Spot contract

About: Spot contract is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 3437 publications have been published within this topic receiving 91599 citations.

Short-term electricity futures prices: evidence on the time-varying risk premium ∗

Abstract: This paper examines empirically the relationship between electricity spot and futures prices, by analysing a decade of data for a set of short term-to-maturity futures contracts traded in the Nordic Power Exchange, Nord Pool. It is found that, on average, there are significant positive risk premiums in short-term electricity futures prices. The significance and size of the premiums, however, varies seasonally over the year; whereas it is greatest during winter, it is zero in summer. It is also found that time-varying risk premiums are significantly related to unexpectedly low reservoir levels. Furthermore, before the unprecedented supply-shock that hit the Nord Pool market around the end of year 2002, the variation of the risk premiums was related to the variance and the skewness of future spot prices. This result is consistent with the view that risk considerations played a role in the determination of futures prices. Finally, additional evidence provided throughout the paper supports the view that circumstances changed in the Nord Pool market after the shock period.

The Endogenous Price Dynamics of the Emission Allowances: An Application to CO2 Option Pricing

Abstract: Market mechanisms are increasingly being used as a tool for allocating somewhat scarce but unpriced rights and resources, such as air and water. Tradable permits have emerged as the most cost–effective measure leading to the emergence of both nationwide (SO2) and supranational (CO2) emission permits markets. By means of the dynamic optimization of companies which are covered by such environmental regulations, we develop an endogenous model for the emission permit spot price dynamics that also accounts for the presence of asymmetric information. In the model, the companies are characterized by exogenous pollution processes that, in the short term, are the underlying of the permit price dynamics. An extensive numerical exercise is carried out for the CO2 permit price in the European market. We introduce for the first-time in the current literature a CO2 option pricing model comparison. The option pricing method can be used for hedging purposes and for pricing CO2-linked projects and investments.

Fractional Price Matching Policies Arising from the Ocean Freight Service Industry

Abstract: We consider a situation in which shippers (customers) can purchase ocean freight services either directly from a carrier (service provider)in advance or from the spot market just before the departure of an ocean liner. The price is known in the former case, while the spot price is uncertain ex-ante in the latter case. Consequently, some shippers are reluctant to book directly from the carrier in advance unless the carrier is willing to “partially match” the realized spot price when it is lower than the regular price. This study is an initial attempt to examine if the carrier should bear some of the “price risk” by offering a “fractional” price matching contract that can be described as follows. The shipper pays the regular freight price in advance; however, the shipper will get a refund if the realized spot price is below the regular price, where the refund is a “fraction” of the difference between the regular price and the realized spot price. By modeling the dynamics between the carrier and the shippers as a sequential game, we show that the carrier can use the fractional price matching contract to generate a higher demand from the shippers compared to no price matching contract by increasing the “fraction” in equilibrium. However, as the carrier increases the “fraction,” the carrier should increase the regular price to compensate for bearing additional risk. By selecting the fractional price matching contract optimally, we show that the carrier can afford to offer this price matching mechanism without incurring revenue loss: the optimal fractional price matching contract is “revenue neutral.”