Showing papers on "Spillover effect published in 1989"

R&D Capital, Rate of Return on R&D Investment and Spillover of R&D in Japanese Manufacturing Industries.

Abstract: The effect of R$50D on productivity growth in Japanese manufacturing industries is examined. Using more accurate firm R$50D expenditure data than widely used data based on financial statements, series of R$50D capital are constructed. Then, rate of return on R$50D investment is estimated. In addition, the impact of other industries' R$50D on the productivity growth of an industry is also estimated. An attempt is made to determine the effect of electronics technology upon the productivity growth of other industries through the transaction of the intermediate electronics goods with improved quality, and through the diffusion of the new technological knowledge discovered. Japanese Technology Trade 1977-1981 Copyright 1989 by MIT Press.

Research and Development and Intra-industry Spillovers: An Empirical Application of Dynamic Duality

Abstract: dynamic duality. We are particularly interested in the effects of R&D spillovers and in calculating the social and private rates of return. There are three effects associated with the intra-industry R&D spillover. First, costs decline as knowledge expands for the externality-receiving firms. Second, production structures are affected, as factor demands change in response to the spillover. Third, the rates of capital accumulation are affected by the R&D spillover. These cost-reducing, factor-biasing and capital adjustment effects are estimated for four industries. The existence of R&D spillovers implies that the social and private rates of return to R&D capital differ. We estimate that the social return exceeds the private return in each industry. Moreover, there is significant variation across industries in the differential between the social and private rates of return.

Foreign Investment and Spillovers

Abstract: 1. Introduction. 2. Multinationals and Technology Transfer: A Survey. 3. The Comparative Performance of Foreign and Domestic Firms in Mexico: The Basis for Spillovers. 4. Foreign Investment and Spillover Efficiency in Mexico. 5. The Nature of Spillover Efficiency 6. Multinationals and Market Structure in Mexico. 7. Foreign Investment and Structural Change: An Agenda for Research.

Excess Capacity, Monopolistic Competition, and International Transmission of Monetary Disturbances

Abstract: Analyzes the excess capacity, monopolistic competition and international transmission of monetary policy disturbances in the United States. Sheds light on the international Impact of monetary policy; Emphasis on the spillover effects of monetary disturbances; Similarity of framework used with open economy macroeconomics.

Spillover Benefits of Agricultural Research: Evidence from U.S. Experience

Abstract: The institutional design of agricultural research programs is typically responsive to factors inhibiting the spillover of research benefits. A particular research unit, e.g., a state experiment station, directs or "targets" its technology development program to certain locations, usually to its perceived clientele. This design implicitly recognizes that new agricultural technology does not spill freely from one region to another. A vast amount of experimental evidence and farm experience shows that the performance of plants and animals (in which new technology is often embedded) is altered by changes in soil, temperature, moisture, and photoperiod characteristics of the producing environment. Accordingly, new technology embedded in these plants and animals will be inhibited in performance, and its real economic value will be altered by these factors (Evenson 1988).

The Wit and Wisdom of Japanese Management: An Iconoclastic Analysis

Abstract: As Japan’s economic success has continued, albeit somewhat bated, interest in the ‘secrets’ of Japanese-style management has grown considerably. Many people have expressed the need to transfer Japanese practices to Western firms, and various modes of transfer have been mentioned. First, the transfer could occur through the direct adoption of Japanese management practices by Western firms. Second, as Japanese firms invest increasingly in Western countries we can expect spillover effects resulting from interaction between the local population (workers, local managers, clients, suppliers, competitors) and Japanese management. Finally, many subsidiaries of Western firms in Japan (especially joint ventures) have had to adopt to Japanese conditions. It can be suggested that any benefits so gained (including better management practices) may be transferred back to the parent company, especially through the flow of personnel.

How Strong Is the Case for International Coordination

Abstract: There seems to be a consensus among politicians and economists that economic problems such as high unemployment and inflation can be solved only if economic policies are coordinated on an international scale. The 1987 economic summit at Venice viewed international coordination as essential “to achieving stronger and sustained global growth, reduced external imbalances, and more stable exchange rate relationships.”1 In a similar vein, Helmut Schmidt (1983, p. 24) argued that “the major industrial countries’ policy mix must be coordinated.” The European Community Commission (1986), as well as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1987a), has recently urged policymakers to implement a cooperative policy action to restore satisfactory macroeconomic performance of the major industrial countries. These calls for more international coordination receive their theoretical underpinnings from the work of a number of economists who argue that by coordinating their policies individual countries can avoid negative spillover effects of uncoordinated sovereign policymaking and take advantage of positive spillover effects. Coordination would allow each country to achieve its economic targets to a greater degree than if it pursued an independent policy stance.2

Location of public facilities with spillover effects: variable location and parametric scale*

Abstract: This paper studies the location of public facilities of two neighboring local governments which consider not only the influence of the land market but also the spillover effects that each jurisdiction may have on the other. We obtain the following results: (1) in most cases, one of the cities behaves as an isolated city in choosing the facility location while the other enjoys the spillover effect as a free rider; (2) we also find that the equilibrium location in the two noncooperative city case is not socially optimal except for a special case.

