Showing papers on "Sovereignty published in 1983"

The social transformation of American medicine

Abstract: A Sovereign ProfessionThe Rise of Medical Authority and the Shaping of the Medical System * The Social Origins of Professional Sovereignty * Medicine in a Democratic Culture, 17601850 * The Expansion of the Market * The Consolidation of Professional Authority, 18501930 * The Reconstitution of the Hospital * The Boundaries of Public Health * Escape from the Corporation, 19001930 The Struggle For Medical CareDoctors, the State, and the Coming of the Corporation * The Mirage of Reform * The Triumph of Accommodation * The Liberal Years * End of a Mandate * The Coming of the Corporation

A Modern Introduction to International Law

Abstract: Is international law really law? Historical and political factors Sources of international laws International law and municipal law States and government International organisations, individuals and companies Treatment of allies Jurisdiction Immunity from jurisdiction Treaties Acquisition of territory Legal consequences of changes of sovereignty over territory (state succession) The law of the sea Air space and outer space The United Nations Peaceful settlement of disputes between states International laws Civil wars Self-determination Table of contents Index

Aztec State Making: Ecology, Structure, and the Origin of the State

Abstract: It has become increasingly difficult to account for state formation solely in terms of ecological variables. It is suggested that consideration of prestate political structure and the interplay of ecological variables and political dynamics (political ecology) would enhance our understanding of why and how states emerge. The Aztecs provide a case for examination. [Aztecs, ecology, political competition, state origins] THE STATE IS A POWERFUL, COMPLEX, PERMANENTLY INSTITUTED SYSTEM Of centralized political administration. It exercises sovereignty in carrying out basic political functions (maintaining territorial rights, maintaining internal order, making and executing decisions regarding group action), and its authority in these matters is buttressed by sovereignty in the use of force within its jurisdiction (Keesing 1976:348; Sahlins 1968:4-7; Yoffee 1979:14-17). States are characterized by administrative complexity; administrative personnel are hierarchically ordered and specialized by administrative tasks (Johnson 1973:1-4; Wright 1978:49-68). The numerous attempts to explain why states emerge in some times and places but not others have been dominated by two contrasting approaches: the ecological and the structural. The first, based on the work of Julian Steward, relates state formation to the problems and/or opportunities presented to a human population by its environmental setting. In this approach, population growth and its resulting pressures provide the dynamic for state formation, and at least the initial stages are said to be promoted by the ecological benefits that the state confers on its general population. The second approach, growing out of the Marx-Engels tradition, regards state formation as a process generated by particular sociocultural orders. Certain types of societies (stratified societies, for example) are said to possess an internal dynamic that exerts pressure for state formation even when the relationship between the human population and its environment is stable. In this approach, the focus is less on a human population as a whole and more on social components and their interactions. Of these two approaches, the first has received a greater share of attention and has been elaborated more fully. As a result, some of its difficulties are now evident. The structural approach has been less thoroughly explored. This paper has three objectives: to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the ecological approach to state formation in its current form; to suggest how a greater em

Cuba Between Empires 1878-1902

Abstract: Exploring the history of Cuba from 1878 to 1902, the author explains the political dimensions both of Spain's loss of sovereignty and of the US hegemony which replaced it. He also looks at the emotional strengths, political ambivalences and organizational weaknesses of the independence movement.

