only the czar's benevolent protection could save them from this peril.
Abstract: In September of 1815, Metternich received alarming news from the Austrian ambassador in Rome: Russia had begun a diplomatic offensive whose aim was to overthrow the Austrian hegemony in Italy which he had constructed at the Congress of Vienna and whose preservation was now among the major aims of his policy. Russian diplomats were busily attempting to undermine Austria's influence over the Italian princes by persuading them that her predominance threatened their sovereignty, that she had designs on their territory, and that only the czar's benevolent protection could save them from this peril. The ambassador feared that this approach was making progress, for "the Italians have always as a mattter of principle feared and opposed whatever Power was predominant in Italy."' Soon similar reports were arriving from all the Italian states, along with even more ominous warnings that Russian agents were making contact with discontented liberals and even the "Sects," or revolutionary secret societies, encouraging their liberal-nationalist ideals and hinting at Russian support.2 In this way, Metternich first learned of the Russian challenge in Italy which was to be among his chief preoccupations for the next five years. He did not underestimate the danger. At present, Austrian hegemony in Italy seemed secure: the Sects might plot and the princes might grow restive under Austrian tutelage, but neither had the strength to challenge her. Russian intervention, however, would upset these calculations: with Russian support the princes might defy Vienna, with Russian encouragement the Sects might dream of revolution with some hope of success. In either case, Austria's Italian hegemony-a vital factor in her international positionwould be threatened.3
10 citations
TL;DR: The effectiveness of universal international law has been denied on the grounds of the international society's cultural heterogeneity as mentioned in this paper, which dates back to the time when international law was developed in the Western world and applied only among "Christian" and "civilized" states.
Abstract: The effectiveness, even the possibility, of universal international law continues to be denied on the grounds of the international society's cultural heterogeneity. The argument dates back to the time when international law was developed in the Western world and applied only among "Christian" and "civilized" states. The Statute of the International Court of Justice still refers to general principles of law "recognized by civilized nations." The argument received a slight shift and a big boost from the ideological warfare in the 1930s, the Cold War in the 1940s and 1950s, and finally from the birth of new states in Asia and Africa. Effective law, the argument runs, requires consensus on values. Yet the main consensus prevailing in the contemporary international society is that all states shall enjoy sovereign independence. They try to do so, with deleterious consequences for international law. Their ways of life, moral tenets, and legal systems differ. The shared value is divisive nationalism, leading to isolated national existence with international structures, institutions, and organizations geared to maintaining or at least not disturbing the separation of states. Even that value is said to be shared in some Asian and African countries only by elites. It is not representative of a generally internalized and accepted normative system. The seemingly unifying spread of modern technology and an international diplomatic language is written off as a surface phenomenon, unable to overcome the world's
10 citations
TL;DR: The formal distinction between external sovereignty and internal sovereignty needs to be emphasized at the outset as discussed by the authors, and the extent to which it has been eroded, in substance if not in form, by the pressures of the modern world.
Abstract: ‘EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY’ IS THE CONCERN OF THIS PAPER, AND THE extent to which it has been eroded, in substance if not in form, by the pressures of the modern world. The formal distinction between external sovereignty and internal sovereignty needs to be emphasized at the outset. Externally, sovereignty connotes equality of status between the states – the distinct and separate entities – which make up our international society. Internally, it connotes the exercise of supreme authority by those states within their individual territorial boundaries. From Bodin who, in De La Republique (1577), saw souverainete as the exclusive right ‘to give lawes unto all and everie one of its . . . subjects and to receive none from them’ to the Permanent Court of International Justice which, in the Wimbledon Case (1922), held that the sovereign state ‘is subject to no other state and has full and exclusive powers within its jurisdiction without prejudice to the limits set by applicable law’, the concept of the sovereign state has implied both supremacy within and equality of status without.
9 citations
9 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The Papacy's participation in the international agreement raises a number of queries in the political order, not the least of which is the fundamental problem regarding die nature of the papacy as a sovereignty.
Abstract: As a political component of the contemporary world, the Catholic il Church plays an important if ambivalent role in international affairs. On February 25, 1971, in Moscow, Archbishop Agostino Casaroli, head of the Vatican's bureau of Public Affairs, affixed die signature of die Holy See to the ratification of die International Treaty Limiting die Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That same day, in London and Washington, die respective Apostolic Delegates to England and the United States signed identical documents. The participation of papal representatives in this international agreement raises a number of queries in the political order, not the least of which is the fundamental problem regarding die nature of the papacy as a sovereignty. No other religious institution in the modern world functions as bodi a church and a political organization that exchanges diplomatic representatives and claims total recognition as an independent member of die community of nations.
