Showing papers on "Stackelberg competition published in 1972"

Stackelburg solution for two-person games with biased information patterns

Abstract: A strategy suggested by Stackelberg for static economic competition is considered and extended to the case of dynamic games with biased information pattern. This strategy is reasonable when one of the players knows only his own cost function but the other player knows both cost functions. As with Nash strategies for nonzero-sum dynamic games open-loop and feedback Stackelberg strategies for dynamic games could lead to different solutions, a phenomenon which does not occur in optimum control problems. Necessary conditions for open-loop Stackelberg strategies are presented. Dynamic programming is used to define feedback Stackelberg strategies for discrete-time games. A simple resource allocation example illustrates the solution concept.

A model of duopoly with Stackelberg equilibrium

Abstract: to estimate the reaction function of the rival which will be shifted as it learns from experiences, i. e., observations of facts. In other words, an equilibrium is possible where conjectures are justified by results with the coefficient of conjectural variation explained in terms of parameters in demand and cost functions, if each firm is assumed to behave as the leader in the sense of Stackelberg. The stability of Stackelberg equilibrium is shown when the marginal costs increase sharply relative to the slope of the demand curve.

Notes on Decision and Control

Abstract: : ;Contents: On the equivalence of information structures in static and dynamic teams; On the Relative leadership property of stackelberg strategies.