Israel's Air Strike upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor

Abstract: The destructive potential of nuclear weapons is so enormous as to call into question any and all received rules of international law regarding the trans-boundary use of force. Many of the old rationales for these rules no longer apply. At the same time, the shared values underlying the rules apply more emphatically than ever, for the stake is global survival. I have tried to suggest some of the questions that must be asked about as apparently “simple” an incident as the Israeli attack on the nuclear reactor in Iraq. Tags: Iraqi nuclear reactor, Israel’s aerial strike, air strike, transboundary force, anticipatory self-defense [pg584]** It is curious that no commentary has appeared in this Journal regarding Israel's aerial strike upon the Iraqi nuclear reactor near Baghdad on the morning of June 7, 1981. Perhaps scholarly consensus accords simply with the Security Council resolution of June 19, 1981, which “strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”FN1 My limited purpose here is to suggest questions regarding any such simple conclusion, and to invite detailed and considered scholarly analysis of the situation.FN2 The starting point for any legal analysis is Article 2(4) of the Charter.FN3 Was Israel's unannounced, premeditated aerial bombardment of the Iraqi reactor a “use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence” of Iraq? On what Professor Julius Stone has called the “extreme” view of 2(4), any unilateral employment of transboundary force not in self-defense against [pg585] an armed attack (Article 51) violates 2(4).FN4 But as Stone goes on to argue, this reading—though it commands some support in the travaux preparatoires—ignores the terms “territorial integrity” and “political independence.” FN5 I suggest that it is open to serious question whether Israel's strike was a use of force against either Iraq's territorial integrity or its political independence. No portion of Iraq's territory was taken away from Iraq by the bombardment. A use of the territory—namely, to construct a nuclear reactor—was interfered with, but the territory itself remained integral. Nor was Iraq's political independence compromised. Iraq's power was undoubtedly lessened, but in what sense was its governmental authority vis-a-vis other sovereign governments diminished? Of course, if Israel's attack had been preliminary to a military campaign directed against Iraq's territorial integrity or political independence, a purposive interpretation of Article 2(4) would result in a finding of illegality of the initial strike against the nuclear reactor. But there has been no evidence of any Israeli purpose beyond the limited one of destroying the nuclear reactor itself. In this respect, Israel's action was analogous to a limited “humanitarian intervention,” such as the Entebbe raid,FN6 which can be justified along similar lines as not violative of 2(4).FN7 But there is another component to Article 2(4)—that the use of force must not be “inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Here a purposive, or teleological, inquiry is explicitly mandated. McDougal and Feliciano, although addressing themselves to self-defense under the Charter, suggest three relevant factors for determining the objectives of the claimant (here, Israel): extension or conservation, degree of consequentiality, and exclusivity or inclusivity.FN8 Let us examine briefly the relevant questions under these categorical factors.

Traditional Concepts of Territory in South East Arabia

Abstract: Explanations of the differences between the traditional and modern notions of territory in the Gulf tend to emphasize the distinction between jus sanguinis andyus soli. The adequacy of such an explanation is examined in the context of South East Arabia with special attention being paid to the notions of territoriality amongst the nomads in whose dars the creation of modern boundaries has been most arbitrary. After examining basic notions of ownership and the means by which allodial rights and precedence in the exploitation of natural resources are established, the article continues by examining the relationship with the functional needs for control of territory, notably demographic pressures on a sparse and fluctuating pastoral resource base. Notions of community, government and sovereignty amongst both the settled and the nomads are then sketched and related to the growth of nascent states through shaykhly control of nodes that give access to marine and land resources. The article concludes that it is meaningless to divorce soli and sanguinis, since we are dealing with a society in which both are intimately linked in a common jus. Some of the rulers of the Gulf appear to be reverting to these notions to regulate territorial differences between them (since the withdrawal of the British presence a decade ago). Their agreements constitute as valid an 'international' law as the Western notions of territoriality which have led to ludicrous fragmentation of sovereign rights over resources in the region. There is little reason to suppose that, because these agreements do not produce 'demarcated boundaries' they are any more unstable than if they were to do so.

Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society

Abstract: Any theory of law that by virtue of its emphasis on law courts and on enforceable remedies focuses mainly on the individual, the State, regulation, and the discrete transactions of the marketplace, is woefully incomplete. It fails to address the broad realm of interaction between the colossal institutions and organizations that dominate advanced societies, and it neglects the way in which law functions as law among them. One common theme underlies the intense dissatisfaction with the formal legal ordering of industrial relations, ongoing contracts, and international law: on account of the character of relations between the parties, their conduct is far removed from the demands of the formal legal order. This dissatisfaction can be found, for example, in the work of an English royal commission on industrial relations.' It was also reflected in the work of the Uniform Commercial Code Commission that adapted the law of contracts to the practices and needs of commerce,2 and it is expressed today in the perceived inadequacy of legal remedies for breaches of sovereign loan agreements.8 Scholars have voiced their dissatisfaction. Clyde Summers, for example, observed that the law of contracts so far as it consists of specific legal rules, has little relevance for collective agreements,4 and Ian Macneil has criticized the transactional bias of classical contract law." This critique is so persistent and uniform that I have been led to question some familiar and powerful views about legal ordering. It is my position that the much lamented "inadequacies" in the law of industrial relations, in the law of contracts, and in international law

