Topic
Stackelberg competition
About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.
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TL;DR: In this paper, an optimal discount policy derived from Stackelberg equilibrium is proposed to coordinate a manufacturer and multiple suppliers in a noncooperative game to resolve decision-making in order to determine quantities of components, price, production, and selection of suppliers simultaneously.
Abstract: In this paper, a coordination strategy is developed to integrate business decisions and manufacturing planning in supply chain management. We consider one manufacturer and multiple suppliers to determine production, prices, and inventory simultaneously with uncertain demands. This paper aims at providing an optimal discount policy derived from Stackelberg equilibrium to coordinate a manufacturer and multiple suppliers. The optimal discount coordination mechanism helps the manufacturer to select suppliers in order to maintain long-term relationship with the contracted suppliers under demand uncertainty. Noncooperative game is applied in order to resolve decision-making in order to determine quantities of components, price, production, and selection of suppliers simultaneously. Computational experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed approach.
66 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the Stackelberg solvable games were introduced and analyzed as a generalization of 2-person zero-sum games, and the problem of sincere pre-play communication was examined.
66 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the existence and uniqueness results for a hierarchical or Stackelberg equilibrium in a two-player differential game with open-loop information structure were derived for games with a rather nonconflicting structure of their cost criteria.
Abstract: We present existence and uniqueness results for a hierarchical or Stackelberg equilibrium in a two-player differential game with open-loop information structure. There is a known convexity condition ensuring the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium, which was derived by Simaan and Cruz (Ref. 1). This condition applies to games with a rather nonconflicting structure of their cost criteria. By another approach, we obtain here new sufficient existence conditions for an open-loop equilibrium in terms of the solvability of a terminal-value problem of two symmetric Riccati differential equations and a coupled system of Riccati matrix differential equations. The latter coupled system appears also in the necessary conditions, but contrary to the above as a boundary-value problem. In case that the convexity condition holds, both symmetric equations are of standard type and admit globally a positive-semidefinite solution. But the conditions apply also to more conflicting situations. Then, the corresponding Riccati differential equations may be of H?-type. We obtain also different uniqueness conditions using a Lyapunov-type approach. The case of time-invariant parameters is discussed in more detail and we present a numerical example.
66 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly, where private and state-owned public firms compete, by allowing two production periods and find that many equilibria exist, including the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower.
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly, where private and state-owned public firms compete, by allowing two production periods. I find that many equilibria exist, including the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower. However, another Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the leader does not exist. If small inventory costs are introduced, the unique equilibrium outcome becomes the Stackelberg type where the public firm is the follower.
65 citations
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TL;DR: A Stackelberg equilibrium solution is presented for n demand points on a tree network that two competitive companies plan to construct their own facilities on this network in a certain order.
65 citations