Model reduction and control of flexible structures using Krylov subspaces

Abstract: Krylov vectors and the concept of parameter-matching are combined to develop a model reduction algorithm for a damped structural dynamics system. The reduced-order model obtained matches a certain number of low-frequency moments of the full-order system. The major application of the present method is to the control of flexible structures. It is shown that, in the control of flexible structures, there generally exist three types of control energy spillover, namely, the control spillover, the observation spillover, and dynamic spillover. The formulation based on Krylov subspaces can eliminate the control and the observation spillover, while leaving only the dynamic spillover to be considered. Two examples are used to illustrate the efficacy of the Krylov method.

The effect of government policies on industries: An approach to its analysis†

Abstract: Government policies can have a major impact on the competitiveness and profitability of industries. This article presents an approach that can be used to evaluate their effect, both individually and in concert, on competitiveness and profitability. The approach, which is based on the same principles as those of effective protection, is demonstrated using Ontario's tomato paste and tomato producing industries. Results of the example demonstrate three important contributions of this approach. First, it helps direct attention to those policies which have the most serious effect on the performance of an industry. Second, it recognizes both the positive and negative effects of policy measures on an industry. Third, it shows that policies can have important spillover effects when industries are linked vertically through markets.

Externalities and the Returns to Agricultural Research: Discussion

Abstract: The three papers presented in this session deal with externalities that result from agricultural research and technology. Capalbo and Antle are concerned justifiably with incorporating social costs into measures of the returns to agricultural research and technology. As such, they are concerned mainly with negative externalities such as pollution and health risk from the use of agricultural chemicals. The policy issue is that in the absence of an accounting for social costs, private and public actors will overinvest in technologies that place stress on the environment and underinvest in those that are environmentally benign. Evenson looks at a different set of externalities: the spillover effects of research and technology between regions and subregions. Evenson's focus is therefore mainly on positive externalities. The policy issue is thus the opposite of Capalbo and Antle's. If public agencies do not count positive spillovers, or private firms cannot appropriate positive spillovers, agricultural research and technology will be underprovided. Carlson does an excellent job of examining the negative and positive externalities of pest control research. Two of his points bear reemphasizing. First, while the use of a pesticide may create externalities, cancellation of that pesticide may also create externalities that need to be examined in the regulatory decision. Second, he notes that IPM is basically an information technology. The public good nature of information makes it necessary for public funding of IPM research. In the remainder of my discussion I will explore that wily beast, the externality. My theme is that some externalities are less "external" than others, in that market, technological, and institutional innovations work to internalize the external effect. Others persist over time. I have two points. First, if you measure social rates of return by combining private returns with nonmarket measures of externalities, caution is needed to avoid double counting. Double counting may arise if some externalities have become internal to the decisions of private or public decision makers. Second, those externalities that persist over time should be the target of public policy. My argument is closely related to those of Demsetz and Randall. Demsetz's point is that new technologies bring new benefits and costs, some internal to existing markets and some external. The external effects will become internalized when and if the benefits from internalization exceed the costs. The costs and benefits of internalization will change as economic values change, which in turn are shaped by the evolution of other new technologies and the opening of new markets. Randall argues that the terms public good, externality, and common property are confusing. He proposes another taxonomy that is familiar to any student of public finance. Goods may be rival or nonrival, exclusive or nonexclusive. Randall also adds the categories congestible and hyperexclusive, but these are not necessary for this discussion. A nonrival good is one in which my consumption does not limit the consumption of anyone else. Examples include breathing clean air or enjoying a scenic view. A nonexclusive good is one that once produced cannot be excluded from nonpaying customers. Breathing clean air is a nonexclusive good, but a scenic view may not be-the view could be obstructed by a fence and admission charged. Private goods, such as bread and milk, are both rival and exclusive. Randall asserts that, "in economies which maintain institutions conducive to trade and efficiency, those things called externality cannot persist in inefficient quantities unless accompanied by nonexclusiveness and/or nonrivalry. Externality, by itself, is simply not persistent" (p. 140). Tim T. Phipps is a fellow at the National Center for Food and Agricultural Policy, Resources for the Future, Washington DC. The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Pierre Crosson.

Leadership and Cooperation in the European Monetary System: a Simulation Approach

Abstract: To assess the importance of economic interdependence and the potential gains from policy coordination in the European area, this paper analyzes the international transmission of policies and disturbances in a rational expectation dynamic general equilibrium simulation model of the work economy, and applies the analysis to the study of the European Monetary System. International spillover effects and potential gains from coordination appear to be small under the assumption of flexible exchange rates in the European area. The implications of a fixed rate EMS with German leadership are compared with those of a cooperative fixed exchange rate regime. Finally, capital controls under fixed rates fails to insure policy autonomy and insulation from external disturbances for the countries restricting the capital movements.

Leadership and Cooperation in the European Monetary System: A Simulation Approach

Abstract: To assess the importance of economic interdependence and the potential gains from policy coordination in the European area, this paper analyzes the international transmission of policies and disturbances in a rational expectation dynamic general equilibrium simulation model of the work economy, and applies the analysis to the study of the European Monetary System. International spillover effects and potential gains from coordination appear to be small under the assumption of flexible exchange rates in the European area. The implications of a fixed rate EMS with German leadership are compared with those of a cooperative fixed exchange rate regime. Finally, capital controls under fixed rates fails to insure policy autonomy and insulation from external disturbances for the countries restricting the capital movements.