Rousseau's Moral Realism: Replacing Natural Law with the General Will

Abstract: The Social Contract is reinterpreted by emphasizing its relation to Rousseau's other writings and doctrines. In the spirit of Hobbesian realism, Rousseau regards natural law and other forms of "private morality" as ineffectual, invalid, and in practice dangerous tools of oppression and subversion. But, still more realistic than Hobbes, Rousseau thinks it impossible to build a nonoppressive state on men's selfish interests alone and embraces the classical view that morality or virtue is politically necessary (as well as intrinsically good). Rousseau's doctrine of the natural goodness of man, however, which traces all vice to the effects of oppression, leads him to conclude that the nonoppression more or less guaranteed by the absolute rule of general laws is also sufficient to make men virtuous. Thus Rousseau can declare law as such (General Will) infallible and "sovereign "-and he must do so in order to protect rule of law from its greatest danger, the subversive appeal to "natural law." Rousseau's political philosophy may be said to comprise three characteristic elements: the theory of the natural goodness of man described in the Second Discourse and Emile; the critique of progress and enlightenment in the First Discourse, or, more generally, the skeptically "realistic" assessment of the worth and power of reason; and the elaborate juridical doctrine of the Social Contract, which calls for the absolute sovereignty of the General Will. How these three elements relate to one another is rarely discussed, and when the Social Contract, in particular, is related to the other two elements, as often as not the purpose is to demonstrate its inconsistency with Rousseau's

The Extraterritorial Application of German Antitrust Law

Abstract: The extraterritorial reach of national economic regulation, particularly of antitrust laws, is one of the most controversial topics in the international legal community, largely because that community has failed to develop jurisdictional principles that both accommodate the regulatory needs of regulating states and are discriminating enough to avoid impinging on the legitimate interests of other states. As a result, international conflicts related to the assertion of jurisdiction have greatly increased in both frequency and intensity.' Assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States have been the focal point of the controversy. Until the 1970's, the United States was the only country with both well-developed and strictly enforced antitrust laws and a legal regime permitting broad application of those laws to foreign conduct. Consequently, it was the only country with significant experience in applying antitrust provisions to conduct occurring outside its territorial boundaries. Outside the United States, the extraterritoriality issue has been seen largely in a defensive context-namely, how to respond to excessive jurisdictional claims by the United States. These problems have reached critical dimensions. While American courts and commentators flail about in search of principles to use in grappling with jurisdictional issues,2 major allies have ceased trying to cooperate with the United States to avoid excessive conflicts ofjurisdiction and have turned to so-called blocking legislation to attempt to protect their nationals and enterprises from the reach of United States antitrust laws.3 The extraordinary difficulties that American law has encountered in this area may be ascribed to two major causes: (1) an inability to define more clearly and concretize the "effects" principle, which is the basis for extending American jurisdiction over foreign conduct; and (2) a failure adequately to take into account the sovereign interests of other states. Recent West German law developments illuminate the dimensions of these two problems and provide guideposts toward useful solutions. In recent years,

Historic and vital bays: An analysis of libya's claim to the gulf of sidra

Abstract: On August 19,1981, a Libyan SU‐22 aircraft fired upon two United States Naval F‐14 aircraft conducting maneuvers over the Gulf of Sidra, off the coast of Libya. The U.S. aircraft returned the fire and shot down the Libyan aircraft. The subsequent dispute was based on Libya's contention that the Gulf of Sidra is a historic and vital bay and is, therefore, Libyan internal waters, making overflight by U.S. aircraft a violation of its sovereignty. This article discusses the history of the dispute between the United States and Libya and the legitimacy of Libya's claim to the Gulf under international law. This review includes a discussion of the law of delimitation of bays and, in particular, the law of historic and vital bays in relation to the factual setting of the dispute. It is concluded that Libya's claim violates international law and that the United States acted within its rights in engaging in maneuvers over the Gulf.

A constitutional republic: the Peking government, 1916–28

Abstract: The death of Yuan Shih-k'ai in June 1916 ushered in the era of the warlords and yet throughout the ensuing decade of militarism, the Peking government remained the symbol of China's national sovereignty and hoped-for unity. Constitutionalism served the interests of ex-bureaucrats and professionals because it offered them legitimate political roles without opening the political arena to the groups below them. The popular support it could command would provide the key to wealth and power for China. The institutional facade of the Peking government was constitutional: legislative, executive and judicial functions parcelled out by law, policy decisions made by institutional procedures. The reality was factional: personal followings, cutting across the boundaries of official institutions, each faction centred on a particular leader. Constitutionalism could not restrain the brutal forces. The tide of change washed the wealthy and fortunate ashore in the foreign concessions of treaty ports. The constitutional system exhausted its own vitality through its members' absorption in factional struggles.