TL;DR: In this paper, a discussion of La Mort Artu in terms of the rapidly changing social and philosophical ethos of thirteenth century France is presented, where the collapse of Arthurian kingship is the direct result of Arthur's and Gauvain's unawareness of and inability to make crucial distinctions between stateright and kin-right, between public and private loyalties and policies: categories that are becoming increasingly important with the reconstitution of the Capetian monarchy and the revival of Aristotelian notions of the state.
Abstract: “The Death of King Arthur and the Waning of the Feudal Age” contains a discussion of La Mort Artu in terms of the rapidly changing social and philosophical ethos of thirteenth century France. Although Arthur's kingdom is, politically speaking, a model of the feudal world, its values and institutions—the judicial duel, entrapment in flugrunte delicto, system of vendetta and private war—no longer function to insure the unity of the realm. More importantly, the crisis that besets Logres extends to the basic pattern of feudal organization, vassalage, and to the feudal notion of state. Mordret's manipulation of fealty for personal gain points to a fatal flaw within the system as a whole: that the barons can only relate to the ultimate source of power, Arthur, through individuals like Mordret; their singular position in a vertical hierarchy of command gives them sovereignty over its lower echelons. In short, the collapse of Arthurian kingship is the direct result of Arthur's and Gauvain's unawareness of and inability to make crucial distinctions between state-right and kin-right, between public and private loyalties and policies: categories that are becoming increasingly important with the reconstitution of the Capetian monarchy and the revival of Aristotelian notions of the state. Only Lancelot is able to distinguish personal and clannish interest from general social interest; because he is willing to sacrifice both Guinevere and the right of his family to avenge his death for the sake of the common good he stands as a new type of individual within the Arthurian world. He seems much closer to the citizen of the modern state than to the subject of the feudal monarchy. Arthur, on the other hand, represents the old king at the end of his reign. His fatigue, blindness and madness reflect, two centuries after the beginning of the end of feudalism in France, the weariness of the feudal world.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors suggest a new type of transnational relationship that arises from the use of a common-property natural environment, which is the relationship that leads to conflict and accommodations at various levels for centuries.
Abstract: In this essay I suggest a newcomer to the list of types of transnational relationship discussed in this volume. This is the relationship that arises from the use of a common-property natural environment. These relations are not new, of course, and have led to conflict and accommodations at various levels for centuries, as Innis's work on the codfisheries testifies. As world population grows and technology broadens, both demand and capacity to exploit these international common property resources in ways that will harm other users have also increased. Yet international law has not been able to devise rights of tenure for international property as efficient as those for, say, agricultural land. This resulting lack of suitable concepts of ownership (or sovereignty) has, therefore, been one source of the loss of control by central governments that is frequently mentioned in the transnational relations literature.
TL;DR: The present South African constitutional developments in fragmenting its territory and granting self-government to a number of "embryonic states" necessitates an inquiry into the relationship between these entities and governmental organs of the Republic of South Africa especially in the light of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
Abstract: The present South‐African constitutional developments in fragmenting its territory and granting self‐government to a number of “embryonic states”, necessitates an inquiry into the relationship between these entities and governmental organs of the Republic of South Africa especially in the light of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Sovereignty as applied to the powers of the British Parliament hardened into a theory with a peculiar absolute dimension which very soon caused the loss of one colonial empire, and it would have caused greater loss if the colonial practice had not drifted away from this harsh doctrine. However, in theory it provided for unlimited powers in time and space and a absolute limitation on the part of parliament to affect any change to the scope of these powers. The decolonisation process from beginning to end remained incomprehensible in terms of such a theory, and it may truly be said that “the Commonwealth took the law by surprise”. This doctrine has also been appl...
TL;DR: The British recognized Bhutan's internal sovereignty and did not even insist upon the establishment of a "Residency" in Bhutan as they had in Nepal and Sikkim.
