Sovereignty

About: Sovereignty is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 25909 publications have been published within this topic receiving 410148 citations.

Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent

Abstract: List of AcronymsBingtuan see PCCCCP Chinese Communist PartyEHM Eastern Turkistan Islamic MovementETR Eastern Turkistan Republic (p44-49)NA III National Army, the military force of the Eastern Turkistan RepublicKMT Chinese Nationalist Party under Chiang Kaishek, defeated on the mainland in ~49MAC Mnzu Affairs CommissionMnzu Official ethnonational category in the PRC; comprises 56 groups, including Uyghurs and HansNationalists see KMTPCC Production and Construction CorpsPL& People's liberation ArmyPRC People's Republic of ChinaTIREI' Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan (p33-34)XUAR Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous RegionExecutive SummaryThis paper analyzes the sources of Uyghur discontent and ethnonational conflict in Xinjiang since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. It argues that the episodes of unrest in Xinjiang have not been simply contemporary manifestations of an enduring culture of violence. Nor have they been the product of foreign intrigues. Instead, while conflict in the region has had several causes, the system of "regional autonomy" operating in Xinjiang must be seen as a principal source of the unrest. Instead of resolving a longstanding political dispute between Uyghurs advocating independence and the Chinese government, this system has deepened Uyghur discontent and exacerbated conflict. To support this thesis, the paper presents both a historical analysis of policy changes over time in Xinjiang and a close study of current policies in the region.Autonomy arrangements around the world have been enacted to protect both states' territorial integrity and the fragile rights of minorities. But all autonomy regimes privilege territorial integrity over absolute responsiveness to the demands of the autonomous group: they are a compromise between (a) states, which want unabridged sovereignty and homogeneous populations; and (b) peoples that want self-determination, generally meaning independence. Thus we should not be surprised to find both state actors and autonomous groups pressing for renegotiation of their agreements. Yet there are dramatic differences in the degree to which states have honored their formal commitments and in the amount of pressure for change brought to bear by nominally self-ruling groups. In Xinjiang, the political system has chronically thwarted Uyghurs' exercise of self-rule and thus provoked and exacerbated Uyghur discontent.One demonstration of the absence of regional autonomy in Xinjiang is that extreme policy swings there tightly followed those in the rest of China and its other autonomous provinces. Relatively tolerant policies in the early 1950s were replaced by strongly repressive and assimilationist ones as the country embarked on the Great Leap Forward in 1958. A return to moderation in the early 1960s was then reversed again with the advent of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. By the end of that movement in 1976, pressures to assimilate linguistically and culturally, the persecution of religious practices and personnel, and attacks on respected authorities had profoundly alienated most Uyghurs. Deng Xiaoping's announcement of economic reforms in China in 1978 was soon followed by somewhat more tolerant cultural and economic policies in Xinjiang, though signally without relaxation of political controls. After public demonstrations in Xinjiang in 1988 and 1989 and a violent uprising in 1990, Deng ordered a crackdown in that province. The political clampdown in Xinjiang was accompanied by new restrictions on culture and religion that have remained in place up to the present.Both long-standing and recent policies by leaders in Beijing and Urumci have combined to deepen discontent among Uyghurs, and the official refusal to allow open expression of dissatisfaction in the region has only increased that discontent. Invariably harsh responses to demonstrations have left the field of overt political action to the violent and desperate while failing to address the concerns of the majority. …

Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute

Abstract: Introduction The unresolved territorial disputes between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Philippines in the South China Sea have highlighted emerging trends and raised important issues pertaining to the security and stability of Southeast Asia. The disputes have not only had a significant impact on the shape of Sino-Philippine relations, but also underlined the important roles played by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States in maintaining regional stability. This article identifies and addresses the salient issues raised by the disputes.(1) Firstly, the events of 1995-98 reinforce the notion that China is gradually expanding its presence in the South China Sea and concurrently indicating a willingness to settle the issue diplomatically. Secondly, the lack of a credible defence force has required the Philippines to negotiate with the PRC from a position of weakness, resulting in little concrete progress. Thirdly, during the dispute ASEAN was willing to take a united stand on the issue and indirectly rebuke China. The United States, on the other hand, was unwilling to commit itself to helping the Philippines militarily for fear of damaging its relations with the PRC. Background The territorial dispute between China and the Philippines centres around the ownership of about fifty small islands and reefs in the Spratly group in the South China Sea. The Spratly archipelago comprises more than 230 rock formations of varying sizes, the sovereignty of which is disputed by six parties - China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. Three of the disputants (China, Taiwan and Vietnam) claim the entire chain, two (Malaysia and the Philippines) claim only certain parts of the group, whilst Brunei disputes a small part of the territorial waters. The fifty islands claimed by the Philippines are located 230 nautical miles west of Palawan island, and are known to Filipinos as the Kalayaans, a term which will be used throughout this article to distinguish them from the Spratly group as a whole. Sovereignty over the islands is important to the disputants not because of their intrinsic value, but because of the maritime resources which ownership would provide - such as valuable fishing grounds and, as yet, unproven quantities of hydrocarbons (oil and gas).(2) China bases its claims in the South China Sea (including the Kalayaans) on the grounds of discovery and occupation going back 2,000 years. The PRC demonstrates its claim by reference to maps drawn up during the Han Dynasty (206 BC to AD 220) which purportedly show the Spratlys as part of its territory, and historical artifacts found on the islands indicating the presence of Chinese fishermen. The Philippine claim is much more recent. In 1956 Filipino national Thomas Cloma laid claim to the Kalayaans, declaring the islands res nullius as Japan had been forced to renounce their ownership at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference.(3) In 1974 Cloma "transferred" sovereignty of the islands to the Philippine Government, and in June 1978 the Kalayaans were declared Philippine territory by presidential decree. According to that decree, the Kalayaans belong to the Philippines "by reason of their proximity".(4) Since 1956 the Philippines has stationed military personnel on eight of the islands. Prior to 1994, the question of ownership of the Kalayaans had not been a major irritant in Sino-Philippine relations. In April 1988, Philippine President Corazon Aquino made a high-profile trip to the PRC. Although trade issues topped the agenda in her meetings with Chinese officials, Aquino raised the issue of the Kalayaans with China's then paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping. Deng promised to shelve the sovereignty issue, engage in joint exploration and exploitation of maritime resources, and work towards a peaceful resolution of the issue.(5) In May 1994, the Philippine Department of Energy approved an application made by the U. …

Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession

Abstract: Secession is the creation of a new independent state out of an existing state. This key volume examines the political, social and legal processes of the practice of secession. Following an analysis of secessionist movements and their role in attempts at secession, eight case studies are explored to illustrate peaceful, violent, sequential and recursive secessions. This is followed by a look at the theoretical approaches and a discussion that focuses on the economic causes. Normative theories of secession are discussed as well as the status of secession in legal theory and practice. The book systematizes our present knowledge of secessions in an accessible way to readers not familiar with the phenomenon and its consequences. It is ideal as a supplementary text to courses on contemporary political and social movements, applied ethics and political philosophy, international relations and international law, state sovereignty and state formation.

Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law

Abstract: Part I. Challenges to International Law Fundamental Assumptions: 1. Introduction: International law and international economic law in the interdependent world of the twenty-first century 2. The real world impinges on international law: exploring the challenges to the fundamental assumptions of international law and institutions 3. Sovereignty modern: a new approach to an outdated concept Part II. The WTO: 4. The WTO as international organization: institutional evolution, structure and key problems 5. The WTO dispute settlement system Part III. The Search for Solutions: 6. Policy, analytical approaches and thought experiments 7. Illustrative applications 8. Perspectives, implications, and some conclusions.

Fixing Failed States

Abstract: Failed states pose one of the deepest challenges to American national security and international peace and stability. Finding a comprehensive and effective solution to the challenges of terrorism, human rights violations, or poverty and economic development requires some understanding of how to restore failed states. The response of the United States and its allies has remained the same: to rebuild the institutions of state control, and, if lucky, to plant a working democracy and a market economy within existing state borders. But many international law scholars remain openly dubious about the ability of states to rebuild – the problem is not failed states but the nation-state as the primary actor in international relations. This paper argues that both American and U.N policy on the one hand, and the conventional academic wisdom on the other hand, are mistaken. Building a normal nation-state with full sovereignty on every territory in the world, without changing any borders, fails to understand why some states are failing in the first place. Viable states simply do not align with the borders recognized by the United Nations or created during the period of rapid decolonization in the decades after World War II. Academics who see in failed states the rise of alternatives to the nation-state have no practical solutions that do not depend on the political, economic, and military resources of strong nation-states. Without them, supra-national governments, trusteeships, or non-governmental organizations have shown little ability to fix failed states. This paper argues that powerful nations can help by performing the more modest role of promoting and guaranteeing power-sharing agreements between competing groups within failed states. It concludes by illustrating the thesis with the outcome of the surge in Iraq.