Sovereignty and the Falklands crisis

Abstract: On 6 November 1982 the General Assembly of the United Nations voted by a large majority, ninety votes to twelve, with fifty-two abstentions, to request 'the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)'. The resolution was co-sponsored by one of the parties to the dispute, namely Argentina, and may therefore be regarded as evidence that that country regards its claim to the territory in question to be a strong one. Mr Francis Pym, the British Foreign Secretary, on the other hand has stated publicly (4 May 1982) that Britain has no doubts, and never has had, as to the validity of its claim. As Peter Beck has recently shown, historically this is not absolutely true. The Foreign Office has on a number of occasions since 1910 been the scene of doubts about the validity of Britain's case in international law1 and in fact the grounds on which Britain has based its claim have been changed not once but twice during the period. Moreover, Argentina has not been historically as resolute in pursuing its claims as it would like people to think. The claims on both sides are based on historical facts that are by turns vague, confused and disputed, and if there is to be any resolution of the question a great deal of homework will have to be done first by both parties. This, then, is a contribution to the debate. First of all, an outline of the problem.

Intervention and security in Africa

Abstract: The last several years have witnessed a growing number of interventions in internal and regional disputes in Africa. If one begins in 1975, a partial list of such intrusions would include the 1975-6 Angolan crisis, the Shaban (Katangan) interventions in 1977 and 1978, the war in the Horn in 1977-8, the conflict in the Western Sahara from 1975 to the present, and the crisis in Chad (see Table 1 at the end of this article). The frequency of this kind of behaviour by both regional and external actors suggests that intervention is a significant issue of African regional security. Most studies of intervention in Africa view the issue from the perspective of East-West relations or that of policy-makers in the intervening or in rival states. 1 The validity and utility for certain purposes of this approach cannot be denied, but the discussion of intervention in Africa is incomplete without attention to its impact on regional politics. This article is an enquiry into the relationship between external military interference in civil and regional disputes on the one hand and African regional security on the other. Is intervention regionally destabilizing? Does it hinder development? Does it intensify regional conflict? Is it destructive of national sovereignty? The geographical focus of this paper is on OAU (Organization of African Unity) Africa. It would be artificial, however, to exclude the Republic of South Africa from a discussion of African security when the internal and external situations of many states in the southern part of the continent are so clearly dependent on the domestic politics and foreign policy of the Republic. Where appropriate, therefore, aspects of South African policy and behaviour are considered here. The terms 'intervention' and 'regional security' are both rather imprecise and contentious. It is accordingly appropriate to indicate how they are being used here. For the purpose of this paper, intervention refers to coercive military involvement in civil and regional conflict, involvement which is intented to, or does, affect internal political outcomes.2 This includes intrusions not only by actors from outside the region, but also by states and other agents within it. It may be, and has been, unilateral, as in the case of Tanzanian intervention in Uganda; multilateral, as with the joint actions of the United States, France, Morocco and Belgium in Shaba; or collective, as in the case of the recent OAU involvement in Chad. It may involve the regular forces of the intervening power or irregulars dependent upon and acting at the behest of the intervener, as is arguably the case with UNITA-South African cooperation in Angola or MRM-South African collaboration in Mozambique.