Abstract: FOREIGN POLICY did not pose complex problems for the Government of Bhutan during the first four decades of the 20th century. The basic operating principles of Bhutan's external relations were set by the events surrounding the British Younghusband Expedition into Tibet (I903-5) and the treaty between Bhutan and British India signed in i9io. The political situation in the Himalayan region thereafter allowed little scope for initiative on foreign policy matters by the Bhutanese authorities even if they had been so inclined-which they were not. Geopolitics thus made it inevitable that British India should be the primary focus of Bhutan's foreign policy, based upon the principle of optimal isolation. Except for a brief fling in the I9IO-I2 period, when Chinese armies occupied Tibet and pushed south to the Himalayan frontier, China was in no position to exert any influence in this region. The overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty in i9ii also signalled the end of China's physical presence in Tibet for more than four decades. Lhasa emerged as a semi-dependency of the British and had to accommodate itself to British hegemony throughout the Himalayan area. In foreign policy terms, then, British India constituted the only potentially complicating factor for the newly-established monarchy in Bhutan in I907, and it is not surprising that Druk Gyalpo (King) Ugyen Dorji made a satisfactory accommodation with the British his first order of business. The response was encouraging as the terms proposed by the British were interpreted by the Bhutan government as the best possible under the circumstances. The British recognized Bhutan's internal sovereignty and did not even insist upon the establishment of a "Residency" in Bhutan as they had in Nepal and Sikkim. Formally, the British Political Officer in Gangtok was also accredited to Bhutan, but this was a unilateral act on New Delhi's part, never recognized by the Bhutanese authorities. The Political Officer was occasionally allowed to undertake brief tours of Bhutan, but only under carefully circumscribed conditions that denied him the opportunity to exert an undue influence in internal Bhutanese politics. The only qualification imposed on Bhutan's sovereignty was the clause in the i9io treaty under which the Bhutanese "agreed to be guided by the advice" of the British on foreign policy matters. But in the context of the existing situation this was nothing more than de jure recognition of the de facto reality, for even without this clause
TL;DR: The unequal status of Zionist and Palestinian Arab nationalism since 1948 renders dialogue between the two virtually impossible, and is responsible for the transferral of the conflict onto the level of established states in the region.
Abstract: 1. Introductory remarks The evolutionary pace of the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement has quickened considerably since the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. Despite setbacks, the movement has done much to increase the level of international awareness concerning the plight of the Palestinian refugees, and has managed, more than ever before, to make consideration of Palestinian nationalism fundamental in any hopes for resolution of the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, the failure of Palestinian nationalism to achieve political sovereignty and territorial expression remains the single most encumbering element in the Palestine question. The absence of Palestinian sovereignty characterizes the Arab-Israeli conflict in all facets and ultimately determines much of the behavior of those states and parties involved in the conflict. The Palestinians, for reasons discussed below, have been unable to muster the international support needed to realize the goal of sovereignty. The behavior of militant Palestinians, determined in large measure by the inability of the movement to garner international support, further alienates Palestinian Arab nationalism from those parties whose influence is essential to realization of nationalist objectives.' The Palestine conflict, in which two movements of differing cultural, historical, and ethnic backgrounds confront each other over the same piece of territory, is novel in the annals of nationalism. The culmination of Zionist nationalism in the State of Israel in 1948 aborted the nationalist movement of the Palestinian Arabs and, in a sense, drove it underground to function in quasi-national exile and in the realm of terrorism, circumstances not unlike those which Zionists themselves endured prior to 1948. As a result, Zionist nationalism in the form of Israel is represented in the international community of sovereign states while Palestinian nationalism is not, except in the rather capricious policies of some of the established Arab states. The unequal status of Zionist and Palestinian Arab nationalism since 1948 renders dialogue between the two virtually impossible, and is responsible for the transferral of the conflict onto the level of established states in the region. Thus elevated, the Arab-Israeli confrontation attracts major powers, which widen the scope of the conflict and its inherent dangers. After a quarter century of these circumstances the question of the Palestinian Arab community is liable to become obscured by the preoccupation of the established states with the consequences of the conflict to themselves.
TL;DR: Venu as discussed by the authors suggests that a confrontation between the multinational corporation and the nation state could produce a "dgeocentric" outward-looking institution, and would constitute a victory of pragmatism over dogma.
01 Apr 1974
TL;DR: In this paper, Private Power and National Sovereignty: Some Comments on the Multinational Corporation, the authors discuss the relationship between private power and national sovereignty in the context of the United States.
Abstract: (1974). Private Power and National Sovereignty: Some Comments on the Multinational Corporation. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 417-447.