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Stackelberg competition

About: Stackelberg competition is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6611 publications have been published within this topic receiving 109213 citations.


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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the emission reduction performance for supply chain members in both single-channel and exclusive dual-channel cases, and introduced government subsidies as an impact factor of low-carbon strategy adoption.
Abstract: This paper investigates the emission reduction performance for supply chain members in both single-channel and exclusive dual-channel cases Two game scenarios (Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg) are examined under different channel structures Furthermore, we introduce government subsidies as an impact factor of low-carbon strategy adoption In the single-channel (Case 1), we mainly examine the influence of consumers’ price-sensitivity on channel members’ optimal decisions In the dual-channel (Case 2), we focus on the joint impact of product substitutability and different channel power structures on the optimal decisions under asymmetric related channel status The analysis suggests that the Stackelberg leaders always perform better than their corresponding followers before emission reduction, while they may not necessarily yield more benefits after emission reduction The implementation of low-carbon strategy depends on parameters like product substitutability and channel base demand Finally, all the supply chain members will encounter a Prisoner’s Dilemma when the product substitutability is relatively high

60 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors considered the problem of how to allocate power among competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel, and they modeled the interaction between selfish users as a non-cooperative game.
Abstract: This paper considers the problem of how to allocate power among competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel. We model the interaction between selfish users as a non-cooperative game. As opposed to the existing iterative water-filling algorithm that studies the myopic users, this paper studies how a foresighted user, who knows the channel state information and response strategies of its competing users, should optimize its transmission strategy. To characterize this multi-user interaction, the Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced, and the existence of this equilibrium for the investigated noncooperative game is shown. We analyze this interaction in more detail using a simple two-user example, where the foresighted user determines its transmission strategy by solving as a bi-level program which allows him to account for the myopic user's response. It is analytically shown that a foresighted user can improve its performance, if it has the necessary information about its competitors. Since the optimal solution of Stackelberg equilibrium is computationally prohibitive, we propose a practical low-complexity approach based on Lagrangian duality theory. Numerical simulations verify the performance improvements. Possible ways to acquire the required information and to extend the formulation to more than two users are also discussed.

60 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper proposes a DDoS defense mechanism named CoFence, which facilitates a “domain-helps-domain” collaboration network among NFV-based domain networks, and designs a dynamic resource allocation mechanism for domains so that the resource allocation is fair, efficient, and incentive-compatible.
Abstract: High-profile and often destructive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks continue to be one of the top security concerns as the DDoS attacks volumes are increasing constantly Among them, the SYN Flood attack is the most common type Conventional DDoS defense solutions may not be preferable, since they demand highly capable hardware resources, which induce high cost and long deployment cycle The emerging of network function virtualization (NFV) technology introduces new opportunities to decrease the amount of proprietary hardware that is needed to launch and operate network services In this paper, we propose a DDoS defense mechanism named CoFence, which facilitates a “domain-helps-domain” collaboration network among NFV-based domain networks CoFence allows domain networks to help each other in handling large volume of DDoS attacks through resource sharing Specifically, we design a dynamic resource allocation mechanism for domains so that the resource allocation is fair, efficient, and incentive-compatible The resource sharing mechanism is modeled as a multi-leader-follower Stackelberg game In this game, all domains have a degree of control to maximize their own utility The resource supplier domains determine the amount of resource to each requesting peer based on optimizing a reciprocal-based utility function On the other hand, the resource requesting domains decide the level of demand to send to the resource supplier domains in order to reach sufficient support Our simulation results demonstrate that the designed resource allocation game is effective, incentive compatible, fair, and reciprocal under its Nash equilibrium

60 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A novel hybrid solution procedure is developed using the optimal control theory, Stackelberg game model and nonlinear programming approaches for proactively provisioning required vaccine doses from two suppliers using the SIR epidemic model.

59 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the rational behaviour of a duopolist who takes account of price as well as quantity in his strategy, and examine various patterns of duopoly.
Abstract: In this paper, we consider duopoly equilibria in which firms act rationally on the basis of mutually consistent assumptions about their rivals' behaviour. It turns out that there exist various kinds of equilibria corresponding to various pairs of behaviour patterns. Depending on the relation between the firms' cost functions and the market demand functions there are different outcomes: monopoly, limit-pricing, stable asymmetric duopoly with one firm a price-maker and the other (less efficient) firm a price-taker, and unstable symmetric duopoly which might have price competition (as in Bertrand, 1883) or quasi-agreement (Fellner, 1960). There remain some weak points in the structure of traditional oligopoly theory as developed by Cournot (1838), Bertrand (1883), Edgeworth (1925), Stackelberg (1934) and others. Cournot hypothesizes that an oligopolist assumes rivals' quantity to be fixed, but this assumption typically turns out to be incorrect as the rivals' reactions occur, and Shapley and Shubik (1969) argue that price is the more natural strategic variable. Bertrand and Edgeworth, analysing duopolists' behaviour with price-setting strategies, find that there is price competition only because of a special assumption about cost conditions. Stackelberg considered asymmetric duopoly, with a leader and a follower, and concluded as follows. (a) There cannot be a "leader-follower" outcome in an oligopolistic market for a homogeneous good with price-setting strategies (see also Fellner, 1960, Chapter 2). The outcome must be price competition as in Bertrand and Edgeworth. (b) Quantity-strategy oligopoly almost always has a "leader-leader" outcome. In this paper we shall investigate rational behaviour of a duopolist who takes account of price as well as quantity in his strategy, and we shall examine various patterns of duopoly. In Section I we shall analyse rational behaviour of a duopolist who conjectures his rival's reaction with respect to price as well as quantity. In Section II, comparing his profit in various cases, we shall describe optimal behaviour. In Section III we shall show various kinds of duopoly equilibria that correspond to various cost curves of both duopolists. Rigorous mathematical arguments are set out in the Appendix.

59 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
2023551
20221,041
2021563
2020557
2019582
2018487