Contemporary understanding about spheres of influence

Abstract: A decade ago it was possible to argue with some confidence not only that the Soviet Union and the United States had spheres of influence but also that they had a tacit understanding about them. The existence of a tacit understanding seemed to be confirmed, for instance, at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, in that while the United States denounced the Soviet action it nevertheless acquiesced in it. At that time it could be claimed that the Soviet Union had merely acted in eastern Europe in the same way as the United States had on various occasions in Latin America, the most recent being the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Further, the doctrines each power used to justify intervention were alike. The Brezhnev Doctrine justifying the intervention in Czechoslovakia seemed similar to the Johnson Doctrine legitimizing intervention in the Dominican Republic in that both claimed hegemonic rights within a sphere of influence.-1 And from this a reciprocal understanding was inferred about what each would allow the other to do in its respective sphere. Both superpowers denied it. The United States did so because spheres of influence transgress the doctrine of the sovereign equality of states and because the practices associated with them violate the norms of interstate behaviour. The Soviet Union did so because it counterposed the Soviet Union to other socialist States and it would have followed that the Soviet Union would not have been acting, as it claimed, in the interests of socialism.2 Despite these theoretical denials, Czechoslovakia seemed to confirm that the superpowers each understood what was permissible with regard to spheres of influence and so each was able to act accordingly. In contrast with the rules embodied in this understanding the more recent events in Afghanistan, Poland and central America are believed to have transformed the situation. Understanding is now thought to be ended. Shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan William Pfaff wrote that there had been rules for the Soviet? United States conflict but that they had been broken. 'They were rules of expedience and survival, not of morality, whatever they were, they now have been abandoned.'3 Similarly Dr Brzezinski has pronounced that the events in Poland herald the end of the post-war mode of superpower coexistence. In his view 'the foreign consequences of the events in Poland are revealing that... the prevailing conditions in Europe are beginning to outlive the post-Second World War arrangements'.4 In essence the guidelines for permissible conduct have either faded or gone. The events in Afghanistan, Poland, El Salvador and other parts of central America are thought to have eroded what each superpower understands about its respective role and about spheres of influence to such an extent that steps are needed to recover the situation which has been lost. In this connection former

Technological sovereignty: forgotten factor in the ‘hi-tech’ razzamatazz

Abstract: Technological sovereignty is the capability and the freedom to select, to generate or acquire and to apply, build upon and exploit commercially technology needed for industrial innovation. It is to be distinguished from technological self-sufficiency, which is the possession of, or the ability to generate readily, all technology required. Australia's past failure to take the sovereignty factor into account has far-reaching implications for future industry/technology strategy.

Seabeds, Sovereignty and Objective Regimes

Abstract: The United States and some of its major allies have been negotiating for some time concerning the establishment of an “alternative” seabed mining regime. Before confronting this issue, however, several threshold issues will be addressed. These will include descriptions of the nodule mining venture, the proposed UNCLOS regime to govern it, and the most recent developments in the U.S. backed “alternative” or reciprocating states” regime. After addressing the “objective regime” hypothesis, a strategy for avoiding potential U.S. estoppel to deny the validity of UNCLOS’ seabed mining regulations will be explored. Finally, possible scenarios for future seabed regulations and their attendant legislative and political ramifications will be explored. SEABEDS, SOVEREIGNTY AND OBJECTIVE REGIMES

Parliamentary sovereignty: lord denning's dexterous revolution

Abstract: The Court of Appeal in Macarthys Ltd v Smith' decided that where a directly effective provision of European Community Law conflicted with a subsequent United Kingdom statute, the European provision should prevail. It seems that the traditional theory of parliamentary sovereignty which prevents one Parliament from curtailing the unlimited sovereignty of its successors has been modified. The purpose of the present writer is to suggest that the decision presents an interesting challenge to both sides in the perennial debate about the nature of sovereignty. If the view of Professor H. W. R. Wade is accepted, parliamentary sovereignty is a continuing one.2 Parliament has power to legislate by its ordinary procedures on any subject it chooses, with one exception: it cannot control the manner or form of future legislation, for that would be to impose fetters on the sovereignty of future Parliaments. The courts will not permit such fetters to be imposed. Alternatively, parliamentary sovereignty may be regarded as self-embracing.3 On this view Parliament has power to legislate effectively about the manner and form of future legislation as about any other subject. Accordingly, the courts will give effect only to legislation which complies with whatever conditions are currently laid down as required for valid legislation on the matter in question. It will be argued that neither analysis is a satisfactory or helpful way of considering issues of sovereignty, and that Lord Denning has deftly overcome an apparent constitutional hurdle leaving the constitutional theorists on one side debating hotly in a vacuum.

