Stackelberg competition

About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.

A Novel Debt-Credit Mechanism for Blockchain-Based Data-Trading in Internet of Vehicles

Abstract: With the advancement and emergence of diverse network services in Internet of Vehicles (IoV), large volume of data are collected and stored, making data important properties. Data will be one of the most important commodities in the future blockchain-based IoV systems. However, efficiency challenges have been commonly found in blockchain-based data markets, which is mainly caused by transaction confirmation delays and the cold-start problems for new users. To address the efficiency challenges, we propose a secure, decentralized IoV data-trading system by exploiting the blockchain technology, and design an efficient debt-credit mechamism to support efficient data-trading in IoV. In the debt-credit mechanism, a vehicle with loan demand could loan from multivehicles by promising to pay interest and reward. In particular, we encourage loaning among vehicles by a motivation-based investing and pricing mechanism. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game to maximize the profits of borrower vehicle and lender vehicles jointly. In the first stage, the borrower vehicle set the interest rate and reward for the loan as its pricing strategies. In the second stage, the lender vehicles decide on their investing strategies. We apply backward induction to analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium at each stage for both independent and uniform pricing schemes. We also validate the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium. The numerical results illustrate the efficiency of the proposed pricing schemes.

Stackelberg voting games: computational aspects and paradoxes

Abstract: We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can be modeled as an extensive-form game of perfect information, which we call a Stackelberg voting game. We first propose a dynamic-programming algorithm for finding the backward-induction outcome for any Stackelberg voting game when the rule is anonymous; this algorithm is efficient if the number of alternatives is no more than a constant. We show how to use compilation functions to further reduce the time and space requirements. Our main theoretical results are paradoxes for the backward-induction outcomes of Stackelberg voting games. We show that for any n ≥ 5 and any voting rule that satisfies non-imposition and with a low domination index, there exists a profile consisting of n voters, such that the backward-induction outcome is ranked somewhere in the bottom two positions in almost every voter's preferences. Moreover, this outcome loses all but one of its pairwise elections. Furthermore, we show that many common voting rules have a very low (= 1) domination index, including all majority-consistent voting rules. For the plurality and nomination rules, we show even stronger paradoxes. Finally, using our dynamic-programming algorithm, we run simulations to compare the backward-induction outcome of the Stackelberg voting game to the winner when voters vote truthfully, for the plurality and veto rules. Surprisingly, our experimental results suggest that on average, more voters prefer the backward-induction outcome.

FedParking: A Federated Learning Based Parking Space Estimation With Parked Vehicle Assisted Edge Computing

Abstract: As a distributed learning approach, federated learning trains a shared learning model over distributed datasets while preserving the training data privacy. We extend the application of federated learning to parking management and introduce FedParking in which Parking Lot Operators (PLOs) collaborate to train a long short-term memory model for parking space estimation without exchanging the raw data. Furthermore, we investigate the management of Parked Vehicle assisted Edge Computing (PVEC) by FedParking. In PVEC, different PLOs recruit PVs as edge computing nodes for offloading services through an incentive mechanism, which is designed according to the computation demand and parking capacity constraints derived from FedParking. We formulate the interactions among the PLOs and vehicles as a multi-lead multi-follower Stackelberg game. Considering the dynamic arrivals of the vehicles and time-varying parking capacity constraints, we present a multi-agent deep reinforcement learning approach to gradually reach the Stackelberg equilibrium in a distributed yet privacy-preserving manner. Finally, numerical results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our scheme.

Dynamic Pricing, Production, and Channel Coordination with Stochastic Learning

Abstract: We consider a decentralized two-period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product with benefits of cost learning, and sells it through a retailer facing a price-dependent demand. The manufacturer's second-period production cost declines linearly in the first-period production, but with a random learning rate. The manufacturer may or may not have the inventory carryover option. We formulate the resulting problems as two-period Stackelberg games and obtain their feedback equilibrium solutions explicitly. We then examine the impact of mean learning rate and learning rate variability on the pricing strategies of the channel members, on the manufacturer's production decisions, and on the retailer's procurement decisions. We show that as the mean learning rate or the learning rate variability increases, the traditional double marginalization problem becomes more severe, leading to greater efficiency loss in the channel. We obtain revenue sharing contracts that can coordinate the dynamic supply chain. In particular, when the manufacturer may hold inventory, we identify two major drivers for inventory carryover: market growth and learning rate variability. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our results by examining a model in which cost learning takes place continuously

Expansion planning in electricity markets. two different approaches

Abstract: This paper presents two different approaches to model expansion planning in electricity markets under imperfect competitive conditions. Both approaches consider a market in which firms compete in quantity as in the Nash-Cournot game. However, the two models differ from each other in how each firm makes its expansion-planning decisions. In the first model, the key assumption that permits its formulation as a Mixed Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP) is that firms not only decide their output in a Cournot manner but also their new generating capacity. In contrast, in the second model, there is a leader firm that anticipates the reaction of the follower firms as in the Stackelberg game. The latter model is formulated as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), wherein the leader firm decides its optimal new capacity subject to a set of market equilibrium constraints. Both models have been implemented in GAMS. A simple example is also presented to illustrate their comparison and application.