The extraterritorial impact of the anti-trust laws: protecting British Trading Interests

Abstract: In recent years the extraterritorial impact of the United States' anti-trust laws has attracted growing attention in the United Kingdom. The British Government decided to respond to this threat from abroad by means of legislation: hence the introduction in Parliament in 1979 of the Protection of Trading Interests Bill, which became law on 20 March 1980 as the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980. The tone of parliamentary debate concerning this measure was characterized by an extraordinary degree of shrillness,' reflecting the extent to which British industry is widely perceived to be the hapless victim of attempts by the U.S. Department of Justice and private litigants to enforce the anti-trust laws of the United States in a manner that involves unacceptable intrusions on the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. In this article the provisions of the 1980 Act will be examined against the background of an account of the areas in which the extraterritorial impact of the United States'

Arctic Waters and Canadian Sovereignty

Abstract: One of Canada's principal objectives at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was to secure international recognition for the jurisdiction asserted over Arctic waters in the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Enacted in 1970 with much support in Canada, but also with considerable controversy, the legislation established a pollution prevention zone to a distance of ioo miles from the coast of Canada north of 6o0 latitude and provided for the prescription by regulation of design, construction, manning, cargo, equipment, and navigational aid standards for shipping. In addition, the act provided that ships violating those standards could be arrested and excluded from the zone. Predictably, such interference with foreign shipping was protested by the United States.' However, Canada had taken the even more

The United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 1981

Abstract: It may come as a surprise to many that the international oommunity through the mechanisms and methods of international law should seek to involve itself in the techniques of war-making to the extent that it does. We all accept that international law is deeply concerned with the prevention of the use of armed force and most people are aware, if in a rudimentary fashion, of the categories of aggression, self-defence, use of force to protect nationals and so forth. It would be a cause of great amazement should the rules and techniques of international law not be heavily engaged in constraining as far as possible the impulses of states to resort to the use of force.1 It is rather different to find international law actually descending to the battlefield, tacitly acknowledging its own failures, and attempting to pontificate on the types of weapons to be used in the destruction of life and property. Or is it? The same general concerns that impel international law to restrain states from using violence against each other are also operative when one considers the methods of warfare, despite the irony.2 The preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare noted that in cases not covered by the regulations, 'the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience'.3 This all-embracing provision of regulated humanity can be hard to quantify, and it is unclear in many instances as to what precise conclusions may be reached in particular circumstances, but it is better than nothing and it does allow room for development. It is also as well to bear in mind in contemplating this particular subject the general structural weaknesses of international law that flow from the nature of the international system and especially the problems of enforcement attendant upon a world of competing, jealous and unequal sovereign states.4 The convention that is the subject of this paper is not a solitary monument to man's desire to mitigate the horrors of war. It is in fact the heir to a tradition that in modern times is directly traceable over one hundred years. Before examining the nature and contents of this Convention, it is necessary to note briefly some previous efforts in order to gain some idea of its historical and contextual framework. The first attempt at codifying the existing laws of war was prepared by Francis Lieber of New York and was adopted in 1863 by the United States

Is violence natural

Abstract: . The balance of obedience/aggressiveness is necessarily skewed to the left in infancy; maturation shifts it to the right. Hierarchies greatly reduce overt violence. Positional shifts in a hierarchy take place through violence or the threat of violence. Self-serving individuals tend to upset hierarchical balance. Peace is served by the acceptance of a sovereign power (like the nation), which gives justice precedence over fairness. “Justice as fairness” is a pernicious doctrine. Religion has in the past favored secular sovereignty for the sake of peace; hence the protection of religions by sovereign powers.

The Canadian Indian Lobby of Westminster 1979–1982

Abstract: This article analyses the activities of the Canadian native lobby of Westminster which opposed patriation of the British North America Act. It explores the positive and negative roles played both by specific native associations and by British parliamentarians and jurists. While acknowledging the failure of the lobby’s ultimate objective, the paper suggests that the events surrounding patriation have emphatically launched Canadian native politics onto the world stage, helping also to clarify and refine native concepts of self-government and sovereignty in an international context.

Interdependence: a Drug of Addiction?

Abstract: Interdependence is the convenient slogan commonly employed today to explain and justify Britain’s external policies — economic, military and political — the euphemism that masks the reality of dependence and of the progressive, if still partial, surrender of British sovereignty

Grotius' Doctrine of the Social Contract

Abstract: In George H. Sabine's great work, A History of Political Thought, he makes the following overall judgment on Grotius’ writing:“Grotius' importance in the history of jurisprudence rests not upon a theory of the state or upon anything that he had to say about constitutional law, but upon his conception of a law regulating the relations between the sovereign states.”